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Abstract 
The Sixties were time of conflict and change in Canada and beyond.  Radical social 
movements and countercultures challenged the conservatism of the preceding decade, 
rejected traditional forms of politics, and demanded an alternative based on the principles 
of social justice, individual freedom and an end to oppression on all fronts.  Yet in 
Canada a unique political movement emerged which embraced these principles but 
proposed that New Left social movements – the student and anti-war movements, the 
women’s liberation movement and Canadian nationalists – could bring about radical 
political change not only through street protests and sit-ins, but also through participation 
in electoral politics. The Waffle movement, which formed around the “Manifesto for an 
Independent and Socialist Canada” and challenged the leadership of the New Democratic 
Party (NDP) from 1969 to 1973, represents a dynamic convergence of many of the social 
movements that comprised the New Left in Canada.  The Waffle argued that the NDP 
should promote socialist measures to combat American economic domination and ensure 
Canadian independence while simultaneously engaging with extra-parliamentary 
struggles.  NDP and trade-union leaders, reluctant to adopt such a radical approach, 
expelled the Waffle from the Ontario NDP in 1972.  Despite its short life-span, the 
Waffle had a considerable influence on Canadian politics and the issues that it raised – 
Canadian economic dependency, Quebec’s right to self-determination, women’s equality, 
and the decline of the manufacturing sector, among others – continue to resonate to this 
day.  Furthermore, the Waffle’s impact on Canadian nationalism and its legacy in the 
NDP, labour and women’s movements, radical left and academia remain contested.  The 
Waffle’s successes and failures represent a potentially revealing perspective on Canadian 
politics and society during a period of rapid social change, the Sixties.  While the existing 
historiography has sketched the outlines of the Waffle’s history, the focus overall has 
been limited to analyses of internal leadership disputes and the experience of the Ontario 
Waffle in particular.  Abundant research materials now exist to support a wider and more 
intensive examination.  Through an analysis of the Waffle, focusing on grassroots 
activists as well as the movement’s leadership, this dissertation demonstrates important 
connections between the Waffle and other New Left social movements.  This 
interconnectivity is particularly significant, as it indicates that the Waffle occupied a 
unique place in the international New Left, specifically a convergence of social 
movements which sought to engage with electoral politics through an existing political 
party, the NDP.  The dissertation also revises the movement/party dichotomy which has 
dominated much of the Waffle/NDP historiography.  Finally, my study of the Waffle, a 
group active from 1969-75, indicates the flaws of applying a declension narrative to the 
Canadian Sixties, instead demonstrating the value of a “long Sixties” approach.  As the 
clock ticked down on the 1960s, the Canadian New Left neither died nor retreated into 
cynicism nor lashed out in violence.  Instead, its diverse elements, led by the Waffle, 
nurtured the wild dream of redirecting and leading to triumph an established political 
party. 
 
Keywords: History, Politics, Social movements, New Democratic Party (NDP), New 
Left, Protest, Nationalism, Sixties, Feminism, Women’s Movement, Unions, Labour 
Movement, Marxism, Radicalism 
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Statement for the Lay Person 
The Sixties were time of conflict and change in Canada and beyond.  Radical social 
movements and countercultures challenged the conservatism of the preceding decade, 
rejected traditional forms of politics, and demanded an alternative based on the principles 
of social justice, individual freedom and an end to oppression on all fronts.  Yet in 
Canada a unique political movement emerged which embraced these principles but 
proposed that New Left social movements – the student and anti-war movements, the 
women’s liberation movement and Canadian nationalists – could bring about radical 
political change not only through street protests and sit-ins, but also through participation 
in electoral politics. The Waffle movement, which formed around the “Manifesto for an 
Independent and Socialist Canada” and challenged the leadership of the New Democratic 
Party (NDP) from 1969 to 1973, represents a dynamic convergence of many of the social 
movements that comprised the New Left in Canada.  The Waffle argued that the NDP 
should promote socialist measures to combat American economic domination and ensure 
Canadian independence while simultaneously engaging with extra-parliamentary 
struggles.  NDP and trade-union leaders, reluctant to adopt such a radical approach, 
expelled the Waffle from the Ontario NDP in 1972.  Despite its short life-span, the 
Waffle had a considerable influence on Canadian politics and the issues that it raised – 
Canadian economic dependency, Quebec’s right to self-determination, women’s equality, 
and the decline of the manufacturing sector, among others – continue to resonate to this 
day.  Furthermore, the Waffle’s impact on Canadian nationalism and its legacy in the 
NDP, labour and women’s movements, radical left and academia remain contested.   
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Introduction 
 
The Sixties heralded a period of significant social transformation, the effects of 
which reverberate to the present day.  Yet historians have only begun to explore the 
diversity of social movements which demanded sweeping political, social and cultural 
change during this critical period of Canadian history.  Many of these social movements 
comprised the Canadian New Left, and while pursuing distinctive goals they also shared 
a political voice in the Waffle movement which formed around the “Manifesto for an 
Independent and Socialist Canada.”  The Waffle movement, in challenging the leadership 
of the New Democratic Party (NDP) from 1969 to 1972, thus represents a dynamic 
convergence of many of the social movements comprising the New Left in Canada.  The 
Waffle argued that the NDP should promote socialist measures to combat American 
economic domination and ensure Canadian independence while simultaneously engaging 
in “extra-parliamentary” struggles.  NDP and trade union leaders, reluctant to adopt such 
a radical and militant approach, expelled the Waffle from the Ontario NDP in 1972.  By 
the mid-1970s the national movement had lost momentum and faded into irrelevancy as a 
political force. 
In October 1969 the debate over the “Manifesto for an Independent and Socialist 
Canada,” commonly known as the Waffle Manifesto, at the national convention of the 
NDP in Winnipeg excited delegates and party members and placed the NDP on the front 
pages of Canadian newspapers.1  Written by a group of radical intellectuals and presented 
                                                        
1 The group’s odd name came from a comment made at one of the meetings, when a participant suggested 
the way out of an impasse in discussion, commenting “If we’re going to waffle, I’d rather waffle to the left 
than waffle to the right.” Hugh Winsor, a Globe and Mail reporter and signatory of the Manifesto, 
described the comment to Jean Horwath, the Globe’s chief editorial writer, and the paper’s editorial was 
titled “The Waffle Manifesto.”  James Laxer recalled, “we knew it would be a problem to have a left-wing 
group that was seen as too serious, so to have a name that was humorous was just great.  We knew right 
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to the convention as a potential party policy, the document boldly proclaimed “our aim as 
democratic socialists is to build an independent socialist Canada.”2  Suggesting that the 
NDP “must be seen as the parliamentary wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental 
social change,” the authors argued that “American corporate capitalism is the dominant 
factor shaping Canadian society… it is an empire characterized by militarism abroad and 
racism at home.”3  Criticizing Canadian economic underdevelopment and American 
economic domination, the Manifesto called for a socialist response: 
Relevant instruments for bringing the Canadian economy under Canadian 
ownership and control and for altering the priorities established by corporate 
capitalism are at hand.  They include extensive public control over investment and 
nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy, such as the key 
resources industries, finance and credit, and industries strategic to planning our 
economy.4 
 
The Manifesto’s authors also argued for workers’ participation in industrial decision-
making and, in possibly the most controversial section, recognized the existence of two 
nations within Canada, English and French, “each with its own language, culture and 
aspirations.”5  The Manifesto concluded with a rousing call to action, calling on the NDP 
to lead the struggle for an independent and socialist Canada. 
 The debate over the Waffle Manifesto, which the authors had released publicly 
two months earlier, animated the NDP convention and drew national media attention.  
But the NDP leadership and much of its membership rejected the document’s “anti-
American” tone and calls for a radical socialist response.  David Lewis, the party’s 
deputy leader and, in the view of many, the architect of the modern NDP, led the debate 
                                                                                                                                                                     
away that it was a great name.” Quotation in Cameron Smith, Unfinished Journey: The Lewis Family 
(Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989), 579. 
2 Appendix B “The Waffle Manifesto.” 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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against the Waffle Manifesto, warning that its “arid nationalism or anti-Americanism” 
would place the party in an “ideological straitjacket.”6  Lewis argued that “to bury the 
party’s policy on economic independence in words foreign to the Canadian people and 
put around it a lot of their issues, is to lose the objective and betray the people of 
Canada.”7  Tommy Douglas, the NDP leader, described the Manifesto as “ambiguous and 
ambivalent.”8  John Harney, secretary of the Ontario NDP, criticized the section on 
Quebec, suggesting it advocated Quebec separatism.  Mel Watkins, an economist and one 
of the Manifesto’s primary authors, defended the document, describing the American 
system as “the military-industrial complex,” and saying “In this century Canada has been 
absorbed into the American system, and has become a resource base and consumer 
market for the American economic empire.”  Watkins called on the NDP to support 
socialist measures, including extensive public ownership, in order to roll back “the 
dangerous extent to which our economy is owned and controlled by the American 
corporate elite.”9  Watkins’s arguments failed to persuade many of the delegates. The 
convention rejected adopting the Waffle Manifesto as NDP policy by a vote of 499 to 
268.10  Manifesto supporters nevertheless agreed they would continue organizing after the 
convention in an ongoing effort to radicalize the NDP.  Their efforts, and the conflict 
with the party leadership they engendered, would shape the NDP and the broader 
Canadian left for the next three years and beyond. 
                                                        
6 Jack Cahill, “Anti-American’ Watkins manifesto rejected by New Democratic Party,” Toronto Star, 
October 31, 1969. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Murray Goldblatt and Roger Newman, “NDP delegates reject Watkins manifesto by margin of nearly 2 
to 1,” Globe and Mail, October 31, 1969.  At its maximum the Waffle mailing list included 2500-3000 
names, less than 10% of the NDP’s approximately 50,000 members.  
  4 
Although previous scholarship has examined the Waffle in Ontario, Saskatchewan 
and New Brunswick, this dissertation broadens our understanding of the movement’s 
significance by examining the Waffle from as close to a national perspective as available 
sources permit.  Existing scholarship treats New Left social movements as distinct 
entities without exploring their interconnectedness, much less their relationship with the 
NDP.  Yet these connections are important.  Linked ideologically by a belief in the need 
for radical and possibly revolutionary change, many New Left activists developed 
political ties across social movements and therefore had to negotiate differences of class, 
race, gender, age and sexuality.  Furthermore, previous studies of the New Left have 
either ignored or dismissed the relationship between radical social movements and 
electoral politics.  This study, by revealing the convergence of social movement activists 
within the Waffle and their willingness to engage with the NDP, a mainstream political 
party, shows that the Canadian New Left did not dismiss electoral politics as a means for 
achieving radical change.11  Therefore, while my principal focus is on the Waffle, I also 
consider the backgrounds, constituencies and historical trajectories of other social 
                                                        
11 A cursory glance over the history of the international New Left suggests that few New Left social 
movements sought such extensive engagement with an existing political party as did the Waffle with the 
NDP.  In the United States, the Democratic Party’s unwillingness to seat the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party’s delegation at the party’s 1964 national convention scuttled the hopes of many young 
civil rights activists, and any remaining hopes for the Democrats died with Robert Kennedy’s assassination 
and the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, during which police violently clashed with protesters on 
the streets and Eugene McCarthy’s anti-war campaign for the presidential nomination ended in defeat.  
Although activists continued to work with Democrats at the local level, New Left social movements largely 
forsook the Democratic Party as an effective means for radical change. See Maurice Isserman and Michael 
Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  In 
Britain, efforts from 1957-61 by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament to force the Labour Party to adopt 
a policy of unilateral disarmament failed, and the social movements turned their attention away from 
electoral politics until the 1980s.  See Adam Lent, British Social Movements Since 1945: Sex, Colour, 
Peace and Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 45-6, 168-73).  In Germany, although the New Left grew 
out of the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) nuclear disarmament campaigns in the late 1950s, activists 
largely worked outside of electoral politics – the SPD discredited by its governing coalition with the 
Christian Democrats. See Cyril Levitt, Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984).  
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movements including the student movement, the women’s movement, and Canadian left 
nationalism. 
This dissertation addresses several historiographical gaps and issues.  First, it 
describes and discusses the Waffle as a national phenomenon, thereby providing a 
comprehensive account of what has hitherto been a piecemeal treatment of an important 
chapter in the larger history of the NDP.  Second, it contributes to the growing body of 
academic literature concerned with the periodization of the era of political, social and 
cultural radicalism and upheaval commonly known as the “Sixties.”  Third, it addresses 
how a relatively small socialist and nationalist political movement influenced the 
popularity of Canadian economic nationalism and the related shift away from the 
country’s longstanding British identity during the “Long Sixties.”  Finally, the 
dissertation assesses the history of the Waffle by rejecting the flawed “movement/party” 
dichotomy that has long been applied to histories of the CCF/NDP.  Previous scholars 
have interpreted the Waffle primarily within the context of CCF/NDP historiography, 
with most authors adopting a movement-versus-party dichotomy to explain the group’s 
appeal as well as its ultimate demise.  Instead, I analyze the Waffle within its historical 
context, highlight its connections with other New Left social movements, and examine its 
efforts to influence the NDP from a New Left perspective.   
The American historian Van Gosse argues persuasively that scholars have defined 
the New Left too narrowly by focusing on the young, white, college-based anti-war 
movement and the national American organization, Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS), in particular.12  Gosse defines the New Left more broadly, as a “movement of 
                                                        
12 Van Gosse Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretative History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
5. 
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movements,” thereby recognizing the important overlap that occurred among New Left 
groups.  Adopting a broader definition of the New Left has prompted scholars to question 
when the ‘Sixties,’ as shorthand for a unique period of political and cultural upheaval, 
truly occurred.13  The growth and activity of the women’s, gay and lesbian rights, 
environmental, Black and Red Power movements in the early 1970s suggests a “Long 
Sixties” periodization extending to 1975.14  Significantly, this approach challenges a 
popular interpretation of the Sixties as a dichotomy by which an idealistic, unified, non-
violent and optimistic New Left of the early “Sixties” is separated from the cynical, 
disparate, confrontational, and pessimistic New Left of the late “Sixties.”15  My study 
contributes to a revision of the declension narrative that dominates the historiography of 
the Sixties.  The Waffle’s emergence in 1969, its activism in the NDP until 1972, and its 
connections with other social movements active in this period indicate a necessary 
reappraisal of the decline of the New Left in the late Sixties and suggests the 
appropriateness of a “Long Sixties” periodization extending into the early 1970s. 
                                                        
13 Andrew Hunt, “‘When Did the Sixties Happen?’ Searching for New Directions,” Journal of Social 
History 33, 1 (1999): 147-61. 
14 I first came across this term in Joan Sangster, “Radical Ruptures: Feminism, Labor and the Left in the 
Long Sixties in Canada,” American Review of Canadian Studies 40, no. 1 (2010), 1-21.  Sangster uses the 
phrase “the Long Sixties” to refer to the period 1965-1975. Other historians have extended the “Long 
Sixties” back into the 1950s, an approach which can, as Bryan Palmer suggests, obscure the significant 
ruptures that occurred in the 1960s in favour of emphasizing historical continuities. Bryan Palmer, Review 
of New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness, eds. Karen Dubinsky, 
Catherine Krull, Susan Lord, Sean Mills and Scott Rutherford, Left History 14, no. 1 (2009), 99. 
15 Perhaps the most obvious example of this dichotomy is Todd Gitlin’s The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of 
Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), although this dichotomy appears repeatedly even in more nuanced 
accounts.  Andrea Levy’s article “Progeny and Progress? Reflections on the Legacy of the New Left” in 
The New Left: Legacy and Continuity, ed. Dimitrios Roussopoulos (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2007) 
acknowledges the false dichotomy between the “good Sixties” and “bad Sixties” even as she reinforces it.  
The contested legacy of the Sixties in the United States, particularly the conservative backlash against the 
New Left, may have contributed to the dichotomous treatment.  See Peter Collier and David Horowitz, 
Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About the ‘60s (New York: Summit Books/Simon & Schuster, 
1989) for a particularly incendiary example of the conservative backlash against the New Left and the 
“Sixties.” 
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The history of the Waffle indicates that one pre-existing interpretation of the 
Sixties is long overdue for revision. The dichotomy between the New Left of the early 
“Sixties” and the New Left of the late “Sixties,” documented by Todd Gitlin in his book 
on the American New Left, Years of Hope, Days of Rage, has been too readily adopted 
by students of the Canadian Sixties, including Cyrill Levitt, Myrna Kostash and Doug 
Owram.  For example, national student organizations such as the Canadian Union of 
Students dismantled by 1969, yet large student protests continued at individual 
universities into the 1970s.  And the range of social movements which comprised the 
New Left in Canada extended well beyond national student organizations.  Second-wave 
feminist, gay liberation, environmentalist, and aboriginal rights movements only began to 
emerge and influence Canadian politics and society during the 1970s.16  Similarly, the 
heyday of Canadian economic nationalism was the 1970s.  An examination of the Waffle, 
which emerged in 1969 and remained active until 1975, reveals important connections 
between the mid-Sixties New Left, dominated by the student movement, and late-
Sixties/early-Seventies social movements which have had a lasting impact on Canadian 
society.  Compared to the plethora of published research on the American Sixties, the 
historiography of the Canadian Sixties long remained relatively undeveloped.  Three key 
books, Myrna Kostash’s Long Way from Home, Cyrill Levitt’s Children of Privilege, and 
                                                        
16 The New Left won important victories in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the supposed period of decline.  
For example, the “Stop Spadina, Save Our Community Co-ordinating Committee” was formed in October 
1969 and successfully prevented the construction of the Spadina Expressway in Toronto when Premier Bill 
Davis cancelled the project in 1971.  The declension narrative is so popular among scholars of the Sixties 
that it appears even when the chronology directly contradicts such an interpretation.  Thus, James Pitsula, 
in his fascinating study of student protest on the Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan, titles 
one chapter “1968: The Year that Everything Changed” despite the fact that the major student protests 
discussed in his book occurred over the 1968-69 academic year and further protests continued through 
1972.  The evidence used to demonstrate that “everything changed” in 1968 is a description of the 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago.  Pitsula, New World Dawning: The Sixties at Regina Campus 
(Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2008). 
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Doug Owram’s Born at the Right Time dominated the historiography by default.  
Fortunately studies of the Canadian Sixties have proliferated in recent years as a new 
generation of scholars grapples with the impact of that profoundly important period of 
Canadian history.  The resulting historiography reveals vibrant and diverse movements of 
cultural and political rebellion operating throughout Canada during the Sixties. 
 Myrna Kostash, an active participant in the activism and counterculture of the 
Sixties in Canada, wrote Long Way from Home, an engaging account of the key events 
and organizations between 1964 and 1970.17  Kostash utilizes memoir, biography and 
oral history, and presents international developments alongside the Canadian domestic 
experience.  She argues that the period of 1964-70 was transformative – for her 
generation and the country – and urges readers to remember and revive the audacity and 
idealism of the political and cultural struggles of the Sixties.  She focuses on the Student 
Union for Peace Action (SUPA), but also describes a variety of activities embraced by 
the Canadian New Left, including aiding American war resisters, leading “student 
power” campaigns and promoting women’s liberation.  Kostash also incorporates the 
counterculture into her narrative of the Sixties in Canada, discussing prevalent archetypes 
such as “sex, drugs and rock’n’roll,” as well as communal expressions of the 
counterculture in places like Kitsilano and Gastown in Vancouver, Riley Park in Calgary, 
Yorkville in Toronto and Mountain and Crescent streets in Montreal.18  While noting the 
New Left’s criticisms of the counterculture, Kostash attempts to define the movement as 
                                                        
17 Myrna Kostach, Long Way From Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada (Toronto: James 
Lorimer and Company, 1980). 
18 Ibid., 122.  Kostash focuses exclusively on hippies in this section, although other groups and identities 
were an important part of the counterculture, as Stuart Henderson illuminates in his local study of 
Yorkville.  See Stuart Henderson, Making the Scene: Yorkville and Hip Toronto in the 1960s (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
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part of a politicized rejection of society, an attempt at “living otherwise,” and part of the 
broader youth movement of the Sixties. 
 Published a few years after Long Way from Home, Doug Owram’s Born at the 
Right Time examined the youthful experiences of the Canadian baby boom generation.  
His narrative, primarily a social and cultural history, links the immediate post-war period 
with the turbulent era of the Sixties.  Owram argues that by its sheer size the baby boom 
generation was a unique phenomenon which dominated the post-war period.19  He 
contends that the baby boomers perceived their generation as unique, a perception 
encouraged by the child-centered culture of the 1950s and reinforced by the youth-
centered culture and politics of the 1960s.  Characterizing the Sixties as “the moment in 
history that forever defined the baby boom as a distinct generation,” Owram examines 
both political activism and a cultural ‘generation gap’ marked by many boomers’ 
rejection of traditional 1950s values such as security, domesticity and conformity.20  
While few youth actually became hippies or activists, the boomers, according to Owram 
shared a “generational sense of identity.”21    
Owram’s examination of the sexual revolution reinforces his central argument 
that the cultural forces of the 1950s and 1960s represented both continuity and rupture.  
Although the cult of domesticity and adherence to strict gender roles dominated 1950s 
culture, a new emphasis on sex, as represented by Playboy magazine, attacks on literary 
censorship, and Freudian psychological theories about human sexuality clashed in the 
1950s with the conservative gender discourse, resulting in profound sexual confusion.  
                                                        
19 Doug Owram, Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996). 
20 Ibid., 159. 
21 Ibid., 215. 
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The 1960s sexual revolution that emerged was therefore as much a product of 1950s 
culture as it was a rejection.  Owram details changes in concepts of sexual morality, the 
effect of the availability of the birth-control pill for unmarried women after 1966, and the 
influence of the women’s liberation movement in the late 1960s. 
Combining analysis of cultural trends and social organizations, Owram crafted a 
detailed synthesis of the social and cultural history of post-war Canada.  His emphasis on 
the continuities, rather than ruptures, between the 1950s and 1960s is a major 
contribution to the historiography.  However, because his extensive account of popular 
culture relies largely upon international, and primarily American, artists and trends, the 
resulting analysis diminishes the uniqueness of the Canadian popular culture experience 
despite his focus on Canadian New Left groups when discussing Sixties radicalism.22  
Finally, although Owram convincingly redefines the links between the 1950s and 1960s, 
he largely adopts the prevailing model of the Sixties as early idealism replaced by 
“polarization, repression and decline.”23  This model, although partially accurate, 
trivializes the tremendous growth in feminism, gay rights and environmentalism that 
occurred in the late Sixties. 
Cyril Levitt’s Children of Privilege is a sociological study of the student 
movement in Canada, the United States and Germany.  Levitt characterizes the student 
movement as “a movement of privilege, against privilege, for privilege – at a time in 
which the character of privilege itself was changing.”24  He argues that student activists, 
                                                        
22 Gillian Mitchell’s The North American Folk Music Revival is a fascinating study of the influential folk 
music revival that is able to achieve the challenging task of telling a North American narrative without 
obscuring the Canadian story. Mitchell, The North American Folk Music Revival: Nation and Identity in the 
United States and Canada, 1945-1980 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishers, 2007). 
23 Owram, Born at the Right Time, 160. 
24 Levitt, Children of Privilege, 185. 
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primarily from middle- and upper-class backgrounds, were disappointed by the loss of 
status that accompanied the “massification” of university education.  Disillusioned by the 
promise of status going unfulfilled, the students of the Sixties reacted by revolting – first 
on behalf of others, then for themselves as students.  As Levitt explains, “their assertion 
of privilege took the form of its opposite – the radical-democratic assault upon 
privilege.”25  The movement retreated to the campus after 1967 and died, Levitt suggests, 
when the students grew up. 
Canadian scholars, by transposing an American chronology and narrative of 
division and decline after 1968, have diminished the Canadian experience of the 1960s. A 
notable exception, Bryan Palmer in Canada’s 1960s, largely abandons this “divided 
Sixties” framework and instead focuses a large part of his narrative on Quebec nationalist 
and Red Power movements of the late Sixties.26  However, in arguing that after SUPA’s 
demise in 1967 “a new New Left emerged,” his explanation that this “new New Left” 
only “rode out what remained of the revolutionary wave of the 1960s” reinforces the 
declension narrative of the good Sixties/bad Sixties approach.  Recent works by Canadian 
historians abandon the good Sixties/bad Sixties dichotomy in favour of a “Long Sixties” 
historical framework, extending the periodization of the “Sixties” as a time of radical 
political and cultural upheaval into the mid-1970s. 
In addition to three collections of scholarly articles about the Sixties in Canada, 
several recent monographs both challenge and broaden the existing interpretation of the 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 
26 Bryan D. Palmer, Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009). 
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era.27  Stuart Henderson’s Making the Scene, a fascinating account of the Toronto 
neighborhood of Yorkville and its counterculture from 1960 to 1970, rejects 
oversimplified narratives of Yorkville’s eventual demise by presenting a nuanced 
discussion of the counterculture. Henderson shows that not just hippies, but also a gay 
underground, working-class ‘greasers’ and ‘bikers,’ and New Left and feminist activists 
formed the Yorkville “scene.”28  Draft dodgers also were included, as Jessica Squires 
reveals in Building Sanctuary, an examination of the Canadian movement to support war 
resisters in the 1960s and 1970s.29  Sean Mills’s study of political activism in Sixties 
Montreal, The Empire Within, reveals the importance of an international discourse of 
decolonization shared and utilized by a variety of Montreal activists and movements for 
social and political change and internal anti-colonization struggles.30  Mills contributes a 
narrative of political activism beyond the neo-nationalist project of modernization and a 
radicalism rooted in the language of decolonization. He thereby highlights, for Canadian 
activism and political ideology, the importance of international developments, not only in 
the United States, Britain and France but also in the global South. 
Although much of the scholarship on activism in the Sixties deals with post-
secondary students, the majority of baby boomers ended their schooling after high school 
and readily found employment in that period’s prosperous economy.  Two excellent 
books analyze Canadian worker militancy in the 1960s.  Benjamin Isitt uncovers 
                                                        
27 Dimitry Anastakis, ed., The Sixties: Passion, Politics and Style (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2008); M. Athena Palaeologu, ed., The Sixties in Canada: A Turbulent and Creative Decade 
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2009); Lara Campbell, Dominque Clément, and Gregory S. Kealey, eds, 
Debating Dissent: Canada and the Sixties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 
28 Henderson, Making the Scene. 
29 Jessica Squires Building Sanctuary: The Movement to Support Vietnam War Resisters in Canada, 1965-
73 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013). 
30 Sean Mills, The Empire Within: Postcolonial Thought and Political Activism in Sixties Montreal 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). 
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connections in British Columbia between the radical labour movements associated with 
the New Left and the ‘Old Left,’ by focusing on the political activism of a “militant 
minority” of workers.31  Ian Milligan’s Rebel Youth details a wave of revolt amongst 
young workers in the mid-1960s and connects worker rebellion with the broader New 
Left.32  Milligan also examines the evolving position of student New Left activists toward 
the working-class and labour unions, culminating with increasing New Left support for 
workers’ struggles in the early 1970s. 
All of these authors adopt the framework of the “Long Sixties,” although only 
Milligan does so explicitly.  Mills concludes his narrative of activism in Quebec with the 
massive May Day protests of 1972, Milligan with a 1973 strike involving New Leftists 
and workers, and Isitt with the provincial election of Dave Barrett’s NDP government in 
1972.  Thus, neither the good Sixties/bad Sixties dichotomy nor the chronological model 
of decline after 1968 fully explain the Canadian experience as there is ample evidence of 
New Left social movements growing in strength during the “late Sixties.”  By assessing 
the meaning and legacy of the Waffle, a New Left movement seeking to transform an 
established political party from 1969 to 1973, this dissertation reinforces the need to 
supplant the post-1968 declension narrative of the Sixties with a “Long Sixties” 
framework. 
It is necessary to situate the Waffle within the historiography of the Canadian 
Sixties in another way.  By its espousal of a progressive Canadian nationalism linking 
independence to socialism, the Waffle played a small but noteworthy role in weakening 
                                                        
31 Benjamin Isitt, Militant Minority: British Columbia Workers and the Rise of a New Left, 1948-1972 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
32 Ian Milligan, Rebel Youth: 1960s Labour Unrest, Young Workers, and New Leftists in English Canada 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014). 
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the British identity many Canadians cherished before the Sixties.  Popular historians and 
academic scholars alike have portrayed the Sixties as a transformative period for the 
elusive concept of Canadian identity.  Historians addressing the assertion of a new 
Canadian identity in the 1960s frequently allude to the parliamentary debate over the 
creation of the Canadian flag, or the year-long festivities associated with the celebration 
of Canada’s centennial, especially the hugely popular Expo 67 in Montreal.  Pierre 
Berton, a best-selling and prolific popular historian, covered Expo 67 for Maclean’s 
magazine.  His book 1967: Canada’s Turning Point combines personal memory and 
historical research in a highly engaging narrative.  In discussing the Centennial 
celebrations, politics, hockey, hippies and an emerging radicalism visible in such causes 
as second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and Quebec separatism, Berton emphasizes the 
extent to which Canada and Canadian identity were transformed during that year.  
Although Berton argues that a “new Canadian attitude” appeared, he was circumspect 
about defining such an attitude.  He did, however, end the book by quoting Judy 
LaMarsh, the Secretary of State for Canada, who provided an unequivocal summation of 
the Centennial’s impact: “since 1967 no one has asked what it means to be a Canadian… 
the year 1967 changed us all profoundly, and we will never look back.”33   
 José Igartua in The Other Quiet Revolution utilizes school textbooks, newspaper 
editorials, and a narrative of the flag debate to demonstrate the Sixties shift in English 
Canada from British patriotism to civic nationalism.34  Philip Massolin adopts a similar 
position in his study of the last generation of Anglophile, “anti-modernist” intellectuals to 
lament the passing of the British Tory tradition of Canadian national identity from the 
                                                        
33 LaMarsh quotation in Pierre Berton, 1967: The Turning Point (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1997), 367. 
34 José E. Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006). 
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end of the Second World War until 1970.35  Bryan Palmer argues in Canada’s 1960’s that 
the decade represented a profound change in Canadian national identity.  Although 
Canada had largely ceased to be defined by a British connection and character in the 
1960s, this former British identity “was replaced only with uncertainty.”36  According to 
Palmer, the ruptures of the 1960s brought an end to the old British Canada without 
establishing a unified and singular sense of national identity in its place.  He identifies 
key incidents of the 1960s, including the dollar crisis of 1961-62, the Munsinger affair, 
the Ali-Chuvalo boxing match, riotous celebrations of Victoria Day, youthful protest 
movements in the workplace and universities, and the rise of women’s liberation and 
‘Red Power’ movements to demonstrate vast changes in the social construction and 
understanding of class, race, gender, sexuality and national identity during this 
transformative decade.  C.P. Champion contends that despite superficial appearances, 
Canada in fact retained many of the institutions and values symptomatic of its British 
heritage.37  Yet, Igartua, Massolin, Palmer and Champion are in agreement that the 1960s 
was a transformative period for Canadian national identity.  Although my primary focus 
is not the slippery concept of an emergent Canadian identity, the Waffle’s espousal of a 
progressive Canadian nationalism that linked independence with socialism, and its 
connections with New Left social movements that sought to redefine the meaning of 
Canadian citizenship, suggest that the group played a role, however minor, in this 
                                                        
35 Philip Massolin, Canadian Intellectuals, The Tory Tradition and the Challenge of Modernity, 1939-1970 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
36 Palmer, Canada’s 1960s, 5. 
37 C.P. Champion, The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-
1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). 
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transformation.  Indeed, other scholars have begun to assess the Waffle’s influence on the 
popularity of economic nationalism in Canada in the 1970s.38 
The history of the Waffle must also be situated within the expansive 
historiography of the CCF and NDP.  Unlike many European countries during the 
twentieth century, where the left consistently rivaled conservative parties for power, or in 
the United States, where social democracy had comparatively little impact, in Canada the 
CCF/NDP emerged as the major third party in Canadian politics by the 1940s.  The 
history of the CCF and NDP has been extensively documented, but few historians have 
written comprehensive accounts encompassing the parties at both the federal and 
provincial level.  Instead, the focus typically has been narrower, zooming in on the 
federal party or one of its provincial sections, or a biography of the party’s leading 
figures.39   
The debate that looms largest over the historiography of the CCF/NDP centres on 
the question of whether or not the CCF is best understood as a “party” or a “movement,” 
distinctions first made by Walter Young in his 1969 book The Anatomy of a Party: The 
National CCF 1932-61.40  Young presents social movements as more ideologically rigid 
than political parties, while parties are seen as willing to sacrifice ideological principles 
as the price of gaining political power.  Social movements are viewed as more 
decentralized and democratic than political parties, which are dominated by elites willing 
                                                        
38 Christo Aivalis, The Constant Liberal: Pierre Trudeau, Organized Labour, and the Canadian Social 
Democratic Left (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018) 
39 Exceptions to this tendency include Desmond Morton, NDP: The Dream of Power (Toronto: A.M 
Hakkert, 1974, 1st ed.); NDP: Social Democracy in Canada (Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1977, 2nd 
ed.); The New Democrats, 1961-1986: The Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986, 3rd ed.) 
and Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada: A Study of the CCF-NDP in Federal and Provincial Politics 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978). 
40 Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1969), 3-11. 
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to impose internal discipline to maintain party unity.  Young described the CCF as 
shifting over time from a movement into a party, and rebalancing its policies and 
practices accordingly.  Interestingly, although Young commends the transformation, 
scholars who followed him have adopted the movement/party distinction in order to both 
criticize the CCF/NDP’s rightward trajectory as well as to praise the party’s supposed 
maturation.41 
The movement/party thesis has been enticing for scholars of the CCF/NDP.  
Struggles over policy, often characterized by left/right ideological divisions, were a 
fixture of the CCF since its founding in 1932.  The CCF originally brought together a 
collection of social movements – its full name included “Farmer, Labour, Socialist” – but 
thereafter also developed ties, sometimes tenuous, with other interests, such as the 
women’s and peace movements.  However, several problems with Young’s approach 
have been identified.  Alan Whitehorn criticizes the movement/party thesis on a number 
of counts, calling it “excessively inbred and increasingly unproductive for future 
research.”42  He argues that differences between movements and parties are overstated, 
pointing out that political parties can also be ideological, focused on social change, and 
less concerned with electoral success than with publicizing their ideas.  Furthermore, he 
suggests that social movements, some of which are highly structured, require different 
                                                        
41 The critics include Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1964), Michael S. Cross, ed., The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea: CCF-NDP 
Manifestoes 1932 to 1969 (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1974), and George Ehring and Wayne Roberts, 
Giving Away a Miracle: Lost Dreams, Broken Promises and the Ontairo NDP (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 
1993).  In addition to Young, scholars approving of the CCF/NDP’s maturation include Desmond Morton, 
NDP: The Dream of Power and J.T. Morley, Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario, A Biography 
(Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1984).  Morley takes the concept of maturation even further, 
attempting to apply psychological categories of human development to the “party personality.” 
42 Alan Whitehorn, “An Analysis of the Historiography of the CCF/NDP: The Protest Movement Becalmed 
Tradition,” in Building the Co-operative Commonwealth, ed. J. William Brennan, (Regina: Canadian Plains 
Research Centre, 1984), 1. 
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degrees of organization.43  Finally, Whitehorn argues that the movement-to-party model 
romanticizes the CCF and ignores the party’s history.  He contends that the CCF was a 
“political party” from its inception, and points to its imposition of internal discipline as 
evidence.44  The larger problem with the movement/party dichotomy lies in the flawed 
nature of the categories Young introduced.  The Communist Party of Canada (CP), in its 
various incarnations, exemplifies this point.  The CP, never expecting realistically to win 
power through electoral politics, retained its ideological purity while running candidates 
with the avowed purpose of using elections to educate the public about the benefits of 
communism.  By this measure the CP should, according to Young, be classified as a 
“movement.”  Yet the CP also manifested extraordinary centralization, domination by 
elites, and an unparalleled penchant for party discipline, all facets of Young’s definition 
of “party.”  As such, Young’s schema for differentiating parties from movements is 
fundamentally flawed when applied to the history of the CCF/NDP.  James Naylor’s 
recent work, The Fate of Labour Socialism, asserts the working-class character of the 
early CCF and addresses the movement/party thesis.  Naylor acknowledges that Young 
introduced “somewhat rigid, dichotomous categories” but suggests that Young’s study 
recognizes “transitions on the non-Stalinist left” and the “growing demobilization” of the 
CCF’s membership in the 1940s and 1950s that his critics ignore.45  Naylor points out 
that “much ink has been spilled in tracing the rightward trajectory of the CCF,” and 
argues that “whether presented in its original form by Zakuta and Young, or turned on its 
                                                        
43 The environmentalist group Greenpeace, for example, has evolved from its origins in the New Left into a 
hierarchical, bureaucratic and centralized organization.  See Frank Zelko, Make it a Green Peace! The Rise 
of Countercultural Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
44 Ibid., 6-7. 
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head by Whitehorn, the declension argument of the 1960s failed to address the specific 
character of socialism in the 1930s.”46 
In addition to accepting the flawed movement/party dichotomy, historians of the 
Waffle have often fallen victim to another historiographical trap – a belief in rigid, 
unchanging ideological categories, such as “socialist” and “social democrat,” which 
discount historical context.  Ian McKay, assessing the historiography of the Canadian 
left, explains: 
The traditional approach invites us to see each one of these names as labels for 
separate species that compete with other species in a struggle of the ideologically 
fittest to survive in the dog-eat-dog world of political warfare… the governing 
assumption is that a Communist was a Communist was a Communist: in 1921, 
1935, 1956, or 1989… or you might argue that the ‘democratic left’ was much the 
same in 1921, 1932, 1948, and 1968, and always at war with the Communists.  
Once in play, these categories become more and more reified: Marxists and social 
democrats (and so on) fight on through the ages.47 
 
This “vertical” approach, emphasizing similarities between leftists groups and ideologies 
across time favours ideological consistency over historical context.  When applied to the 
CCF/NDP this “vertical” approach explains the party’s history as a continuing struggle of 
socialist versus social democrat, radical versus moderate, or movement versus party.  To 
pick but one example, Ivan Avakumovic equates the radicals at the 1933 CCF convention 
who criticized the Regina Manifesto as being insufficiently socialist, to the Wafflers at 
the 1969 NDP convention who criticized the party for veering too far from the Regina 
Manifesto’s socialism.48  Similarly, J.T. Morley addresses the Waffle alongside previous 
expulsions of Communists and Trotskyists in his chapter on “Party Discipline” and 
applies his stretched metaphor of the “party personality” to assert that “like many human 
                                                        
46 Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 302-3. 
47 Ian McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada’s Left History (Toronto: Between the Lines, 
2005), 33. 
48 Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 66. 
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individuals, the party, as it came to maturity… was still recognizable as the same person 
it had always been.”49  McKay urges scholars to instead adopt a “horizontal” approach, 
positioning and interpreting groups and ideologies within their proper historical context.50  
My study, instead of viewing the Waffle as one manifestation of an ongoing but largely 
unchanging ideological struggle within the NDP, subscribes to McKay’s “horizontal” 
approach by presenting the Waffle as a product of a unique historical period and uniquely 
Canadian manifestation of the New Left. 
 One further issue mars the historiography of the Waffle.  Much of what has been 
published about the Waffle was written by either its members or their opponents, and too 
often these accounts seek to judge whether the participants were right or wrong in their 
actions.51  McKay dismisses this “scorecard approach” to history, arguing “sectarian 
exercises in scorecard history will confirm the values of the present day leftist, over and 
over and over again… what bothers me most about scorecard history is the hubristic 
arrogance of believing that any historian can infallibly bestow or deduct points.”52 
 The harshest assessment of the Waffle was provided by Desmond Morton, an 
advisor to Tommy Douglas and assistant secretary of the NDP in the mid-1960s.  
Morton’s NDP: The Dream of Power, published shortly after the Waffle’s challenge to 
the party leadership, describes the Waffle Manifesto as “emotionally cathartic for 
younger, radical academics” and suggests the group’s primary appeal was as an 
“alternative to… the indispensable drudgery of a self-financed political organization.”53  
                                                        
49 Morley, Secular Socialists, 219. 
50 McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals, 34.  McKay explains “this second approach is a horizontal approach that 
looks at how leftists in a given period shared many things.” 
51 For example, both Terry Morley and Desmond Morton were members of the ONDP executive during the 
Waffle period and opposed the group’s positions consistently. 
52 McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals, 81-2. 
53 Morton, The Dream of Power, 131 
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Dismissing the group’s motivations as primarily egotistical, Morton asked “after four 
days of meeting, plotting, mutual congratulation and media attention, what was the point 
of stopping?”54  In Morton’s estimation, the Waffle’s leaders, having opted to persist in 
challenging the NDP status quo instead of ascending to “positions of prestige and 
influence in the party,” were quite simply “losers.”55  Morton chastises the Waffle for 
mimicking the rhetoric and demands of the American New Left – notorious in Morton’s 
eyes for attacks on “American imperialism” and “appeals for sexual freedom” – by 
urging the NDP to adopt radical tactics with potentially damaging implications for the 
Canadian left.56  Yet Morton ignores the Waffle’s importance in directing the Canadian 
New Left away from issues that dominated the American movement – the Vietnam War 
in particular – and focusing attention on Canadian independence and the role of the state 
on the road to socialism.  In addition, Jill Vickers has demonstrated how the Waffle’s 
feminism, driven by increased demands on the welfare state, differed dramatically from 
the American women’s liberation movement, which sought to avoid the state by creating 
a women’s-centered alternative.57  Contrary to Morton’s portrayal, the Waffle, despite 
emerging from the Canadian New Left and presenting a radical critique of American 
capitalism and foreign policy, was a uniquely Canadian political movement. 
 While highly critical of the Waffle, Morton nevertheless subscribes to an 
interpretation of the NDP history similar to that of Waffle sympathizer Robert Hackett, 
by embracing Walter Young’s “movement-party thesis.”  The “problem for the NDP,” 
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55 Morton, The Dream of Power, 135. 
56 Morton, The Dream of Power, 96.  Morton comments “radical chic obscured the fact that taking to the 
streets is a tactic of the weak.” 
57 Jill Vickers, “The Intellectual Origins of the Women’s Movement in Canada,” in Challenging Times: The 
Women’s Movement in Canada and the United States, ed. Constance Backhouse and David H. Flaherty 
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Morton maintained, “was due to its own ambivalence.  It was and behaved like a mass 
party of the democratic Left; it also presented itself as a socialist movement.”58  But as a 
“mass party” it was preferable, Morton believed, that the NDP consign its “movement” 
phase to the proverbial dustbin of history.59 
 Robert Hackett’s account of the Waffle, titled “Pie in the Sky” and first published 
as a special issue of Canadian Dimension in 1980, situates the group within the 
movement/party dichotomy.  Hackett claims the Waffle “represented the best organized 
and most sustained leftist attempt to transform the parent party,” describing its emergence 
as a product of the international New Left and burgeoning Canadian nationalism.60  He 
argues that the Waffle positively influenced the NDP on a number of policies, including 
women’s issues and nationalism, and laments the group’s departure from the party.   
Hackett utilizes data from surveys of NDP convention delegates to draw ideological and 
demographic distinctions between Wafflers and other New Democrats.61  But, like 
Morton, Hackett interprets the Waffle’s exit as signaling an end to the NDP’s 
movement/party dichotomy.  Ultimately, he concludes, the NDP and indeed all “social 
democratic parties in advanced capitalist societies,” could not be a vehicle for a socialist, 
anti-imperialist left such as the Waffle.62  He argues that the Waffle, emblematic of the 
“movement” orientation but lacking a Marxist analysis, was doomed in its struggle to 
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transform the NDP.  According to Hackett, social democratic parties, committed to 
change through electoral means, are incapable of embracing a socially transformative 
ideology.  Furthermore, the structure of social democratic parties, including the power of 
the party leader, the importance and autonomy of the legislative caucus, and the veto 
power of affiliated unions, both as a voting bloc and as financial supporters, makes 
fundamental change virtually impossible without a mass mobilization of the working 
class.63 
Former Wafflers have contributed to the movement’s historiography, most 
notably in a series of retrospectives published in the journal Studies in Political Economy 
in 1990.  The authors vary in their approach, but generally agree that the Waffle 
contributed positive ideas to the NDP and Canadian politics.  Moreover, they lament its 
passing and what they perceive as the NDP’s subsequent moderation.64  Reg Whitaker, 
who wrote the introduction to the retrospective series, claims the Waffle’s departure from 
the NDP produced an intellectual vacuum.  This assessment was reinforced by David 
Lewis who, exasperated with his party’s “me-too performance” during the constitutional 
debates of the 1980s, commented to Whitaker, “when the Waffle left the party, most of 
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the brains left with them.”65  Not surprisingly, many former Wafflers shared this 
perspective. 
 The articles by former Wafflers possibly overstate their group’s overall impact by 
crediting it with initiating virtually every nationalist policy the NDP subsequently 
adopted.  Yet their wide-ranging reflections highlight convincingly the Waffle’s impact 
on a multitude of issues ranging from Canadian and Quebec nationalism to international 
New Left protest causes such as the women’s and anti-war movements, rather than 
dwelling, as many historians of the NDP have done, on where the Waffle fits into the 
party’s long history of internal ideological struggle. 
Mel Watkins and John Smart suggest that the Waffle contributed to 
groundbreaking economic nationalist initiatives implemented in the 1970s, including the 
Canada Development Corporation, the Foreign Investment Review Agency, Petro-
Canada and the “Third Option.”66  Pat Smart notes the Waffle’s forward-looking position 
on Quebec, which entailed recognition of “two nations” within Canada and Quebec’s 
right to self-determination.67  Rianne Mahon and Gregory Albo focus on the Waffle’s 
intellectual contribution to the new Canadian political economy school and its journal 
Studies in Political Economy.68  Gilbert Levine argues that the Waffle helped to pave the 
way for the “Canadianization” of the labour movement, including the separation of a 
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number of Canadian branches of international unions into national entities.69  Varda 
Burstyn discusses some of the issues for which women in the Waffle advocated, 
including childcare, abortion, equal pay and quotas for women on the NDP’s governing 
bodies.  Burstyn credits the Waffle not only with pressuring the NDP to recognize 
women’s oppression within its own ranks, but also with being “the conduit through which 
the radical women’s politics of the late 1960s entered and profoundly moved the NDP, 
and indirectly, many members of the unions affiliated to it.”70  John Richards, a Waffler 
and former MLA in Saskatchewan, and Larry Pratt argue in Prairie Capitalism that the 
Waffle directly influenced the Saskatchewan NDP’s 1971 election platform, but concede 
its influence faded once the Waffle withdrew from the party.71  Among former Wafflers, 
Dan Heap is unusual in his criticisms of the group.  Heap suggests that the Waffle’s 
failure was not because of its ideological radicalism within a moderate party, but resulted 
from the group’s own elitism.  He insists the Waffle exhibited an “elitist tendency,” and 
placed too much emphasis on “convention battles over policy statements and party 
office.”72 
In addition to published discussions of the Waffle, three MA theses focus 
primarily on provincial Waffle sections.  John Bullen’s MA thesis, which he published in 
condensed form in The Canadian Historical Review in 1983, concludes that the Ontario 
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Waffle “overestimated the immediate potential for radicalism… and recklessly 
disregarded the consequences of its own continued existence within the NDP.”73  He 
suggests the Waffle underestimated the extent of the ideological gap separating the 
NDP’s moderate leadership from the party’s “radical left wing.”74  Moreover, the Waffle 
erred strategically with its singular focus on transforming the NDP, thereby alienating 
long-time party and union activists who expected some acknowledgement that the 
radicals shared the same goals.  Despite its shortcomings, Bullen is convinced the Waffle 
influenced both the NDP and Canadian nationalism, and that the NDP has moderated the 
party’s image and policies as part if its transformation from the CCF. 
Peter Borch’s 2005 MA thesis on the Saskatchewan Waffle identifies significant 
differences between the Ontario and Saskatchewan groups, in particular the emphasis 
they placed on labour and agriculture respectively.  Borch also reveals that the 
Saskatchewan Waffle grew out of the Committee for a Socialist Movement (CSM), a 
small Regina-based discussion group formed in 1966 he describes as “dominated by 
expatriate American Marxist intellectuals… dedicated to furthering socialism in 
Saskatchewan.”75  Following the release of the Waffle Manifesto in 1969, CSM members 
joined with other student and farm activists in creating the Saskatchewan Waffle in 1970.  
Borch also points to the group’s Marxist ideology to explain its conflict with and ultimate 
departure from the social democratic NDP. 
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The third MA thesis is Patrick Webber’s analysis of the Waffle in New 
Brunswick where the group was closely associated with New Left activism at the 
University of New Brunswick and was predominantly Trotskyist in orientation.76  The 
New Brunswick Waffle was formed by members of the Fredericton Young Socialists, a 
branch of the League for Socialist Action (LSA), Canada’s major Trotskyist organization.  
Against the advice of LSA leader Ross Dowson, the New Brunswick Waffle successfully 
took over the New Brunswick NDP in 1971, only to have the federal party suspend the 
provincial section later that year.  Thus Webber’s study highlights the presence of 
important ideological divisions within the Waffle, in particular between adherents of 
Trotskyism and others. 
In Chapter One this dissertation provides a brief history of the Canadian left, 
specifically the CCF/NDP, from 1932 to the emergence of the Waffle in 1969.  Although 
covering well-trod ground, this chapter establishes the historical context of the CCF/NDP 
within the Canadian left that informed the Waffle’s decision to seek transformative 
change to a well-ensconced political party.  The chapter also addresses the conflict 
between the CCF and the Communist Party, primarily a proxy war in the labour 
movement, a conflict that profoundly affected how NDP leaders such as David Lewis 
eventually regarded the Waffle. 
The second chapter addresses the growth of the New Left in Canada from 1959 
until the Waffle’s emergence in 1969.  Adopting an expansive definition for the Canadian 
New Left, this chapter asserts that historians of the Sixties should examine not only the 
anti-war and student movements most commonly associated with the New Left, but also 
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the women’s liberation movement, the ‘Red Power’ movement, left-nationalist 
movements in Quebec and English Canada, and the wave of militant labour actions 
taking place throughout the period.  The short-lived but influential Combined 
Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND) and the Student Union for 
Peace Action (SUPA), as well as the activism of the women’s liberation, student, and 
anti-war movements were formative for many future Wafflers. 
The third chapter examines the formation and emergence of the Waffle.  A group 
of NDP and student activists first met in April 1969 to discuss the party’s perceived 
failures, in particular its inattention to “the growing dominance of the United States,” and 
agreed to outline their beliefs in a manifesto.77  In addition to the activism of the New 
Left, the original Wafflers were greatly influenced by the strength of English-Canadian 
nationalism in the 1960s, shaped in part by the publication of George Grant’s Lament for 
a Nation in 1965 and the Watkins Report on foreign business ownership in 1967.78  The 
chapter reviews the evolution of the Waffle Manifesto through successive drafts written 
by James Laxer, Mel Watkins and Gerald Caplan, and explores efforts by the early 
Wafflers to build support within NDP riding associations, youth clubs, and affiliated 
unions.  The response they received indicated both enthusiasm for youthful radicalism 
and hesitation by others within the party to alter dramatically its direction.  Debate over 
the Waffle Manifesto at the October 1969 federal NDP convention in Winnipeg thrust the 
group into the media spotlight.  Despite the Manifesto’s rejection by convention 
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delegates, the Wafflers were sufficiently inspired by the support they did receive to 
commit to continuing their campaign for party reform. 
The fourth chapter addresses the Waffle’s efforts to transform the NDP in the year 
following the group’s emergence at the Winnipeg NDP convention.  The Waffle 
organized provincial sections, mirroring the NDP’s structure, and held both a western 
regional conference and a national meeting.  It sought, with some measure of success, to 
influence party policy at provincial NDP conventions in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, 
Ontario and Manitoba in 1970, and contested, albeit unsuccessfully, the leadership of the 
Saskatchewan NDP following Woodrow Lloyd’s resignation.  Beyond the party Wafflers, 
motivated by New Left support for women’s liberation and decolonization movements, 
participated in extra-parliamentary protests and encouraged the NDP to follow suit. 
Diverging from the chronological narrative of the Waffle and the NDP at national 
and provincial levels, Chapter Five is devoted primarily to examining the Waffle at the 
grassroots level in Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon.  In addition to working within the 
NDP, local Waffle activists engaged in extra-parliamentary social movements including 
the women’s liberation and anti-Vietnam War protests, as well as supporting striking 
workers and the National Farmers’ Union.  The chapter also explores Waffle attempts to 
engage in a different kind of electoral politics on a local level, emphasizing policy issues 
instead of merely winning votes. 
Chapter Six examines the Waffle’s participation in the federal NDP leadership 
race and the successful provincial election campaign in Saskatchewan during the first half 
of 1971.  In an effort to raise the group’s prominence and influence, Waffle candidate 
James Laxer entered the race to succeed Tommy Douglas as leader of the federal NDP in 
  30 
April 1971, finishing a surprising second place behind David Lewis.  Wafflers also took 
heart from their influence on the Saskatchewan NDP’s election platform ahead of the 
1971 provincial election which brought the party to power and elected a pro-Waffle MLA 
amongst the NDP caucus. 
The seventh chapter analyzes the Waffle’s escalating conflict with the NDP 
leadership throughout the latter half of 1971 and early 1972, culminating with Ontario 
NDP leader Stephen Lewis’s speech denouncing the Waffle as “a party within a party” in 
March 1972.  The Waffle in Ontario sought to capitalize on the prominence of Canadian 
economic nationalism in 1971 by supporting striking workers at Texpack in Brantford 
while backing six pro-Waffle NDP candidates in the provincial election held that fall.  In 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, where the NDP had formed governments, the Waffle 
struggled with its relationship with the party.  But conflicts over the Trotskyist-dominated 
New Brunswick Waffle, the Waffle’s role in the Ontario election campaign, and support 
amongst dissident caucuses within leading pro-NDP unions exacerbated the divide and 
prompted Ontario labour leaders and party moderates to push for the Waffle’s 
marginalization in early 1972. 
The remainder of 1972, a pivotal year for the Waffle, is the focus of Chapter 
Eight.  The Ontario Waffle’s ultimately unsuccessful efforts to remain within the NDP in 
the first half of 1972 initiated an existential crisis in the group, whose primary focus for 
the previous two-and-a-half years had been on transforming the party.  When faced with 
a choice between disbanding and expulsion, the majority of Ontario Wafflers chose to 
leave the NDP and form a new Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada.  
Nevertheless, the decision split the Ontario Waffle and a substantial minority remained to 
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“stay and fight” in the party and formed a Left Caucus to do so.   In the two provinces 
where the NDP formed the government, the Manitoba and Saskatchewan Waffle groups 
struggled with their frustration at the party’s moderate agenda.  The group dwindled in 
Manitoba and debated the timing and manner of its inevitable departure from the party in 
Saskatchewan. 
Chapter Nine examines the year-and-a-half the Waffle spent engaged primarily in 
internal debate following the group’s ouster from the Ontario NDP.  Absent its primary 
purpose – transforming the NDP into a socialist party focused on preserving Canadian 
independence – the Waffle struggled to regroup.  During the 1972 federal election both 
Ontario and Saskatchewan Wafflers mounted a “counter-campaign” criticizing the NDP 
yet neither group was prepared to challenge the party electorally.  Provincial elections in 
British Columbia in 1972 and Manitoba in 1973 illustrated the group’s demise in those 
two provinces.  Throughout 1972 and 1973 Wafflers debated options for the group’s 
future direction amidst a rapidly evolving New Left milieu highlighted by an intellectual 
turn towards Marxism and the working-class.  By the end of 1973 the Saskatchewan 
Waffle had finally broken decisively with the NDP and the Ontario Waffle prepared to 
challenge the party electorally. 
Chapter Ten analyzes the Waffle’s activities and internal debates during 1974 and 
1975 following the group’s decisive break with the NDP.  In particular the group’s 
embrace of a strict Marxist analysis that emphasized the importance of class divisions 
above all else had ramifications for its relationship with the women’s, labour and 
farmers’ movements as well as its approach to electoral politics.  Furthermore, the 
emphasis on Marxism resulted in many Wafflers reevaluating their group’s commitment 
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to Canadian nationalism, and produced contentious ideological debates that split the 
Ontario and Saskatchewan Waffles into tiny sectarian fragments.  By the end of 1975, the 
Waffle as a national movement was dead. 
The Waffle’s successes and failures offer revealing and hitherto largely 
overlooked perspectives on Canadian politics and society during a period of rapid social 
change, the Sixties.  While the existing historiography sketches the outlines of the 
Waffle’s history, it is limited by focusing largely on internal leadership disputes within 
the NDP and the experience of the Ontario Waffle in particular.  Abundant research 
materials now exist to support a wider and more intensive examination of this important 
and unique group’s significance in Canadian political history.  Specifically, the 
dissertation is based upon significant archival collections documenting NDP and Waffle 
correspondence, meeting minutes, position papers, leaflets and speeches, as well as 
interviews with former Wafflers, New Democrats, and New Left activists.  Through an 
analysis of the Waffle focusing on grassroots activists in three local studies as well as the 
movement’s leadership, this dissertation demonstrates influential connections between 
the Waffle and other New Left social movements of the time.  In addition, it revises the 
movement/party dichotomy which has dominated so much of Waffle/NDP 
historiography, while also emphasizing the Waffle’s place in the international New Left, 
specifically as a convergence of social movements which sought to engage with electoral 
politics through an existing political party, the NDP.  Finally, my study of the Waffle, a 
group active from 1969-75, indicates the inherent flaws in applying a declensionist 
narrative to the Canadian Sixties, demonstrating instead the relevance of the “long 
Sixties” approach.  For as the clock ticked down on the 1960s, the Canadian New Left 
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did not die, retreat into cynicism or lash out in violence.  Instead, as the Waffle’s story 
demonstrates, young radicals and activists nurtured the ambitious dream of achieving, via 
an established political party, the NDP, “fundamental social change… an independent 
socialist Canada.”79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
79 Appendix B “The Waffle Manifesto.” 
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Chapter One 
“Our party was born out of protest:” The CCF/NDP, 1932-69 
 
The activists and intellectuals who comprised the Waffle viewed the New 
Democratic Party (NDP) as a logical vehicle through which to advance their own New 
Left agenda.  The NDP, and its predecessor the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 
(CCF), between them had almost four decades of experience on the Canadian political 
scene, both nationally and provincially, organizing leftist electoral challenges to a 
political status quo dominated by the Liberal and Conservative parties, as well as striving 
to distance themselves from challengers, Communists in particular, that existed on their 
own left.  The institutional and electoral history of the CCF and its successor NDP, which 
in summary fashion is the subject of this chapter, can be placed within four more or less 
distinct periods.  Formed in Calgary in 1932, the CCF reached the height of its popularity 
in the midst of the Second World War.  However, the period of its greatest successes – 
including forming the government in Saskatchewan in 1944 and briefly leading the 
national polls in 1943 – was relatively short-lived.  As the Liberals and Progressive 
Conservatives moved to the left, and business organizations funded vicious anti-CCF 
campaigns, the party lost its luster.  The CCF outside Saskatchewan never regained the 
popularity it enjoyed during the Second World War, and saw its electoral record decline 
in the heightened tension of the Cold War.  By the mid-1950s, party leaders became 
convinced there was little future for the CCF and sought to moderate the party’s 
commitment to socialism.  At the same time, the CCF worked in conjunction with 
sympathetic trade union leaders to largely purge Communists from the labour movement 
and to establish a new party, the NDP, in 1961.  Although the NDP initially struggled to 
win more support than the CCF had experienced, by the summer of 1969 it had 
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profoundly influenced Canadian politics and society, held significant representation in 
legislatures across the country, and appeared to be on the cusp of gaining power in 
several provinces. 
In each of these periods – the CCF’s formative years (1932-40), its rise (1941-45) 
and decline (1946-60), and the NDP’s early history (1961-69) – the prospects and 
policies of the parties were determined primarily by the economic and political context of 
the time as well as by such internal factors as party leadership, organization, and 
membership.  This chapter addresses these internal factors as well as examining the 
effects of the political economy more broadly on the party’s fortunes.1  The impact of the 
Great Depression which devastated the economy and left millions unemployed, sent 
farmers’ incomes plummeting, and made one in five Canadians dependent on relief for 
survival, profoundly influenced the early days of the CCF.  Extensive economic planning, 
coordination and oversight by the federal government during the Second World War 
combined with a war weary populace’s demands for postwar social security, briefly 
enhanced the CCF’s popularity and prospects.  But following the war, the party 
experienced a drop in popularity as the Cold War encouraged public suspicions of 
socialism.  Furthermore, postwar prosperity contradicted the CCF’s claims of capitalist 
collapse.  In the 1960s, crises in the postwar society – decolonization, the civil rights and 
anti-Vietnam War movements in the United States, renewed and intensified nationalism 
in both Quebec and English Canada – created political opportunities and challenges for 
the newly-established NDP.   
                                                        
1 This approach draws from Benjamin Isitt and Nelson Wiseman, “Social Democracy in 20th Century 
Canada: An Interpretive Framework,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 40, no. 3 (2007): 567-89; and 
from McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals, especially his description of a “reconnaissance” strategy of research, 
81-2. 
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The history of the CCF/NDP is significant to the Waffle story because that history 
informed and influenced the decisions made by Waffle activists and NDP leaders alike.  
For Wafflers, the very existence of a social democratic party with a direct connection to 
the labour movement and a history championing left causes contrasted the Canadian New 
Left from its American neighbour.  Furthermore, the sense that the NDP had moderated 
its commitment to socialism and strayed from the CCF’s founding principles lent 
substance to the Waffle’s arguments and appealed to some long-time party members.2  
On the other hand party and union leaders, who had spent decades struggling to rid the 
labour movement of Communist influence, saw the Waffle as a reincarnation of these 
left-wing rivals.3  The close ties the party enjoyed with the labour movement had only 
recently been established with the NDP’s formation in 1961, and party and union leaders 
were determined to preserve this connection. 
As will become obvious in this chapter, characterizing the CCF/NDP as a singular 
entity presents a challenge.4  Whereas most historians have focused on either the national 
party or one of the provincial parties as the basis of analysis, clear distinctions between 
the federal and provincial parties are often difficult to discern.  The national CCF, beyond 
its caucus and small central office, existed essentially as a conglomeration of provincial 
sections with overlapping memberships.  As a result, any attempts at characterizing the 
                                                        
2 For example, James Laxer and Gerald Caplan claimed the NDP had been “born at the end of a long 
ideological retreat on the part of its predecessor, the CCF.” Laxer and Caplan, “Perspectives on un-
American Traditions in Canada,” in Close the 49th Parallel etc: The Americanization of Canada, ed. Ian 
Lumsden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 315. 
3 As Desmond Morton explained about the Waffle and party moderates at the time, “both sides are 
consciously or unconsciously re-running the battles of the 1930s and 40s.” Morton, “Reconciling the 
extremes within the NDP,” Toronto Star, March 8, 1972. 
4 James Naylor likewise argues that “it is difficult to characterize the CCF as a whole.  CCFers came from a 
range of radical and reform currents and organized themselves into various affiliated organizations.  Also 
the balance between different currents in the CCF could vary dramatically from province to province” and 
asserts “the CCF was a study in ambiguity and little can be gained by attempting to proclaim on the essence 
of the party.” The Fate of Labour Socialism, 9, 17. 
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party’s ideological shifts by a limited focus on a single component of the party risks 
oversimplification.5  The CCF/NDP has been since its founding a coalescence of multiple 
interests, personalities, ideas, policies, and strategies, operating in all of Canada’s diverse 
regions and at all three levels of Canadian politics, thereby defying easy categorization. 
 Before the CCF’s creation, various left-wing currents surfaced in Canada during a 
surge of radical political activity following the First World War.  The 1919 Winnipeg 
General Strike was the largest and most visible manifestation of increasingly intensive 
worker activism that included labour organizing and striking for union recognition.6  
Labourist and socialist parties emerged throughout the 1920s, including the Communist 
Workers’ Party in 1922.  Several Independent Labour Parties (ILP) elected members in 
Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Vancouver and Hamilton, while the Socialist Party of 
Canada (SPC) and the Social Democratic Party of Canada (after 1920 the Federated 
Labour Party) offered unique interpretations of socialism.7  The Trades and Labour 
Congress (TLC) formed the Canadian Labour Party (CLP) in a bid to elect union 
candidates municipally, provincially and federally, even attempting collaboration with 
Communists in the CLP, albeit with difficulty, before largely abandoning the project in 
1928.8 
                                                        
5 For example, in 1936-7 the Saskatchewan CCF moved to the right, the British Columbia CCF shifted 
clearly to the left, and in the late 1960s the Manitoba NDP moved to the right while the Saskatchewan NDP 
campaigned on one of the most left-wing platforms in the party’s history. 
6 Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement: A Brief History (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 
1996), 54-5.  See also James Naylor, The New Democracy: Challenging the Social Order in Industrial 
Ontario 1914-1925 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) on the post-First World War workers’ 
revolt. 
7 McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals, 152-4.  See also Ian McKay, Reasoning Otherwise: Leftists and the 
People’s Enlightenment in Canada, 1890-1920 (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2008). 
8 Norman Penner, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 130.  The 
CLP continued to be active in Alberta through the creation of the CCF, to which it affiliated, in 1932. 
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 Growing numbers of farmers rejected the established Liberal and Conservative 
parties in resounding fashion, electing United Farmers governments in Ontario in 1919, 
and in Alberta and Manitoba in 1921.  The farmers’ electoral rebellion extended into the 
federal election of 1921 when fifty-eight members of the newly-formed Progressive Party 
won seats in the House of Commons.9  Although Prime Minister William Lyon 
Mackenzie King eventually wooed many Progressives back to the Liberal Party, a 
remnant of the Progressive caucus eventually allied with Labour MPs James Shaver 
Woodsworth (Winnipeg North Centre), William Irvine (Calgary East), and, A.A. Heaps 
(Winnipeg North).10  Holding the balance of power after the 1925 federal election 
produced a Liberal minority government, Woodsworth, Heaps and a faction of left-
leaning Progressive MPs formed the ‘Ginger Group’ whose achievements included 
forcing King to introduce old-age pension legislation in exchange for their support.11 
Outside Parliament, coordination and cooperation among farmers, workers and 
socialists proved harder to achieve, despite their often shared common intellectual 
heritage.12  In Saskatchewan, where farmers had supported the Liberal Party in the 1920s 
and the Progressives had never challenged for provincial power, the United Farmers of 
                                                        
9 W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950) remains the 
classic history of the Progressives. 
10 Kenneth McNaught, Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1959), 165-6. 
11 Ibid., 213. 
12 Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Fedration in 
Saskatchewan: A Study in Political Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), 73-4.  
Influenced by the Social Gospel, Marxism, labourism, agrarian radicalism and populism as well as a variety 
of European and American socialists, the leaders and activists who comprised the CCF drew from a 
remarkably expansive intellectual heritage.  As well as the British Labour Party and the Fabian Society, 
Edward Bellamy, Henry George and Herbert Spencer all featured prominently alongside Marx and others.  
Ian McKay details the various influences on socialists and radicals during the first two decades of the 20th 
century in Reasoning Otherwise: Leftists and the People’s Enlightenment in Canada, 1890-1920 (Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 2008).  See also Allen Mills, “Single Tax, Socialism and the Independent Labour Party 
of Manitoba,” Labour/Le Travail 5 (Spring 1980), 33-56, and Robert A.J. McDonald, “‘Telford Time’ and 
the Populist Origins of the CCF in British Columbia,” Labour/Le Travail 71 (Spring 2013), 87-100. 
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Canada (Saskatchewan Section) [hereafter UFC (SS)] moved steadily to the left, adopting 
in 1930 a radical farmers’ program committed to political action based on socialist 
ideas.13  Around the same time the Western Labour Parties Conference, first held in 
Regina in 1929, connected workers’ and farmers’ organizations.14  In the summer of 
1931, a joint conference of the UFC (SS) and the Saskatchewan ILP, led by former 
teacher and Regina city councillor M.J. Coldwell, agreed to work together to “establish a 
cooperative commonwealth” and support political candidates committed to the same.15  
Developments occurred quickly thereafter.  In May 1932, members of the ‘Ginger Group’ 
meeting in William Irvine’s Parliament Hill office agreed to form a national political 
party.16  The following month the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) also agreed to 
cooperate with like-minded organizations in creating a “cooperative commonwealth,” and 
in July the UFC (SS) and the Saskatchewan ILP elected Coldwell as leader of the 
Farmer-Labour Group in their province.17  In August the Western Labour Conference, 
including the Manitoba and Saskatchewan ILPs, the Socialist Party of Canada, and labour 
parties from Alberta, were joined in Calgary by representatives from the UFA, the UFC 
(SS) and several left-wing intellectuals from the League for Social Reconstruction 
(LSR).18  This meeting’s outcome was the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 
                                                        
13 Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, 76-77, 79, 82. 
14 Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 29. 
15 Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, 104.   
16 McNaught, Prophet in Politics, 259, Michiel Horn, “The LSR, the CCF and the Regina Manifesto,” in 
Building the Co-operative Commonwealth, 27. 
17 The Farmer-Labour Group gained a MLA before the election when Progressive Jacob Benson left the 
governing Progressive-Conservative coalition to sit as a Farmer-Labour representative. 
18 Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 55-56.  The League for Social Reconstruction, modeled on the British 
Fabian Society, included Frank Scott, Eugene Forsey, Frank Underhill and King Gordon, and sought to 
examine and promote socialist solutions to society’s problems.  See also Michiel Horn, The League for 
Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1980); Frank Milligan, Eugene A. Forsey: An Intellectual Biography (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 2003); and Keith R. Fleming, The World is Our Parish: John King Gordon, 1900-1989: An 
Intellectual Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). 
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(Farmer, Labour, Socialist), an amalgam of the various constituent organizations. J.S. 
Woodsworth, by then a prominent and respected Labour MP, an ally of farmers, and the 
honourary president of the LSR, was elected president of the new political party.19 
 The CCF at its convention in Regina the following year endorsed as its party 
platform the Regina Manifesto. The Manifesto’s meaning and significance has been 
much debated ever since.  Ian McKay’s description is as accurate as any.  He deemed the 
Manifesto: “a sandwich; it had a moderate middle between two slices of radicalism.”20  In 
calling for the eradication of capitalism, the Manifesto was uncompromising in its 
criticism of what it perceived as a failed economic system needing replacement by public 
ownership and economic planning.  Sweeping in scope, the Manifesto catalogued a long 
list of urgent reforms including increased public expenditures on housing, schools, and 
parks, tax reform, a labour code to improve working conditions, and free universal health 
care.21  Drafted by Frank Underhill, a University of Toronto professor of History and co-
founder of the LSR, the Regina Manifesto expanded upon the LSR’s own manifesto, 
whose contributors included Eugene Forsey, a lecturer at McGill University, King 
Gordon, a professor at the United Theological College in Montreal, and Frank Scott, a 
poet and law professor at McGill University.  Most notable among the few changes made 
                                                        
19 Possibly the only leader the various groups in attendance could unite behind, J.S. Woodsworth had 
widespread appeal as a long-standing and principled opponent of injustice in Canada. 
20 Ian McKay, “The Maritime CCF: Reflections on a Tradition,” in Toward a New Maritimes: A Selection 
from Ten Years of New Maritimes, eds. Ian McKay and Scott Milson (Charlottetown: Ragweed Press, 
1992), 70. 
21 Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 58-9; Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 38-45.  The reformist nature 
of its program can obscure the Marxist basis of the Manifesto’s critique of capitalism – and vice versa, 
depending on the reader.  James Naylor points out that even CCFers who rejected “reformism” in favour of 
overthrowing capitalism still espoused an “immediate program” of enactable measures to implement if 
elected.  Naylor criticizes Whitehorn and Walter Young for characterizing the early CCF as moderate and 
opposed to revolution.  Naylor emphasizes the commitment of early CCFers to public ownership and 
replacing capitalism with socialism, even if they were “gradualists.”  Nevertheless he argues that the LSR’s 
influence at the Regina convention “suggest a strategic moment in an ongoing coup, as the contingent of 
working-class socialists were marginalized at an important moment in the creation of the new movement.” 
Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 71-2, 105. 
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to the draft manifesto at the CCF convention was the addition of the rousing closing 
sentence – “no CCF government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and 
put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the 
establishment in Canada of the Cooperative Commonwealth.”22  Although Underhill later 
disavowed the Manifesto and criticized the radical additions to it, historian Michiel Horn 
points out “the sentence was not fundamentally out of harmony with the rest of the 
manifesto or, indeed, with Underhill’s draft.”23 
 With a nascent party structure in place and stirring manifesto in hand, CCF 
supporters next confronted the formidable task of establishing provincial parties from 
among the various leftist fragments, as well as organizing for the next federal election. 
The CCF’s structure as a federation of affiliated organizations proved both boon and 
burden.  First off the mark was British Columbia, where the Socialist Party of Canada, 
the successor to the ILP (Socialist) of BC, was initially the CCF’s sole affiliate in that 
province. The SPC’s membership included radicals such as Ernest Winch, the former 
president of the Vancouver and District Labour Council and a committed socialist, and 
his son, Harold, as well as the moderate ILP MP Angus MacInnis (Vancouver South).  
Members of the Vancouver and Victoria LSR clubs formed the short-lived 
Reconstruction Party to join the CCF, while otherwise unaffiliated individuals got on 
board by establishing CCF clubs.  At the BC party’s founding convention in September 
1933 an election platform for contesting the provincial campaign in November was 
                                                        
22 “Regina Manifesto” in The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea, ed. Michael S. Cross, 23. 
23 Horn, “The LSR, the CCF and the Regina Manifesto,” 33.  M.J. Coldwell would later describe the 
sentence as a “millstone around the party’s neck.”  It may well have been written by two other members of 
the LSR, Scott and Gordon, anxious to preserve the spirit of the original.  See Fleming, The World is Our 
Parish, 104-5. 
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endorsed.24  Running candidates in most ridings, the BC CCF won over thirty per cent of 
the vote and elected seven members, a commendable first try, but not enough to prevent 
the return to power of self-proclaimed reformer “Duff” Patullo’s Liberal government. 
 In Saskatchewan, M.J. Coldwell led the Farmer-Labour Group established in 
1931 by the UFC (SS) and the ILP into the June 1934 provincial election, winning a 
respectable twenty-five per cent of the popular vote and five seats after enduring a 
campaign marked by intense opposition from the press and the Roman Catholic Church.25  
Here too the election result proved disappointing insofar as Coldwell’s team failed to 
capitalize sufficiently on farmers’ discontent with the incumbent Conservative 
government of James Anderson to prevent James Gardiner’s Liberals from sweeping into 
office with a large majority. 
 A lack of ideological unity among the disparate groups that constituted the CCF 
was most apparent in Ontario.  A dispute in early 1934 within the Ontario CCF over 
whether to support the Communist-linked Canadian Labour Defence League deepened 
existing divisions between moderates in the Ontario CCF and members of the radical and 
influential Labour Conference, comprised of several small labour and socialist parties.  
When the moderate UFO disaffiliated from the CCF, the CCF National Council 
intervened by dissolving and then reconstituting the Ontario party, thereby eliminating 
the federated structure in favour of straight party memberships for individuals.26  Given 
                                                        
24 Young, “Ideology, Personality and the Origin of the CCF in British Columbia,” BC Studies, 32 (Winter 
1976-77), 139-62. 
25 Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, 107. 
26 Gerald L. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1973), 50-62; Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 125-42.  Naylor emphasizes the role long-
time Liberal Elmore Philpott played in ostracizing the Labour Conference during his brief tenure in the 
CCF.  He indicates that the conflict was another moment in the process of transforming the party from the 
working-class character of the labour socialists to the middle-class social democracy it embraced after the 
Second World War.  Naylor argues that “the contest in Ontario was particularly explosive, due to the 
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its recent internal conflict and reorganization, the party was not surprisingly ill- prepared 
for its first provincial electoral contest that same summer.  With candidates running in 
just over one-third of Ontario’s ridings, the CCF drew seven per cent of the popular vote 
and elected just one member in the face of the Liberal party’s sweep to power under the 
flamboyant leadership of Mitchell Hepburn. 
 Although the UFA and the Canadian Labour Party in Alberta had experienced 
electoral success and held seats in the provincial legislature, when both organizations 
affiliated with the CCF they carried significant problems.  The UFA had remained in 
government since 1921, and the CLP shared municipal power with centrists in Edmonton 
and Calgary.  But the desire of both groups to retain their autonomy prevented them from 
cooperating in essential outreach and organizational activities following their affiliation 
within the CCF.  Moreover, the unpopularity of Premier Richard Reid’s scandal-ridden 
UFA government, as well as the Labour-led municipal government in Edmonton, 
contributed to Albertans backing William Aberhart’s nascent Social Credit Party, which 
swept into office with a massive majority in the 1935 provincial election.27 
 The CCF’s first federal election results in the fall of 1935 also proved 
disappointing.  With candidates contesting only half of the country’s ridings, including 
just three east of Ontario, the party was not a serious contender for government.  Its 
campaign platform, which emphasized the Regina Manifesto, the socialization of banks 
and finance, social insurance, new public works, the cessation of farm and home 
foreclosures and neutrality in wartime, failed to sway many, who opted instead for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
relationship of forces representing the older tradition of labour socialism and the newcomers who rejected 
this class-based epistemology.” 
27 Alvin Finkel, “Obscure Origins: The Confused Early History of the Alberta CCF,” in Building the Co-
operative Commonwealth, 99-122. 
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Mackenzie King’s Liberals despite Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett’s last 
minute embrace of a Franklin Delano Roosevelt inspired “New Deal.”28  The following 
summer, candidates in the Manitoba provincial election ran under the ILP-CCF banner, 
although as the party’s membership expanded, primarily from the growing number of 
CCF Clubs, the ILP was undergoing a slow demise as an independent entity.29  Running 
few candidates and facing a popular leader in the Liberal-Progressives’ John Bracken, the 
party elected only seven MLAs with twelve per cent of the popular vote, primarily in 
north and central Winnipeg.30 
 Despite failing to persuade a majority of Canadians to adopt a socialist solution to 
the Depression, those whom the CCF did elect rapidly became advocates of enhanced 
public services and civil liberties in Canadian society, and critics of governments for 
failing to staunch worsening unemployment and unchecked monopoly capitalism.31  In 
Saskatchewan, significant support developed for pursuing an electoral alliance with 
Social Credit.  For example, the Baptist minister Tommy Douglas had won his federal 
seat for the CCF in 1935 with Social Credit support and nomination.  However, federal 
CCF leaders expressed grave concerns about the potential alliance.32  Regardless, the 
Saskatchewan CCF dropped all references to socialism at its 1936 convention, abandoned 
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the party’s commitment to land nationalization and continued to seek electoral coalitions 
with Social Credit in select ridings.33 
 The British Columbia CCF also explored new directions.  After contesting a 
leaderless election campaign in 1933, its seven-member caucus chose Robert Connell, an 
Anglican clergyman and member of the Victoria LSR, as house leader.  Connell clashed 
with Ernest Winch and other party leaders, and rival newspapers the Clarion and the 
Commonwealth debated the CCF’s policies and internal struggles.34  The divide came to a 
head when Connell repudiated Winch’s “Marxist and revolutionary” positions on the 
floor of the provincial legislature.35  When left-wingers moved no-confidence in Connell 
at the 1936 BC CCF convention the motion was defeated but the left dominated elections 
to the executive that in turn wielded authority over the party caucus.  Unwilling to accept 
such ideological constraints and facing expulsion, Connell joined three other members of 
the CCF caucus in forming the short-lived Social Constructives party.36 
 The federated structure of the early CCF clearly posed challenges in Ontario, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia, where the various organizations 
comprising the provincial parties strove to ensure their autonomy and the primacy of their 
own ideological positions and leaders.  But more positively, the decentralized structure 
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also presented opportunities for an array of leftists, unionists, farmers, women, and 
socialists to engage with the CCF, and accommodated a wide mix of ideological 
discourse, ranging from Marxism and populism, to Christian socialism and labourism.  
Furthermore, the early CCF had strong links to several social movements of the 1930s, 
including the unemployed and pacifist movements, although little connection with a 
diminished women’s movement.  As circumstances in the labour movement changed in 
the 1930s and 1940s and under the influence of David Lewis, the CCF sought closer ties 
with trade unions. 
 The struggles faced by single unemployed men during the Depression, and the 
refusal of multiple levels of government to offer them adequate relief, sparked protests 
across Canada, including the 1935 On-to-Ottawa trek.  The BC CCF, for instance, was 
outspoken in defending the unemployed men’s demands for relief, and members 
routinely attended, spoke at and led rallies and demonstrations in support.37  In addition 
to the economic crisis of the Depression, many CCFers argued that the capitalist system 
was responsible for war.  Early CCF policy statements, from the Regina Manifesto to the 
party’s election platforms, demonstrated their commitment to pacifism, and close links 
existed between the CCF and various pacifist and Christian organizations, such as the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation. Pacifists abounded in the CCF, LSR and Co-operative Commonwealth 
Youth Movement (CCYM).38  However, the danger of fascism challenged the party’s 
commitment to pacifism, initially when faced with Communist and socialist struggles 
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against Franco in Spain from 1936-39, and subsequently from the looming spectre of war 
with Germany.39   
The CCF’s relationship with the women’s and labour movements was not as 
strong in the 1930s.  Women formed an “important presence” in the CCF and in some 
cases, such as the Women’s Joint Committee in Toronto, organized around distinctively 
women’s issues during the Depression.  However, their influence within the party was 
limited and long-time female party activists were often frustrated by the lack of 
leadership opportunities and their relegation to secondary tasks like making coffee and 
stuffing envelopes.40  Despite Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees leader A.R. 
Mosher’s attendance at the party’s founding meeting, the CCF struggled to attract support 
from trade unions and their leaders throughout the 1930s.  The rivalry between the Trades 
and Labour Congress (TLC) and the All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL), the two 
primary English-Canadian union centrals, constrained the party’s ability to win support.  
The TLC, suspicious of the party’s ties to the ACCL, kept its distance and repeatedly 
rejected appeals to support the CCF, while sympathetic ACCL leaders such as Mosher 
distanced themselves from the party in a vain effort to avoid antagonizing the TLC.41  
Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Workers’ Unity League in 1936, Communist 
organizers and union leaders formed a significant part of the labour movement in Canada, 
and enjoyed support even from members who disagreed with their politics.42 
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Circumstances in the labour movement changed rapidly during the late 1930s.  
Industrial unions organized by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) began to 
expand and CCF and Communist activists alike struggled alongside workers in their often 
bitter fights for union recognition and collective bargaining rights.43  Nevertheless, it 
came as a surprise to CCF leaders when, after a lengthy struggle in 1938 between 
Communists and moderates to represent Cape Breton mineworkers, District 26 of the 
United Mine Workers (UMW) sought to affiliate with the CCF.  After much debate the 
CCF adopted a policy allowing for union affiliation, and established a Nova Scotia 
section of the party in 1939.44  David Lewis, arguably the most significant figure in the 
history of the CCF/NDP, supported union affiliation to the party.45  Lewis is rightly 
acknowledged as the guiding force of the CCF and chief architect of its successor.  A 
Rhodes Scholar and labour lawyer who developed a healthy respect for the British 
Labour Party while at Oxford, Lewis returned to Canada in 1935 to serve as the CCF’s 
national secretary.46  Serving in that position until 1950, Lewis strove to build a party 
organization with limited resources while imposing discipline and solidarity on the oft-
divided party.  Furthermore, Lewis worked closely with union leaders, especially in the 
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Steelworkers, to expel Communists from the labour movement, take over Communist 
dominated unions, and affiliate unions to the CCF.47 
The CCF struggled to improve its electoral fortunes.  The party’s share of the 
popular vote declined in provincial elections in British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan,  
and Alberta throughout the 1930s, as well as federally in 1940.  In many cases the party 
failed even to muster a full slate of candidates.48  The CCF was also divided over 
Canada’s decision to enter the Second World War in September 1939, most notably due 
to the pacifist convictions of its leader J.S. Woodsworth, while others, including 
Saskatchewan CCF leader George Williams and Winnipeg MP A.A. Heaps, advocated 
full support for the war effort.  An attempt by the CCF’s National Council to calm 
tensions in the party with a compromise position endorsing limited participation in the 
war resulted in Woodsworth, true to his pacifist principles, tendering his resignation as 
party leader.49  When the National Council refused the resignation it was Woodsworth 
who led the CCF in the 1940 federal election campaign, although it fell largely on M.J. 
Coldwell to explain the party’s position opposing military conscription of manpower and 
urging “greater equality of sacrifice,” state planning of the economy, and nationalization 
of wartime industries.50  The CCF gains were marginal with eight MPs elected on 8.4 per 
cent of the popular vote, while King’s Liberals were returned with a massive majority 
winning 179 of the 245 seats. 
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If the 1940 federal election demonstrated the CCF’s “capacity for survival,” 
events in Manitoba quickly posed a new challenge to the party’s long-term prospects.51  
A proposal by Premier Bracken to form a non-partisan coalition government appealed to 
many in the Manitoba CCF who were convinced their party could ill afford to oppose the 
popular premier in wartime, much less force an election for which they were unprepared.  
Although David Lewis and the national CCF executive opposed the coalition proposal, 
the Manitoba party accepted Bracken’s offer.  Seymour Farmer, the Manitoba CCF party 
leader, entered Bracken’s cabinet as Minister of Labour, the only CCF MLA to be given 
a seat at the table.  The arrangement proved disastrous for the CCF.  The coalition 
government accepted none of Farmer’s reform proposals, and the CCF eventually 
withdrew its support in 1942 after Bracken bolted to federal politics as leader of the 
recently renamed Progressive Conservative Party.52  Meanwhile, back in Manitoba, the 
CCF would be reduced to three seats in the ensuing 1945 election. 
Bracken’s departure signaled a move to the left by both the PCs and the Liberals 
as they tapped into growing public support for social security programs.53  CCF fortunes 
improved over the course of the war.  Massive industrial expansion went hand-in-hand 
with widespread government planning and control, lending credence to the CCF’s 
arguments in favour of nationalization and economic planning while simultaneously 
adding thousands of industrial workers to the party’s base of support.54  The ACCL had 
merged with the CIO in 1940 to form the Congress of Canadian Labour (CCL), which 
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experienced rapid growth.55  By 1942 its membership had grown to 200,000 from 70,000 
in 1940, a potential body of support the CCF hoped to attract with its policies of postwar 
planning and social security programs, labour rights, and the conscription of wealth for 
the war effort.56  Shamefully, the party also endorsed the wartime internment and 
deportation of Japanese-Canadians.57   
 The first indication of a boost in party support appeared in British Columbia 
where the CCF, now led by Harold Winch, won 33.4 per cent of the popular vote in the 
October 1941 provincial election and doubled to fourteen its representation in the 
legislature.  Reduced to a minority, the governing Liberals were forced into a coalition 
with the Conservatives, which ensured Duff Patullo’s resignation as premier.58  One week 
later in Nova Scotia, Cape Breton elected the first three Maritime CCF MLAs thereby 
solidifying the party’s beachhead on the island first established by Clarence Gillis’s 
election to the House of Commons in 1940.  A federal by-election in February 1942 in 
the Toronto working-class riding of York South, long a safe Conservative seat, was 
expected to provide a coronation for Conservative leader Arthur Meighen as he sought to 
return to the House of Commons after an absence of sixteen years.  Instead, a surprise 
upset resulted when schoolteacher Joseph Noseworthy of the CCF took the seat in the 
absence of a Liberal candidate.   The next generation of party leaders was also emerging 
at the time as exemplified by United Church minister Stanley Knowles replacing 
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Woodsworth in the riding of Winnipeg North Centre, and Ted Joliffe and Tommy 
Douglas taking over as leaders of the Ontario and Saskatchewan CCF respectively. 
 The CCF’s upward trend continued with the August 1943 election in Ontario 
where a real breakthrough appeared possible.  The party’s support in the popular vote 
surged to nearly thirty-two per cent, enough to elect thirty-four members, only four fewer 
than the victorious Conservatives.  Five days later, four federal by-election losses – two 
to the CCF in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and two in Montreal to the Labour-
Progressives and the Bloc Populaire – convinced Mackenzie King that his governing 
Liberal party might be in trouble, an impression confirmed by a September 1943 Gallup 
poll that placed the CCF narrowly ahead of the Liberals, twenty-nine per cent to twenty-
eight per cent.59  The party’s growing popularity and strongly expressed dissatisfaction 
towards the King government’s labour policies inspired the 1943 CCL convention to 
endorse the CCF and encourage its union locals to affiliate with the party. 
 During the summer of 1944 Tommy Douglas led the Saskatchewan CCF to an 
astounding election victory, winning over fifty-three per cent of the popular vote and 
forty-seven of the legislature’s fifty-two seats.  A variety of factors had contributed to the 
upset: a forceful campaign promising expanded social services, security of farm 
ownership, and improved farm incomes; a strong party organization boasting an 
increasingly active membership; and Douglas’s personal appeal.60  Douglas in turn 
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acknowledged the fortuitous timing of the election: “we were lucky in Saskatchewan.  
We happened to come in in 1944 when the tide was running in.”61 
The election of one CCF MLA in the Quebec provincial election of 1944, when 
the party ran candidates in fewer than one-third of the constituencies and espoused a 
strong federal government, also prompted hopes that perhaps the party was on track to 
acquire a truly national presence.62  However, the 1944 provincial election in Alberta, 
coming on the heels of popular Social Credit Premier William Aberhart’s death, proved 
disappointing to the CCF.  Ernest Manning led the Social Credit to re-election, 
solidifying its grip on power in Alberta and restricting the CCF to twenty-three per cent 
of the popular vote and just two MLAs.  It appeared the tide might already have started to 
roll out.63 
 The CCF’s opponents also increasingly took aim at the perceived socialist 
upstarts. Prime Minister King sought to undercut CCF appeal by legislating social 
benefits such as family allowances and a veterans’ charter, and promising an expanding 
list of postwar reconstruction and social security programs.  Furthermore, after the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union sparked a reversal in the Canadian communist 
position on the war effort, from opposition to full-fledged support, both the federal and 
Ontario Liberal parties arranged unstated coalitions with the communists in working-
class ridings that undercut CCF support.64  Business organizations, including insurance 
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companies and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, attacked the CCF by aggressively 
expounding the benefits of free enterprise and cautioning the public against the perils of 
socialism.65  Gladstone Murray, a former journalist and CBC manager, and Burdick 
Trestrail, a former advertiser and consultant, received funding from business to attack the 
CCF via speeches, advertising, publications and direct mail.66  In conjunction with 
criticisms hurled by the press, religious leaders, and several business organizations, 
Murray and Trestrail warned that the CCF’s socialism would lead inevitably to 
totalitarianism.  Shortly before the 1945 provincial election, Ontario CCF leader Ted 
Joliffe accused Conservative Premier George Drew of organizing a Gestapo-like “secret 
police” unit of the OPP to spy on the party.  Drew vehemently denied the accusations, 
and received support from the press when he counter-attacked the CCF for making 
desperately slanderous allegations.67  The resulting national furor severely damaged the 
CCF’s prospects in Ontario where it lost twenty-six seats and watched its popular vote 
fall to 22.4 per cent during the June provincial election. The backlash was also felt during 
the federal election held one week later. 
Despite achieving the highest popular vote (15.5 per cent) and seat count (twenty-
eight) in its history to this point, the CCF had cause for disappointment with the 1945 
federal election results.  The party nominated candidates in most ridings outside Quebec 
and won a significant share of the popular vote in seat-rich Ontario, but failed to elect a 
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single MP in that province.68  Provincial election returns in Manitoba and British 
Columbia during October were further confirmation that fierce opposition had stalled the 
CCF’s momentum.  Despite winning the largest share of the popular vote (33.8 per cent) 
in Manitoba, the ability of the governing coalition of Liberal-Progressives and 
Conservatives to coordinate the allocation of seats resulted in the CCF electing only nine 
MLAs out of the legislature’s fifty-five.  The decision of two MLAs to run as 
“Independent CCF” candidates after facing discipline for advocating closer cooperation 
with Communists provoked a controversy that deeply divided the provincial party and 
marred its campaign.69  Similarly in the British Columbia contest the Liberal and 
Conservative electoral coalition contributed to the CCF losing four seats despite 
capturing over thirty-seven per cent of the popular vote. 
The years 1946 to 1960 were marked by a long decline for the CCF.  In the Cold 
War environment, promoters of public ownership and socialism were easily suspected of 
being atheistic communist sympathizers.  Adding insult to injury, CCF predictions of 
economic crisis and capitalist collapse were undercut by the relative prosperity Canada 
was enjoying in the immediate postwar years.  At the same time the party reduced its 
earlier commitments to public ownership and focused instead on economic planning and 
social welfare measures, yet efforts at presenting a more moderate image failed to attract 
widespread support.  Developments in the labour movement, however, particularly the 
exclusion of communist unionists and the creation of the Canadian Labour Congress 
(CLC) in 1956, promised new opportunities for CCF leaders determined to forge a closer 
connection between the party and the unions. 
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Admittedly, the news for the CCF in the immediate postwar years was not all bad.  
In the Ontario provincial election of June 1948 financial support from the CCL’s Political 
Action Committee substantially augmented the CCF’s advertising budget.  The improved 
results – a rebound in its popular vote to twenty-seven per cent, the party’s return to 
Official Opposition status with twenty-one seats, and the personal defeat of Conservative 
Premier George Drew by CCFer William Temple – demonstrated to the CCF and its 
union supporters the potential benefits of closer cooperation with organized labour.70  
Seventeen days later, Tommy Douglas’s CCF was returned in Saskatchewan with  a 
reduced majority of thirty-one seats and 47.5 per cent of the popular vote.  However, 
undermining these positive signs was a continued slippage in the CCF’s popular vote 
generally, often resulting in significant numbers of lost seats, as occurred in the 1949 
federal election when over half its caucus fell leaving a rump of only thirteen MPs.  
Provincial elections in Manitoba in 1949 and Ontario in 1951 mirrored this decline; in 
Ontario, for instance, the party lost all but two of its seats.71  Saskatchewan remained the 
party’s bright spot.  There in 1952 the CCF increased its seat count to forty-two, won 
fifty-four per cent of the popular vote, and earned a third term as a result of popular 
reforms and a formidable organization. 
 The Cold War also sharpened divisions, between Communists and CCFers within 
the labour movement, and moderates and radicals within the party.  The CCL established 
a Political Action Committee to act as the political instrument of the labour movement, 
and pro-CCF unionists sought to ensure support for the party despite internal opposition, 
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especially from Communists.72  At times embracing Cold War rhetoric and working in 
tandem with employers and the state, CCF leaders attempted to eliminate Communists 
from influential positions within the Canadian labour movement.  The expulsion of the 
Canadian Seamen’s Union from the TLC in 1949 initiated a series of purges that, by 
1955, had eradicated Communist influence within the Congress.73  Similar battles 
occurred in the industrial unions that comprised the CCL.  Two examples will suffice 
here.  The CCF considered Communist interference the greatest challenge to winning 
seats in automobile manufacturing centres such as Windsor.74  CCF leaders, resentful of 
Communist influence over Canadian UAW director George Burt, worked with the newly 
elected UAW president Walter Reuther to dislodge Communists from the union.  By 
1951 their efforts paid off as a diminished Communist presence forced Burt to embrace 
the pro-CCF stance of the CCL leadership in order to remain in power.75  Similarly, 
CCFers in British Columbia worked to undermine Communists within that province’s 
labour movement wherever possible.  During the ‘Red Wars’ of 1948, their efforts bore 
fruit, first by winning control of the Vancouver Labour Council (affiliated to the CCL), 
next by suspending the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine-
Mill) from the CCL in response to intemperate and critical comments by Communist 
activists about the union’s leadership, and finally by taking advantage of the absence of 
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Mine-Mill delegates to win control of the BC Federation of Labour (BCFL).76  The 
struggles peaked in the battle over BC’s woodworkers.  Amidst attacks from CCF 
unionists, the mainstream press, and the international executive of the International 
Woodworkers of America (IWA), the Communist Labour Progressive Party (LPP) 
decided to break away from the IWA.  In the ensuing legal battles, the courts, the Labour 
Board, and the employers all favoured the IWA.  The inability of LPP leadership to 
garner member support for the break would cost the Communist party one of its largest 
union bases.77  Indeed, the IWA, much like the UAW, became one of the CCF’s strongest 
supporters in the labour movement. 
 Struggles existed within the CCF as well.  In Ontario, the explicit emphasis on 
party organization upset members who felt the party should focus on education.   
Dissatisfied members formed a ‘Ginger Group’ in 1952 with the slogan “Keep Left.”78  
Shortly after, a conflict ensued over the finances and autonomy of the Woodsworth 
Foundation, a progressive think-tank headed by Frank Underhill.  Although members of 
the ‘Ginger Group’ were also active in the Woodsworth Foundation, they disagreed with 
Underhill’s view of the party’s direction.  Underhill, who had been the primary author of 
the Regina Manifesto, argued that the CCF must update its platform from the 1930s, and 
strongly warned against a party dominated by union leaders.79  Historian Dan Azoulay 
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astutely recognizes that conflicts within the Ontario CCF at the time originated in the 
paranoid atmosphere of the Cold War.  Members of the ‘Ginger Group’ and Woodsworth 
Foundation alike were sufficiently fearful of being associated with totalitarianism that 
they exaggerated any tendencies of the CCF toward centralization, bureaucratization, and 
the elimination of dissent.80 
 An atmosphere of fear engendered by the Cold War also loomed large over the 
BC CCF in the 1940s and 1950s.  Foreign policy debates frequently divided ‘left’ and 
‘right’ factions of the provincial party, with moderates led by Angus and Grace MacInnis 
working with national CCF leaders such as David Lewis to curb the influence of radicals 
such as Ernest and Harold Winch, Rodney Young, Bert Herridge, Colin Cameron and 
Dorothy Steeves.81  Angry over this turn to the right, lefists in the BC CCF formed a 
Socialist Caucus, soon renamed the Socialist Fellowship, to fight the moderates’ growing 
influence.  The Socialist Fellowship was short-lived, and dissolved under pressures 
exerted both from without and within.82  Although Harold Winch remained the CCF 
leader, Steeves was removed from her position with the CCF News in 1951.83  The 
party’s ‘right’ faction thus asserted itself in executive elections and, to a lesser extent, in 
the party’s policy platform.  Despite entering the 1952 provincial election campaign 
divided, the BC CCF emerged with the most votes of any party (thirty-four per cent of 
the popular vote) and eighteen seats, decimating the governing Liberal-Conservative 
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coalition which had been created to keep the CCF from power.  Under the short-lived 
preferential ballot system used in BC, many voters placed Social Credit as their second 
choice, allowing the Socreds to elect nineteen members without a leader.  Former 
Conservative MLA W.A.C. Bennett assumed the Social Credit leadership, and with the 
assurance of support from Labour MLA Tom Uphill was offered the opportunity to form 
a government.84  When Bennett engineered his government’s defeat in 1953, hopeful he 
could achieve a majority in the subsequent election, Harold Winch first requested and 
was denied by the lieutenant governor the opportunity to form a government.85  Winch 
subsequently resigned after being heavily criticized by his own caucus.  Arnold Webster, 
his successor, was more moderate, but when he led the ill-prepared party into the 1953 
election the result was a Social Credit majority and the loss of four CCF MLAs. 
 The Manitoba CCF also chose a new leader, United Church minister Lloyd 
Stinson, in preparation for the 1953 election that followed dissolution of the Liberal-
Progressive and Conservative governing coalition.  The CCF assembled only twenty-five 
candidates to run in the election, and returned five MLAs with 16.5 per cent of the 
popular vote as the Liberal-Progressives were swept back into power.86  Although the 
CCF’s popular vote declined in the August 1953 federal election, concentrated support in 
working-class areas of BC, north Winnipeg, Cape Breton and in part of Saskatchewan 
yielded twenty-three seats and further convinced the Ontario CCF of the importance of 
party organization and the new poll-by-poll committee system of identifying supporters.87  
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In November, the architect of that system, former national treasurer Donald C. 
Macdonald, was elected leader of the Ontario party. 
 Ongoing developments in the labour movement continued to impact the CCF.  
The widespread acceptance of collective bargaining and automatic dues check-off 
contributed to lessening spontaneous protests and “wildcat strikes,” while enhancing the 
power of unions and their leadership in negotiating labour relations.88  Combined with 
purges of Communist activists and their unions from the mainstream labour movement, 
the changed labour relations climate (often referred to as “the postwar compromise”) 
allowed senior union leaders to alter significantly the political direction of the Canadian 
labour movement.89  Beginning in 1953, CCL and TLC leaders explored the possibility of 
a merger.  Following the election of the left-wing former president of the Montreal 
Trades and Labour Council Claude Jodoin as TLC president, the two organizations 
merged in 1956 as the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC).  Unlike his earlier efforts to 
secure CCL support for the CCF, David Lewis, in concert with Jodoin, counseled 
patience and made no attempt to ensure the new union centre would immediately back 
the CCF.90  Instead, Lewis initiated discussions with CLC leaders about the possibility of 
creating an entirely new party in the near future. 
 Meeting in Winnipeg in 1956 for the party’s federal convention, CCF leaders 
sought to update the party’s image and policies.  The resulting Winnipeg Declaration, 
written primarily by David Lewis and national secretary Lorne Ingle, moderated the 
CCF’s statement of principles.  In deference to Cold War anxieties, the Winnipeg 
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Declaration contained few condemnations of capitalism and proposed only a limited 
program of public ownership alongside extensive economic planning and social welfare 
reforms.91  The Declaration’s “guarded” language emphasized the modifier “democratic” 
whenever referring to the party’s socialism.92 
 Despite falling to 45.3 per cent of the popular vote and thirty-six seats, Tommy 
Douglas and the Saskatchewan CCF won a fourth consecutive majority in the summer 
1956 election.   Elsewhere the party still appeared to be in decline.  In the Alberta 
election of 1955, Social Credit retained its grip on power while the CCF’s eight per cent 
of the popular vote translated into just two seats and the personal defeat of its leader, 
Elmer Roper.93  That same year in Ontario, the CCF’s new leader Donald Macdonald 
managed to win back York South, but with only 16.5 per cent voter support the party won 
two seats in Oshawa and Hamilton and lost its lone northern Ontario seat.94  For Robert 
Strachan, the BC CCF’s new leader, the 1956 election in that province proved equally 
disheartening.  W.A.C. Bennett and Social Credit enjoyed an increased majority while the 
CCF’s share of the popular vote (28.3 per cent) was its lowest yet in that province.  
Federally the party added two MPs to its caucus in the 1957 election, but was decimated 
by Conservative John Diefenbaker’s historic electoral sweep of the country in 1958.  
When the dust had settled, the CCF was reduced to three northern Ontario ridings, Hazen 
Argue’s seat in Saskatchewan, and four working-class strongholds in BC.  The debacle 
convinced CCF leaders the time had come for a new party and a fresh start. 
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 One month after the federal election, the CLC in convention adopted a resolution 
calling for the establishment of a new “broadly based political movement.”  CCF and 
CLC leaders soon thereafter created the National Committee for the New Party (NCNP).  
Stanley Knowles, who had lost his Winnipeg North Centre seat in the 1958 rout, was 
elected CLC vice-president to work with Lewis in developing a new political party.95  
Farm organizations, unlike in 1932, were uninterested in affiliating with the new party.96  
In addition to the CCF’s existing labour constituency, the NCNP sought to attract 
“professional people and liberally minded persons” through the creation of New Party 
clubs, of which there were 300 by 1961.97  Many CCFers expressed suspicion that an 
influx of union activists and liberal professionals might dilute the commitment to 
socialism and, in the case of labour specifically, use its considerable financial clout and 
large membership to dominate the party. 
Oddly, given the federal CCF’s reliance on its constituent provincial sections, the 
provincial parties were little consulted in the discussion and planning for the new party.98  
Some of those parties, most notably in Manitoba, Ontario, Saskatchewan and BC, had 
managed to overcome the CCF’s general struggle with dwindling support and diminutive 
caucuses to exert an important influence on Canadian political life and society.  In 
Manitoba, for example, where the CCF held the balance of power after the 1958 
provincial election, it backed Duff Roblin’s minority Progressive Conservative 
government in implementing extensive reforms including hospital insurance and a 
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centralized public school system.  The Saskatchewan CCF fought the 1960 provincial 
election over the proposed introduction of Medicare, a provincially-funded, universal 
medical care plan, and won a slightly increased majority despite facing heated opposition 
from the College of Physicians and Surgeons.  Medicare’s successful introduction in 
Saskatchewan two years later was an important first step in the eventual creation of a 
nationwide publicly-funded health insurance plan.  In the British Columbia election of 
1960, Robert Strachan and the CCF vigorously promoted nationalization of the 
province’s hydro-electric industry, enduring Premier W.A.C. Bennett’s taunts about 
socialism in the process, only to have Bennett implement the idea once his government 
was returned to office.99  The CCF’s policy influence in spite of disappointing election 
results prompted some within its ranks to question the need for a new party, and many 
expressed their discontent by supporting MP Douglas Fischer’s unsuccessful attempt to 
challenge David Lewis for the CCF presidency in 1958.100 
 The act of creating the new party involved retaining many aspects of the old CCF, 
although one noteworthy difference was enhanced financial support from organized 
labour.101  Dan Azoulay has shown how in Ontario the new party was “new” in image 
only, and instead of recruiting supporters into New Party clubs, organizers focused on 
bringing them into existing CCF riding associations.  Indeed, the organization of the new 
party often remained reliant upon existing CCF riding associations rather than the New 
Party clubs and donations from labour continued to originate with the same sympathetic 
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union leaders who had supported the CCF.102  Nevertheless, early on there were grounds 
for encouragement when Walter Pitman, a school teacher, won the 1960 federal by-
election as the New Party candidate in Peterborough, a city where the CCF previously 
had been shut out.103  Also positive was the decision by Tommy Douglas, the CCF’s most 
successful politician to date, to run for the new party’s leadership.  Despite David 
Lewis’s efforts to ensure Douglas was acclaimed to the position, Hazen Argue, the CCF 
house leader and only Saskatchewan MP to survive the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958, also 
threw his hat into the ring.  Argue was suspicious of the motives for creating the New 
Party and of the increased influence that labour was likely to exercise within it.  He was 
backed by his caucus mates Douglas Fisher, Frank Howard and Arnold Peters, as well as 
left-wingers in the CCF angered by the party’s apparent rightward drift.104 
 Over two thousand delegates attended the New Party’s July 1961 founding 
convention in Ottawa.  Much about the New Party’s program, with its emphasis on 
economic planning and regulation, progressive taxation, and an expanded welfare state in 
the form of health insurance, pensions and free education, was carried over from the old 
CCF.105  Douglas easily defeated Argue’s challenge for the leadership by 1391 votes to 
380.  Much closer was the decision over the party’s name, with New Democratic Party 
(NDP) eventually winning out over, among other suggestions, the Social Democratic 
Party.106  The excitement generated by the first federal convention was not emulated in 
the provinces.  Founding conventions for the provincial NDP in British Columbia, 
Manitoba and Ontario only highlighted the “lack of substantive change in membership 
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and leadership.”107  Also disheartening was Argue’s decision, six months after losing the 
leadership, to cross the floor and join the Liberals, claiming that labour’s domination of 
the NDP rendered it untenable. 
 The new party’s first electoral test was not long in coming.  Diefenbaker’s PCs 
sought re-election in 1962 following a tumultuous first term in office marked by cabinet 
divisions over nuclear weapons and a feud with Bank of Canada governor James Coyne.  
The NDP’s platform emphasized increased and portable pensions, a federally-funded but 
provincially-run universal medicare program, and a royal commission on bilingualism 
and biculturalism.108  Despite renewed interest in Quebec, the NDP mustered only forty 
candidates for that province’s seventy-five ridings.  Elsewhere in the country it 
assembled almost a full slate of candidates.109  Spending more money on the 1962 
campaign than the CCF had ever managed to amass, the NDP was still vastly outspent by 
both the Liberals and PCs.  In the final week of the campaign the NDP staged several 
massive rallies featuring Tommy Douglas in a bid to draw greater media coverage.110  
But the election returns for the NDP – nineteen seats and 13.6 per cent of the popular 
vote – while an improvement over the CCF’s in 1958, were disappointing nonetheless.  
Although its support remained focused largely in the same areas that previously 
supported the CCF, the NDP was shut out of Saskatchewan despite winning twenty-two 
per cent of the vote in that province, and Tommy Douglas lost in his bid to return to the 
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House of Commons after an absence of eighteen years.111  Particularly galling, Argue 
won re-election for the Liberals. 
The national NDP’s embarrassing failure to win a single seat in Saskatchewan – 
the birthplace of the Regina Manifesto, home to three CCF/NDP leaders, and location of 
the first social democratic government in North America – was not corrected when 
Canadians returned to the polls in 1963 amidst a heated debate over the stationing of 
American nuclear missiles in Canada.  The NDP augmented its previous election 
platform by emphasizing an internationalist foreign policy and strong anti-nuclear stance.  
Douglas, who had been returned in a by-election in British Columbia’s Burnaby-
Coquitlam riding, attempted to convince voters that the Liberals’ pro-nuclear position 
was equivalent to championing continentalism and an American-dominated economy.  
But Douglas struggled to be heard over the clamour of Diefenbaker railing against 
American imperialism in a losing battle against Lester Pearson’s Liberals.  The NDP lost 
three seats and remained in fourth place in the House of Commons.  In the aftermath of 
the 1963 election, delegates to the party’s second national convention in Regina endorsed 
a statement confirming the NDP’s commitment to “democratic socialist” principles and 
agreed that Quebec’s ‘special status’ within Confederation needed to be formally 
recognized.112 
Provincial elections in the early 1960s produced further disappointments for the 
NDP.  A decline in its popular vote in elections in Ontario and British Columbia during 
1963 was an unnecessary reminder of the challenges involved in tackling well-ensconced 
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provincial regimes.  Despite gaining two seats in Ontario, the NDP’s share of the popular 
vote slipped marginally to 15.5 per cent, while in British Columbia a steeper decline in its 
popular vote to 27.8 per cent produced fourteen seats.  A severer blow occurred a year 
later in Saskatchewan where voters replaced the twenty-year-old CCF government with 
Ross Thatcher’s Liberals.113  After the bitterness of the doctors’ strike, the CCF finished 
fewer than 700 votes behind the Liberals in the provincial election, but won only twenty-
five seats to the Liberals’ thirty-two.  “The NDP,” historian Desmond Morton lamented, 
“was at its nadir”.114 
Morton and some other historians of the NDP have interpreted the by-election in 
the Toronto riding of Riverdale in September 1964 as a “turning point” for the party.115  
David Lewis’s 25-year-old son Stephen masterminded for the party a volunteer-based 
door-to-door canvassing and ‘get-out-their-own-vote’ strategy. After contributing to 
NDPer James Renwick’s victory in Riverdale, the strategy became a model for the 
party’s future campaigns.116  Two additional by-election victories in late 1964 – federally 
in Waterloo and provincially in Hanley, Saskatchewan – raised hopes that further gains 
would materialize in the upcoming federal election.  Meanwhile, in 1965 at its third 
national convention, the party at the urging of Robert Cliche, the leader of the Quebec 
NDP, adopted a position endorsing joint federal-provincial consultations and pledged to 
work for French-language rights in English Canada.117 
                                                        
113 The Saskatchewan CCF did not rebrand itself as the NDP until 1967. 
114 Morton, NDP: Dream of Power, 52. 
115 See also Morley, Secular Socialists, 83; Smith Unfinished Journey, 350. 
116 Morton, NDP: Dream of Power, 53-4.  The Riverdale by-election and the “system” became famous in 
the party’s lore.  When clearing out the ONDP’s office in 2007, I discovered a box of old leaflets produced 
about Riverdale to inspire canvassers. 
117 Morton, NDP: Dream of Power, 60-1. 
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In the 1965 federal election that followed, the NDP achieved a record twelve per 
cent of the popular vote in Quebec, but was unable to elect a single member.  Charles 
Taylor, the party’s leading intellectual, lost to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who along with Jean 
Marchand and Gerard Pelletier had recently accepted Pearson’s overtures to join his 
Liberal government.  The NDP platform focused on the creation of a national medicare 
system, promised an immense array of social programs, an increase to old age security, 
and improved federal provincial cooperation and economic planning.118   Winning an 
improved 17.9 per cent of the popular vote, up from 13.6 per cent in 1963, the party only 
increased its seat count by four, up to twenty-one, comprised of nine each in British 
Columbia and Ontario and three in Manitoba.  At least the continued minority 
government status of Pearson’s Liberals seemed to guarantee that the NDP would 
continue to wield influence over it for a while longer.  Indeed, Pearson’s two minority 
governments (1963 to 1965 and 1965 to 1968) often relied on NDP support, resulting in 
several major reforms the CCF/NDP had advocated for years, including a new Canadian 
flag, a public pension plan, and federally-funded public medicare.119 
A series of provincial elections in 1966-67 seriously tested the NDP’s resources.  
Improved results and close races in Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and 
Ontario were gratifying, but in each province the party experienced a turnover in 
leadership following the election.   The departure of Russell Paulley, Robert Strachan, 
Woodrow Lloyd and Donald C. Macdonald, each of whom had led a provincial CCF 
                                                        
118 Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 86. 
119 Although it would be hard to discern from most accounts of Pearson’s government, the Liberals need for 
NDP support significantly influenced the government’s direction.  See P.E. Bryden, Planners and 
Politicians: Liberal Politics and Social Policy, 1957-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1997), 106-8, for a discussion of Medicare’s introduction. 
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party before the advent of the New Party, suggested a significant generational and image 
change was underway. 
The popularity of Duff Roblin’s PCs was waning in Manitoba, and although they 
were reelected in 1966 with a reduced majority and the Liberals returned as Official 
Opposition, the increase in NDP popular vote (23 per cent) and seat count (eleven) were 
grounds for optimism.120  In British Columbia the NDP’s provincial secretary described 
the 1966 provincial election results there as “quite satisfactory,” given the party had 
gained two seats and won over thirty-three per cent of the popular vote even as Social 
Credit under W.A.C. Bennett returned to a sixth term in office with a comfortable 
majority.121  In Saskatchewan the NDP made its debut under Woodrow Lloyd.  Emerging 
only 5200 votes behind Ross Thatcher’s incumbent Liberals, the NDP’s seat total was 
twenty-four to the Liberals’ thirty-five.  Six days later, on October 17, 1967, Ontario 
voters awarded the NDP its best result yet in that province, with 26 per cent of the 
popular vote and twenty seats, including wins in Toronto, Hamilton, Oshawa, 
Scarborough and northern Ontario, as well as in Brantford, Windsor and Peterborough, 
where there had not traditionally been a strong history of CCF support. 
Despite some increases in party strength since 1965 at both the provincial and 
federal levels, pressure was building from NDP members and activists to recruit a new 
generation of leaders. In the aftermath of the British Columbia election, for example, 
union affiliations with the party proliferated after newly-elected MLA Thomas Berger, 
with the support of BCFL secretary Pat O’Neil, announced he would challenge Robert 
                                                        
120 Wiseman, Social Democracy in Manitoba, 110. 
121 Clive Lytle quotation in Isitt, Militant Minority, 178. 
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Strachan’s leadership at the 1967 provincial convention.122 Strachan eventually fended 
off Berger’s challenge by a vote of 277 to 178 among convention delegates.123  A desire 
for generational change was also evident at the national level.124  At the party’s fourth 
national convention held in Toronto during the summer of 1967, a group of ‘Young 
Turks,’ including future provincial party leaders Stephen Lewis and Grant Notley, former 
federal secretary Terry Grier, provincial secretaries John Harney and Clive Lytle, and 
provincial legislators Sidney Green and Jim Renwick, focused on defeating the federal 
executive’s choice for party president, former Saskatchewan cabinet minister J.H. 
Brockelbank.  Stephen Lewis considered challenging for the presidency but was 
dissuaded after a conversation with his father and reported to his fellow ‘Young Turks’ 
that “blood would run in the streets” were he to personally challenge Brockelbank.125  
Nevertheless, their opposition prevailed and Jim Renwick won the presidency “by dint of 
feverish canvassing.”126  Also noteworthy, effective lobbying by Robert Cliche, Laurier 
LaPierre, and Charles Taylor prompted the party to adopt a policy recognizing ‘special 
status’ for Quebec, including the potential for separate social programs along the lines of 
                                                        
122 Berger, a former MP and lawyer who advocated for labour and civil liberties, had successfully sued 
Bennett on a wrongful dismissal case.  An exchange of letters in Canadian Dimension prompted by 
allegations that Berger and O’Neil’s labour support came from international unions annoyed with 
Strachan’s support for the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC) over the IWA is interesting as 
a reminder of the often close involvement of CCF/NDP scholars in the party’s activities.  Political scientist 
Walter Young wrote to dismiss the rumour about O’Neil supporting Berger and to criticize Strachan’s 
leadership.  Strachan himself replied and assured readers that “no one in BC takes Mr. Young seriously.” 
Walter D. Young, “Old-Left, New Left in the NDP,” Canadian Dimension, November-December 1967, 39; 
Robert Strachan, “Letter,” Canadian Dimension, January-February-March 1968, 56. 
123 Isitt, Militant Minority, 178-9. 
124 Morton, NDP: The Dream of Power, 75-6.  The party was forced to hold the federal convention in 
Toronto because of the scarcity of hotels in Montreal that summer of Expo 67. 
125 Giles Endicott, “Account of Young Turks at NDP Convention,” July 31, 1967, Box 2009-047/001, File 
3 Waffle - History - Prior Documents leading to the Waffle Manifesto - ca. 1964-1967 (1 of 2), Giles 
Endicott fonds, YUA. 
126 Morton, NDP: The Dream of Power, 75-6; McLeod and McLeod, Tommy Douglas, 270. 
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the Quebec Pension Plan.127  Furthermore, in the late 1960s the NDP was the only 
Canadian party closely associated with opposition to the Vietnam War.128  Tommy 
Douglas condemned Canadian complicity in the “bloody and barbaric” war in Vietnam in 
a February 1967 speech to the House of Commons.129  New Democrats were regular 
speakers at antiwar rallies and NDP riding associations and youth groups were occasional 
participants in organizing protest demonstrations.130 
Although the NDP had briefly led the PCs in a March 1967 Gallup Poll, the 
Tories rebounded in public opinion nationally when the selection of Nova Scotia premier 
Robert Stanfield as PC party leader later that year helped to ease memories of woes 
associated with Diefenbaker’s tempestuous leadership. One year later Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau succeeded Pearson as the Liberal leader.  Long identified with the left in 
Quebec, Trudeau posed a threat to the NDP in particular, both from his reputation as a 
progressive and socially liberal reformer, and as a staunch opponent of Quebec 
nationalism. 
Even before Trudeau’s elevation to the Liberal leadership, Stephen Lewis, who 
had recently been elected provincially in the Ontario riding of Scarborough, met with 
Tommy Douglas in Vancouver to urge his resignation from the helm of the NDP.  
Lewis’s request, which he claimed was supported by the Ontario caucus, and was in 
                                                        
127 Morton, NDP: The Dream of Power, 77. 
128 Although Prime Minister Pearson’s timid criticism of American bombing in Vietnam at an April 1965 
speech at Temple University resulted in an infamously angry response from President Lyndon Johnson 
(“you don’t come here and piss on my rug”), Pearson, Trudeau and successive Liberal governments 
supported the American war effort, although their public comments on the matter were muted.  Mild 
criticisms and the government’s willingness to welcome draft dodgers may have contributed to a belief that 
the Liberal Party stance on Vietnam was at least conflicted.  See Powell, 238-239 and English, Worldly 
Years, 362-367. 
129 Powell, 209. 
130 See Powell, 263, 337, for examples of sporadic NDP involvement.  Deputy leader David Lewis later 
condemned the “imperialist war” in Vietnam at an antiwar demonstration in Montreal in November 1969 
and successfully pushed for an emergency debate in the House of Commons about the American invasion 
of Cambodia in May 1970.  See Powell, 287, 291. 
  73 
response to Douglas’s earlier willingness to step aside for a new generation to take over, 
was nevertheless badly received.131  An obvious and ambitious candidate to succeed 
Douglas was Stephen’s father, David, the federal house leader, but he was only four years 
younger than Douglas.  Moreover, Douglas was looking forward to leading the NDP into 
an election against Stanfield and Trudeau, relatively inexperienced leaders at the federal 
level. 
There was much that was new about the 1968 election; in addition to the arrival of 
Stanfield and Trudeau, the campaign included the first televised leaders’ debate.132  In the 
afterglow of the highly successful Centennial celebrations held the year before, 
nationalism was a prominent campaign theme.  Economic nationalism, in particular, had 
been at the forefront of political debate since Walter Gordon’s brief stint as Liberal 
Minister of Finance from 1963 to 1965, and the publication of the Watkins Report of 
February 1968 into foreign ownership had sharpened concerns.133  Douglas and the NDP 
attacked Trudeau and the Liberals for promoting a dependent continentalism, and 
campaigned instead on a platform of affordable housing, the establishment of a prices 
review board to reduce the cost of living, a guaranteed annual income and tax reform, and 
for an end to the American bombing of North Vietnam.134 
By keeping the details of Trudeau’s promise of a ‘Just Society’ deliberately 
vague, the Liberal campaign focused attention on the charismatic leader himself .135  On 
one issue, however, the lines were clear – Trudeau’s opposition to Quebec nationalism 
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and his criticisms of Quebec’s attempts to gain for itself a heightened international status 
stood in stark contrast to the positions of both the PCs and the NDP.136  On the eve of the 
election, Trudeau’s widely reported resilience and personal courage in the face of a 
nationalist riot on St. Jean-Baptiste Day in Montreal endeared him further to many 
English Canadians.  The result was a Liberal majority with 154 seats and 45.4 per cent of 
the popular vote compared to seventy-two seats and 31.4% of the popular vote for 
Stanfield’s PCs.  Although the Liberal victory was not unexpected given the 
unprecedented outpouring of Trudeaumania, the result was a disappointment nevertheless 
for the NDP.  It had nominated a record 263 candidates but elected just twenty-two MPs 
with 16.9 per cent of the popular vote.  In Quebec the NDP had run such high-profile 
standard bearers as Charles Taylor and Laurier LaPierre, yet instead of achieving a 
breakthrough due to the party’s adopting a ‘deux nations’ approach to federalism, its 
support in that province slumped to 7.5 per cent of the popular vote.137  The election in 
Oshawa of Ed Broadbent, a young political science professor, and its resurgence in 
Saskatchewan, where it won thirty-five per cent of the vote and elected six members 
including Canada’s youngest MP, Lorne Nystrom, only partially compensated for NDP 
losses incurred in northern Ontario, Toronto and Hamilton.  With the loss of Douglas’s 
redistributed Burnaby-Seymour seat, attention refocused on the leadership question.  This 
time, Douglas, now sixty-three years of age and approaching icon status in the party, 
made clear his intention to resign at the 1969 convention.138  The death of long-time 
leftist Colin Cameron only a month after the election, however, opened a relatively safe 
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137 Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 88-9. 
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seat on Vancouver Island, and Douglas, at the urging of the party executive, stayed on as 
leader and re-entered the House of Commons after winning the February 1969 by-
election.139 
Leadership challenges in Ontario and Manitoba during the fall of 1968 
highlighted differences in image, more so than ideology or policy.  Jim Renwick in 
Ontario, although only four years Donald Macdonald’s junior, represented a fresh face. 
First elected in 1964 and named federal NDP president at the party’s 1967 convention, 
Renwick surprised Macdonald by announcing that he planned to challenge his leadership 
at the November ONDP convention in Kitchener.140  Although many agreed the party 
should have performed better in the provincial election of 1967, Macdonald’s long-
standing connections with many party activists complicated Renwick’s struggle to win 
delegates.  In the event, Macdonald prevailed by a vote of 859 to 370.141  That same 
month Grant Notley took over the leadership of the Alberta NDP from Neil Reimer, who 
resigned after the party won sixteen per cent of the vote but no seats in the 1967 
provincial election. 
In Manitoba, Sidney Green challenged Russell Paulley’s leadership of the 
province’s NDP, not over policy differences but because he believed a contest would be 
healthy for the party.142  However, many party members interpreted Green’s challenge as 
a left-wing insurgence.  Paulley indicated he planned to resign soon, but his preferred 
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successor was the popular MP Ed Schreyer.143  Paulley retained his leadership at the 
Manitoba party’s November 1968 convention by a vote of 213 to 168 and eventually 
resigned the following year.  Thereupon, the majority of the caucus encouraged Schreyer 
to run in the June 1969 leadership race which he won handily.144  In British Columbia, 
after Robert Strachan resigned the leadership in early 1969, Thomas Berger defeated 
MLAs Dave Barrett and Bob Williams and New Left activist John Conway to head that 
province’s NDP.145 
When the activists and politicians who ultimately formed the Waffle began 
meeting in the spring of 1969, the CCF and NDP had significantly influenced Canadian 
politics and society over the previous thirty-seven years.  Despite experiencing electoral 
disappointments and misplaced optimism repeatedly at both the federal and provincial 
levels, the CCF/NDP had nevertheless achieved strong representation in many provinces, 
especially Saskatchewan, and demonstrated the potential to take power in others, 
specifically Manitoba and British Columbia.  The party could point to solid regional 
bases of support in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and parts of 
Ontario, and commentators across the political spectrum characterized leading party 
figures as committed, intelligent and principled parliamentarians.146  At the same time the 
NDP faced many challenges in the late 1960s, including alternating hostility and 
inattention from the press, a dearth of financial resources, entrenched Liberal and 
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Conservative supporters in many regions of the country, and a first-past-the-post electoral 
system which often worked to its disadvantage.   
Each period of the CCF’s history – its early years from 1932 to 1940, its rise from 
1941 to 1945, and its decline from 1946 to 1960 – had been primarily influenced by the 
political and economic context in which the party operated, especially the “matrix 
events” of the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War.147  The context of the 
1961 to 1969 period, including various crises in the postwar system such as 
decolonization, the civil rights and anti-war movements in the United States, and 
intensified nationalism in both Quebec and English Canada, created both challenges and 
opportunities for the NDP.  One of the greatest challenges was the emergence of a series 
of social movements that, taken together, represented an entirely different approach to 
political action and social change.  As will be seen in the following chapter, a ‘New Left’ 
comprised primarily of young ‘baby boomers’ active in extra-parliamentary social 
movements such as the student and anti-war movements rejected the politics of an ‘Old 
Left’ which many in Canada associated with the NDP and its allies in the trade union 
leadership.
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Chapter Two 
“We had a sense of the world afire with revolution:” The New Left in Canada,  
1959-69 
 
The Waffle was closely tied to the New Left’s emergence in Canada during the 
1960s.  Indeed it was within a variety of New Left movements that many future Waffle 
activists first met and were attracted to ideas of radical political reform.  James Laxer and 
Krista Maeots, for example, each began their activism in the Student Union for Peace 
Action (SUPA) and the Canadian University Press (CUP), two key organizations of the 
Canadian New Left.  Another prominent Waffler, the liberal economist Mel Watkins, 
through his involvement in such New Left manifestations as the American civil rights 
and Canadian anti-war and draft resistance movements, developed an enhanced sense of 
Canadian nationalism and questioned the benefits of continental economic integration.  
Other future Wafflers cut their activist teeth in the labour movement, especially within 
massive locals of the automotive and steel industries radicalized by an influx of young 
workers and a wave of wildcat strikes.  And young members of the New Democratic 
Party such as Giles Endicott, John Smart and Gerald Caplan, all of whom would become 
Waffle supporters, were drawn to the New Left’s youthful, aggressive and exciting 
politics next to which the NDP appeared old, timid and dull by comparison. 
The concept of the New Left, which was international in scope, is inseparably 
linked to the rebellious political, social, and cultural ferment of the “Sixties.”  The term 
“New Left” was first used self-referentially by activists in the British anti-nuclear 
movement of the late 1950s, many of whom, in the stark Cold War atmosphere, were 
determined to distance themselves not only from capitalism, but from their former 
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communist sympathies as well.1  By May 1968, Parisian student insurgents manning the 
barricades and scrawling poetic graffiti (“be realistic, demand the impossible;” “it is 
forbidden to forbid;” “run comrade, the old world is behind you”) on city buildings while 
battling police in the streets, had become, along with clamorous protests from a cross-
section of American society opposed to United States involvement in the Vietnam War, 
the indelible image of the international New Left.    
This chapter, in surveying the New Left’s origins and activities in Canada, and 
thereby establishing the important ideological and institutional backdrop in which the 
Waffle is situated, adopts Van Gosse’s broad definition of the New Left discussed earlier.  
As will be shown, the Canadian New Left, in addition to encompassing the anti-Vietnam 
War movements and university campus-based organizations such as the SUPA, also 
included the women’s liberation, ‘Red Power,’ left-nationalist, and militant labour 
movements that took place throughout the “Long Sixties.”2  Those rejecting the Old Left, 
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represented in Canada by the NDP and union leaders, brought a new approach to politics, 
as described by Peter Warrian, a Canadian New Left activist, in 1968: 
We are committed to democratic and humanistic values.  Consequently, we are 
opposed to authoritarian forms of social organization that repress self-
determination and self-development and we aim at democratization of education 
and, necessarily, the democratization of our society.3 
 
The Canadian New Left, in addition to being influenced by British and American 
New Left social movements, originated in three historical developments in the aftermath 
of the Second World War: the baby boom; the Cold War; and the decolonization 
movements that emerged in Africa and Asia throughout the 1950s and 1960s.   A fourth 
influence, unique to Canada, was the early 1960s Quiet Revolution in Quebec. 
The baby boom of approximately 1946 to 1962 massively altered Canadian 
society. Between 1946 and 1955 alone, 3.9 million babies were born as the birth rate per 
thousand of the population rose from 24.3 in 1945 to 28.9 in 1947, and remained above 
twenty-four until 1963.4  Historian Doug Owram has demonstrated how the baby boom 
generation dominated the post-war era.5  He details, for instance, the explosion in state-
financed educational investments, including buildings and instructors, required by the 
baby boomers as they progressed through elementary, secondary and post-secondary 
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Susan Lord, Sean Mills and Scott Rutherford (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009), 26. 
4 The Canadian Encyclopedia, 3rd ed., s.v. “Baby Boom.” (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 2000); 
Milligan, Rebel Youth, 14; Owram, Born at the Right Time, 4. The absolute number of babies born in 
Canada rose from 300,000 in 1945 to 372,000 in 1947 to over 400,000 in 1952 and remained above 
400,000 in each year until 1966. 
5 Owram, Born at the Right Time, 1-5. 
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institutions in unprecedented numbers.6  Despite the increasing numbers of youth 
attending university by the 1960s, a majority of the boomers did not advance beyond 
secondary school, opting instead to enter the paid workforce in a relatively buoyant 
economy with its expanding job market.7  Raised in the child-centered environment of the 
1950s that merged into a youth-centered culture and politics of the 1960s that was quick 
to reject hitherto normative values of domesticity and security, the boomers, Owram 
asserts, perceived their generation as unique.  Their replacing of the previous generation’s 
values of domesticity and security with a radical counterculture and politics highlighted a 
broadening ‘generation gap.’ 
 The virulent anticommunism of the Cold War only enhanced the political 
conservatism of the 1950s, soon to be challenged by outbreaks of liberalized sexual 
expression and adolescent rebellion.  Fears of nuclear annihilation motivated students to 
form the first New Left organization in Canada, the Canadian Universities Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND).  The slow and painful end to European colonialism 
following the Second World War also profoundly affected the development of the 
Canadian New Left.  As historian Sean Mills has demonstrated, the influence of Third 
World decolonization movements, including revolutions in Cuba and Algeria, and the 
accompanying views of anti-colonial theorists deeply influenced activists’ analysis of 
their own oppression in Montreal and Quebec throughout the 1960s.  His conclusions 
                                                        
6 Ibid., 181.  Canadian university enrolment increased as much between 1963 and 1968 as it had in the 
previous fifty years, and the ranks of university faculty nearly tripled between 1961 and 1971 as a result.  
New universities built in the 1960s include Trent, Brock, York, Lethbridge and Simon Fraser, while branch 
campuses at Calgary, Regina, Waterloo, and Sir George Williams became full-fledged independent 
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could easily be applied to English Canada as well.8  Finally, the Quiet Revolution in 
Quebec that followed the death of long-time conservative Union Nationale Premier 
Maurice Duplessis in 1959 and the election of Jean Lesage’s reformist and modernizing 
Liberal government the following year fundamentally altered provincial society during a 
period of rapid social and economic development marked by an expanded welfare state, a 
redefined Quebec nationalism, and an expanded and increasingly secularized educational 
system that signaled the waning power of the Roman Catholic Church. 
The international New Left’s influence on the Canadian movement must also be 
acknowledged.  From the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the late 1950s to 
the student protests in Paris, Prague, Tokyo and Mexico City in the late 1960s, Canadian 
activists engaged with and were inspired by the struggles of New Left movements around 
the world.  The proximity of the United States meant that the civil rights and anti-war 
movements in that country held particular importance for Canadian New Leftists, with 
the American radical newspapers The Guardian and Ramparts conveying to Canadian 
readers the immediacy of New Left activism south of the border. 
Although the Canadian New Left contained important links to the Old Left, its 
ideology and tactics represented a significant rupture with its predecessor organizations.9  
In particular, Canada’s social democratic party, the NDP, came under attack from New 
Leftists dismayed by the perceived limitations of parliamentarianism and of postwar 
social democracy.  Stanley Gray, a prominent New Left activist, criticized the NDP’s 
“top-down” approach to social change for “failing to create a popular movement for a 
                                                        
8 Sean Mills, The Empire Within, 62-84. Anti-colonial theorists Albert Memmi, Franz Fanon and Aime 
Cesaire were widely read alongside such New Left heroes as C. Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse and Jean-
Paul Sartre. 
9 Some historians, such as Benjamin Isitt in Militant Minorites, have emphasized the continuities between 
the Old and New Lefts in British Columbia, and while there are many, significant differences did emerge. 
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democratic and socialist Canada” and not harnessing the energy of youth protest 
movements.10  “An exclusive concentration on electoral politics,” Gray argued, and 
“attempts to introduce social change from the top” were incapable of revolutionizing 
Canadian society.11  Even more telling, Gray doubted the NDP even harbored a 
commitment to “fundamental social change.”12  James Harding, another prominent New 
Left activist but future critic of the Waffle concurred, writing in Canadian Dimension 
that “the present rationale of the NDP stands in contrast to the position of the new left” as 
“our present political institutions are not capable of ensuring that our degree of 
democracy will survive or participation in decisions occur.”13  Seeking revolutionary 
social change, participatory democracy and humanism alongside equality, the New Left 
looked askance at the NDP and other representatives of the Old Left, in particular labour 
unions and the largely discredited Communist Party. 
In Canada, students at Montreal organized the first New Left group in response to 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s 1959 decision to position American Bomarc nuclear 
missiles at sites near Thunder Bay, Ontario and La Macaza, Quebec.14  Dmitri 
Roussopoulos, a graduate student from Montreal who had been profoundly influenced by 
the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) while studying at the London 
School of Economics, proposed and launched the CUCND with students from McGill 
and Sir George Williams universities.  In tandem with students from the Université de 
Montréal, the group held a demonstration in Ottawa on Christmas Day 1959, during 
                                                        
10 Stanley Gray, “New Left, Old Left,” Canadian Dimension, November-December 1965: 11-13. 
11 Ibid., 12. 
12 Ibid. 
13 James Harding “The NDP, The Regina Manifesto and the New Left,” Canadian Dimension (November-
December 1966), 19. 
14 Michael Maurice Dufresne, “‘Let’s Not Be Cremated Equal:’ The Combined Universities Campaign for 
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which eighty participants delivered petitions to the federal government opposing 
Canada’s decision to host the Bomarcs and laid a symbolic memorial wreath at the 
National War Memorial.15  This was, Roussopoulos explains, “the first such action by 
young people in the postwar period.”16 
 CUCND chapters, in the face of hostility and accusations of harboring 
Communist sympathies from other students and the press, began springing up at 
universities across Canada.  A priority of the CUCND was to distinguish itself from the  
Canadian Peace Congress (CPC), the much-maligned face of the Communist-dominated 
peace movement of the 1940s and 1950s.  In fact, the Toronto chapter of the CUCND 
expelled a campus Communist leader from the group for refusing to denounce Soviet 
nuclear tests.17  Yet this first New Left organization also retained important ties to the 
Old Left.  For example, when the CUCND engaged with the National Committee for the 
Control of Radiation Hazards (NCCRH), a body which disseminated educational 
information on the dangers of nuclear radiation exposure, it successfully pressured the 
committee into adopting a position opposing the placement of nuclear weapons on 
Canadian soil and even to changing its name to the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CCND).18  Furthermore, as Doug Owram describes, many student activists 
began in the Student Christian Movement (SCM), another manifestation of the ‘Old 
Left,’ while Myrna Kostash has linked many CUCND activists to membership in the 
NDP youth.19  Despite the acknowledged influence of the British CND, the CUCND 
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16 Dimitri Roussopoulos, “Introduction,” in The New Left in Canada, ed. Dimitri Roussopoulos (Montreal: 
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18 Ibid., 27. 
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initially focused its attention on opposition to nuclear weapons and unlike its British 
counterpart did not undertake a broader critique of the existing social and political 
systems.20  Neither was the CUCND the only peace group actively opposing nuclear 
weapons.  The Voice of Women, founded in 1960 as part of the immense grassroots 
response to journalist Lotta Dempsey’s columns in the Toronto Star opposing nuclear 
weapons, also lobbied the federal government.21  Nevertheless, as Kostash explains, “for 
the post-war generation at this point, the ‘movement’ was CUCND.”22  The Montreal-
based newspaper Our Generation Against Nuclear War, founded in 1961 by Dimitri 
Roussopoulos, became an important source of information and debate for the nascent 
New Left.23 
 The CUCND continued its own public agitations against nuclear weapons 
throughout 1960, staging a one hundred-student picket at the Bomarc construction site in 
North Bay in May, and a Christmas Day demonstration in Ottawa that attracted a crowd 
of 450 from seventeen universities across Canada.24  The following year the CUCND in 
conjunction with the CCND held a Thanksgiving weekend vigil in Ottawa and presented 
Diefenbaker with a 140,000-person petition opposing the Bomarcs, actions that 
contributed to the prime minister’s decision to renege on his previous nuclear 
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commitment, deeply dividing his cabinet in the process.25  After failing to defeat 
Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives in the 1962 federal election, Liberal leader 
Lester Pearson reversed his party’s stance and vowed to accept the Bomarc missiles if 
elected.  When the April 1963 election produced a Pearson Liberal minority government 
committed to nuclear weapons, CUCND reconsidered its own tactics. 
 At a September 1963 meeting in Regina, speakers including Art Pape and James 
Harding, who would go on to chair CUCND and SUPA respectively, urged the CUCND 
to expand its mandate and to learn from other social movements, such as the civil rights 
movement, to link economic exploitation with war.  At the CUCND’s federal conference 
in Montreal that December, the membership broke with the CCND over the latter’s 
refusal to endorse a proposal urging Canada’s withdrawal from all military alliances, 
including NATO.26  The CUCND’s Christmas Day 1963 march to the War Memorial in 
Ottawa was its last prior to adopting new strategies for opposing nuclear weapons and 
promoting broader social change.27 
 In January 1964, Bomarc nuclear missiles were installed at bases near North Bay 
and La Macaza.  That summer, CUCND activists began projects in both communities that 
revealed a newfound approach to organizing locally, including utilizing the tactic of civil 
disobedience, reflecting the influence of the civil rights movement in the United States.  
Twelve students, including one staffer from the American Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS), lived in North Bay for the summer in an effort to persuade the community 
to oppose nuclear weapons.  The students, confronted with considerable local support in 
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27 Bruce Douville, “Project La Macaza: A Study of Two Canadian Peace Protests in the 1960s,” in Worth 
Fighting For, 161. 
  87 
favour of the missile base and its anticipated economic benefits, instead focused on 
identifying alternative modes of community development, all the while warning of the 
dangers of nuclear fallout.28  Unable to offer the residents of North Bay a tangible 
alternative to the Bomarc base, the organizers’ efforts came to naught.  At La Macaza as 
well, CUCND activists, in conjunction with union supporters and members of Quebec 
Socialist Youth, adopted non-violent direct action tactics to register their opposition to 
the nuclear weapons.29  In June 1964, activists combined a week-long vigil outside the 
Quebec base with attempts to engage in discussions with the local community.  
Seventeen activists, coached by a Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) veteran, blocked 
the access road into the base for two hours during which police repeatedly dragged the 
protesters into an adjacent ditch.  This demonstration of civil disobedience was the first 
large-scale use of non-violent direct action amongst the Canadian New Left, and was 
followed by an even larger demonstration that September.30 
 Energized by these efforts and by examples of activism by students in the United 
States and elsewhere, 150 students from eighteen Canadian universities met in Regina 
over the 1964-65 Christmas break.  Following the SDS example of making decisions by 
consensus, the group agreed to disband the CUCND and create in its place the Student 
Union for Peace Action.31  Although SUPA’s statement of purpose re-emphasized 
opposition to nuclear weapons and war, the document also included an analysis of the 
role of universities and students in society, emphasizing participatory democracy and 
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non-violent protest as the legitimate means for effecting fundamental social and political 
change.32 
 SUPA’s first major action in March 1965 signalled how far the group had 
advanced beyond a singular focus on opposition to nuclear weapons as well as the 
importance of international connections among New Left movements across borders.  In 
response to the violent dispersal by police a few days earlier of the civil rights marchers 
Martin Luther King Jr. led from Selma to Birmingham, Alabama, SUPA and SCM 
activists, alongside veterans of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) and CORE, organized protests outside the United States consulate in Toronto.33  
Sixty-five people, mostly students from the University of Toronto, prevented the 
consulate from opening and, in an act of civil disobedience purposefully reminiscent of 
the civil rights movement, went limp as police arrested them and supporters sang “We 
Shall Overcome.”34  The performance was captured in a photograph printed in the Globe 
and Mail, thereby vastly enhancing the new group’s visibility and attuning its members to 
the power of the media.35  Canadian activists, seeing a role for themselves in the struggle 
for civil rights, established the Canadian Friends of SNCC and held a conference in May 
1965 featuring SNCC speakers.36  SUPA activists, by now closely connected with the 
SDS, at the same time helped organize a protest against Adlai Stevenson, the American 
Ambassador to the United Nations, who was scheduled to receive an honourary degree at 
the University of Toronto.  Stevenson, a defender of American involvement in the 
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Vietnam War, was met by three hundred protesters when he arrived at Convocation 
Hall.37 
 Following the American consulate protests, editorial opinions in both the Globe 
and Mail and the Toronto Star questioned why Canadian students were focusing on 
American rather than domestic issues.  Home-grown problems were very much the 
impetus for five summer projects SUPA undertook across Canada during 1965.  SDS, 
which previously had staged Economic Research and Action Projects (ERAP) on a model 
of community organizing popularized by Saul Alinsky, clearly influenced SUPA’s plans 
to situate student organizers among the working poor in Kingston, on First Nations 
reservations in Saskatchewan, and in pacifist Doukhobor settlements in British 
Columbia.38  Nor were previous issues forgotten – students continued to protest against 
nuclear weapons in La Macaza and Toronto SUPA members researched examples of 
Canadian support for the Vietnam War.  However, the students quickly learned the 
challenges of community organizing.  Faced with the realization that revolution was not 
imminent and suspicion from those who would remain in the marginalized communities 
long after the students returned to class, SUPA activists recognized the limitations of the 
1965 summer projects.  Amongst First Nations in Saskatchewan, the students spent much 
of their time working to earn the trust of a suspicious community, and their attempts at 
political organizing faced stiff opposition from the federal government.39  In the 
Kootenay region of British Columbia, the SUPA workers discovered to their dismay that 
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young Doukhobors were as materialistic as their own peers back home.40  In Halifax, a 
single African-Canadian SUPA organizer sought to organize the black community, but 
when left largely to his own devices failed to experience much success.41  Only in 
Kingston, where the students successfully lobbied for minor changes such as road and 
park safety measures and forced a public meeting with a negligent landlord could they 
claim a modicum of success in community organizing.42  The one sobering lesson to be 
taken away from all five of the summer projects was that the poor were not inherently 
radical agents of an incipient revolution.43   
Although Joan Newman and Myrna Wood continued their organizing efforts in 
Kingston by forming the Association for Tenants’ Action, Kingston (ATAK), SUPA did 
not reprise the summer projects in the future.44  Instead, responding to the escalation of 
American military intervention in Vietnam in the mid-1960s became the larger focus.  
The anti-war movement which in Canada began in 1964, was linked from its beginning to 
the international anti-war movement.  Furthermore, as Christopher Powell has 
documented, the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action and its youth branch, the Young 
Socialists (LSA/YS), along with the Communist Party of Canada (CP) played important 
organizational roles in fostering the anti-war movement.45 Describing the 1965 
International Days of Protest in Toronto Powell notes, “the participation of SUPA, 
Trotskyists, Communists, the NDY and others indicated a rare unity of old and new 
left.”46  Although the anti-war movement drew the largest crowds in major cities like 
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Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, anti-war demonstrations attracted protesters across the 
country and was not limited to university students. 
Organizers of the spring 1965 protest against Adlai Stevenson at the University of 
Toronto had included both SUPA activists and NDP youth, but professors Chandler 
Davis and Natalie Zemon Davis, immigrants from the United States, had been the 
principal instigators.  Economics professor Mel Watkins, whose ideological orientation 
had begun to move leftward, also attended the protest.  These three faculty members, 
along with economist Abraham Rotstein and historians Peter Russell and Kenneth 
McNaughton, organized an ‘International Teach-In on Vietnam’ for October 1965.47  
Framed as an educational event rather than a protest, the undertaking received 
institutional support and the blessing of the university’s president.  Broadcast over three 
days on radio in New York as well as across Canada via the CBC, the event may have 
felt “top-heavy” to seasoned student activists, but it was, according to Myrna Kostash, a 
“coup” and a “phenomenon” for those beginning to question the war and Canada’s role in 
supporting the United States in waging it.48 
 Groups opposed to the Vietnam War, such as Winnipeg’s Vietnam Action 
Committee and Saskatoon’s Committee to End the War in Vietnam, began appearing 
across the country.  In the aftermath of the Teach-In, SUPA activists Heather Dean and 
future Waffler Danny Drache began assisting American war resisters in Toronto with 
securing housing, legal advice and employment.49  SUPA produced a pamphlet, ‘Escape 
to Freedom,’ aimed at Americans worried about the draft and distributed by SDS in the 
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United States.50  By 1966 SUPA had set aside space in its crowded Spadina Avenue 
office for its Anti-Draft Programme – soon renamed the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme 
(TADP) – and hired war resister Mark Satin to run it.51  Around the same time, the editor 
of the radical magazine Sanity formed the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters, and 
activists on the other side of the country organized the Vancouver Committee to Aid 
American War Resisters.  These three groups would stay in frequent contact by early 
1967.52  Also that year, the TADP began publishing the Manual for Draft Age 
Immigrants to Canada, printing 35,000 copies of the pamphlet in the first three editions 
alone for distribution throughout the United States.53  American refugees established their 
own American Deserters Committees in both Toronto and in British Columbia.54  A small 
expatriate community lived on Baldwin and Huron streets in Toronto and for the most 
part integrated within local student, activist and bohemian communities.55  The magazine 
AMEX, whose target audience was war resisters, urged them to integrate into Canadian 
life and most did, although some were accused by the Canadian academic and future 
Waffler Robin Mathews of extending American imperialism to Canada by retaining an 
exclusive focus on the politics of the United States.56  Regardless of such criticisms, 
many Canadian activists viewed assisting American war resisters as a tangible means of 
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actively opposing the Vietnam War, a cause with international resonance for the New 
Left.57 
 By the mid-1960s, student off-campus activism in the Canadian anti-war 
movement and SUPA’s attempts at community organizing in marginalized communities 
were augmented by more students focusing their attention on reforming the university 
itself.  Many among the new wave of “boomers” flooding university campuses 
increasingly regarded themselves as a distinct group tasked as agents of social change.58  
A variety of often overlapping organizations, including the Canadian Union of Students 
(CUS), local student councils, Students for a Democratic University (SDU), and campus 
newspapers, strove to transform the university into their idea of a democratic, accessible 
and socially engaged institution. 
Until 1965 the CUS had acted primarily as a service organization and eschewed 
political action.  However, between 1964 and 1966 all Quebec-based francophone student 
groups left the CUS to join the Union générale des étudiants du Québec (UGEQ) which 
had been established in 1960.  The exodus was  initiated by two influences: a heightened 
sense of Quebec nationalism, and ‘student syndicalism,’ the belief that students, by virtue 
of being the upcoming generation of workers not yet embedded in the capitalist system, 
had a unique and vital role to play in bringing about revolutionary social change.59  In 
response the participants at the 1965 annual CUS conference recognized UGEQ as a 
“sister union” and adopted policies endorsing financial accessibility to higher education 
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and student power in university governance.60  At the following year’s annual conference, 
student activists adopted a full-fledged “student syndicalism” policy that positioned CUS 
as a New Left organization in tune with the activism of the times.61  Despite routinely 
facing backlash from conservative students who sought to disassociate their schools from 
the CUS, the organization would prove integral to the New Left throughout the late 
1960s, distributing activist literature from SUPA’s Research, Information and 
Publications Project after that group’s demise, and radicalizing numerous student leaders 
who attended CUS seminars and conferences.62   
In addition to anti-war and civil rights demonstrations, by 1967 “student power” 
in university governance had become the “overriding goal in campus struggles.”63  As 
historian Roberta Lexier demonstrated, student activists at Canadian universities imbued 
with democratic ideals mobilized in large numbers to fight for “direct student 
representation on university governing structures,” such as university senates, boards, and 
departmental committees.64  Self-identifying as a distinct group with a collective identity 
on campus, many students questioned the university’s role in society, and in particular its 
support for the hierarchical and technocratic world student activists rejected.65  The most 
prevalent “student power” organization on campuses was the Students for a Democratic 
University (SDU), although SDU groups actually shared little beyond the name and 
irreverent style.66  Radicalized student councils also led numerous “student power” 
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campaigns.  Although not widely adopted at other universities, departmental and course 
unions were created to advocate for students’ rights at the University of Toronto and 
Simon Fraser University.67  Student newspapers such as the Varsity, the Carillon, and the 
Ubyssey also emerged as forums for campus activism.  Often the only media outlet 
reporting on student protests and demands, campus newspapers provided lively and often 
explicitly New Left perspectives.68  Equally important was the Canadian University Press 
(CUP) which not only shared and disseminated news and opinions across university 
campuses but also held annual gatherings at which many students were radicalized.69  
Numerous Wafflers, including James Laxer, Krista Maeots, John Conway, Don Kossick 
and Don Mitchell, launched their activist careers at student newspapers. 
It should not be overlooked that a large majority of young Canadians in the 1960s 
did not attend post-secondary institutions, and thus had no part in campus civil rights 
demonstrations, anti-war rallies and “student power” protests.  Despite the tremendous 
growth in enrolments at Canadian universities and colleges during the decade, only one in 
six high school graduates pursued post-secondary education in 1965.  With 
unemployment less than four per cent that year, clearly the majority entered directly into 
the workforce after graduation.70  Yet young workers also were not immune to the spirit 
of protest and unrest as the wave of illegal wildcat strikes that swept the country in 1965 
and 1966 attests.  Exact numbers are difficult to determine, but historians estimate 
between twenty and fifty per cent of the 1100 strikes that occurred over those two years 
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were wildcats, many of them initiated by younger workers.71  By rejecting their union 
leaders and participating in these informal “quickie strikes,” workers challenged the 
“postwar compromise” for workplace stability that had been reached among the Old Left 
union leadership, management, and the state. 
 This “postwar compromise,” initially defined by the ‘Rand Formula,’ was 
subsequently enshrined in legislation that provided unions with the security of formalized 
collective bargaining and automatic dues check-off.72  However, the compromise 
reserved for management the right to make major decisions involving production and 
technology, while unions were limited to negotiating wages and benefits.  Furthermore, 
strikes were permitted only between contracts, while shop-floor issues – staffing, 
overtime, discipline, and technological change – were addressed through a formal 
grievance process between union representatives and management.73  By the mid-1960s, 
frustration over the formalized, bureaucratic, and often plodding means for negotiating 
contracts and resolving shop-floor issues frequently erupted as walkouts and illegal 
strikes.  As historian Bryan Palmer has described, informal and spontaneous wildcat 
strikes were “the perfect vehicle for the expression of youthful labour rebellion.”74 
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 Young workers, who were flooding into the general labour force at the time, were 
undoubtedly central to the mid-1960s wildcat wave.75  Moreover, the youngest low-
seniority workers were often clustered together in less desirable jobs or locations.76  
Perhaps most importantly, young workers often shared with other youths of the 1960s a 
similar cultural outlook.  Historian Ian Milligan has identified a mass culture of the time 
that, although interpreted somewhat differently by working-class and middle-class youth, 
nevertheless resulted in a “shared youth consciousness.”77  Emphasizing personal 
liberties, individual expression, and anti-authoritarianism, this common youth culture was 
primed to protest on the factory shopfloor and campus courtyard alike during the 1960s. 
Older workers obviously led and participated in wildcat strikes as well, but “the new 
militancy” clearly “signaled a rejection of the ‘old left’ unionism of the previous 
decades.”78 
 Although the majority of wildcat strikes in 1965-66 were confined to a single 
union local, two nation-wide strikes notably defied this pattern.  Members of the 
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT) throughout 
southwestern Ontario walked off the job illegally in June 1965 to protest management’s 
imposition of disciplinary demerit points, and again in August 1966 over the slow pace of 
negotiations with Canadian National Railway (CN).79  In both cases, the wildcat strike 
spread from an initial walkout across disparate locations.  The 1965 illegal strike by 
postal workers was relatively well-organized by comparison, and paved the way for the 
formation of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) and extension of collective 
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bargaining rights to public servants.80  Most of the wildcat wave, however, occurred at 
individual union locals in spontaneous expressions of anger and frustration.  For example, 
workers represented by UAW Local 444 conducted fifty-five brief wildcat strikes at 
Chrysler’s Windsor plant in 1966 alone.81  Buzz Hargrove, a shop steward at the Chrysler 
plant while still in his twenties, recalled the rebellious atmosphere: 
The Chrysler plant was overrun with young hotheads full of their own ideas and 
not willing to take orders from authority figures – company or union.  We were 
rebellious and took advantage of our collective power and the protection the union 
offered us.  Between 1965 and 1968 we had more wildcat strikes in our section – 
the cushion room – than at any other time in the plant’s history.82 
 
Seemingly trivial issues could spark a walkout, particularly in workplaces with a history 
of severely strained labour-management relations.  Such was the case at the remote 
Levack Mine outside of Sudbury in July 1966, where young Newfoundlanders employed 
by the International Nickel Company of Canada (Inco) were disciplined for eating 
sandwiches while on break.  At the time, contract negotiations between the United 
Steelworkers of America (USWA) local and Inco were languishing in conciliation and 
only a small spark was required to ignite spontaneous protests.  The wildcat strike at 
Levack quickly spread to all of Inco’s operations, sidelining nearly 16,000 workers 
despite their union leadership’s pleas that they return to work.  Union officials clearly lost 
control of their membership for several days, particularly when gunshots were fired by 
strikers at helicopters transporting managers over the picket lines.83  After returning to 
work the union members rejected a proposed contract just three weeks later prompting 
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yet another brief wildcat which ended only after a collective agreement was negotiated 
that doubled the earlier wage offer.84 
 Also in 1966, workers represented by USWA Local 1005 at the Steel Company of 
Canada (Stelco) in Hamilton, frustrated over the slow pace of their contract negotiations, 
exploded in anger when a foreman taunted them saying “you guys haven’t got the guts to 
walk out.”85  The mass walkout by nearly 11,000 workers that ensued ground Stelco’s 
operation to a halt.  But without clearly defined leadership or a list of demands the strike 
consisted of “just picket lines and angry young men” who rejected their local president’s 
entreaties to return to work.86  Three hundred police officers eventually broke through the 
picket lines charging some workers with unlawful assembly, while other strikers burned 
cars and staged a sit-down on the street blocking traffic.  A mass meeting, conducted 
while the strikers’ wives held the line, voted to return to work.  Ultimately the local won 
a generous collective agreement, but the strike was the precursor to the membership 
ousting the local leadership the following year, further demonstrating how a culture of 
rebellion against the established authority of management and union leadership alike was 
taking hold.87  Just as the student protest movements provided a breeding ground for 
future Wafflers, so too did the wildcat wave create fertile territory for young workers to 
become politicized and radicalized.  USWA Locals 1005 in Hamilton and 6500 in 
Sudbury later became important centres of Waffle support alongside large UAW locals in 
southern Ontario such as 444 in Windsor, 222 in Oshawa and 27 in London. 
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 Meanwhile, SUPA activists debated whether they might have acted prematurely 
in disregarding the working-class as potential agents for revolutionary change.  At 
SUPA’s September 1965 conference in Saint Calixte, Quebec, activists debated the 
efficacy of the organization’s five community projects in Kingston and elsewhere the 
previous summer, while the aforementioned Stanley Gray, at that point a graduate student 
at Oxford University, urged more attention be focused on working-class struggles.88  
Dimitri Roussopoulos criticized the group for its “lack of intellectual vigour” in 
examining “neocapitalism in Canada,” while James Harding described SUPA as “an 
ethical movement in search of an analysis.”89  Roussopoulos later concluded that “turning 
our backs on the campuses had a crippling effect,” and Myrna Kostash sees the Saint 
Calixte conference as “the beginning of the end” for SUPA.90  Although SUPA’s primary 
activity during the final two years of its existence was its Research, Information and 
Publications Project, including publication of the SUPA Newsletter, the group continued 
with its public activism by organizing anti-war rallies in Ottawa and Toronto.  In 
addition, some student members returned to Saskatchewan First Nations reservations in 
the winter of 1965-66 before ultimately admitting that SUPA’s projects there “did little to 
affect change in the Indian and Métis communities.”91 
 The Saint Calixte conference introduced an additional challenge for SUPA 
activists.  Inspired by the success of the American Peace Corps, Lester Pearson’s Liberal 
government had established in April 1965 the Company of Young Canadians (CYC), a 
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somewhat vaguely defined government initiative that was intended to mobilize Canadian 
youth enthusiastic for social change.92  SUPA activists, including Art Pape, the former 
CUCND chair, and David DePoe, who saw an opportunity to fund the Toronto Youth 
Project with “free” government money, moved quickly to embrace the CYC.93  Largely 
controlled by young activists imported from student protest movements in its chaotic 
early years, the CYC commissioned a report on SUPA’s community organizing projects 
and paid for much of the Saint Calixte conference, leading to criticism from 
Roussopoulos and others that the Canadian student movement was in danger of being co-
opted by the state.94  Nevertheless, several SUPA activists were recruited by Pape to join 
the CYC, including Alan Clarke as Executive Director, Stewart Goodings as Associate 
Director of the Organizing Committee, and Doug Ward, the first New Left president of 
the CUS.95  According to historians of the CYC Carrie Dickenson and William Campbell, 
many student activists were “genuinely excited” at the possibility of government 
promoting New Left values of “participatory democracy and empowerment as opposed to 
colonialism, oppression and marginalization.”96  Unfortunately, CYC volunteers sent to 
some of Canada’s most impoverished and marginalized Canadian communities soon 
encountered the same sorts of challenges and disappointments stemming from 
community organizing that SUPA activists had previously discovered.  Even more 
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troubling for the organization, when the participation by CYC workers David DePoe and 
Lynn Curtis in a January 1967 anti-war protest at the U.S. consulate in Toronto attracted 
harsh media attention, the relative autonomy hitherto enjoyed by CYC activists began to 
diminish.  Increasingly, politicians and the press alike focused on CYC worker radicalism 
and “bad behavior.”  The revelation of CYC connections to separatist sympathizers in 
Quebec was the proverbial final straw which resulted in government appointees, rather 
than the student activists, assuming tight control of the organization.  Shorn of its 
autonomy, energy and sense of purpose, the CYC gradually withered until the final 
elimination of its funding in 1975 killed the experiment. 
 The lure of CYC salaried positions and funded projects also took a toll on SUPA.  
Recriminations, doubts and debates over SUPA’s ongoing purpose tainted its December 
1965 conference in Saskatoon.97  Rising tensions among SUPA’s central office in 
Toronto, its more radical western Canadian chapters, and Montreal activists centered 
around Our Generation exacerbated the divisions.98  The following year’s conference in 
Waterloo resumed the debate over the organization’s future directions; in particular the 
question of where SUPA should focus its energies – on students, youth, the working-
class, minorities, or the marginalized – remained unresolved.99  The conference tasked 
seven men, including James Laxer, with drafting a SUPA manifesto, which was 
presented at the September 1967 conference held in Goderich, Ontario.100  Aimed at an 
“integration of Marx and new left theory” the document identified a “new working class” 
borne out of “society’s contradictions” which would replace the economically stable and 
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culturally conservative traditional working class as the agent for revolutionary change.101  
Unlike the “couple of hundred” who had attended the Saint Calixte conference two years 
earlier, only forty students attended the Goderich meeting, and they failed to reach 
agreement on the manifesto, or much else.  SUPA dissolved shortly afterwards.  Twelve 
of its former members formed the short-lived New Left Committee, but it too folded after 
publishing only a couple of issues of the New Left Committee Bulletin.102 
 As Ian Milligan notes, SUPA’s choice of seven men and no women to compose 
its manifesto “speaks volumes” about the organization’s often misogynistic 
atmosphere.103  As readers of Sara Evans’s foundational work Personal Politics: The 
Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left will 
recognize, the emergence of the Canadian women’s liberation movement from within the 
New Left closely mirrors the American experience.  As the four female activists who 
authored “Brothers, Sisters, Lovers… Listen…” for the 1967 SUPA conference in 
Goderich attested, the organization segregated women into just two roles – “the workers 
and the wives.”104  As such, they argued the “myth of participatory democracy is just that, 
if one looks at the participation of women in SUPA.”105  The realization that they were 
“oppressed as women within an organization that was attacking oppression” prompted 
the four to declare “we are going to be the typers of letters and distributors of leaflets 
(hewers of wood and drawers of water) no longer.”106  Political scientist Naomi Black 
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points to the use of this famous Canadian imagery to suggest differences between the 
emergence of the Canadian and American women’s liberation movements.  Most 
significantly, Canadian women did not exit the New Left with the same level of anger as 
their counterparts in the United States often did.107  Indeed, many who became involved 
with women’s liberation groups in Canada continued their activism in various New Left 
organizations, at least initially.   
Toronto Women’s Liberation, which began meeting in the winter of 1967-68, 
prepared and presented to the House of Commons a brief on abortion.108  Other activities 
included protesting a “winter bikini contest” that denigrated women, and demanding day-
care services at the University of Toronto.109  In June 1968, women active in the New 
Left at Simon Fraser University formed a women’s liberation group which soon became 
the Vancouver Women’s Caucus that included non-campus women as well.110  With 
abortion rights becoming a central focus of the early movement, in Montreal women’s 
liberation activists published a Birth Control Handbook.111  The women’s liberation 
movement considered itself distinct from liberal feminist groups, including the voluntary 
and professional women’s organizations that formed the Committee on Equality for 
Women and pushed for a Royal Commission on the Status of Women.  However, 
following the 1970 publication of the Royal Commission’s report in 1970 and the 
subsequent creation of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, greater 
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overlap between the more radical women’s liberationists and liberal feminists 
occurred.112 
Even as SUPA disintegrated, mass protest continued unabated across Canada.  
Anti-war demonstrations continued to draw large crowds, including 1800 participants at a 
rally in Montreal in 1967.  Dow Chemical, the manufacturer of napalm, was targeted by 
anti-war activists during on-campus job recruitment sessions at universities in Toronto, 
Waterloo, British Columbia and Manitoba, among others.113  Until they were forcibly 
evicted by police, SDU members at McGill occupied the administration building to 
protest perceived attacks on the campus newspaper’s autonomy, while at the University 
of Alberta the SDU protested tuition increases in the spring of 1968 and set up counter-
education groups in Edmonton and at the University of Calgary.114 
 Protests occurred at Simon Fraser University (SFU) almost from the school’s 
opening in 1965.  An “instant university” that had been constructed atop Burnaby 
Mountain in Vancouver in just two years, SFU’s nascent departmental and faculty 
structure, its overrepresentation of junior untenured faculty members close in age and 
outlook to many graduate students, and its promotion of a different kind of education that 
attracted a student body more inclined to radical activism than was found on most 
Canadian university campuses, proved to be a volatile mix.115  In March 1967 police 
arrested five graduate students for staging a protest in support of a high school student 
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suspended for satirizing his poetry teacher.116  When the university dismissed the five as 
teaching assistants, several days of protest rallies and the threat of a student strike ensued 
until all were reinstated.117  Shortly thereafter, activists established a SDU group on the 
SFU campus. 
 Following the spring and summer of 1968, when massive student protests 
internationally shared media attention with the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. 
and Robert Kennedy, and reaction to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago 
engulfed the city in riot, Canadian student protests exploded in the fall and winter of 
1968-69.118 An October anti-war rally in Winnipeg drew five hundred people, “by far the 
most successful demonstration yet held in Manitoba,” and over 1000 students protested 
over access to student loans at the Regina Campus of the University of Saskatchewan.119  
At SFU students occupied the administration building to protest “the administration’s 
discrimination against junior college students” in admissions procedures, and the SDU 
campaigned to rename SFU ‘Louis Riel University’ instead of commemorating what one 
future Waffler called “a member of the vanguard of pirates, thieves and carpetbaggers 
which dispossessed and usurped the native Indians of Canada from their rightful 
heritage.”120  The Toronto Student Movement, an independent New Left group at the 
University of Toronto, joined striking workers at the Peterborough Examiner on the 
picket line, another example of the student movement’s broadening horizons. “Student 
power” continued to be a central issue, however, at the University of Ottawa when 
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demands for student representation on university governing bodies prompted a strike 
amongst social science students.121   
Seemingly innocuous issues occasionally developed into major protests during the 
1968-69 academic year.  At the University of New Brunswick (UNB), physics professor 
and future Waffler Norman Strax objected to his university’s decision to introduce 
student identification cards for the fall semester as an “erosion of civil liberties and 
democracy.”  Student activist members of the Canadian Struggle for a Democratic 
Society (CSDS) followed up by inundating the library circulation desk with hundreds of 
books and refusing to produce identification cards.  When UNB suspended Strax, several 
students registered their support for the professor by occupying his office, an action 
dubbed ‘Liberation 130’ in reference to Strax’s room number.  Despite a court injunction 
removing Strax from campus, regular confrontations between student activists and 
opponents seeking to end the office occupation occasionally turned violent.  Police ended 
the stand-off after forty-four days and thwarted a second ‘Liberation 130’ attempt in 
January 1969.  UNB’s student council was divided over the occupation, but a Canadian 
Association of University Teachers (CAUT) censure of the university in March 1969 
prompted a student council-sponsored protest attended by over 1000 students at which a 
makeshift coffin was burned to symbolize the passing of the “old order” of the 
university’s Board of Governors.122 
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 A similarly minor issue – the December 1968 publication of a ‘Happy New 
Year’s’ image of the Vietnamese communist revolutionary Ho Chi Minh emerging from 
an abstract womb printed in the University of Saskatchewan’s Regina campus student 
newspaper The Carillon – raised the ire of the school’s principal and Board of Governors 
who responded by suspending collection of student activity fees and thereby cutting off 
the paper’s funding.  Some 1600 students held a mass demonstration on the Regina 
campus in January 1969 to protest the clamp-down and 100,000 copies of a special issue 
of The Carillon were distributed across the province with the assistance of the National 
Farmers’ Union (NFU) and the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL). Bowing to the 
pressure, the Board of Governors reinstated the newspaper’s funding two months later.123  
Nor was this the first occasion in which The Carillon’s left-wing editorial policy had 
been attacked.  In 1965 future Waffler John Conway had been forced to resign as editor 
after he placed a picture of a frosh parade next to images of the Vietnam War.  Conway 
was replaced as editor by another future Waffler, Don Mitchell, who was succeeded by 
yet another future Waffler, Don Kossick.124 
Long-standing social and political tensions and the existence of a diverse and 
vibrant radical community in Montreal made the atmosphere in that city particularly 
fraught during 1968-69.  Quebec’s Union Nationale government opened the first twelve 
Collèges d'enseignement général et professionnel (CEGEPs) in 1967, only to announce 
just one year later that 20,000 CEGEP students would not be able to find a place at 
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university in the fall of 1969 due to insufficient capacity.  CEGEPs across the province 
effectively stopped functioning during two weeks of student occupations and protests 
following the announcement.125  Students protesting the inadequacy of French-language 
education in Montreal during the fall of 1968 directed their anger at McGill University.  
A protest march of 5,000 to 10,000 students on campus in October was followed two 
months later by a student occupation of McGill’s computer centre, which only ended 
when the radicals were evicted by police.  In February 1969 the university fired Stanley 
Gray, by then a political science professor and author of a recent and widely reprinted 
article “McGill and the Rape of Quebec,” a move activists perceived as politically 
motivated that prompted further protests.  In an unprecedented move at the end of March, 
between 10,000 and 15,000 protesters sought to occupy McGill, an action requiring over 
2500 police officers to prevent.  Opération McGill, its visibility and support enhanced by 
the ongoing political debate in the province over the Union Nationale government’s 
language rights Bill 63, continued into the fall of 1969 with some demonstrations 
drawing crowds of over 20,000 supporters.126  Meanwhile, at Sir George Williams 
University, the failure to resolve year-old accusations of racism in the biology department 
prompted students to occupy both the campus computer centre and faculty club in 
January 1969.  Two weeks into the occupation of the computer centre, police stormed the 
student-erected barricades.  In the ensuing violent confrontation the facility was 
destroyed.  In response, the outraged mainstream media harshly criticized the students for 
their militancy.127 
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Student activists, inspired by their counterparts in the international New Left, had 
thus ensured that the 1968-69 academic year on Canadian campuses was contentious.  In 
addition to encouraging student protests, international developments in the New Left also 
influenced Canadian women’s liberationists.  CUS meetings provided opportunities for 
female students from across Canada to connect with one another.  An SFU activist 
described one CUS seminar as “fantastic, women met daily and turned on almost all girls 
from campuses… women were the only ones to break down the terrible regionalism that 
dominated the conference, the only ones to really exchange experiences and theories.”128  
By 1969 women in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, Guelph, 
Sarnia, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton and Vancouver could all access a local 
women’s liberation movement.129  But when a group of Ontario women attended a 
Women’s Liberation conference in Chicago in 1969 they were exposed to serious 
divisions among American activists, some of whom insisted on linking women’s 
liberation to Marxism and others who defined themselves solely as “consciousness 
raisers.”130  Consequently, a split subsequently developed within the Toronto Women’s 
Liberation Movement when several women who “rejected the view of a social and 
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political revolution as a precondition for the liberation of women” left to form the New 
Feminists.131 
Canadian New Leftists who turned toward Marxism in the late 1960s could be 
forgiven for feeling overwhelmed as they contemplated the plethora of ideological 
interpretations proffered by a range of sectarian Marxist organizations operating in 
Canada at the time.  Two parties with a long history in the Canadian left, the Communist 
Party (CP) and the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA), competed for adherents 
with three Maoist groups that emerged in the late 1960s.  As Christopher Powell has 
demonstrated, both the CP and the LSA played an important role in the Canadian anti-
war movement.132  Although significantly diminished from when its membership peaked 
in the 1930s, the CP continued to exert influence over several unions, including the 
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE), in the 1960s.  However the CP, 
tainted by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 revelations of Stalinist purges and the 
Soviet suppression of uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 
struggled to obtain much support in the Canadian New Left.133   
Not all Canadian Marxists embraced the Soviets.  Hardial Bains, an Indo-
Canadian microbiology student at the University of British Columbia, opposed Soviet 
communism’s perceived “revisionism” after Khrushchev succeeded Stalin, endorsed 
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China’s position in the Sino-Soviet split, and advocated Maoism.134  Bains’s new 
organization, the Canadian Student Movement, appealed to New Leftists through its 
unquestioning support of China and opposition to American imperialism.  The group 
renamed itself the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) in 1970 and competed, 
sometimes violently, with other sectarian Marxist groups.135  In the late 1960s and early 
1970s “Maoism… absolutely permeated the New Left,” not only in Canada but 
throughout the Western European and American movements as well.136  For New Leftists 
in search of a revolutionary Marxist analysis updated to reflect the conditions of a 
postwar, decolonizing world, Maoism held significant appeal.  The most prominent 
adherents of Maoism in the United States, the Progressive Labor (PL) party, ferociously 
defended its belief in the working class as the only potential agent of revolution.  Not 
surprisingly, its dismissiveness towards students and racialized minority protesters 
infuriated critics and divided the SDS national organization.  The PL’s disciplined and 
hierarchical organization enabled it to control a sizeable minority of delegates to the 1969 
SDS convention in Chicago, where the divide between the PL and its opponents over 
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SDS support for the Black Panthers, Brown Berets and Young Lords fatally split the 
student organization.137 
The Canadian Party of Labour (CPL), formed in the late 1960s, associated with 
the American PL and adopted its analysis that “all nationalism is reactionary.”138 The 
CPL, like the PL, sought to establish Worker-Student Alliances at universities and 
criticized New Left movements when they failed to adhere to the CPL’s line.139  In 
contrast, the Canadian Liberation Movement (CLM) interpreted Maoism to highlight 
nationalist, anti-imperialist struggle and sought to elevate Canadian independence as the 
primary goal of the Canadian New Left.  Gary Perly, his wife Caroline Walker, and  
Norman Endicott were the central figures in the militantly nationalist CLM.140  The 
group’s public profile was enhanced in the early 1970s through its publishing house, New 
Canada Press, and its association with Milton Acorn, a well-known poet and resident of 
Toronto’s seedy Waverly Hotel.141 
Unlike Maosim, Trotskyism’s much deeper roots in the Canadian left dated back 
to the 1920s.  One variant, the League for Socialist Action (LSA), was spearheaded by 
Ross Dowson and founded shortly before the NDP in 1961.  The LSA practiced 
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“entryism,” an international strategy premised on infiltrating a country’s major working-
class party, in this case the NDP, and urging the party to adopt a more radical and 
socialist platform in order to win new recruits to Trotskyism.  The LSA viewed itself as a 
Leninist “vanguard” party prepared to lead the much anticipated workers’ revolution.  It 
published a newspaper, the Workers Vanguard, but failed to exert much influence within 
the NDP, not least because its members regularly were expelled from the party.142  By 
contrast, the LSA’s youth wing, the Young Socialists (YS), did achieve an important 
presence in the student New Left by the late 1960s, and played an important role in the 
Canadian anti-war movement.143  Although Trotskyist groups were expelled from anti-
war coalitions in Toronto and Vancouver in 1966, two years later the LSA/YS dominated 
the Vietnam Mobilization Committee, the leading anti-war organization in Toronto.144 
Other New Left social movements began to gather momentum internationally in 
1969, while their Canadian equivalents were only in their infancy, if active at all.  The 
civil rights and Black Power movements profoundly influenced the emergence of ‘Red 
Power’ movements in both Canada and the United States, leading to engagement with 
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New Left activists in the years to come.145  Although homophile organizations existed in 
Canada during the 1960s, they were based on the educational and behind-the-scenes 
lobbying approach of the American Mattachine Society. In the aftermath of the June 1969 
Stonewall riot in New York, gay liberation groups began to emerge, first in the United 
States and then in Canada by the early 1970s.146  Unlike the gay liberation movement, the 
inspiration for Canada’s 1960s environmental movement lay close to home.  Historian 
Ryan O’Connor traces the movement’s origins to the airing of the television documentary 
The Air of Death on CBC in October 1967.147  Although O’Connor does not characterize 
Pollution Probe, an early Ontario environmental group, as a New Left organization, 
despite New Leftists and Wafflers such as Varda Burstyn being amongst its founders, the 
British Columbia movement Greenpeace grew directly from the anti-war and counter-
cultural milieu of late 1960s Vancouver.148  However, in 1969, both groups’ days of 
public activism lay ahead of them. 
The New Left operated in a context of an international culture of social and 
political rebellion against established authority.  In Canada, New Leftists rejected 
established political, social and cultural traditions, structures and institutions, including 
the NDP and union leadership.  A wide-ranging series of movements constituted the New 
Left in Canada, including CUCND/SUPA, the anti-war movement, the “student power” 
movement, wildcat striking workers, women’s liberationists and, after 1969, many others.  
Despite their disparate contexts and goals, the characteristics of the New Left in Canada – 
                                                        
145 See Bryan Palmer, “Indians of All Tribes: The Birth of Red Power,” in Debating Dissent, 193-210. 
146 The Stonewall riot, a spontaneous act of resistance against a police raid on the Stonewall Inn, a popular 
gay bar in Greenwich Village, is widely considered the spark for the gay liberation movement. 
147 Ryan O’Connor, The First Green Wave: Pollution Probe and the Origins of Environmental Activism in 
Ontario (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015). 
148 Zelko, Make it a Green Peace! 
  116 
the youthfulness of the participants, their acceptance of a democratic ethos, their anti-
authoritarianism, and their willingness to embrace unconventional tactics and strategies – 
were present in each of these movements.  At the same time, the diversity of aims and 
constituencies among these movements presented a difficult challenge to anyone seeking 
to channel the New Left in a particular direction.  In the midst of this sometimes 
cacophonous mélange of voices, the authors of the Waffle Manifesto, among whom were 
experienced New Left activists, embarked on a brazen campaign to transform Canada’s 
major ‘Old Left’ political party, the NDP.
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Chapter Three 
“A little subversive gathering:” The Waffle Manifesto, 1969 
 
By early 1969, James Laxer, a leading New Left activist, graduate student, and 
former president of the Canadian University Press, had become disillusioned with the 
student movement in Canada for uncritically replicating its American counterpart.  At 
much the same time the economist Mel Watkins, who in 1968 was writing a prominent 
report on foreign ownership commissioned by the federal government, concluded that 
Canadian independence could only be achieved through socialism.  Meanwhile, Gerald 
Caplan, a young professor and NDP activist, added his voice to this growing chorus of 
lament by expressing frustration with the NDP for its timidity over “the growing 
dominance of the United States” in Canada.1  This chapter explores how Laxer, Watkins, 
Caplan and a small group of New Left and NDP activists came together in the spring of 
1969 to draft a statement – the Waffle Manifesto – in which they outlined their belief in 
an independent, socialist Canada, and devised a strategy to co-opt an increasingly left-
leaning NDP as the electoral vehicle by which their goals would be advocated and 
hopefully realized.  Even prior to meeting in 1969 the original Wafflers had been 
influenced by the rising tide of nationalism in English Canada during the 1960s.  Before 
turning attention to the “little subversive gathering” that gave birth to the Waffle, this 
chapter addresses the political events which contributed to the nationalist wave that the 
young authors of the Waffle Manifesto sought to catch by tapping into the concerns 
shared by many Canadian leftists.  Furthermore, as will be shown by examining the 
Manifesto’s evolution through three drafts written by Laxer, Watkins, and Caplan, and 
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their efforts at reaching out to NDP riding associations, youth clubs and affiliated unions, 
the Waffle moderated the rhetoric of the Manifesto in a strategic attempt to broaden its 
appeal to New Democrats ahead of their party’s federal convention held in Winnipeg in 
October 1969.  At the convention the Waffle generated intense publicity, thrusting the 
group into the media spotlight.  Despite the Manifesto’s defeat, the strength of their 
support inspired the Waffle to commit to ongoing organizing within the NDP. 
Laxer’s scathing 1969 critique argued “the Canadian New Left derived much of 
its style and ideology from the United States and American-centered issues filled its 
political agenda.”  As a result, “it has been unable to formulate a political strategy 
relevant to Canadian society.”2  Laxer accused the Canadian New Left of uncritically 
adopting the analysis of the American movement which, he contended, ignored uniquely 
Canadian circumstances.  Laxer criticized the New Left’s “suspicion of institutional 
structures” and lack of concern for “the survival of Canadian national institutions, in that 
they represent the best means to thwart American dominance.”3  By focusing on 
American issues such as the Vietnam War and civil rights, Canadian New Left activists 
typically ignored and showed little appreciation for the history of workers’ and farmers’ 
movements in Canada, as well as the role of the CCF/NDP.  Most importantly for Laxer, 
the Canadian New Left failed to recognize the dire threat that American economic 
domination posed to Canadian independence.   
Laxer’s focus on Canadian independence and his expressed desire to disentangle 
Canada from a United States fraught with war and racial divisions was representative of 
the “new nationalism” expressed in English Canada during the late 1960s and early 
                                                        
2 James Laxer, “The Student Movement and Canadian Independence,” Canadian Dimension, August-
September 1969, 29. 
3 Ibid., 30. 
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1970s.  The “new nationalists” encompassed a wide range of spokespersons and 
ideological perspectives.  In addition to the Waffle’s New Left-influenced socialism, 
prominent voices included Walter Gordon, Peter Newman, and Abraham Rotstein, whose 
Committee for an Independent Canada championed a moderate economic nationalism, 
and the academic Robin Mathews, who espoused a particularly vigorous form of cultural 
nationalism.4  Two points about the “new nationalism” are especially pertinent.  First, 
some observers, such as the Wafflers, harbored deep concerns about both American 
economic and cultural domination of Canada.  Other “new nationalists” had a narrower 
focus.  Walter Gordon, for instance, showed little interest in cultural protections.  Yet 
Robin Mathews focused relentlessly on issues of Canadian hiring and content at cultural 
institutions and universities.5  Secondly, criticism of the American model of liberal 
capitalism in Canada had hitherto been primarily the preserve of conservatives who 
valued the British connection and were suspicious of the individualism, consumerism and 
liberalism of the United States, whereas links between Canadian and American leftists 
were often very strong.6  The “new nationalists” of the late 1960s and early 1970s, by 
comparison, tended to critique American liberal capitalism from a left-wing perspective, 
albeit with considerable variation.7 
                                                        
4 Anthony Westell, “New Nationalists May Push Trudeau to the Left,” Toronto Star, November 29, 1969.  
See Stephen Azzi, Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1999) and Jeffrey Cormier, The Canadianization Movement: Emergence, Survival and 
Success (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) for discussions of the “new nationalism” and two of 
its leading practitioners. 
5 Cormier, The Canadianization Movement, 6-7. 
6 Damien-Claude Bélanger, Prejudice and Pride: Canadian Intellectuals Confront the United States, 1891 
to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 21.  J.L. Granatstein explained, “anti-Americanism 
was almost always employed as a tool by Canadian political and economic elites bent on preserving or 
enhancing their power.” J.L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and anti-Americanism (Toronto: 
HarperCollins, 1996). 
7 Historian Paul Litt suggests that “contemporary American issues like the civil rights movement, the 
nuclear arms race, pollution, ghetto riots, and Vietnam showed Canada to be the morally superior North 
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These “new nationalist” critiques frequently were responses to developments in 
Canadian-American relations already several decades in the making.  The move towards 
closer military and economic integration between the two countries accelerated 
dramatically during World War II and continued into the postwar period.8  On the 
cultural front, the final report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the 
Arts, Letters and Sciences, released in 1951, warned against the “dangers of dependence 
upon American culture in the postwar world.”  Popularly known as the Massey 
Commission after its chair, Vincent Massey, the commission proposed government-
sponsored strategies for strengthening Canadian culture.9  By the mid-1950s concerns 
about increasing American control of the Canadian economy were a topic of public 
debate.  Walter Gordon was foremost among the critics.  As the wealthy scion of the 
prestigious accounting firm Clarkson Gordon and personal friend of Secretary of State for 
External Affairs Lester Pearson, Gordon had the government’s ear.10  Consequently, 
when Walter Harris, the minister of finance, established the Royal Commission on 
Canada’s Economic Prospects in 1955, he appointed Gordon as chair.  Although not 
originally a priority, the issue of foreign investment soon was a highlight of its public 
hearings.11  The Dominion Bureau of Statistics’ data demonstrating markedly increased 
                                                                                                                                                                     
American liberal democracy” in the eyes of Canadian nationalists.  Litt, Trudeaumania (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2016), 74. 
8 Canada and the United States committed to closer cooperation in defense in the Ogdensburg Agreement 
(1940).  Canada was among the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1949 and joined the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957.  In that same year, 
seventy-one percent of Canada’s imports came from the United States, and fifty-nine percent of its exports 
went to the U.S.  The Auto Pact, signed in 1965, cemented the integration of the countries’ auto industries.  
9 Paul Litt, The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1992), 3. 
10 Azzi, Walter Gordon, 27-28.  Gordon had previously acquired some influence with the national Liberal 
government through his wartime work in the Ministry of Finance and service on various boards and 
commissions.  As Azzi explains, Gordon raised enough money to provide for Pearson’s livelihood in order 
to ease his fears about leaving the security of the civil service for the insecurity of electoral politics. 
11 Ibid., 38. 
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levels of American investment in Canada amplified the concern, and a July 1956 poll 
indicated increasing numbers of Canadians fretting over the prospect of even higher 
levels in the future.12  The Commission’s Preliminary Report issued in January 1957 
mildly criticized the increase in foreign investment and recommended tax incentives to 
motivate enhanced Canadian investment and employment, a solution largely panned by 
economists at the time.13 
 Other events of the 1950s exacerbated Canadians’ concerns over American 
interference in their affairs.  Many Canadians, never completely comfortable with 
ruthless US Senator Joseph McCarthy’s virulent anti-communism, became further 
concerned about American interference when Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman 
committed suicide in Egypt in 1957 after being publicly accused of Communist 
sympathies by the US Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.14  John Diefenbaker, 
the leader of the Progressive Conservative party, attempted to capitalize on the tragedy 
while on the campaign trail later that year by criticizing the Pearson government for 
mishandling Norman’s situation, and in turn insisting that Canadian independence must 
be defended against American interference.15  Diefenbaker’s rhetoric describing his 
“New Frontier Policy” was designed to inspire a sense of Canadian nationalism.16  His 
tactics succeeded.  The Progressive Conservatives took power, first as a minority 
                                                        
12 Ibid., 43-7. 
13 Ibid., 52-7. 
14 Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada, 403-25. 
15 John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, volume II: 1949-1972 (Toronto: Alfred A. 
Knopf Canada, 1992), 164-83, 189-92; The election prompted Gordon to write “there is a very definite 
feeling of nationalism in Canada – anti-Americanism if you will – and the Tories capitalized on this.” 
Gordon quotation in Azzi, Walter Gordon, 58. 
16 Diefenbaker emphasized the economic development of Canada’s regions, especially the north, in 
painting a positive picture of Canada’s national purpose during the election campaign. 
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government from 1957-58 and then with a massive majority from 1958-62.17  As 
historians Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English explain, “Diefenbaker was 
honestly attached to the British connection and genuinely distressed about the ever-closer 
integration between the Canadian and American economies.”18  After attending the 
meeting of Commonwealth leaders in London in 1957, Diefenbaker announced his 
intention to divert fifteen percent of Canadian spending on imports from the United 
States to Great Britain.19  While the trade diversion proposal, not surprisingly, went 
nowhere, concerns over the perceived threat that powerful American multinational 
corporations and growing Canadian-American economic integration posed to Canadian 
independence grew louder throughout the second half of the 1950s.20  
 Canada’s close ties to the American-dominated NATO and NORAD military 
alliances also raised concerns among some Canadians, including a significant portion of 
the CCF, over the resulting loss of national autonomy.  In particular, Diefenbaker’s 
obfuscation over whether Canada should accept nuclear warheads on Bomarc missiles 
stationed in Ontario and Quebec as part of its NORAD commitment divided his cabinet 
and the country.21  The issue festered through the 1962 election that reduced the 
Progressive Conservatives to a minority government, prompted the resignation of 
                                                        
17 The Progressive Conservatives won 208 seats compared to the Liberals’ forty-eight and the CCF’s eight 
in the 1958 election. 
18 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada since 1945: Power, Politics and 
Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 189. 
19 Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter & 
Ross, 1995), 251-3.  Bothwell, Drummond and English suggest that the fifteen percent figure “occurred to 
him in the course of the interview,” Canada since 1945, 189. 
20 Bothwell, Drummond and English, Canada since 1945, 190-1.  The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade prohibited further preferential tariffs, Canada rejected Britain’s proposal of free trade, and the rest of 
the government had little appetite for such a measure.  Diefenbaker also opposed Britain’s application for 
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being transformed.” Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution,115. 
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Defence Minister Douglas Harkness in protest, and dominated the federal election of 
1963 when NDP leader Tommy Douglas associated Lester Pearson’s pro-nuclear weapon 
stance with American domination of the Canadian economy.22  Although Pierre Berton 
declared in Maclean’s that “if this election proves anything it proves that anti-
Americanism is finished as a political issue.  We have cast our lot with the continent for 
better or worse and the people know it,” the election of Pearson’s Liberals to a minority 
government merely shifted nationalists’ focus to Canada’s economic, rather than military, 
integration with the United States.23  Certainly, the Liberals’ success at the polls in 1963 
provided Pearson’s friend Walter Gordon with an opportunity to put his economic 
nationalist beliefs into practice. 
In the aftermath of the disastrous 1958 election, Gordon along with the party’s 
national campaign director Keith Davey and Pearson advisor Tom Kent had reshaped the 
Liberal organization and polices into a modern, progressive force.24  Although Gordon 
never succeeded in getting his opposition to foreign investment and American control of 
the Canadian economy formally adopted by the Liberal Party, his views were well-
known, having been published in his 1961 book Troubled Canada.25   However, as 
Minister of Finance in the new government, Gordon had the clout to overcome wary civil 
servants and present in June 1963 as part of Pearson’s “sixty days of decision” a budget 
that reflected at least some of his concerns over American investment in Canada.26  
Gordon’s budget imposed a “takeover tax” of thirty percent on foreign takeovers of 
                                                        
22 John Duffy, Fights of Our Lives: Elections, Leadership and the Making of Canada (Toronto: 
HarperCollins, 2002), 236. Duffy points out that the campaign focused, in addition to the issue of nuclear 
weapons, on the more abstract qualities of leadership and vision. 
23 Pierre Berton, “The Real Issues in the Election,” Maclean’s, April 6, 1963, 62. 
24 Azzi, Walter Gordon, 71-2, 75-80. 
25 Ibid., 87-8. 
26 Ibid., 99. 
  124 
Canadian companies, along with changes to the withholding tax that favoured companies 
even partially owned by Canadians.27  The stock market’s negative reaction to the 
changes forced Gordon to withdraw the proposed takeover tax just six days after 
announcing it in the budget.  He also offered his resignation to Pearson, who refused it, 
but the 1963 budget imbroglio irreparably weakened Gordon’s standing in cabinet.  He 
did not pursue further policies to limit foreign investment during his remaining two years 
in the finance portfolio.28 
 Whereas Pearson and the Liberal government remained generally cool to 
economic nationalism, Canadian symbolism loomed large in political debates throughout 
much of the following year.  On the Victoria Day weekend in 1964, Pearson announced, 
to a chorus of boos at the Royal Canadian Legion Hall in Winnipeg, his intention to 
introduce a new Canadian flag.29  When opening debate on the subject in the House of 
Commons, Pearson expressed hope the new flag would “strengthen national unity and 
national pride.”  But the Progressive Conservatives, with an apoplectic Diefenbaker at 
their helm, would have none of it.  They mounted an intense public opposition to the 
proposed flag – derided as “Pearson’s pennant” – and filibustered debate while 
Diefenbaker demanded a national plebiscite.30  With the filibuster grinding government 
business to a virtual halt, and Conservative professions of affection for British institutions 
and symbols sounding increasingly critical of French-Canadians specifically, Pearson 
                                                        
27 Ibid., 99-102. 
28 Ibid., 111.  Gordon promised to resign from Finance if the Liberals failed to win a majority in the 1965 
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upset when the Prime Minister accepted it and appointed Mitchell Sharp to replace him. 
29 Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution, 177. 
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invoked closure.  The motion to approve the new Canadian flag passed the House of 
Commons in December 1964.31 
 Pearson’s determination to provide the country with a distinctively Canadian flag 
was motivated in part by concerns over recently growing strains on the national fabric, in 
Quebec especially.  That province’s rapid political and economic modernization under 
the Liberal government of Jean Lesage had also precipitated a dramatic surge in radical 
Quebec nationalism during the 1960s.  The separatist Rassemblement pour 
l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) was formed in 1960 to advocate for Quebec’s 
independence, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) exploded its first bomb in March 
1963, and René Lévesque, the Minister of Natural Resources in Lesage’s government, 
proclaimed Quebeckers were “maîtres chez nous” when rationalizing expansion of the 
publicly-owned Hydro-Québec in the early 1960s.32  The question of Quebec’s place in 
Canada would continue to dominate Canadian political discourse for the next three 
decades. 
Along with the new flag, Pearson’s government sought to foster national unity 
and pride with a boisterous celebration of Canada’s centenary in 1967.  Montreal’s 
success hosting a widely popular world’s fair, Expo 67, did much to enhance Canadians’ 
pride in, and optimism for, their country that, in 1967 at least, felt one hundred years 
young.  Indeed, as the journalist Margaret Wente observed fifty years after the fact, 
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young Canadians felt as if their generation came of age at the same time as their 
country.33  Historians Bothwell, Drummond and English described Canadian nationalism 
in 1967 as “gentle,” and Pierre Berton later rhapsodized how “Expo taught us to go first 
class, and we reveled in the pride that inspired.”34  Yet, according to Stephen Clarkson, 
accompanying this sense of “prevailing optimism” was a “fear that the United States 
might drag the world into nuclear holocaust with the Soviet Union – unless a social 
revolution did not first erupt there.”35   
All the while, Canadian opposition to America’s escalating military conflict in 
Vietnam grew.  As was shown in the previous chapter, the Canadian New Left was an 
energetic participant in the emerging international anti-war movement.36  Emulating the 
spontaneous “teach-ins” breaking out at American universities, anti-war faculty at the 
University of Toronto organized an administration-sponsored “International Teach-In on 
Vietnam” in October 1965.  One of the speakers, and an unusual darling of the Canadian 
New Left, was 47-year-old McMaster University philosophy professor George Grant.  
Earlier in 1965 Grant had published Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian 
Nationalism, a pessimistic indictment of the Liberal Party’s acceptance of the country’s 
growing integration with the United States, and a eulogy for the British tradition in 
Canada and its recently defeated champion, John Diefenbaker.37  Among Grant’s laments 
was the Pearson government succumbing to pressure from the United States to accept 
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nuclear warheads on Canadian soil.  Lament for a Nation, in addition to establishing 
Grant as a “Canadian intellectual celebrity,” resulted somewhat ironically in this 
conservative and religious philosopher being embraced by the Canadian New Left.38  
Much of Grant’s critique of American society – the homogenizing impact of its 
technology, consumerism and materialism – and its unparalleled threat to a uniquely 
Canadian culture, identity, and independent nationhood, resonated strongly with New 
Left activists. 
As became evident at the Toronto “teach-in,” Grant not only opposed the war in 
Vietnam.  He also criticized Canadian industrial and diplomatic interests for their 
complicity with the American war effort, and connected the lack of an independent 
foreign policy to the decline in Canadian sovereignty.  For Mel Watkins, then a thirty-
four-year-old economist at the University of Toronto, “the whole experience of the teach-
in was very radicalizing.”39  Watkins had been a student of Harold Innis in the 1950s and 
completed his graduate studies at MIT before assuming an academic appointment in the 
University of Toronto’s Political Economy department.  A self-described “well-trained 
technocrat and an American left democrat” upon his return to Canada, Watkins grew 
“disillusioned” by American involvement in Vietnam.40  Innis’s influence remained 
strong, and Watkins’s 1963 article “A Staple Theory of Economic Growth” updated the 
senior scholar’s earlier groundbreaking explanation of Canada’s economic development 
as a series of “staple” resources for export.41  Although initially skeptical about the 
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possibility of Canadian nationalism, Watkins had become concerned by 1966 about the 
“political costs” associated with American investment despite its “economically 
advantageous” effects.42  Thus, when Walter Gordon approached another University of 
Toronto economist, Abraham Rotstein, to chair a Task Force on the Structure of 
Canadian Industry, Rotstein suggested Watkins instead.43  Watkins accepted.  Gordon 
had resigned as Minister of Finance following the 1965 election but then re-entered 
Pearson’s cabinet as minister-without-portfolio on condition a cabinet committee on 
foreign investment be established.  Watkins’s task force was to conduct the committee’s 
research.  In the meantime Gordon had also published his second book, A Choice for 
Canada: Independence or Colonial Status.  A critique of foreign investment in Canada, 
the book sold 12,000 copies in its first six months, a Canadian bestseller.44  Watkins 
recalled reviewing the book “favourably on the whole, which put me in a distinct 
minority among Canadian economists.”45 
 The report of the Task Force, titled “Foreign Ownership and the Structure of 
Canadian Industry,” caused a stir upon its release in February 1968, despite its 
accompanying caveat that the report had not yet been endorsed by the government.46  In 
fact, the report’s recommendations were far from radical, reflecting the task force’s 
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membership.47  The document accepted that the Canadian economy needed foreign 
investment, and argued that there was little difference in the performance of American-
owned and Canadian-owned firms.48  The task force recommended multilateral tariff 
reduction and the creation of a Canadian Development Corporation to provide investment 
capital to domestic companies.  The issue of extraterritoriality – the application of 
American laws to companies operating in Canada and in particular the US embargo 
against Cuba – rankled all of the task force’s members and they recommended 
establishing a government agency to monitor foreign-owned firms and passing legislation 
to prevent foreign laws from being applied to foreign-owned firms operating in Canada. 
Media responses to the report generally reflected previously established editorial opinions 
about Walter Gordon and foreign investment – the Toronto Telegram and Winnipeg Free 
Press for instance, were critical, while the Toronto Star’s coverage was detailed and 
laudatory.49  Historian Stephen Azzi notes in his biography of Gordon that “the most 
interesting aspect of the media’s coverage of the report was the context,” as stories about 
the task force were placed alongside articles and photographs of the ongoing war in 
Vietnam and violent police responses to peaceful civil rights protesters in the United 
States.50 
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Although the Watkins Report received significant public attention, many 
intellectuals and New Democrats were already aware of corporate America’s expanding 
ownership of the Canadian economy.  Concerns over foreign ownership of the economy 
and Canada’s increasing continental integration had been a staple of NDP policy since 
the party’s founding, and its election platforms in 1963 and 1968 had harshly criticized 
the federal Liberal government’s tacit support of continentalism.  Nevertheless, political 
scientist Gad Horowitz expressed surprise at the results of a 1966 survey of politicians, 
academics and reporters on the future of the NDP, published in the left-wing magazine 
Canadian Dimension, which indicated that a majority of respondents expected the party 
to become the voice of Canadian independence.51  Founded by Cy Gonick, a future 
Waffler and Manitoba NDP MLA, Canadian Dimension was a regular forum for critics 
of the Vietnam War and of Canada’s continuing absorption by American cultural, 
economic, and foreign policy influences.52  McGill University philosopher Charles 
Taylor, the NDP’s leading public intellectual, published articles in the magazine on 
“Alternatives to Continentalism” and “Nationalism and Independence.”53  The NDP also 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Liberal Party, keeping his “Just Society” and “More Power for Everyone” slogans deliberately ambiguous.  
However, his criticism of Quebec’s international aspirations, his rhetorical linking of Robert Kennedy’s 
assassination and terrorism in Quebec, and his hostility to the “two nations” conception of Confederation 
espoused by both the PCs and the NDP made his opposition to Quebec nationalism evident to all.  The 
sixty-three-year-old Tommy Douglas, leader of the federal NDP and a fixture in Canadian politics since the 
1930s, appeared dated and out of touch in comparison to Trudeau’s dynamic and modern image.  English, 
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held policy seminars in 1966 and 1967 at which Taylor, Mel Watkins and Kari Levitt 
presented policy papers on challenges to Canadian independence.54  Although Levitt’s 
classic indictment of continental integration, Silent Surrender, was not published until 
after the Waffle Manifesto was written, her work began as a study of foreign ownership 
prepared for the NDP at the behest of Charles Taylor, and the Manifesto’s authors were 
certainly familiar with and influenced by her conclusions.55 
 During the 1968 federal election campaign, Douglas and the NDP endorsed the 
Watkins Report and criticized the incumbent Liberals for Canada’s unchecked drift 
toward continentalism that had occurred on their watch.56  The NDP even invited 
Watkins to join with Douglas’s campaign tour, but he declined on the grounds that he had 
assured Gordon that he would be available to promote the task force report for one year 
following its publication.57  Watkins did acknowledge, however, that the entire process of 
writing and defending the report “pushed me towards socialism.  It seemed clear to me 
that only through substantial nationalization could Canadians regain control of their 
economy.”  Still, he remained uncertain about the NDP’s brand of democracy, describing 
it as “the Old Left position of considering hierarchical power structures inevitable.”58  
Watkins identified instead with “a New Left version of socialism” which emphasized 
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democratic decision-making by citizens in their workplaces, universities and 
neighbourhoods.59 
 In April 1969, after Watkins had spent the year as promised promoting his report, 
he was invited by Gerald Caplan, a professor at the Ontario Institute for Studies in 
Education, to attend a weekend meeting at his home in Toronto.  Also on the guest list 
were, as Caplan explained, other like-minded friends and acquaintances “who feel that 
we’re significantly left of the NDP but not happy to simply embrace all of the jargon and 
tactics of the New Left.”60  Watkins and Caplan were joined by Ed Broadbent, James 
Laxer, Krista Maeots, Doug and Carol Myers, John and Patricia Smart, and Giles 
Endicott in what would become the inaugural meeting of the Waffle.  Among Caplan’s 
invitees, only Stephen Lewis, the MPP for Scarborough West, failed to respond to 
Caplan’s invitation.  Caplan and Lewis were close friends, but Lewis’s nonattendance 
reportedly did not surprise the others.61 
 It had been Stephen Lewis who, in the late 1950s, introduced and converted 
Caplan, then an undergraduate student at the University of Toronto, to socialism.  
Together they had co-managed in the spring of 1962 David Lewis’s successful election 
campaign in the riding of York South.62  Caplan went on to graduate school in England 
and then Rhodesia, where he was arrested and deported in 1965 for supporting black 
student protests against Ian Smith’s white nationalist government.63  Giles Endicott also 
met Caplan and Stephen Lewis while an undergraduate at the University of Toronto and 
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served with them and John Smart in a CCF student cabinet.64  Along with Caplan and Ed 
Broadbent, Endicott later joined a group of Canadians living in London, England, in the 
early 1960s in founding a New Party club.65  By 1969, Endicott was back in Canada as 
research director with the United Packinghouse Workers-Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
union, a member of the NDP’s federal council, and party activist in the downtown 
Toronto riding of St. David.  Endicott had participated in the ‘Young Turks’ revolt 
against the party establishment at the federal NDP’s 1967 convention, for which he was 
criticized and threatened by his union for breaching the principle of labour “caucus 
solidarity.”66  Although Cy Gonick dismissed the ‘Young Turks’ revolt as “a family 
quarrel which saw the presidential candidate of the middle-aged generation, James 
Renwick, defeat the candidate of the over-sixties generation, J.H. Brockelbank,” Endicott 
walked away from the unpleasant experience convinced that the NDP sorely needed to 
modernize and move further left.67  Endicott ran unsuccessfully as the NDP candidate in 
St. David in the 1963 and 1967 provincial elections.68 
 Endicott had remained friends with Ed Broadbent, who taught political science at 
York University until NDP and UAW activists recruited him to seek the federal party’s 
nomination in his hometown of Oshawa.  In one of the NDP’s few gains in the 1968 
election, the thirty-two-year-old Broadbent defeated long-time Progressive Conservative 
MP Michael Starr by a margin of just fifteen votes.  Upon joining the NDP caucus in 
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Ottawa Broadbent initially devoted much of his energy advocating for industrial 
democracy, a concept then popular with elements of the American New Left that sought 
greater levels of worker participation and influence in the workplace.  Broadbent fully 
expected the NDP to embrace the concept, but his idealism took a blow over the steadfast 
opposition of the union movement, including the UAW, to the idea.69  A similar naivety 
was on display when Broadbent attempted to arrange for Caplan and Laxer, neither of 
whom had been formally invited, to present to the federal NDP caucus their views on the 
party, Canadian independence, and socialism.70  The decision by caucus not to break 
procedure and hear them out caused Broadbent much embarrassment. 
 James Laxer, who had been active in the student movement as an undergraduate 
at the University of Toronto, was head of Canadian University Press (CUP) in 1965 when 
it added to its mission statement a commitment to “act as an agent of social change.”71  
Along with Dimitri Roussopoulos, Art Pape and Doug Ward, Laxer was a leader of 
SUPA’s Vietnam Action Committee when it organized the March 1966 sit-in on 
Parliament Hill that resulted in sixty-one arrests.72  By that point, Laxer was at Queen’s 
University where, along with fellow graduate student and SUPA activist Krista Maeots, 
he worked at revitalizing the campus NDP club.  There was “considerable overlap” in 
membership between the Kingston SUPA and the Queen’s University NDP, but by 1966-
67 “the NDP had taken over SUPA’s role as the major political organization on 
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campus.”73  Although Laxer was the “key figure” in the campus NDP, he continued his 
involvement in SUPA until its demise.74  Maeots edited the Queen’s Journal in 1967, and 
under her direction the campus newspaper began featuring broader social and political 
coverage.75  However, as Laxer grew disenchanted with the Canadian New Left’s focus 
on American issues and its ignorance of the history of socialist struggle in Canada, his 
focus shifted away from the student movement and towards the NDP.76 
While at Queen’s Laxer participated in student-run seminars on Canada’s history 
and politics where he encountered kindred spirits among graduate students and junior 
faculty primarily from the Department of History, including George Rawlyk, Krista 
Maeots, George and Rosemary Warskett, John and Patricia Smart, and Lorne and 
Caroline Brown.  Laxer, who at the time was writing a Masters thesis on the Quebec 
nationalist politician Henri Bourassa, became increasingly convinced that a leftist 
program combining socialism and economic nationalism “would attract French-Canadian 
nationalists back to federal politics.”77  Patricia Smart recalls having long conversations 
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with Laxer about Quebec nationalism and Canadian independence.78  Her husband, John 
Smart, also a Queen’s graduate student in history, had been active in the CCF/NDP as an 
undergraduate at the University of Toronto with Stephen Lewis, Caplan and Endicott.  He 
later worked on David Lewis’s 1962 federal election campaign, managed Stephen 
Lewis’s 1963 provincial election campaign and after moving to Kingston managed John 
Meister’s 1965 federal and 1967 provincial election campaigns before becoming 
president of the local riding association by 1969.79 
 Laxer’s small coterie of Queen’s students transformed the Kingston NDP.  At the 
suggestion of Joan Newman, a SUPA activist who had continued her organizing efforts 
among the city’s poor and working-class youth after SUPA ended its summer community 
project in September 1965, the local riding association supported the creation of an 
information centre in Kingston’s poor North End.  The Community Information Service 
that opened in January 1968 with NDP support proved so popular that within months 
Newman and others established the Association for Tenants’ Action, Kingston 
(ATAK).80  Although the NDP and ATAK were not formally linked the connection 
nevertheless expanded the Kingston NDP’s commitment to grassroots community 
organizing because many people were active in both the riding association and the 
tenants’ organization.81  Involvement in community organizing appeared to pay 
immediate electoral dividends when two of the three ATAK candidates were elected 
aldermen and the NDP vote in the city’s north end increased in the 1968 federal 
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election.82  Laxer regarded Joan Newman’s election to city council in particular as 
representing “the beginnings of a new coalition of poor tenants, labour and students.”83  
Such fruitful ties between the New Left and Kingston NDP working together to address 
local social problems further motivated Laxer, Maeots and the Smarts to join Watkins, 
Broadbent, Endicott and the Myers at Gerald Caplan’s house in late April 1969 for what 
the host dubbed “a little subversive gathering.”84 
 Over the course of the weekend the group discussed the state of the NDP and the 
left in Canada, while formulating ideas for inclusion in a draft statement that Laxer would 
compose.85  They also agreed that new recruits to the group should be members of the 
NDP.86  At the second meeting held one month later at John and Patricia Smart’s home in 
Kingston, they were joined by Lorne and Caroline Brown, who had been active in the 
Saskatchewan NDP before moving to Kingston where Lorne was a graduate student.  
Also new were Don Taylor, an assistant research director for the Steelworkers, Hugh 
Winsor, a reporter for the Globe and Mail, Gordon Flowers, the federal NDP Youth 
secretary, Hans Brown, a staffer in the federal NDP leader’s office, and several others, 
mainly from Toronto and Kingston.87  The enlarged group assigned Watkins the task of 
incorporating ideas from their second meeting into Laxer’s draft.  After a third meeting 
held in Toronto two weeks later, Caplan made the final edits to the document. 
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 Much of the substance of Laxer’s draft would be included in the final Waffle 
Manifesto, and reflected many of the concerns he had previously expressed in articles 
appearing in Canadian Dimension.  The draft highlighted two key issues: domination of 
the Canadian economy by a morally bankrupt United States tainted by chronic racial 
inequality and its war in Vietnam, and the potential for a heightened emphasis on 
Canadian economic nationalism to attract Quebec nationalists into a pan-Canadian 
socialist coalition.88  The first draft also argued that capitalism caused regional 
inequalities within Canada, and included a nod to the importance of “the struggle for 
worker participation in industrial decision making.”  No mention was made of the NDP 
specifically until the final paragraph.89  Laxer later recalled that “we had the spirit of the 
New Left.  The Manifesto was an expression of the youthful radicalism of the era, but it 
was Watkins who made it a brilliant document.  Watkins was my idol.”90 
 Watkins’s draft considerably improved Laxer’s.  Watkins added stirring 
introductory and concluding paragraphs, reworked some of Laxer’s awkward phrasing, 
and included three paragraphs on industrial democracy – a major preoccupation of 
Broadbent’s – that highlighted the need to redistribute managerial power to workers and 
concluded that the labour movement was crucial to the struggle for Canadian 
independence and socialism.91  The draft acknowledged that “concern is sometimes 
expressed in Canada about the role of international unions and there are some who call 
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for national unions” before rejecting such an approach for fear of “weakening unionism 
and the condition of the working man.”92  As Watkins later explained: 
Although we were nationalists, we did not want to take a stand denouncing 
international unions, despite urgings from some of our friends on the Left.  We 
felt that taking that stand would have been political suicide.  For one, it would 
have made it impossible for us to stay in the NDP.  Also it would have put our 
supporters who are militant members of international unions, in an intolerable 
position.93 
 
The references to international unions were eventually removed, and the final version of 
the Manifesto remained silent on the issue.  According to Endicott, the discussion over 
international unions inspired the group’s odd name: 
We agreed that the case was very different from that of multinational 
corporations, since the corporations have real power to initiate and control 
economic development whereas the unions do not.  But in the course of this 
discussion it was argued that if we were going to waffle, it would be better to 
waffle to the left than waffle to the right.94 
 
After the Globe and Mail used the term in a September 1969 editorial “The Waffle 
Manifesto,” the group quickly adopted the “Waffle” name publicly.95  Even prior to the 
editorial, Endicott had signed his letters “the Waffle King,” and declined some requests 
for copies of the Manifesto with the regretful admission “we are now out of waffles.”96  
Although Laxer recalled that “we might not have had it without the editorial… We knew 
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it would be a problem to have a left-wing group that was seen as too serious, so to have a 
name that was humorous was just great.  We knew right away that it was a great name.”97 
 The group also waffled on the strength of their statement’s wording on the thorny 
issue of Quebec’s right to self-determination.98  Explicitly stating support for Quebec’s 
right to determine its own fate, including separating from the rest of Canada, went further 
than existing NDP constitutional policy that endorsed a “deux nations” approach to 
federalism including “special status” for Quebec.  When the executive committee of 
Endicott, John Smart, Caplan, Laxer, Watkins and Don Taylor met in June to finalize the 
Manifesto, they did not alter the document significantly aside from striking the sentence 
“Quebec’s right to self-determination is not in question” from a paragraph that began “a 
united Canada is of critical importance in pursuing a successful socialist strategy.”99   
Despite the controversy it soon created within the party, the Waffle Manifesto did 
not represent a complete radical rupture with NDP policies and ideology in the late 
1960s.  As Ontario NDP provincial secretary John Harney explained to Waffler Steven 
Langdon, “there is almost nothing in there that I have not endorsed already as a member 
of the NDP… if anything, I think that the ‘manifesto’ is not radical enough, and in 
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several points seems to be taking a step backward from positions which the party has 
already taken.”100  Certainly the Manifesto’s proponents had waffled on the contentious 
issues of international unions and Quebec’s right to self-determination.  However, the 
Waffle Manifesto distinguished itself from the mainstream Canadian left, as represented 
by the leadership of the NDP and the affiliated labour movement, by its aggressive tone 
and its origins in the New Left, both as articulated by its authors and as evidenced by its 
approach to the issues of capitalism and Canadian independence. 
 The Canadian nationalism central to the Manifesto – it pronounced that “the most 
urgent issue for Canadians is the very survival of Canada” – was a product of the New 
Left’s avid opposition to American “racism at home and militarism abroad.”101  The civil 
rights and anti-war movements in the United States were pivotal for a generation of 
young people who mobilized to expose the hypocrisy they perceived at the heart of Cold 
War America.  The Canadian New Left in turn demanded Canada chart a course distinct 
from the racism and militarism plaguing American society.  Capitalism, too, was 
condemned for threatening Canada’s independence.  The Manifesto linked the American 
“empire” and “military-industrial complex” to a dominant corporate capitalism it 
castigated for producing Canada’s regional economic disparities.  Notably, the Manifesto 
did not attack capitalism for impoverishing Canadians or alienating workers.  Moreover, 
it is vague in its discussion of socialism, indicating only that it will be achieved “by 
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national planning of investment and by the public ownership of the means of production 
in the interests of the Canadian people as a whole.”102 
 A New Left emphasis on democracy was central to the Waffle Manifesto’s 
assertion that neither independence nor socialism “are meaningful without true 
participatory democracy.”  A section on industrial democracy argued that “the NDP must 
provide leadership in the struggle to extend workingmen’s influence into every area of 
industrial decision-making.”  Despite its stance that the NDP must ally with New Left 
social movements as “the parliamentary wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental 
social change,” the Manifesto was not an expression of a post-materialist, “new social 
movement” approach sometimes associated with the New Left.103  Issues such as 
women’s and gay liberation, racial discrimination, and environmental protection, while 
not mentioned specifically in the Manifesto, would nevertheless become important to the 
Waffle. 
In preparation for the October 1969 federal NDP convention in Winnipeg, the 
Wafflers devised concrete plans for rallying support of the Manifesto and their goal of 
moving the party’s policies further left.  They put Endicott in charge of “overall 
organization of our efforts,” appointed Caplan “internal secretary,” and tasked John 
Smart with coordinating a slate of resolutions for submission to the convention on such 
“agreed topics” as industrial democracy, Quebec, foreign ownership, extra-parliamentary 
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social movements, party structure, and the Americanization of universities, and also for 
ensuring they were submitted to the convention.104 
 Broadbent, meanwhile, began expressing doubts about the direction the group was 
headed.  After he showed the Manifesto to the NDP’s research director, Marc Eliesen, 
who was decidedly unimpressed, the two of them rewrote it.105  Although Endicott wrote 
to Caplan to suggest that several sections of the Broadbent/Eliesen draft could be 
incorporated into the Manifesto, others were equally unhappy with the revisions.106  
Laxer, for example, complained “you’ve taken all the juice out of it… the guts are 
gone.”107  Broadbent, whose focus was still the issue of industrial democracy, quietly 
withdrew from the group.  Others among the original Wafflers were determined that the 
Manifesto remain a radical statement.  In an interview twenty years later, Saskatchewan 
Waffler John Warnock explained: 
I was talking with Lorne Brown the other day about the drafting of the Waffle 
Manifesto, spring of 1969, and he said that people don’t realize that his position, 
which was then supported by Mel Watkins, is that the Waffle Manifesto should be 
strong enough to the left so that the NDP could not accept it, and this would force 
the creation of a left-wing caucus within the NDP, so Caplan and Broadbent and 
Endicott tried to water it down, but they wanted the Waffle Manifesto to be strong 
enough that it could not be co-opted by the NDP leadership and would create an 
organization.108 
 
However, Laxer’s recollections suggest that Brown’s determination was not universally 
shared among the original Wafflers, and he explained: 
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The furthest thing from my mind was the idea of destroying the NDP… when we 
drafted the Waffle Manifesto, I was full of virtue and belief that we were doing 
some thing that was good… I didn’t think that there was anything conflictual, or 
that David Lewis would hate this, or that trade union leaders would almost give 
themselves coronaries chasing twenty-six-year-olds from one side of a convention 
hall to another to stop us…109 
 
Mel Watkins recalled: 
None of us who wrote the Waffle Manifesto, and certainly not myself, ever sat 
down and said: “Let’s radicalize the NDP.” It was much more of a spontaneous 
thing of a half dozen or so people realizing they were in the Party and fed up with 
it.  We never set out to do what we ended up doing.  In the best sense, I think, 
you’re doing something real if you touch a nerve and everybody jumps.110 
 
The Waffle’s executive committee next decided to draw more publicity for the 
Manifesto in advance of the convention by seeking endorsements from prominent New 
Democrats “whose names will be recognizable and attractive.”111  Copies were sent to 
potential supporters with a note explaining the desire to “swing the NDP convention a bit 
to the left.”112  Among those Endicott contacted were MPs Alf Gleave, Grace MacInnis 
and Max Saltsman, newly-elected Manitoba MLA and editor of Canadian Dimension Cy 
Gonick, Nova Scotia NDP leader Jeremy Akerman, former BC NDP leadership candidate 
and New Left activist John Conway, UAW-Canada Director Dennis McDermott (who 
formerly worked with SUPA activists as an organizer in Kingston), left-wing Simon 
Fraser University political scientist Martin Robin, and two American-born professors in 
Saskatchewan, Joe Roberts and John Warnock.113 
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 Many of the recipients were already aware of the Manifesto.  Broadbent had 
presented it at a meeting of the federal caucus, and he was informed “that such papers 
should not be circulated without having their source attached.”  Both MacInnis and 
Gleave thought the document “interesting,” but declined to endorse it.114  The response 
beyond the federal caucus was considerably more positive.  Cy Gonick, Joe Roberts, John 
Warnock and Jeremy Akerman all indicated their enthusiastic support, but not without 
suggesting some revisions were in order.  Gonick in particular explained that he had 
spoken at length with Watkins and Laxer about the document and indicated that “the 
contents are okay but it starts off badly.”115  Concerned that the Manifesto “casts us as 
outsiders,” Gonick offered a new preamble he had written that he thought better situated  
concerns about American economic and cultural domination of Canada within the 
broader history of the CCF/NDP.116  Endicott replied positively to Gonick’s preamble, 
but regretted it was too late to make further changes to the document as it had already 
been distributed widely among potential supporters.117  Stephen Lewis recalled that he 
“came fairly close to signing” the Manifesto because “I felt I had a similar view of the 
left.”  However, he explained “I think I was scared off by David [Lewis].  I think it was a 
severe parental admonition – he scared me off – and it was ironic that I didn’t rebel by 
signing.”118 
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 Once a list of notable supporters whose names could be affixed to the Manifesto 
was compiled, the executive committee planned to distribute the document to riding 
associations during the month of August in a preemptive bid to ensure that it received due 
consideration at the October convention.  The Wafflers were worried that the structure of 
the convention, which provided for resolutions to be debated by panels rather than the 
entire assembly, would preclude the Manifesto from being debated and voted on by all 
delegates.  However, if sufficient riding associations indicated support for the Manifesto, 
Wafflers hoped that party officials could be persuaded to allow a convention-wide debate 
on the topic.  While John Smart continued his work of coordinating a series of left-
leaning resolutions for submission to the convention, Wafflers sent copies of the 
Manifesto to provincial NDP newspapers and Canadian Dimension for publication in 
September and encouraged supportive party members to seek election as delegates to the 
October gathering.119   
 Some Manifesto supporters proved so enthusiastic they jumped the queue and 
circulated it at NDP meetings in advance of the Wafflers’ intended distribution date.  
John Conway handed out copies at the Saskatchewan NDP convention in Saskatoon in 
early July, where “it was given further attention by Ed Broadbent who declared his 
disagreement with it.”120  Delegates to the Young New Democrats convention in Ottawa 
also distributed the Manifesto prematurely, resulting in its mid-July publication in the 
Workers Vanguard, the newspaper of the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA).  
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The newspaper’s editor apologized for the misstep, but perhaps he need not have.121  The 
Manifesto was not further circulated over the balance of the summer, prompting 
Endicott’s comment to political scientist Joe Roberts, “we are grateful that the paper has 
not yet hit the regular press – apparently nobody reads the Workers Vanguard.”122 
In Saskatchewan the Waffle encountered an existing network of intellectuals and 
students predisposed to supporting an expression of New Left-tinged socialism within the 
NDP.  Intellectuals and activists critical of American imperialism had founded the 
Committee for a Socialist Movement (CSM) in 1967.  Primarily a Saskatoon- and 
Regina-based discussion group, the CSM was the initiative of two expatriate American 
academics, Joe Roberts and Ed Mahood, along with Bill Gilbey and Roy Atkinson, who 
were union and farm activists respectively.123  A fifth participant was Jack Shapiro, 
whose friendship with Woodrow Lloyd’s executive assistant, Jack Kinzel, prompted an 
informal dialogue with the Saskatchewan NDP leader as well.  Lloyd believed internal 
ideological debates were vital for a healthy social democratic party.  His public criticisms 
of unrestrained capitalism’s damaging effects on the marginalized of Saskatchewan 
convinced those in the CSM that they were exerting at least some influence on the NDP 
leader.124  The group also connected with student New Left activists, including Don 
Mitchell, Richard Thompson and Don Kossick.125  In the summer of 1969, following an 
unsuccessful foray into Saskatoon’s municipal election and internal disagreements over 
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the group’s future direction, the CSM’s members were “re-energized” by the timely 
appearance of the Waffle Manifesto.126 
That same summer in neighbouring Manitoba the outlook was propitious for New 
Democrats.  Shortly after Ed Schreyer, a popular thirty-three-year-old MP, won the race 
to succeed Russell Paulley as leader of the Manitoba NDP, the province was in the midst 
of a provincial election campaign.  Schreyer’s “rural touch” appealed to many voters, and 
his party also enjoyed additional media coverage early in the campaign as a result of its 
recently televised leadership convention.127  With the Liberals under the leadership of 
R.R. Bend occupying much the same territory on the right of the political spectrum as the 
governing Progressive Conservatives, the NDP enticed progressives and reformers with a 
platform promising lower medicare premiums, public automobile insurance, an increased 
minimum wage, a lowered voting age, the appointment of a provincial ombudsperson, 
and a review of Manitoba’s hydro-electric industry.128  Aided by a “voting coalition of 
the ethnic minorities, the traditional outsiders in Manitoba society and politics,” and a 
more representative redistribution of electoral districts, the NDP won the June 25th 
election with twenty-eight of the province’s fifty-seven seats and formed a majority 
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government when Liberal MLA Larry Desjardins joined the NDP caucus as a “Liberal 
Democrat.”129 
 The NDP in British Columbia, led by thirty-six-year-old Thomas Berger, likewise 
appeared poised for victory when Social Credit premier W.A.C. Bennett dissolved the 
legislative assembly in July 1969 and called a provincial election.  Bennett had 
antagonized workers and unions by limiting collective bargaining and legal strikes in the 
province, and the NDP raised money from national unions headquartered in English 
Canada and hired organizers to target vulnerable Social Credit-held seats.130  Bennett  
stoked fears of socialism by seizing on the NDP’s commitment to nationalizing the 
British Columbia Telephone Company.131  A modest gain in its popular vote did not 
prevent the NDP from losing four seats, including Berger’s, and Social Credit from 
increasing its majority in the August election.  Berger resigned soon afterwards leaving 
his former leadership rival David Barrett, the MLA for Coquitlam and signatory to the 
Waffle Manifesto, as party leader. 
Much like in Saskatchewan, in British Columbia an existing array of left-wing 
party members and activists were attracted to the radical tone of the Waffle Manifesto.  
But unlike in Saskatchewan, an organized network of socialist academics and students 
comparable to the CSM did not exist.  In British Columbia the Waffle attracted grassroots 
members of the provincial NDP’s long-standing and influential left wing alongside 
Barrett and his supporters in caucus.  Perhaps frustrated by Berger’s moderate views and 
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unsuccessful leadership of the provincial party, five Vancouver-based NDP MLAs signed 
the Waffle Manifesto.132  So too did Wally Ross, NDP provincial secretary, Norm Levi, a 
former MLA and party president, and Paddy Neale, the left-wing secretary-treasurer of 
the Vancouver and District Labour Council.  Barrett recalled several years later that he 
had viewed the Manifesto as a good starting point for a discussion about the NDP’s next 
steps, but he did not support the entire statement outright.133 
After a summer spent attempting to garner support for their cause among NDP 
riding associations, Wafflers officially unveiled their Manifesto at a press conference in 
Ottawa on September 4, 1969.  Six of the signatories were present, with Watkins, who 
was the best known among the group from his previous public defense of the Watkins 
Report, acting as spokesperson.  Journalists in attendance were blunt in their criticisms.  
Charles Lynch, reporting for the Southam News Service, dismissed as “fatuous” 
Watkins’s views on the “American Empire,” and jeered the Waffle “wouldn’t even be 
able to elect a dog-catcher anywhere in Canada on a platform like that.”134  Douglas 
Fisher, a Toronto Telegram columnist and former CCF and NDP MP, dubbed the 
Manifesto “a jumble of discarded slogans of the 1930s, a nostalgia of guild socialism and 
above all a frenzy of anti-Americanism.”  He predicted that not even twenty of the 
approximately one thousand delegates to the NDP convention would be interested in 
discussing the Manifesto in any detail.135 
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Ontario NDP leader Donald MacDonald was similarly critical.  In an interview 
the day after the press conference, he described the Manifesto as “a disappointing 
document containing old and weary rhetoric and ideas.”136  Later in the month, 
Manitoba’s Ed Schreyer expressed concern about the Manifesto’s “strident anti-
Americanism,” and intimated he would work behind the scenes to reject the document at 
the upcoming Winnipeg convention.137  Most of the critical responses directed to 
Endicott focused on problems of worker participation in management, and warned that 
the Manifesto’s support for industrial democracy threatened to antagonize the labour 
movement.138  At least one unionist smelled a plot, and demanded to know whether the 
party leadership had been informed of the Waffle group’s “secret meetings.”  He assured 
them that “it was not the lack of a good old-fashioned doctrinaire socialist program that 
lost us that [BC] election.”139  In general, however, the Manifesto’s founders were 
pleasantly surprised and encouraged by the interest and positive response their initiative 
had generated. 
  Watkins recalled that “when we called meetings to discuss it [the Manifesto], 
50-60 party members would show up regularly.  We were also getting letters and phone 
calls from NDP’ers across the country.”140  At an Ontario Young New Democrats 
seminar at the University of Toronto, 150 delegates debated and endorsed the Manifesto.  
Prominent Wafflers recommended to the gathering a combination of social movement 
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activism and electoral politics.  Caplan’s complaint was whereas “most of the student 
movement in Canada doesn’t talk to anyone but itself… socialism means dialogue,” 
while Laxer cautioned that “the NDP has become dangerously fossilized as a left-wing 
institution.”  Steven Langdon, the former president of the University of Toronto Student 
Administrative Council, advised that “the NDP in power in parliament, by itself, cannot 
make the fundamental changes for a socialist society.”141  Eventually, twenty-one riding 
associations endorsed the Manifesto, but usually only after heated debate.142   
By now widely known as the Waffle, thanks to the Globe and Mail’s editorial, the 
group began printing a rudimentary Waffle Weekly news bulletin in the lead-up to the 
convention.143  A victim of their own success in generating interest, the Wafflers 
struggled to manage all the requests for information.  Endicott reported “various self-
made promotional committees” popping up in support of the Manifesto, and a month 
before the convention additional copies of the document were unavailable.  Meanwhile, 
queries directed to the overburdened Wafflers often went unanswered for several 
weeks.144  Some members of the media began to recognize, as the Winnipeg convention 
drew nearer, that the Manifesto and its oddly-named champions might well be a force to 
be reckoned with.145 
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On the down side, the Waffle Manifesto achieved little traction with either the 
labour movement or the federal NDP leadership.146  Don Taylor, the Steelworkers’ 
assistant research director and original member of the Waffle executive committee, 
resigned from the group before the convention.  Taylor explained he no longer wished to 
defend “the workers’ participation section with which I never really agreed and from 
some superfluous anti-Americanism; none of which is really essential to the manifesto” 
but which triggered “almost automatic distrust” among his colleagues in the labour 
movement.147  The philosopher Charles Taylor, who had signed and subsequently 
repudiated the Waffle Manifesto, collaborated with NDP deputy leader David Lewis in 
producing a statement ‘For a United and Independent Canada,’ that both acknowledged 
the Manifesto’s popularity within the party and attempted a repudiation of its more 
radical elements.  In response to widely shared concerns about expanding foreign 
ownership, the Taylor/Lewis document called for the creation of a Canada Development 
Corporation and held up public ownership as one important, but not exclusive, means of 
limiting and regulating foreign ownership of the Canadian economy.148  Endicott alerted 
other Wafflers to the existence of a “competing statement” that union officials such as 
Modren Lazarus of the OFL and Lorne Ingle of the Steelworkers distributed to labour 
leaders prior to the convention.149  Labelled the Marshmallow Manifesto by convention 
delegates for its moderate tone, the Taylor/Lewis statement criticized anti-Americanism 
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as a “barren and negative” concept and was adopted by the party’s federal council.150  
Prior to the convention some NDP executive members attempted to block the Waffle 
Manifesto from even reaching the convention floor, but David Lewis insisted that the 
party both debate and vote on it.151  Eventually it was decided that both manifestos would 
be debated simultaneously on the final night of the convention. 
The media interest generated by the Waffle, the ideological and generational 
differences between Waffle supporters and long-time New Democrats, and the 
convention’s plenary structure combined to create an often frantic atmosphere.  Several 
days of policy panels open to all delegates found Waffle supporters and party moderates 
alike rushing from one panel session to another in an effort to win crucial votes.  
Desmond Morton described it as “a nightmare for party regulars” as “rival clutches of 
delegates were sent panting through the corridors of Winnipeg’s Civic Auditorium.”152  
James Laxer recalled a similar scenario of “young, long-haired and often bearded Waffle 
supporters… racing from one workshop session to another, being pursued by older, and 
often paunchy, trade union delegates.”153  The Waffle arranged for its own space at the 
convention which proved fortuitous since its meetings regularly drew 300 to 400 
delegates, although the Waffle was not intended to operate as a “binding caucus” whose 
members would vote in concert, in contrast to the expectation of solidarity among union 
delegates on party policy issues.154 
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Douglas Fisher’s prediction proved wildly inaccurate.  Debate over the Waffle’s 
policy resolutions dominated the convention, and revealed some delegates were prepared 
to support some of its policy positions without endorsing the Manifesto in its entirety.  
For instance, a Waffle resolution advocating Canada’s withdrawal from NATO, NORAD 
and other joint military agreements with the United States passed a policy panel despite 
opposition by the NDP’s foreign affairs critic.  Indeed, John Harney, the Ontario NDP 
provincial secretary, and Lorne Nystrom, a Saskatchewan MP, supported the withdrawal 
resolution, suggesting that the Waffle’s opposition to American militarism was shared by 
some young party moderates.155 
The Waffle also successfully influenced the policy panel on education when the 
Ottawa South New Democratic Youth (NDY) submitted a proposal to replace the 
Resolutions Committee’s education policy with one more radical that passed by a close 
vote of ninety to eighty-eight.  Wafflers Krista Maoets and Daniel Drache spoke in 
favour of the NDY resolution which proposed giving students a greater role in university 
governance, abolishing tuition fees, paying salaries to students, and requiring universities 
to hire a majority of Canadian professors.156 
 The Waffle was less successful in the policy panel dealing with Quebec.  The 
Kingston NDP sponsored a resolution, supported by the Waffle, that committed the party 
to recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination, defined Canada as two nations, and 
criticized bilingualism as a futile endeavour.  Charles Taylor confronted the Waffle head 
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on, and advocated retention of the party’s current policy that promoted bilingualism but 
was silent on the question of Quebec’s right to self-determination.  Taylor proposed a 
formal special status for Quebec, arguing “I don’t think it is wise for this convention to 
tell us what to do in Quebec.”157  Taylor’s moderate resolution passed by a vote of 123 to 
seventy-seven.158 
 Wafflers were instrumental in devising a compromise resolution on foreign 
ownership passed by the policy workshop.  Watkins moved the resolution, which stated 
that “multi-national corporations, mostly American based, are the dominant institutions 
of Canadian life,” and claimed that Canada “has virtually been reduced to a resource base 
and consumer market within the American empire.”159  It went on to advocate 
government restrictions on foreign takeovers of Canadian-owned firms, and a general 
prohibition on foreign ownership in certain unspecified sectors of the economy.  The 
resolution also proposed creating a Canada development corporation as an instrument of 
state economic planning and means of increasing Canadian economic independence, a 
government export trade agency, and requiring higher standards of financial data 
disclosure by corporations.  David Dodge, secretary-treasurer of the CLC, argued 
unsuccessfully in support of the NDP federal council’s recommendation that the motion 
advocate foreign investment controls without criticizing the United States directly.160  
Dodge decried the compromise resolution as “dangerous nonsense” and criticized its anti-
American language, but delegates at the plenary session of the convention two days later 
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nevertheless passed it with minor modification, replacing the phrase “American empire” 
with “American economy.”161 
 The Waffle could also share credit for the convention’s acceptance of a resolution 
calling for Canada’s withdrawal from NATO and NORAD.  Some other Waffle causes, 
however, were defeated.  Its radical education policy, which had been adopted by the 
conference’s education policy panel, was referred at the plenary to the federal council for 
redrafting.162  Also defeated was the Waffle resolution calling for recognition of 
Quebec’s right to self-determination, with the party choosing instead to stick with its 
position on Quebec’s ‘special status’ adopted at the 1967 convention.163 
 Amendments to the party’s constitution were also debated.  A proposal to end 
affiliated memberships for trade unions was soundly defeated, and convention delegates 
instead opted to increase the spots allocated to affiliated union representatives on the 
party’s federal council.  Also rejected were two proposals to increase the number of 
federal council spots designated specifically for women.  The first, sponsored by the 
women’s caucus, advocated increasing the allotment from five to twenty-five.  When the 
motion was defeated, deputy leader David Lewis moved an amendment to increase 
women’s representation to fifteen seats.  It also failed to achieve the support of two-thirds 
of voting delegates necessary for passage, much to the frustration of feminists and Waffle 
supporters.164 
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 The convention’s keynote speakers sounded markedly different notes over the 
party’s direction moving forward.  Tommy Douglas opposed the Waffle Manifesto, but 
his speech conveyed at least some sympathy for the issues it championed: 
We must achieve economic independence so that the decision-making power will 
be restored to the people of Canada… I believe that the challenge of the ‘70s calls 
for greater public intervention in the economy, social planning, direction of 
investment to meet social needs and where necessary, public ownership of those 
sectors of our economy which are essential for economic planning… However, 
we must do more than advocate programs.  We must involve ourselves in the 
daily struggles of those who fight against social injustice.  The NDP must become 
the voice of the voiceless and the champions of those who are the victims of 
injustice and exploitation. Most important of all, the NDP must be the political 
vehicle by which the people of this country can bring about social change by 
democratic means.165 
 
Manitoba Premier Ed Schreyer, by contrast, spoke of the importance of achieving 
political power in order to implement a progressive agenda.  In a thinly-veiled critique of 
the Waffle’s radical policies and rhetoric, Schreyer ignored the issue of foreign 
investment and described his own government’s legislative agenda, including its plans for 
public auto insurance, before emphasizing “the kind of progress which I have been able 
to report to you this evening has been possible because we are in power… We are not 
fulfilling our responsibilities as a political party or as committed social democrats if we 
place the problem of gaining political power as being beneath our consideration.”166 
The seventy-five minute televised debate between supporters of the Waffle and 
Marshmallow Manifestos, proved a highlight of the convention.  David Lewis started off, 
urging delegates to reject the Waffle Manifesto’s anti-Americanism.  Mel Watkins 
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responded, rejecting accusations of anti-Americanism by explaining how “a growing 
number of Americans reject American militarism and the exploitation of the third world 
by its multi-national corporations.”  Referring to the rapidly changing politics of the 
1960s, Watkins implored the NDP to “relate itself as a Party to these new undercurrents 
of radicalism… It must become the parliamentary wing of a broad social movement.”  
Several more speakers, including Dennis McDermott and Ed Broadbent, accused the 
Waffle Manifesto of anti-Americanism, with McDermott reminding delegates “we belong 
to a political party not a pseudo-intellectual debating society.”  Despite earlier comments 
he made to Steven Langdon, John Harney criticized the Manifesto for implying that 
Quebec separatism was desirable.  Three MLAs spoke in its favour.  Cy Gonick 
suggested the NDP had become “too soft… too timid… more concerned with 
respectability than with social action,” while Gordon Dowding (Burnaby-Edmonds) and 
Walter Smishek (Regina North East) beseeched the convention to support the Manifesto 
as a clear affirmation of their commitment to independence and socialism.  Party leaders 
added to Lewis’s opposition.  Allan Blakeney, the federal NDP’s incoming president, and 
federal leader Tommy Douglas both rejected the Waffle Manifesto for its lack of 
specificity compared to the Marshmallow Manifesto’s clear policies on introducing a 
Canadian Development Corporation, corporate financial disclosure rules, and a takeover 
tax.  Douglas indicated “both documents recognize that we can only attain independence 
through democratic socialism, and that we will never get complete democratic socialism 
until we have succeeded in winning economic independence,” but questioned the 
meaning of the Waffle’s commitment to “public ownership of the means of 
production.”167  After lengthy and boisterous debate, delegates defeated the Waffle 
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Manifesto by a vote of 499 to 268, and passed the Marshmallow Manifesto by a wide 
margin in an unrecorded vote.168  Despite the setback, Wafflers were energized by their 
success in garnering significant support for several of their policy proposals throughout 
the convention, as well as over the substantial media attention they had attracted. 
 Furthermore, the Waffle experienced some success in elections for the party 
executive and council.  Watkins was elected one of the seven vice-presidents on the 
executive, and Waffle sympathizers won eight of the twenty available council spots.169  
The Waffle did not challenge Allan Blakeney’s acclamation as NDP president. 
 Delighted with the enthusiasm the Manifesto and their radical policy positions 
had generated, after the convention the Wafflers committed to continue organizing as a 
distinct group within the NDP.170  Before travelling to Winnipeg, as Endicott had 
acknowledged, “we cannot expect to change the whole party at one convention… it really 
matters more what the delegates go away thinking than what they go away having 
endorsed.”171  Despite the Manifesto’s failure to win support among a majority of the 
convention delegates, the Wafflers “were ecstatic about their success in drawing national 
attention to their cause.”172  Although still a minority faction within the NDP, the Waffle 
had nevertheless made strides towards achieving its objective of providing for 
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representatives of radical social movements a sympathetic forum and effective impetus 
for political action within an established national political party. 
The Waffle Manifesto and its supporters shook up the 1969 NDP convention.  
The image of an incursion by radical young activists into the staid and sober NDP was 
enhanced by media reports, well-versed in the Sixties tropes of the generation gap, that 
emphasized the Wafflers’ youth and unusual appearance.  One Toronto Star reporter 
described the “long-haired and bearded” leftists while another columnist explained 
“many of them have long curly hair, with sideburns and mustaches.  They do not favor 
ties and wear jeans as if they were a uniform for the guerrilla army.”173  NDP leaders 
rejected any suggestion that the Waffle represented one-third of party members, despite 
the results of the Manifesto vote, and argued that “students and other radicals” were 
overrepresented at the convention.174  Yet this element of the Canadian New Left was 
unusual in its embrace of the ‘new nationalism’ that had emerged in English-Canada 
during the preceding decade as well as anti-imperialist decolonization movements 
internationally.  The authors of the Waffle Manifesto, with backgrounds in both the New 
Left and the NDP, had become concerned that the party was ignoring the single most 
pressing issue of the time – American domination of the Canadian economy.  Convinced 
that only extensive public ownership could reverse this trend, they sought to convince the 
NDP to turn leftward and espouse a similar message.  Coming together in the spring of 
1969, they had crafted a Manifesto that resonated with a significant minority of New 
Democrats and attracted excited media attention to the party’s 1969 convention.  After 
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the Waffle Manifesto’s defeat Tommy Douglas thanked the young radicals for helping to 
revitalize the party and suggested he was “delighted” they were part of the NDP.  
Douglas praised the debate the Manifesto had spurred, commenting “the time to worry is 
when a convention turns into a mutual admiration society.”175  The New Left’s arrival in 
the party via the Waffle ensured that would not be the NDP’s immediate fate. 
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Chapter Four 
“The Waffle has made the NDP exciting:” Activism and Influence, 1970 
 
Following the October 1969 federal NDP convention in Winnipeg, the Waffle 
sought to continue working within the party to promote socialism and Canadian 
independence from American economic domination.  Without question, its activism at 
Winnipeg had jolted the NDP. Donald MacDonald, the leader of the Ontario NDP, 
acknowledged the Waffle’s role in producing “the most exciting and satisfying” 
convention of his career, but simultaneously warned against adopting policies that 
“would totally isolate us from the community at large.”1  Despite minor conflicts arising 
between the Waffle and the party’s leadership, and criticisms from some party moderates 
that as the group organized further it threatened to create a “party within a party,” the 
Waffle became an important influence within the NDP in the year following its 
emergence. Mel Watkins declared after his election as one of the party’s vice-presidents 
that he intended to act as a spokesperson for the Waffle and would not be “co-opted.”2  
Acknowledging the ongoing radical activism amongst students, women, and workers, 
Watkins hinted at the Waffle’s potential strategic role on the left of the party, saying “we 
want to demonstrate that the NDP can relate to such groups.”3  Indeed, throughout 1970 
the Waffle would pursue its goals both from inside the NDP and through extra-
parliamentary activism including participating in the Abortion Caravan and rallies 
opposing the federal government’s use of the War Measures Act.  Within the party the 
Waffle influenced with some measure of success policy conventions in Saskatchewan, 
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British Columbia, Ontario and Manitoba, as well as supported a Saskatchewan NDP 
leadership candidate who ran an “issues-based campaign.” 
Cy Gonick, the MLA and editor of the influential Canadian Dimension, proposed 
during the final Waffle caucus of the Winnipeg convention that they continue their 
organizational efforts by establishing provincial committees across the country.  Gonick 
took the lead in Winnipeg, organizing during the 1969-70 winter holidays a group who 
met regularly at the Dimension bookstore.4  The Manitoba Young New Democrats 
(YND) at their January 1970 convention passed a manifesto calling for an independent 
and socialist Canada and support for party participation in the women’s liberation, anti-
Vietnam War, and student movements.5  In Saskatchewan, a Waffle group formed in 
December 1969 at a meeting in Moose Jaw called by John Conway, Joe Roberts and Don 
Mitchell attended by thirty people.  The following month the Committee for a Socialist 
Movement (CSM) agreed to fold its activities into the Saskatchewan Waffle.6  In 
preparation for its public launch at a conference in March, the group developed a 
statement for the Saskatchewan NDP convention expected in the fall of 1970, and 
participated in several of the party’s regional policy seminars.7  In Toronto, a chapter of 
the Waffle was launched in an early December meeting attended by 150 people.  Even in 
Newfoundland, where the party had few supporters, NDP activists established a small 
Waffle group.8 
                                                        
4 “Left of Central Canada,” Waffle News, January 1970, File 446-18, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC; “On the 
Move in Manitoba,” Waffle News, May 1970, Box 2008-017/001, File 1 Waffle Newsletter, Kim 
Malcolmson and Paul Barber fonds, YUA. 
5 Ellen Simmons, “Go left young man, says NDP manifesto,” Globe and Mail, January 31, 1970;  The 
Alberta Waffle was formed at the Alberta NDP convention in November 1969. 
6 “Prairie Chapter Formed,” Waffle News, January 1970, File 446-18, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC; untitled 
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7 “Saskatchewan Waffle Statement,” Waffle News, February 1970, File 446-18, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC. 
8 “From Sea To Sea,” Waffle News, February 1970, File 446-18, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC. 
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The Waffle caucus, having decided at the 1969 federal NDP convention to hire 
Jackie Larkin as a full-time organizer to plan both a western regional conference and a 
national conference in 1970, began soliciting monthly donations to support its initiatives.  
Not all Waffle supporters were pleased with these decisions.  Wally Ross, the B.C. 
NDP’s provincial secretary and a signatory to the Manifesto, declared that although he 
continued to support the group’s “aims and objectives,” he opposed development of a 
distinct Waffle organization as “no political party can long afford to contain within it 
another.”9  Giles Endicott responded to Ross by explaining that the monies collected were 
solely for funding the conferences and no memberships were being sold.  Endicott shared 
Ross’s concerns that the establishment of a “real bureaucratic apparatus” by the Waffle 
risked creating a “party within a party.”10  In fact, both Endicott and Gerald Caplan 
would soon leave the Waffle, for roles organizing Stephen Lewis’s leadership bid for the 
Ontario NDP. 
Some disputes raised during the October 1969 convention carried over into the 
party’s federal council when it met in Toronto three months later.  Despite creating a 
Participation of Women Committee to “assist and encourage women’s participation in all 
forms of political activity,” convention delegates had twice defeated proposals to increase 
women’s representation on the federal council.11  Nevertheless, during the October 
convention the party’s Women’s Committee had elected five of its members to represent 
it on the federal council.  Yet when the council met in January the five were denied 
                                                        
9 Wally Ross to Giles Endicott, November 27, 1969, Box 2009-047/001, File 2 Waffle - Correspondence, 
1969, Giles Endicott fonds, YUA. 
10 Giles Endicott to Wally Ross, December 9, 1970, Box 2009-047/001, File 2 Waffle - Correspondence, 
1969, Giles Endicott fonds, YUA. 
11 Dennis Anderson, “Deny activist women federal council seats,” Globe and Mail, January 31, 1970. 
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delegate status.12  Carol Fogel, the chair of the Women’s Committee, suggested that the 
youthfulness and activist backgrounds of the five women were contributing factors to the 
party’s refusal to grant them seats on the council.  Fogel commented, “I think if we had 
elected four nice middle-aged women, they wouldn’t have protested.”13  Fogel also 
claimed the party had misconstrued the five women as Waffle supporters as only three of 
them voted in favour of the Waffle Manifesto.14  Eileen Dailly, the British Columbia 
MLA who chaired the Women’s Committee meeting at Winnipeg, attempted to clarify 
that the point of the election was only to recommend, not appoint, the five as members of 
the federal council.  Allan Blakeney, the party’s newly acclaimed president, attributed the 
dispute to confusion over the respective roles of the two women’s committees.15  
Regardless, the refusal to seat the women’s delegates, combined with other defeats of 
Waffle policy proposals at Winnipeg on issues such as education and Quebec, caused 
some Wafflers to question the NDP’s commitment to radical societal reform. 
 Mel Watkins ruffled more feathers by writing in the Globe and Mail that his 
appointment to the party’s policy review committee did not indicate the Waffle’s demise 
in favour of “instant consensus.”16  Rather, Watkins offered assurances that “the Waffle 
is very much alive and well” and there remained “disagreements within the party on a 
number of fundamental issues” still to be resolved.17  NDP federal secretary Cliff 
Scotton, in a private reply to Watkins, attempted to assuage his concerns with an 
                                                        
12 The five women elected were Carol Fogel, 36-year-old executive assistant to Manitoba cabinet minister 
Philip Petursson, as chair, Ena Parsons, Sheila Kuziak, Krista Maeots and Pat Armstrong. 
13 Barbara Vedan, “Winnipeg Leader of NDP Quintet Will Change Tactics Next Time,” Winnipeg Free 
Press, February 5, 1970. 
14 Ibid., Kuziak, Maeots and Armstrong all supported the Waffle Manifesto. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Mel Watkins, “New Democratic Party (Letter to the Editor),” Globe and Mail, February 6, 1970. 
17 Ibid. 
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assurance that the policy review committee would certainly stimulate debate within the 
party, but suggested its disputes should not be aired in the media.18 
 The emergence of provincial Waffle groups in Saskatchewan, Ontario and 
Manitoba after the 1969 federal convention illustrated the Waffle’s growing influence as 
it challenged the NDP status quo.  The official launch of the Saskatchewan Waffle at an 
Easter weekend conference in Saskatoon in March 1970 was overshadowed by the 
provincial NDP leader Woodrow Lloyd’s sudden resignation.  Lloyd had led the 
provincial party ever since Tommy Douglas left the premiership to pursue the federal 
NDP leadership in 1961.  Despite negotiating a successful end to the 1962 Doctors Strike 
and overseeing the implementation of universal health care in the province, Lloyd lost the 
1964 election to Ross Thatcher and the Liberal Party.  He recruited new and younger 
candidates to contest the 1967 election campaign, but after the NDP again lost to 
Thatcher’s Liberals some began questioning his leadership.19  Lloyd gave moderates in 
the Saskatchewan NDP, including a number of the young MLAs he had recruited, further 
cause for doubt when he voted for the Waffle Manifesto at the October 1969 federal NDP 
convention.20   
Approximately half of the Saskatchewan delegation had supported the Manifesto 
at Winnipeg, including MLA Walter Smishek and Carol Gudmundson, vice-president of 
                                                        
18 Cliff Scotton to Mel Watkins, cc Federal Officers, February 6, 1970, 446-4, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC.  
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for the NDP leadership. Scotton also took issue with Watkins’s claim that no women or farmers were on 
the policy committee, pointing to the presence of ONDP research director Marion Bryden and 
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19 Dennis Gruending, Promises to Keep: A Political Biography of Allan Blakeney (Saskatoon: Western 
Producer Prairie Books, 1990), 53, 61-2. 
20 Dianne Lloyd, Woodrow: A Biography of W.S. Lloyd (Regina: Woodrow Lloyd Memorial Fund, 1979), 
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the Saskatchewan NDP.21  Gudmundson had been elected to the provincial party 
executive only a few months earlier along with a number of other leftists, including 
Lloyd’s friend Bev Currie, a farmer from Swift Current sympathetic to the Waffle and the 
National Farmers Union (NFU).22  Currie raised the ire of NDP moderates when, in a 
discussion paper at the Winnipeg convention and an article in the provincial party’s 
newspaper the Commonwealth, he endorsed the concept of a land bank, a measure by 
which the government purchased land to lease back to farmers on a voluntary basis as a 
means of alleviating the decline in family farms resulting from the corporate 
consolidation of farmland.23  The policy of “use-lease” had been a controversial issue for 
the CCF during the 1930s when the Great Depression ravaged the province’s agrarian 
economy, and was eventually eliminated from the party’s program in 1936.  Now 
Currie’s proposal revived fears that any move to purchase farmland at its “assessed” 
value would ultimately result in forced expropriations of properties at much less than 
their actual value.24  Under pressure from MLAs Gordon Snyder and Ted Bowerman, the 
provincial party caucus asked Lloyd to call a joint meeting of the executive and caucus to 
                                                        
21 “The Lloyd Story,” Waffle News, May 1970, File 446-18, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC; Gruending, 
Promises to Keep, 61. 
22 Rich Thompson, “NDP: Convention and Caucus,” 1969, File 446-14, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC; Farmers 
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discuss Currie’s actions.25  Although the meeting, held on March 26, 1970, began with 
criticisms of Currie, former MLA and current executive committee member Robert 
Walker redirected the focus to questioning Lloyd’s leadership and his lack of electoral 
success.  However, the timing of his criticisms – shortly after Lloyd’s support for the 
Waffle Manifesto and immediately following the formation of an organized Waffle group 
in Saskatchewan which included Lloyd’s allies – suggests that Lloyd’s critics were 
motivated as much by ideological differences with their leader as by the party’s 
disappointing recent election results.  One group of MLAs piled on with criticisms of 
their own, while Lloyd’s friends and allies – including MLAs Walter Smishek and Bob 
Davies and executive members Jack Shapiro and Frank Coburn – attempted, largely 
unsuccessfully, to defend Lloyd by returning attention to Currie’s action as party 
president.26  Shaken by his critics’ attacks and the lack of a vocal defense from his 
supporters, Lloyd promptly offered his resignation and left the room.27  When urged by 
the executive to reconsider his decision, Lloyd waited three days before confirming that 
he would indeed be resigning as party leader in the Legislative Assembly the following 
day.28   
When details of the stormy caucus-executive meeting leaked out, the Waffle 
interpreted the incident as an unfortunate victory for the Saskatchewan NDP’s right 
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27 Lloyd, Woodrow, 173.  Lloyd’s daughter and biographer explains, “it was powerful, it was personal and 
it was devastatingly painful.” 
28 “Saskatchewan NDP Executive Meeting Minutes,” March 29, 1970 File I.26 Meetings 1969-70, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
  170 
wing.29  In a reflective speech on leadership, party and province Lloyd made to the NDP 
provincial council a couple of weeks later, he professed to being incapable of generating 
the “mass emotional appeal” necessary for winning votes in a contemporary political 
environment.  Lloyd also extolled the virtues of encouraging debate and accommodating 
a diversity of opinions within the NDP: 
We as a party have never been (certainly have never wanted to be so far as I am 
concerned) a tightly disciplined organization.  That is both a strength and a 
weakness… We have always been tolerant with ideas.  This must continue, but 
even this can be a strength or a weakness.  Some of those ideas or inclinations 
inevitably worry and may even frighten some.  Whether such tolerance is strength 
or weakness depends on the respect and sensitivity for the positions and opinions 
of those with a right to worry or be frightened by that which they fear is a barrier 
rather than a bridge.30 
 
For his part, Robert Walker denied that he had sought to prompt Lloyd’s resignation, 
claiming instead that Lloyd had previously indicated an intention of resigning before the 
next provincial election.31  The caucus also responded to the accusation, levelled on the 
CBC, that it had forced Lloyd’s hand.  In an open letter caucus members contended that 
political style rather than policy differences were behind their criticisms of Lloyd’s 
leadership.32 
 The recently formed Saskatchewan Waffle believed otherwise.  Interpreting 
caucus pressure for Lloyd’s resignation as a right-wing reaction to the emergence of a 
coordinated leftist bloc within the provincial party, the Saskatchewan Waffle prepared a 
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statement for the group titled For a Socialist Saskatchewan in an Independent Socialist 
Canada.  The document, which shared the original Waffle Manifesto’s concerns about 
the increasing Americanization of Canada, also contained a brief history of socialism in 
Saskatchewan that emphasized economic planning as the key to reversing regional 
underdevelopment.  It also included an extensive agricultural policy, which the Manifesto 
had not mentioned at all, that promoted guaranteed farm incomes, a halt to corporate 
farming, the creation of a land bank, limits on farm size, and a rationalized food industry 
in which processing and marketing were conducted in the same region as production.33  
The Saskatchewan Waffle’s statement also addressed women’s liberation, 
environmentalism and the plight of native peoples, all topics absent from the original 
Waffle Manifesto.34 
An Ontario section of the Waffle was also formed at the end of March.  It elected 
a steering committee with representatives from several localities in the province and 
adopted For a Socialist Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada, a statement that 
echoed the Waffle Manifesto’s emphasis on the dangers of American domination of the 
Canadian economy and Ontario’s reduction to a “branch plant society.”35  The Ontario 
Waffle statement criticized the provincial government’s support of foreign corporate 
takeovers and subsidies, and shared the original Manifesto’s prescription of centralized 
planning and public ownership of “key sectors of the economy.”36  For a Socialist 
Ontario also incorporated the Manifesto’s emphasis on extra-parliamentary social 
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movements of workers, farmers, students, tenants, women, and minority groups as key 
components to achieving social transformation, and called on the NDP to act as “the 
vitalizing centre that gives these social forces a common perspective, a sense of solidarity 
and an organization for united action.”37  Unlike the Waffle Manifesto, the Ontario 
document warned of the “reckless exploitation of the natural environment,” and linked its 
ecological concerns to the consequences of entering into energy resources deals with the 
United States.  The Ontario statement also included a section, heavily influenced by 
Robin Mathews, on the Americanization of Ontario’s “branch plant system of higher 
education.”38  On labour matters it called for the “full autonomy” of Canadian sections of 
international unions, and encouraged mergers among domestic unions.39  Whereas the 
Manifesto did not address feminism, the Ontario statement called on the NDP to “provide 
its full support to the struggle for the liberation of women” including for independent 
feminist groups.40  The Ontario document retained the Manifesto’s commitment to giving 
“control in decision-making to workers and the community,” but the absence of the 
phrase “industrial democracy” reflected Broadbent’s departure from the Waffle.41  
Finally, in the event of Donald MacDonald’s resignation as provincial NDP leader, the 
Ontario Waffle agreed it would only field a leadership candidate if no other candidate 
agreed to “publicly endorse and actively support” the manifesto.42 
 In addition to organizing provincial sections within the NDP, Wafflers attempted 
to practice the Manifesto’s commitment to extra-parliamentary activism.  The Winnipeg 
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Waffle sponsored two conferences in the spring of 1970: the first, on the theme 
“Manitoba: Colony Within a Colony,” drew 200 attendees, while the second, an 
exploration of extra-parliamentary activism, included invitees from the women’s 
liberation movement, the Métis Federation, the NFU, the Welfare Rights Union, and the 
Manitoba Association of Students.43  The Toronto Waffle, in conjunction with the 
University of Toronto NDP club, organized a two-day public forum in March 1970 
dubbed “Teach-In: The Americanization of Canada.”  The event attracted approximately 
eight hundred participants who heard featured speakers Walter Gordon, Cy Gonick, 
Robin Mathews, NDP MP Andrew Brewin, and Michel Chartrand, president of the 
Montreal council of the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU).44  Grace 
Hartman, secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), 
utilizing a report prepared by the union’s research director and Waffler Gil Levine, 
informed the crowd that $35 million of Canadian workers’ union dues were sent annually 
to the head offices of international unions in the United States, for which little benefit 
was received in return.45 
Although the Waffle Manifesto failed to address the issue of women’s liberation, 
many female Wafflers were actively involved in Canada’s burgeoning women’s 
liberation movement.  As has been seen, the debate over women’s representation on the 
federal NDP council was among the most contentious at the 1969 Winnipeg convention.   
Waffler D.J. O’Donnell, a member of the Vancouver Women’s Caucus, later reflected on 
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the disappointment caused by the convention majority twice defeating proposals to 
increase women’s representation on the council.  She argued that women “need special 
representation on party bodies to both speak to women's issues and to criticize male 
chauvinism within the party, just as labour requires special representation to speak to 
working-class issues and to ensure the party maintains its commitment to the working-
class.”46  Citing the Waffle Manifesto’s insistence that the NDP act as “the parliamentary 
wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental social change,” O’Donnell cautioned that 
unless the NDP took a strong stand in support of women’s liberation, it risked becoming 
as “irrelevant” to that vital cause as it was to the anti-Vietnam war movement.47 
O’Donnell and other Vancouver Wafflers pursued women’s liberation struggles 
beyond party politics.  In the spring of 1970 they staged what became a historic cross-
country protest against Canada’s abortion laws.  Despite the federal Liberal government’s 
partial legalization of abortion in 1969, abortion remained in the Criminal Code of 
Canada and the law was interpreted inconsistently among hospitals and doctors.48  The 
Vancouver Women’s Caucus (VWC), which emerged in 1968 out of the Students for a 
Democratic University movement at Simon Fraser University, was one of the earliest 
women’s liberation groups formed.  In protest against the continued criminalization of 
most abortions and the difficulties of accessing the procedure legally throughout the 
country, the VWC organized an ‘Abortion Caravan’ to travel across Canada.49  Dawn 
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Carrell, a Vancouver Waffler and one of the Abortion Caravan’s two key organizers, first 
crossed the country ahead of the Caravan to mobilize support.50  Jackie Larkin, whom the 
Waffle hired to plan its 1970 conferences, was released by the group to work on the 
Caravan instead.  She described a “cross-country connection of socialists, students, 
women and anti-war activists” who provided the “framework” for the protest.51  The 
caravan of automobiles, carrying a coffin filled with coat hangers “in memorial to the 
thousands of women who die each year from illegal abortion,” departed Vancouver on 
April 29, 1970, stopping in nine cities before arriving in Ottawa on Mother’s Day 
weekend.52  Another Waffler, Sally Mahood, was the Caravan’s contact in Regina, and 
Toronto Wafflers, under the guise of the women’s liberation group of the NDP, worked 
with the Voice of Women, the Trotskyist Young Socialists (YS), and the radical New 
Feminists to organize a welcoming rally for the Abortion Caravan.  Five hundred people, 
including pregnant women and children, attended the resulting Free Abortion on Demand 
protest in downtown Toronto.53  
Once in Ottawa, the caravaners requested an audience with Pierre Trudeau and 
invited any interested MPs to meet with them.  Only three NDP MPs (Grace MacInnis, 
David Lewis and Lorne Nystrom) and one Progressive Conservative backbencher (Gerald 
Baldwin) accepted the invitation.  Trudeau declined, as did John Munro, the minister of 
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health, and John Turner, the minister of justice, to whom the VWC’s brief was addressed.  
Refusing to be ignored, the several hundred protesters who had gathered on Parliament 
Hill marched to the prime minister’s residence to leave the coffin of coat hangers.54  One 
Waffler, Dawn Carrell, expressed the sentiments of many in the crowd: “we’re tired of 
this buck passing and we won’t stand for it any longer – the poor and working women 
bear the brunt of the current law; we cannot stand by and watch our sisters die.”55 
The following day thirty-six women, including Ottawa Waffler Jackie Larkin, 
gained access to the public gallery of the House of Commons, chained themselves to 
chairs, and disrupted proceedings with chants of “free abortion on demand” and “we want 
control of our bodies.”56  Their protest caused Commons Speaker Lucien Lamoureux to 
adjourn the House while guards cleared the galleries.57  Waffler Krista Maeots described 
the protests associated with the Abortion Caravan as the “first significant national 
expression of a movement which had been active and growing for some time.”58  Maeots 
explained that women’s liberationists were concerned with a variety of issues, but 
abortion “served as no other issue to link university and working women, the 
economically comfortable and the poor, young and middle-aged in an urgent, personal 
struggle to achieve a definable goal.”59 
The Waffle in Ontario and British Columbia also took action to support various 
worker-related causes.  Waffler Sharon Yandle described the B.C. Waffle as forming 
“around the dual issues of extraparliamentary activity and foreign ownership of the 
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Canadian economy” and its April 1970 meeting in Vancouver was attended by one 
hundred people, leading a visiting Cy Gonick to consider their prospects “very 
promising.”60  It organized a public demonstration against BC Hydro rate increases that 
attracted two hundred people, held a seminar featuring Mel Watkins, and published a 
newsletter.61  Wafflers in Vancouver also supported striking tugboat workers during a 
month-and-a-half-long strike in May and June 1970.62  Court injunctions which 
prohibited picketing at the MacMillan Bloedel’s mills and resulted in jailed union leaders 
and seized union assets when defied, further motivated the Vancouver Waffle.63  Yandle 
described the group’s activities as “involving the NDP in the day-to-day struggle for 
democratic socialism in the community, the workplace, the school and the living place.”64 
In late March 1970, at the union local’s invitation, the Toronto Waffle offered 
assistance to the 600 workers then fighting closure of the Dunlop Tire plant on Queen 
Street East in Toronto.  Wafflers attended union meetings, helped the local create and 
distribute a newspaper, and aided in circulating a petition throughout the adjacent 
community.65  They also helped organize a demonstration at Queen’s Park where, 
following addresses by Watkins, James Renwick, the local NDP MPP for Riverdale, 
Waffler Steven Langdon, the former president of the University of Toronto Students 
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Administrative Council, and Phil Japp, the president of Local 132 of the United Rubber 
Workers of America, scuffles broke out between protesters and police.66 
However, the Waffle and the NDP differed on how best to support the Dunlop 
workers.  Despite Renwick’s efforts in the Legislature to require Dunlop to keep the plant 
open for three months to allow for a study of its economic feasibility, he eventually 
concluded the plant could not be saved and advised the union to take legal action to 
secure the best severance pay deal possible.67  Despite the NDP’s Community Action 
Committee declaring themselves “generally satisfied” with the party’s participation in the 
campaign to save the plant, Mel Watkins recalled that the Waffle “would like to have 
thrown our support behind the more militant workers of the plant who were 
contemplating direct industrial action, such as sit-ins or work-ins.”68  In his critique of 
both the union leadership and Renwick, Waffler Steve Penner argued that “the potential 
militancy of the Dunlop workers and the rank and file of Toronto’s labour movement was 
never really tested.”69  NDP member Michael Prue defended Japp and Renwick from 
Penner’s criticisms and argued that Penner’s “doctrinaire truth… was not that of the 
workers.”70  For their part, the Wafflers’ efforts on behalf of the Dunlop workers were 
viewed favourably by union activists.  As Watkins saw it, “labour people were beginning 
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to lose some of their suspicions of us as impractical intellectuals and long-hairs when we 
actually did some of this practical work.”71 
 A Waffle influence within the labour movement was also apparent at the 
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) convention in Edmonton in May 1970.  A ‘Reform 
Caucus’ of younger union activists presented a five-point program urging the CLC “to 
establish a team of organizers who could be assigned on short notice to help 
underprivileged groups – slum dwellers, native people, working poor and the 
unemployed.”72  The program also called for the creation of a CLC youth department to 
counter younger workers’ tendency to feel alienated from unions, the adoption of a policy 
supporting equal rights and opportunities for women, the creation of aid and information 
centres for the poor and unemployed, and the use of multi-union teams to organize the 
unorganized.73  In addition, the Reform Caucus demanded that Canadian sections of 
international unions be allowed to operate independently by having domestic offices, 
policy conferences, staffs, funds specifically earmarked for Canadian projects, and 
complete autonomy over their political involvement.74  Much of what the Reform Caucus 
proposed did not come to fruition.  Although Waffler Gil Levine later admitted only a 
few among the “odd lot” who comprised the Reform Caucus “had any direct connection 
to the Waffle” beside himself, commentators described the caucus as the “counterpart 
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within the union movement of the Waffle,” and members acknowledged the influence of 
the Waffle on its program.75 
Historian Steve Hewitt has documented the extensive surveillance and 
investigation of New Left social movements in the 1960s and 1970s by the RCMP, 
including the Waffle.  The RCMP Security Service monitored the Waffle’s activities 
“believing that subversives were using it as a means to infiltrate the NDP” and 
investigated both Waffle and NDY meetings.76  A brief submitted by the RCMP Security 
Service to Solicitor General Jean-Pierre Goyer in March 1971 accurately summarized the 
Waffle’s intentions: 
The prime aim of the Waffle Group within the NDP is the establishment of an 
independent socialist Canada to be achieved through the existing structure of the 
New Democratic Party.  The Waffle Group hope to change the NDP from within 
and radicalize the NDP socialist policies.  Considering the Waffle group as a 
whole, it is felt that they will be a viable political force within the NDP.77 
 
Although a police informant attending the 1970 ‘Americanization of Canada Teach-In’ at 
the University of Toronto focused on the attendees’ factionalism and suggested “several 
more teach-ins of this type would really scatter any semblance of cohesion left within the 
‘New Left’” another disagreed and warned that the Waffle had the potential to polarize 
debate over Canadian independence.78  The RCMP Security Service targeted Waffle 
groups at eight universities as well as the NDY at the University of Regina and the 
University of Saskatchewan but only the Waffle at the University of Toronto was 
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considered a “significant threat.”79  The Waffle was investigated alongside other radical 
left groups active at the time, including the YS, CLM, SDS, CPC (M-L), Black Students 
Unions and the CP. 
 Its involvement in extra-parliamentary struggles for women’s liberation and 
worker’s rights, and against Americanization and foreign ownership, did not distract the 
Waffle from focusing on transforming the NDP from within.  In riding associations and 
especially at provincial party conventions in B.C., Saskatchewan, Ontario and Manitoba, 
Wafflers sought to alter party policy and thereby shift the NDP decisively leftward.  
Although ultimately falling far short of its goals, the Waffle during the summer and fall 
of 1970 did wield influence on a variety of issues, including agriculture in Saskatchewan, 
and in Ontario and British Columbia women’s equality and nationalization of resource 
industries.80 
 In May 1970, just over a year after its initial meeting at Gerald Caplan’s house in 
Toronto, the Waffle described itself as a “national coalition of socialists within the NDP” 
with a mailing list of 1300 people across nine provinces.81  A Western Regional 
Conference held in Banff in late April failed to attract many delegates from B.C. or 
Saskatchewan and none from Manitoba.  Despite “productive” discussions in a series of 
workshops, the conference only produced a “substantial statement” on agricultural policy, 
leading Lorne Brown to conclude that “good written statements… amplifying existing 
policy are not possible to produce in a two-day seminar – at least not without 
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considerable preparation beforehand.”82  Laxer spoke at the conference, emphasizing the 
need for a national campaign opposing a possible energy resources agreement with the 
United States.  Despite the low turnout in Banff, the Waffle persisted with plans to hold a 
national conference later that year in August.83 
 In the meantime, the Saskatchewan Waffle’s efforts to move the provincial NDP 
further left in the aftermath of Woodrow Lloyd’s resignation was facing tough resistance 
from party moderates.  The Waffle’s takeover of the Regina South riding association in 
early April 1970 aroused concern, but its efforts to deny a sitting MLA the NDP 
nomination for Moose Jaw South raised genuine alarm.84  When Bill Davies, the NDP 
incumbent in Moose Jaw South announced his retirement, Gordon Snyder, the NDP 
MLA for Moose Jaw North seized the opportunity to seek for himself the nomination in 
Davies’s former riding, which was considered to be the safer seat of the two.  But then 
John Conway, a sociologist, New Left activist, and former candidate for the BC NDP 
leadership announced his intention to contest the Moose Jaw South nomination.  Conway 
promptly staked out his ideological turf, criticizing American domination of the Canadian 
economy, the corporate consolidation of agricultural land, and its resulting threat to rural 
life, arguing “we must point to a bolder future of a society that puts people’s needs before 
the profits of a few.”85  After the party’s provincial secretary, Don Faris, intervened to 
delay the nomination meeting from January to April in order to assist Snyder, Conway 
and his Waffle supporters campaigned hard, canvassing party members and holding a 
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Moose Jaw teach-in on the topic of the Americanization of Canada that featured Mel 
Watkins, Fred Gudmundson, Cy Gonick and Conway.86  Snyder, who had the added 
advantage of being nominated by the popular Davies, eventually won the contest, which 
only deepened the animosity between Saskatchewan Wafflers and NDP moderates.87 
 One month later, Robert Walker, the executive committee member who led the 
attack on Woodrow Lloyd’s leadership, wrote to party president Bev Currie and all 
provincial council members, riding presidents, and secretaries, to accuse Currie and “a 
majority of the executive” of identifying with “an extremist minority group” that placed 
the Waffle’s interests ahead of the NDP.  Walker attacked the Waffle’s land bank policy 
as “compulsory socialization of farmers’ land,” expressed anger over “the two women on 
the executive” who vowed to defeat “reactionary” NDP MLAs, and accused Currie of 
using party funds to subsidize Waffle activities in contravention of provincial council 
directives.88  Currie dismissed Walker’s charges as misleading “inaccuracies” and denied 
that a grant to the Saskatchewan Young New Democrats (SYND) constituted a misuse of 
party funds.89 
 The Saskatchewan NDP leadership convention to name Lloyd’s successor was 
scheduled for early July 1970.  Allan Blakeney, the party’s deputy leader and MLA for 
Regina Centre, as well as the favourite to win, announced his candidacy in mid-April.  
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Roy Romanow, the MLA for Saskatoon-Riversdale, made it a race a few weeks later.  
Blakeney emphasized his proven competency in government and the need for party unity 
to win back voters who had switched over to the Liberals in recent elections.  Romanow 
touted his ability to communicate effectively with voters in a modern era in which 
television was the predominant medium of politics.90  Neither candidate presented a 
comprehensive policy platform. 
The Saskatchewan Waffle held two meetings in early May, one of which included  
leaders of the Saskatchewan NFU, to determine their strategy for the leadership race.  
Since none of the Waffle’s “serious possibilities – Bev Currie, Roy Atkinson, Fred 
Gudmundson” was willing to run, the group adopted the unusual strategy of encouraging 
two different candidacies.91  At the urging of the NFU, Waffler Don Mitchell, a NFU 
organizer and student activist, threw his hat into the ring in part to support Waffle efforts 
to defeat Romanow by denying him “the ‘youth’ vote.”92  The Waffle also intended to 
support a labour candidate in an effort to “split the labour vote in the cities,” but their 
preferred choice, MLA Walter Smishek, declined to run, and the group was not 
associated with another candidate, the respected labour lawyer George Taylor.93  Don 
Mitchell was not explicitly a Waffle candidate, although he drew his campaign team and 
policy positions from the Saskatchewan Waffle.94  Campaigning under the slogan “issues 
not images,” Mitchell criticized his opponents’ lack of substantive policies and the 
“bankruptcy of image politics,” claiming “we cannot stand by playing polite politics 
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while farms and town are abandoned, unemployment soars, and our people are forced to 
leave Saskatchewan in mass exodus.”95 
 At his first press conference Mitchell advocated “an agricultural policy which 
would keep farmers and eliminate profiteers.”96  Although Mitchell pitched a detailed and 
comprehensive platform, agriculture featured most prominently in it, including a land 
bank proposal, the nationalization of farm machinery and food processing industries, a 
plan for provincial government procurement of agricultural products, and more 
government investment in agricultural research.97  His links to the National Farmers 
Union were an important element of his campaign. As Don Kossick, a former student 
activist and NFU organizer explained, “we used the Farmers Union as a cover to organize 
for Mitchell… we were using that to offset Taylor… he was organizing the labour vote 
and the way we were balancing every labour vote that Taylor had was with every NFU 
local we could penetrate. We spent our time organizing.”98 
After Mitchell entered the race, Blakeney finally began to espouse his position on 
agriculture, labour, health, taxation and education policies.  Romanow too was more 
forthcoming, articulating an eighteen-point agricultural platform that included loans to 
young farmers and warnings about the dangers of foreign ownership.99  Yet, the Waffle’s 
influence on the leadership campaign extended beyond prompting Blakeney and 
Romanow to develop more detailed policy positions.  By the start of the leadership 
convention in Regina, all three leading candidates expressed support for the idea of a land 
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bank.  Mitchell claimed such a policy would reduce “the burden of land debt that 
excludes young farmers from starting out,” and Blakeney, in agreeing to a land bank, also  
emphasized Saskatchewan’s disputes with Ottawa over agricultural price and market 
guarantees.  Even Romanow, the most centrist among the candidates, supported a land 
bank, criticizing corporate and absentee ownership of farmland but cautioning such a 
policy must include an option-to-purchase clause and explicit refutation of 
expropriation.100  The Saskatchewan Waffle, which attracted an average of 130 delegates 
to its convention meetings, urged centre-left delegates to vote for Mitchell on the first 
ballot but heard from many who, fearing a Romanow victory, were committed to 
Blakeney instead.  Others, particularly union delegates and those identified with “the old 
left” were reported to be endorsing Taylor.101 
With the importance of the rural vote in the upcoming provincial election a 
foremost concern, the Saskatchewan NDP also used the leadership convention as an 
opportunity to debate a new agricultural policy.  Its “Position Paper on Agriculture and 
Rural Life” strongly resembled aspects of the Waffle’s agricultural policy, including 
proposals for a land bank, limits on farm size, and a publicly-owned farm machinery 
industry.102  The position paper maintained, 
We require a farm policy that increases the farm population, not one that depletes 
it.  We require a policy that opens the door to young farmers, not one that slams it 
in their faces.  We require a land policy that provides the basis for a new and 
invigorated rural community, not one that undermines it.  We require a policy that 
supports the family farm, not one that destroys it.103 
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Aspects of the position paper proved controversial, and a committee review of it 
produced several revisions, including a clarification that “the NDP does not contemplate 
any program of compulsory acquisition of farm lands.”104  To that end, the convention 
revised the ‘Position Paper on Agriculture and Rural Life’ by replacing the limit on farm 
size with restrictions on the foreign ownership of farmland, rejecting the idea of a 
publicly-owned farm machinery industry, and strongly restating the NDP’s support for 
the family farm.105  As the Leader-Post explained, “while the original paper was in no 
way considered a product of the Waffle caucus… some parts of it came closer to Waffle 
policies on farm land ownership than past party policy, and the changes approved by the 
convention were considered a defeat for the left-leaning faction.”106  Certainly Waffle 
supporters disapproved of the changes and in particular the continued emphasis on 
private over public ownership.  Fred Gudmusson of the NFU argued “many feel it is not 
always desirable for a farmer to own all or part of his land… by renting, the farmer can 
beat the banks and the mortgage companies.  If we reject the farmers, they will reject the 
party, and they should.”107   
 In his speech to the convention, Mitchell reminded delegates “our party was born 
out of protest!  It was created by the people of Saskatchewan to express anger and fight 
for social justice!”108  He urged the party to “not be afraid” of policy debates or the 
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party’s youth, messages that secured for Mitchell a respectable twenty-two per cent of 
first-round ballots cast.109 
Saskatchewan NDP Leadership Election – July 4, 1970 
First Ballot   Second Ballot   Third Ballot 
Roy Romanow 300 Roy Romanow 320 Allan Blakeney 407 
Allan Blakeney 286 Allan Blakeney 311 Roy Romanow 349 
Don Mitchell  187 Don Mitchell  219 
George Taylor  78 
Totals   851    850    755 
 
Many of Taylor’s delegates supported Mitchell on the second ballot, and Mitchell’s 
supporters in turn voted for Blakeney over Romanow by a three-to-one margin on the 
final ballot.  Waffle support was therefore key to Blakeney’s victory, and they were 
relieved over Romanow’s defeat, but ninety-six Wafflers including Mitchell declined to 
vote on the third ballot in response to Bev Currie’s failed bid for re-election as party 
president.110  In fact, the leftist candidates lost every election for party office, and the 
Saskatchewan Waffle suggested that even Blakeney was upset that “the far right swept 
the executive.”111  Still, the Wafflers departed the convention enthusiastic over what had 
been accomplished.  Their support had been crucial to Blakeney’s win, the party’s 
updated agricultural policy bore their imprint, and Blakeney had appointed Mitchell as a 
legislative advisor and encouraged him to seek an NDP nomination in the next 
election.112  In a press conference immediately following the convention the new leader 
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admitted that “perhaps the party will move moderately more leftward than it has in the 
past.”113 
 The left wing had fared much better in elections for party offices at the B.C. NDP 
convention held earlier that summer in Chilliwack.  The BC Waffle estimated that 150 of 
the 500 delegates to the convention were its supporters.  Waffle resolutions to nationalize 
chronic industrial polluters, and to advance women’s equality by committing to supports 
for child daycare, abortion clinics, and free abortion on demand, were all adopted by the 
convention.114  The BC Waffle also distributed a “Statement of Principles” echoing the 
Waffle Manifesto’s warnings about the inequalities inherent in capitalism and American 
corporate domination of the Canadian economy, as well as its call for party members to 
engage with their communities at a grassroots level and not only during election 
campaigns.  Unlike the Manifesto, the BC Waffle “Statement” specifically emphasized 
the primacy of the working class in realizing “fundamental social change,” and insisted 
“the NDP must clearly be seen as the only mass party rooted in the working class.”115  
The Waffle ran a full slate of fourteen candidates for the party executive, electing three – 
Paddy Neale, the secretary-treasurer of the Vancouver and District Labour Council, 
Dawn Carell and Harold Winrob.116  The BC NDP went into the convention divided 
between supporters of Tom Berger and Dave Barrett, who had been acting leader in the 
Legislature since Berger’s resignation the previous year.  Yet Barrett, who also supported 
Neale for party vice-president, was acclaimed as party leader, and the BC Waffle 
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reported that “the Barrett forces (which comprise the left and centre of the party) 
basically smashed the party’s right wing at the convention.”117 
 Despite the Waffle’s high profile at the recent Saskatchewan and BC NDP 
conventions, and its efforts to subsidize costs for delegates travelling longer distances to 
attend, its national conference held in Toronto in early August did not attract many 
representatives from Western Canada.  For the nearly 200 delegates who did attend, 
workshops on themes such as anti-imperialist strategies, energy and resources, regional 
underdevelopment, media and universities, women’s liberation, labour and the left-wing 
within social democratic parties occupied much of the conference which was designed to 
be as much educational as strategic in focus.  There were also panels on organizing the 
unemployed, farmers, tenants, minorities, students and youth in recognition of the 
Waffle’s commitment to extra-parliamentary activism.118  Steve Penner criticized the 
educational focus and complained “we are so preoccupied with intellectual debate that 
the very debate is taking place in a vacuum where questions of strategy… are hardly 
considered.  We lack a sense of praxis – the creative give and take between revolutionary 
ideology and radical action.”119  A debate over the Ontario Waffle’s relationship with 
organized labour occupied the conference for an entire evening, causing Saskatchewan 
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Waffle delegates to complain that Ontario’s issues were dominating proceedings.120  
Another debate erupted over an unsuccessful proposal for the Waffle to hire three people 
to undertake a national campaign to organize the unemployed.121  Cy Gonick explained 
the challenges the Waffle faced attempting to navigate between “visions of apocalyptic 
revolutionary transformation” and “the trap of evolutionary reformism.”  Although the 
Waffle “must view capitalism as a system and must elaborate an alternative system in its 
stead,” Gonick cautioned against relying on revolutionary rhetoric alone, arguing “just to 
state and restate the overall goal is to have no strategy at all.”122 
The primary strategic decision confronting the Waffle involved the impending 
federal NDP leadership race.  At the conference it was decided to form a ten-person 
campaign committee tasked with promoting the Waffle’s vision for the party among other 
NDP members before settling on a leadership candidate to endorse.  Cy Gonick, Mel 
Watkins and James Laxer were each touted as possible contenders.  Watkins, who had 
health concerns, was prepared to exclude himself, although he and Gonick endorsed the 
campaign committee plan as an opportunity to prioritize “issues” over the “cult of 
personality.”123  In addition to Gonick, Watkins, and Laxer, the conference selected Gil 
Levine, John Conway, Jackie Larkin, Kelly Crichton and Sheila Kuziak for the campaign 
committee, and left two spots open to be filled later by the Saskatchewan Waffle.124   
Regardless of who ultimately would be selected to lead the party, Laxer was 
adamant that the NDP must engage in an ambitious campaign opposing the “energy 
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sellout” of Canada’s resources to the United States.  In response, the Waffle in September 
1970 sponsored demonstrations across the country protesting the “sellout” of Canadian 
natural gas to the Americans.125  The Canadian government announced an increase in 
natural gas exports to the US at the same time as the United States, after months of 
bilateral energy negotiations, hiked its quota on Canadian oil imports.126  Tommy 
Douglas criticized the Trudeau Liberal government’s decision, predicting it would raise 
the price of gas in Canada.  Laxer prophesized an even more disastrous result, describing 
the federal government as “incompetent” and suggesting the sale was the first step toward 
a continental energy deal endangering Canadian sovereignty.127 
In addition to the provincial Waffle groups in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
Alberta and British Columbia, there were sympathetic New Democrats and activists in 
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Quebec who corresponded with prominent Wafflers 
without forming their own provincial organizations.  In New Brunswick, by contrast, a 
provincial Waffle section was launched in September 1970 despite having had only 
limited contact with the authors of the Waffle Manifesto.  Earlier in 1970 a handful of 
Trotskyists in Fredericton had contacted the LSA and formed the Fredericton Young 
Socialists (FYS).  Upon discovering there was no NDP to infiltrate in Fredericton, the 
FYS members approached former NDP candidate Pat Callahan and together they began 
reorganizing a riding association in the local riding of York-Sunbury.  The provincial 
NDP was without a leader at that point and had run only three candidates in the previous 
provincial election, all of whom lost their deposits.  The nascent New Brunswick Waffle 
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was therefore well positioned to revitalize the NDP’s organization, electing Callahan as 
party president and several other Wafflers to executive positions at a provincial NDP 
convention.  Despite adopting a number of Waffle policies, such as the creation of a mass 
public transit system, public ownership of natural resource industries and committing the 
party to supporting women’s liberation, the delegates voted against adopting the Waffle 
Manifesto by a vote of twenty-four to eighteen and elected non-Waffler J. Albert 
Richardson as party leader.  In the New Brunswick election one month later, the NDP 
nominated candidates in thirty-one of the province’s fifty-eight ridings, but secured only 
2.8% of the popular vote.128 
The Ontario NDP’s longtime leader Donald MacDonald had previously fended 
off a leadership challenge by Jim Renwick in 1968, but by early 1970 Stephen Lewis was 
mobilizing for his own bid to unseat MacDonald.  Lewis contended that after seventeen 
years headed by MacDonald the party needed a “fresh face.”  He built alliances within 
the provincial caucus, and served as the NDP’s labour critic in an attempt to attract union 
supporters.129  When senior union leaders and members of the party’s executive failed to 
dissuade Lewis from following through with his campaign, MacDonald simplified 
matters somewhat by resigning.  As Desmond Morton described the alignment of factions 
behind Lewis, “senior union leaders had discovered, somewhat to their chagrin, that he 
had quietly lined up many of the second-level leaders in their organizations as well as 
Dennis McDermott, the aggressive new leader of the United Autoworkers in Canada.”130  
With his friend and former Waffler Gerald Caplan managing the campaign, Lewis 
                                                        
128 Patrick Webber, “‘For a Socialist New Brunswick’: The New Brunswick Waffle, 1967-1972,” 
Acadiensis 38, no 1. (2009), 77-84. 
129 Morton, The NDP: The Dream of Power, 108. 
130 Ibid., 109. 
  194 
announced his candidacy on July 3, 1970, counting fourteen of the twenty-one members 
of the ONDP caucus amongst his supporters.131  Six weeks later, Walter Pitman, MPP for 
Peterborough since 1967 and now the voice of party members disgruntled over Lewis’s 
ambitions, announced his own candidacy for the top job.132   
With little to differentiate between the two candidates in terms of policy, Pitman 
contended that his softer and more moderate image would appeal to voters.  Lewis, by 
comparison, portrayed himself as a fighter committed to advancing the party’s 
principles.133  Described in the press as waging “a contest between the centre and right 
wings of the party,” neither candidate advocated sweeping nationalization, for which they 
were received with muted enthusiasm at a Waffle meeting in Toronto.134  Granted, unlike 
the restrained Pitman, Lewis’s impassioned rhetoric at times came close to emulating the 
Waffle’s strident nationalism, if not its emphasis on public ownership.135  Indeed, Lewis 
claimed to have moved further to the left ideologically of late, explaining “there are too 
many parties clouding up the centre.  The place in the political spectrum is for us to take 
a radical posture on issues” rather than the NDP’s recent “anxious, self-conscious search 
for respectability and security in a Canadian body politic.  It was a false quest and we 
have paid the price.”136 
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Based on its own survey data, the Ontario Waffle concluded that with only 
thirteen percent of convention delegates prepared to vote for a Waffler it was futile for 
the group to attempt a credible leadership campaign.137  Yet they also agreed that “it is, of 
course, obvious to most of us that Stephen Lewis will not lead the party in a socialist 
direction either in program or in the practice of the party.”138 As a result, the Waffle 
concentrated instead on attempting to shape party policy and getting some of their group 
elected to executive and council positions, including Krista Maeots for ONDP president 
and John Smart for secretary.139 
The day before the convention’s official start, Waffle supporters on the provincial 
council attempted to replace a resolution critical of a recently announced sale of Canada’s 
natural gas to the United States with a policy of widespread nationalization, but were 
defeated handily.140  The Waffle proved more successful the following day.  By the 
overwhelming ratio of twenty to one, the convention adopted a Waffle resolution to 
nationalize Ontario’s energy resource industries, such as Imperial Oil’s refineries.  The 
resolution also committed the NDP to a “massive public campaign” against a possible 
continental energy agreement between Canada and the United States.  A delighted Laxer 
described the resolution as a “clear indication” that Ontario New Democrats supported 
nationalization, and he told reporters that its passage “takes it [NDP policy] a significant 
step further.”141  The Globe and Mail noted that none of the party’s leadership spoke 
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during the debate, leaving it to the ONDP’s research director Marion Bryden to present 
the opposing viewpoint.142 Although both Stephen Lewis and Pitman expressed support 
for the resolution, both had reservations about the precise extent of the nationalization 
being proposed.143 At the initiative of Bruce Kidd, a Waffler, the convention passed a 
second resolution endorsing the imposition of stiff penalties, including “forfeiture of 
ownership,” for polluting industries.  The Waffle’s housing policy, which called for 
greater involvement by the Ontario Housing Corporation, financial aid for co-operative 
housing, and expanded rights for tenant unions, was also approved.  Throughout the 
entirety of the convention, the ONDP women’s caucus, which included Wafflers Krista 
Maeots, Kelly Crichton, and Jackie Larkin, lobbied tirelessly for a series of resolutions of 
particular concern to women.144  On the final day, following an abbreviated debate, the 
convention endorsed the Waffle’s lengthy resolution on women’s liberation which 
included prohibitions on gender-based discrimination in hiring and in the workplace, a 
government-funded houseworkers’ allowance, improved access to child-care, 
amendments to the nation’s divorce law, and support for abortion on demand.145  The 
women’s caucus was stymied, however, in its attempt to pass a constitutional amendment 
that would have stipulated one-third of the provincial NDP executive must be comprised 
of women, and elected by women.146 
The Waffle’s candidates for party executive positions also met with some success.  
Although Krista Maeots lost the presidency to Gordon Vichert by a vote of 818 to 416, 
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and John Smart was defeated by Gordon Brigden with a similar margin in the election for 
party secretary, four Wafflers were elected executive members-at-large and Laxer earned 
a spot on the federal council.147  Yet despite making significant gains pushing its agenda 
and candidates during the conference, the Ontario Waffle’s statement For a Socialist 
Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada was defeated by a secret ballot vote of 744 
to 628. 
Numerically, organized labour wielded greater influence over the convention than 
did the Waffle.  Union members accounted for 830 of the 1868 delegates in attendance, 
the majority of them Autoworkers or Steelworkers.148  While Walter Pitman continued to 
emphasize his moderate image and electability amongst conservative Ontarians, it was 
Lewis who attracted the largest bloc of union delegates, with twice as many present as 
had attended the previous provincial convention.149  When the votes were counted, Lewis 
easily prevailed over Pitman 1,188 to 642. 
As had been the case at the federal, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan 
conventions, the Waffle had good reason to be pleased with its performance at Toronto.   
 A number of policy resolutions, most significantly those dealing with energy resources, 
housing, and women’s liberation had been approved, and the group had even made 
inroads among union delegates.  Cy Gonick, for example, recalled counting at least fifty 
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labour delegates among the 250 attendees at a meeting of the Waffle caucus during the 
convention.150  Also encouraging was the fact both leadership contenders had embraced a 
pro-nationalist message in their campaigns, albeit with strong reservations about public 
ownership.  All in all, the party appeared poised to highlight economic nationalism in the  
next provincial election.  The Globe and Mail was unimpressed; in an editorial it decried 
the ONDP’s support for nationalization, and dismissively defined its new leader Lewis as 
“an attractive young man shackled to the wranglers and wafflers.”151  
Certainly the Waffle’s influence and successes to this point should not be 
overstated.  Desmond Morton and Gonick suggested that the party establishment’s 
distraction over the leadership race had enabled the Waffle to fill a policy vacuum at the 
convention, and neither of the leadership candidates had openly championed 
controversial policies identified with the Waffle.  Indeed, following the convention party 
leaders publicly downplayed the Waffle’s impact shaping NDP policy.  Lewis, during his 
first press conference as leader, explained “what the party has done is taken a very strong 
vote for independence.  Now we will have to see how that applies in the province of 
Ontario.”152  Jim Renwick, the former deputy leader, suggested that the Waffle resolution 
on energy resources represented merely a “general statement” which provided caucus 
with a “framework” for future consideration.153  Another party leader, albeit unnamed, 
claimed the Waffle had been absorbed: “That’s the ballgame… They’ve been sucked into 
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the mainstream of the party.”  Mel Watkins countered that “the party establishment is not 
co-opting us, it’s jumping on our bandwagon.”154 
Following the convention, Lewis reached out to party establishment figures he 
might have alienated during the leadership race, including appointing Pitman as his 
deputy leader.  Lewis largely dropped whatever radical rhetoric he had employed during 
the campaign, and began addressing business clubs to reassure them that the prospect of 
an NDP government was nothing to fear.155  Lewis also recruited Desmond Morton who, 
in one of many attacks on the Waffle, deemed its ideology “a particularly archaic, sterile 
and academic brand of socialism.”156  Tasked by Lewis to “clean up the radical policy 
mess left at the convention,” Morton eventually produced a 73-page campaign platform 
“that only used the word ‘socialist’ once.”157  Gonick’s post-convention evaluation 
pointed to the sorts of difficulties likely to confront both the Waffle and the party in the 
days ahead: “The NDP was boring and dull before the Waffle.  The Waffle has made the 
NDP exciting.  How it will retain the delicate balance of simultaneous autonomy from 
and involvement in the party remains to be seen.”158 
 Disturbing news from Quebec had overshadowed the Ontario NDP convention 
and Stephen Lewis’s election as party leader.  On October 5, 1970 members of the 
violent separatist Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped first the British trade 
commissioner, James Cross, and five days later Quebec’s Minister of Labour and 
Immigration, Pierre Laporte.  On October 15, in an atmosphere of crisis and uncertainty, 
                                                        
154 Ibid. 
155 John Zaritsky, “Lewis in the lions’ den,” Globe and Mail, February 23, 1971. 
156 Desmond Morton, “The NDP Can Take Ontario, If…” Globe and Mail, November 28, 1970. 
157 “Spring Cleaning: How Stephen Lewis Gave up Wellington Boots, The Waffle, the NDY, and Grew 
Wiser in His Years,” The Last Post, April-May 1971, 34. 
158 Gonick “Waffling in Ontario,” Canadian Dimension, October-November 1970, 6. 
  200 
the federal cabinet invoked the War Measures Act, which never before had been used in 
peacetime, to grant police extraordinary powers of search, seizure and imprisonment.  
Eventually over five hundred individuals were detained, some as suspected terrorists or 
their sympathizers, as well as Parti Québécois supporters.159  All but four members of the 
NDP’s federal caucus opposed implementation of the War Measures Act, thereby 
backing their leader Tommy Douglas who condemned it as “overkill on a gargantuan 
scale… we are not prepared to use the preservation of law and order as a smokescreen to 
destroy the liberties and the freedom of the people of Canada.”160  According to Morton, 
many Canadians in turn “vilified the NDP as an alliance of cowards, traitors and secret 
separatists.”161  The Waffle demonstrated its support of the federal caucus’s stance by 
organizing several large public meetings at which the Trudeau government’s use of the 
War Measures Act was challenged.  The Ontario NDP executive declined officially to co-
sponsor one such event, although MPs David Lewis and Ed Broadbent each spoke at a 
demonstration in Toronto that drew several thousand people.162 
 Manitoba’s Ed Schreyer, leader of Canada’s only provincial NDP government at 
the time, broke with the federal NDP and offered his measured support for the War 
Measures Act during the October Crisis.  The issue continued to hang over delegates to 
the Manitoba NDP convention in November 1970, where otherwise the speeches and 
policy debates focused largely on provincial issues.  The Manitoba Waffle, when 
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organizing for the convention, recognized the potential dilemma it faced of being true to 
its radical roots on the left of the party, yet reluctant to criticize Manitoba’s first social 
democratic government.  As Don Mitchell observed in the Waffle News, “with a 
precariously situated government party, it is difficult to get many left thinking people to 
identify with the [W]affle.  Understandable, and it is probably important the [W]affle 
group in no public way create the impression of a split in the Manitoba NDP.”163  As it 
happened, the Waffle suffered a series of policy defeats at the convention involving  
labour rights, economic and northern development, and a constitutional amendment 
designed to bind MLAs to uphold party policies.164  Waffler Alvin Finkel complained  
that cabinet ministers frequently intervened in convention debates to urge delegates not to 
“tie the hands” of government with specific and radical policy instructions, a practice that 
threated to reduce the gathering to “an exercise in cheerleading for the government 
team.”165  Nevertheless, the Waffle attracted 120 of the convention’s 600 delegates to its 
public meeting, and filled four of the ten elected executive positions including Una 
Decter as party vice-president.166  Furthermore, delegates loudly applauded Douglas’s 
fierce defense of the federal caucus’s opposition to the War Measures Act, yet remained 
largely silent when Premier Schreyer repeated his qualified support for the Act.167  
Although unhappy that the NDP leadership exercised such firm control, Wafflers were 
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optimistic that a lack of policy debate or meaningful consultation among party members 
would ultimately direct more people into the Waffle.168 
 One year after the federal NDP convention debate that shot the group into 
prominence, the Waffle had established itself as a significant minority within the NDP.  
The Waffle boasted a presence virtually everywhere that the NDP did, demonstrating its 
capacity to influence the party’s policy and leadership elections at the provincial level.  
The Waffle had also acted on its commitment to engage with extra-parliamentary social 
movement activism through strike support, abortion law protests, and public 
demonstrations against the War Measures Act, at times dragging the NDP along with it.  
Within the party, the Waffle had a strong presence in the miniscule NDP sections in 
Atlantic Canada, although Wafflers in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
tended to be too busy organizing the largely moribund NDP to cause significant conflict 
with the party leadership.169  In Ontario, the largest Waffle group had influenced the 
provincial party’s policies and ensured that Stephen Lewis was elected leader over the 
more moderate Walter Pitman.  The Manitoba Waffle, despite its weakness at the 
convention, continued to organize and featured a spokesperson in MLA Cy Gonick 
capable of publicizing their criticisms of Premier Schreyer and the NDP government.  In 
Saskatchewan the Waffle’s leadership candidate had achieved a respectable 25 per cent 
of the vote in the provincial party’s leadership contest, had helped elect Allan Blakeney 
instead of Roy Romanow, and had significantly influenced the party’s policy on 
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agriculture.  The BC Waffle, while not as organized as the Ontario or Saskatchewan 
groups, had also influenced the provincial party’s policies at convention, content to work 
with a leader and caucus that appeared sympathetic to their cause. After one year of 
organized activity, the Waffle’s efforts to transform the NDP had borne some fruit.  But 
the Waffle’s plans to run a leadership candidate to succeed Tommy Douglas as leader of 
the federal NDP would bring the group into direct conflict with established party and 
union leaders and set the stage for open struggle within the party. 
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Chapter Five 
Waffling in Winnipeg, London, and Saskatoon 
 
 This chapter diverges from the chronological narrative of the Waffle and the NDP 
at national and provincial levels to examine the activists and activities of local Waffle 
chapters in three diverse localities.1  The history of the Waffle is not only one of intra-
party conflict, nor was the group’s impact limited to the resurgent Canadian nationalism 
of the 1970s.  Instead, as has been discussed earlier, the Waffle’s struggle within the NDP 
both developed out of the existing work of New Left activists and inspired Wafflers to 
engage in local, extra-parliamentary struggles.  Examining the grassroots of the Waffle in 
Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon demonstrates that Waffle activists, in addition to 
working within the NDP to advocate for socialism and Canadian independence, engaged 
in extra-parliamentary social movements within their local communities.  These 
movements included second-wave feminism, anti-Vietnam War protests, aid for draft 
resisters, and support for striking workers, as well as participation in municipal politics.  
Furthermore, election campaigns undertaken by local Waffle chapters, including 
municipally in Winnipeg in 1971, federally in Middlesex-Lambton-London in 1974, and 
provincially in Saskatoon-Centre in 1975, demonstrate their efforts to engage in a 
different sort of electoral politics, emphasizing policy issues instead of merely winning 
votes. 
 The three Waffle chapters were chosen primarily on the basis of available archival 
materials and oral histories.  Together they provide an opportunity for comparisons.  
Winnipeg was the centre of both the provincial NDP and Waffle in Manitoba and had a 
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long history of left-wing radicalism tempered by the election of a moderate NDP 
government in 1969.  London was neither a hotbed of NDP support nor the home of 
Ontario’s Waffle leadership, but it contained the third-largest local chapter in the 
province drawing supporters from the UAW as well as the University of Western Ontario 
(UWO).  Saskatoon was not the centre of the provincial Waffle leadership – that title 
belonged to the Regina chapter – but it was the largest provincial chapter and took on 
enhanced significance for the group after John Richards’s election as an NDP-Waffle 
MLA for the riding of Saskatoon-University in 1971. 
Over the winter holidays in 1969-70, an initial gathering of “about thirty” people 
established a Waffle group in Winnipeg following the Manifesto’s well-publicized defeat 
at the federal NDP convention just a few months before.2  With an expanding student 
population, a tradition of left radicalism and the presence of a sympathetic MLA schooled 
in the New Left, in many ways Winnipeg was an ideal city for the Waffle to organize 
support.  Winnipeg’s status as the “gateway to the west” had declined as the city grew 
and transformed in the decades following the Second World War.  In becoming a major 
urban centre for the surrounding hinterland, metropolitan Winnipeg increasingly 
dominated the province’s economy, especially in finance, insurance, trade, services, 
construction, transportation, communications, and utilities, while accounting for nearly 
two-thirds of the province’s employment.3  While the city experienced a slight population 
decline in the 1960s, the rapid expansion of the surrounding suburban communities 
increased metropolitan Winnipeg’s population by over 30,000 to 540,000 during the five 
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years prior to 1971.4  Skyrocketing demand for postsecondary education led to the 
creation of the University of Winnipeg, newly separated from the University of 
Manitoba, in 1967.5  The city historically attracted a diverse population, but whereas 
working-class north Winnipeg had a well-deserved reputation for radicalism, having 
previously elected both CCF/NDP and Communist representatives at the municipal, 
provincial, and federal levels, south Winnipeg was considered equally conservative.6  The 
city’s municipal politics had been dominated by a pro-business, anti-socialist coalition 
since 1919, but the Manitoba NDP’s provincial election victory in 1969 depended on 
strong urban support, with seventeen of the party’s twenty-eight MLAs coming from 
Winnipeg. 
After focusing on the New Democratic Youth (NDY), Winnipeg Wafflers 
prepared position papers on Manitoba’s economic development and labour issues in a bid 
to influence the provincial NDP convention in the autumn of 1970.  Throughout that year 
a group met regularly at the Dimension bookshop run by Cy Gonick, the NDP MLA for 
the Winnipeg riding of Crescentwood, to discuss issues such as foreign ownership, the 
Americanization of universities, and independent Canadian unions.7  In the fall of 1970, 
two young Wafflers, Arthur Schafer and Michael Mendelson, began hosting regular 
political education meetings.  The provincial group elected a steering committee, chaired 
by Sheila Kuziak and comprised almost exclusively of Wafflers from Winnipeg.8  Indeed, 
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all but seventeen of the 182 names on the Manitoba Waffle’s mailing list in late 1971 
hailed from Winnipeg.  The Winnipeg Waffle group managed to elect to the federal NDP 
leadership convention in support of Waffle candidate James Laxer “a number of 
delegates largely representing the New Democratic Youth and the federal constituency of 
Winnipeg South.”9  In the summer of 1971 the group restructured, began publishing a 
newsletter for the Manitoba Waffle, offered support to striking construction workers and 
started organizing for Winnipeg’s municipal elections in October. 
The Winnipeg Waffle would focus much of its efforts on local issues.10  The 
creation of the amalgamated metropolis of Winnipeg “unicity” and its first municipal 
elections in the fall of 1971 engendered much local public debate including among 
members of the Winnipeg Waffle.  Furthermore, the NDP ran a slate of candidates on a 
unified municipal party platform. The Winnipeg Waffle, concerned that “unless the left 
within the party draws up a concrete set of proposals for the NDP’s policy convention, 
there can be little doubt that the party will run on a platform indistinguishable from the 
platform of real estate groups,” organized an Urban Policy Conference in June 1971.11 At 
the conference the Winnipeg Waffle developed policies on housing, taxation, 
transportation and citizen involvement in the newly amalgamated city, and made plans to 
support the nomination of Waffle sympathizers and left-wingers as NDP candidates in the 
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upcoming municipal election.12  At the NDP’s Municipal Policy Convention in August 
1971, the Winnipeg Waffle was, by its own account, “relatively successful in winning 
support for its policies.”13  The NDP’s municipal platform clearly reflected Waffle 
policies including proposals to nationalize the Greater Winnipeg Gas Company, and 
create a Winnipeg public housing corporation, a mass-transit system, and more 
progressive taxation.  Although Waffle sympathizer and incumbent Metro councillor 
Andrew Robertson lost to fellow councillor Art Coulter the vote to become party 
electoral chair by 125 to 90, Robertson was elected to a three-person leadership 
committee for the municipal NDP, and a Waffle resolution binding NDP councillors to 
the party’s policy platform was passed.14  Nevertheless, only three Waffle-supported 
candidates won their nomination as NDP candidates, and none were elected in the 
October general election.15  The NDP elected only seven councillors, while the right-
wing Independent Citizens’ Election Committee elected thirty-seven.  On a more positive 
note, one Waffle-supported candidate and four other New Democrats were elected to the 
Winnipeg school board, constituting a left-wing majority.16  In a reflection on the NDP’s 
poor showing in the city’s north end, Waffler Alvin Finkel acknowledged the advantage 
enjoyed by incumbents and the strong support for Communist councilor Joe Zuken, but 
complained the “NDP has to date completely failed to make people think of municipal 
elections as important” and urged candidates to “run issue-oriented campaigns” instead of 
seeking election based on the party brand.  Waffler Paul Barber emphasized the city’s 
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“class cleavages” in his analysis of the campaign and pointed to Waffler Carol Fogel’s 
strong support in an “area of older, small, working class homes” in comparison with her 
poor showing in wealthier parts of south Winnipeg.  Barber warned that unless the NDP 
challenged the “capitalist value structure” and altered Canadians’ “political 
consciousness” it should expect little success at the ballot box.17 
Following the municipal election the Winnipeg Waffle produced four pamphlets 
outlining its policy positions, distributed them at the Manitoba NDP convention in 
November and held a “well-attended public meeting” featuring Saskatchewan Waffle 
MLA John Richards.  After several educational meetings in March and April 1972, the 
group’s activity slowed as its members became disillusioned with the NDP government.  
At the same time, several Winnipeg Wafflers began to publish an alternative newspaper 
titled Prairie Dog Press which continued until August 1973.18 
 As was the case in Winnipeg, the Waffle in London drew a large portion of its 
members from the local university community.  Unlike in Winnipeg, however, it also had 
a base in the labour movement, specifically the large UAW Local 27.  London in the late 
1960s and early 1970s was in many ways true to its image as a conservative, white, 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant city.  With a population of 200,000 London was home to 
insurance and trust companies, as well as John Robarts, Ontario’s Progressive 
Conservative Premier from 1961 to 1971.  But significant change was afoot as the city 
underwent a decade of suburban expansion and industrial growth.  UWO was growing 
too, with the addition of eight new academic buildings and three student residences 
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during the 1960s, while Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and Technology opened in 
1967.19  Immigration from south Asia, Africa and the Caribbean changed the face of 
London in this period, as diverse communities expanded across the city.20  Furthermore, 
London fostered a dynamic art scene in the 1960s where nationally renowned artists 
worked, taught, and fostered a vibrant creative atmosphere.21  Although the Liberals and 
Conservatives had long dominated London’s politics, this too began to change in the 
1960s.  Anglican archdeacon Kenneth Bolton won a 1969 by-election for the NDP in 
Middlesex South, a riding containing part of London, while in 1972 Jane Bigelow 
became the first female and New Democrat to become the city’s mayor.22  The Ontario 
Young New Democrats (OYND) reported having two clubs in London in 1970, including 
a campus club at UWO.  The OYND indicated “many of the NDP and NDY in London 
seem to be from a first or second generation European family, probably because the 
WASP power structure has tended to exclude them.”23 
The key figures in the London Waffle were Mary and Al Campbell.  Mary 
Campbell, who worked at the UWO library, was active in a variety of social justice 
groups, including the Committee to End Canada’s Complicity in Viet Nam, the Voice of 
Women, and the Women’s Auxiliary for Auto Workers.  She was also involved in early 
attempts to unionize staff at the university.24  Hilary Bates Neary, who worked with Mary 
Campbell, describes her as “an organizer… She knew exactly why she held certain 
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political attitudes and beliefs.  I’m not saying she was a rabid proselytizer, but she never 
lost an opportunity to remind people why things were the way they were and how they 
could change.”25  Bates Neary and Margaret Simpson, a social work professor at 
Fanshawe College, remember Mary Campbell welcoming and helping American draft 
evaders in addition to her other activism.  Both Mary Campbell and her husband Al, an 
employee at Eaton Automotive and former president of UAW Local 27, were active in 
the NDP riding association and supported Waffle positions, albeit with limited success, at 
local party meetings.   
The London Waffle’s 1972 mailing list of 128 people is not truly indicative of 
local support for the group as it included both Wafflers and its opponents.26  Several New 
Democrats on the list ran for party offices in opposition to the Waffle, such as Charles 
and Jane Bigelow, or denied any involvement with the Waffle.  Another London Waffler, 
Paddy Musson, a graduate student, suggests that “Mary Campbell would see all of those 
people as people she could talk into supporting something she was interested in.”27  After 
the Ontario Waffle decided to form the Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada 
(MISC) at the August 1972 conference at Delaware, a decision that split the twelve-
person London delegation, the number of Waffle supporters declined.28  Still, between 
November 1972 and September 1974 the London Waffle’s membership ranged between 
twenty-nine and forty-three, making it the largest local chapter outside of Toronto and 
Ottawa.  Many London Wafflers continued to support the NDP after MISC’s formation.  
One of the delegates to the Delaware conference remembers that he “wanted to remain in 
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the party… because I thought it [MISC] would be a dissipation of our energies – we 
couldn’t afford to do that.”29  He remained a NDP member and volunteered for election 
campaigns throughout the 1970s.30  Paddy Musson also remained involved with the NDP, 
including running as a candidate in the 1979 and 1980 federal elections.31  In contrast, 
UWO professor Henry Roper’s frustration with the ONDP’s treatment of the Waffle led 
him to resolve not to work for the NDP after 1972.32 
As well as Campbell’s colleagues at the university library, the London Waffle 
mailing list included the names of professors and graduate students at UWO.  Craig 
Simpson, a history professor, had moved to London after attending university in the 
United States, where he and his spouse Margaret Simpson were radicalized by the anti-
Vietnam War and student movements.  Craig Simpson remembers “we’d come from a 
highly politicized environment, where by that time I think it’s fair to say that we were 
ready for some action.”33  Another faculty member, Henry Roper, had been politically 
involved prior to joining the Waffle, both as a canvasser for the British Labour Party in 
1964 while studying at Cambridge University, and as campaign manager for an NDP 
candidate in Halifax in 1968.34  Roper suggests that he was sympathetic to the Waffle’s 
nationalism and influenced by the Vietnam War, concerns over Canada becoming a 
“branch plant economy,” the writings of George Grant, and the perception that Canadian 
universities were hiring too many American professors.  The mailing list also included 
members of London’s burgeoning arts community alongside the professors, students, and 
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Al Campbell’s co-workers at the Eaton Automotive plant.  Among several London artists 
involved with the Waffle, Greg Curnoe was the best known.35  Curnoe had gained 
national notoriety in 1968 when his 110-foot mural at Montreal’s Dorval airport was 
taken down after just four days for its “anti-American” content.36  Hugh McIntyre, 
another London artist and Waffler, co-founded the improvisational Nihilist Spasm Band 
with Curnoe and others during the late 1960s. 
The London Waffle’s primary activity outside the NDP was in providing support 
for workers, for example by opposing the closure of the American-owned Eaton 
Automotive factory and joining striking workers at Brantford’s Texpack plant.  London 
Wafflers also helped organize the Ontario Waffle’s Delaware conference during the 
summer of 1972 when, after contentious debate, the group split and the majority left the 
NDP to form the Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada.  Mary Campbell was 
one of three MISC candidates to run in the 1974 federal election, but received only a 
fraction of the NDP’s vote in the riding of Middlesex-Lambton-London.37  The London 
Waffle characterized the campaign as an opportunity to educate people about the 
Waffle’s positions on independence and socialism.  Campbell had decided to run in 
Middlesex-Lambton-London instead of London West since it was “Waffle policy not to 
run against left-wing NDP candidates,” or in London East, where the NDP candidate Ray 
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Funk was believed to have a strong chance of winning.38  Furthermore, the London group 
had been surprised by the Ontario Waffle election strategy committee’s decision to field a 
candidate in London and were ill-prepared for a full-fledged campaign.  In an attempt to 
engage electors in more substantial discussions than usually occur during campaign door-
to-door canvassing, they opted to canvass one-third of the riding twice.  The first visit, a 
“light canvass,” was limited to leafleting, whereas during the second sweep they sought 
to engage people in longer discussions about socialism and the Waffle’s policies.39  
Unfortunately, they failed to convince voters the Waffle’s long-term socialist program 
was substantially different from other parties’ short-term election promises.  The London 
Wafflers also regretted not preparing a pamphlet focusing on women’s issues despite 
running a female candidate.40 
The London Waffle’s primary extra-parliamentary activity was to support local 
left-wing labour causes. Al Campbell, president of the large UAW Local 27 and long-
time editor of its newsletter had formerly been a Communist Party (CP) member and 
electoral candidate.41  Although Campbell had left the CP in 1956, he was still regarded 
as a leftist within the UAW by the union leadership.42  When London’s Eaton 
Automotive plant, where many members of the left wing of UAW Local 27 worked, 
closed in 1971, Campbell found himself out of a job and the UAW.43  The London 
Waffle’s prompt response was to organize a meeting to decry plant closures by 
American-owned companies and to picket the Eaton Automotive plant alongside activists 
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of the Militant Co-Op group.44  In light of the plant’s impending closure, Campbell, a 
Laxer supporter and delegate at the federal NDP’s April 1971 convention in Ottawa, led 
his fellow New Democrats in a spontaneous protest on Parliament Hill against the Liberal 
government’s economic strategy.45 
London Wafflers also participated in the September 1971 Texpack strike in 
Brantford. The strike set a small independent Canadian union representing a primarily 
female workforce against a large American-based multinational corporation.46  While 
wages and benefits were in dispute, Kent Rowley and Madeleine Parent, the leaders of 
the Canadian Textile and Chemical Union (CTCU), considered the phasing out of 
manufacturing operations at Brantford a fundamental issue.  The Texpack strike 
encapsulated several significant issues for the Waffle, including Canadian economic 
underdevelopment, foreign ownership, exploitation of female workers, and the influence 
of conservative international unions.  Craig Simpson recalls: 
The issue involved the strikebreakers, who were coming up in their buses, and he 
[Rowley] broke the containment of the police and ran off in front and tried to 
position himself – like the man in Tiananmen square with the tank – and the lead 
bus had to stop. And he was whacked a couple of times by the cops and hauled 
out of the way. And that infuriated many of us, and the cops formed a cordon 
protecting the area for the buses to go into the plant.47 
 
As the crowd of demonstrators surged forward, police ordered them to disperse as a court 
injunction had limited to seven the number of pickets permitted at the plant.  Several 
Wafflers became involved in heated arguments with the police, including Simpson who 
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had to be restrained by his friends.  London Wafflers Henry Roper, Al Campbell and 
James Napier were arrested along with eleven others, including Mel Watkins, Steve 
Penner, Robert Laxer and Daniel Drache.48  Roper recalls being separated from the others 
in jail for several hours before undergoing police questioning and eventually being 
charged with obstructing a police officer in the course of duty.49  After the arrests, the 
remaining Wafflers drove to the courthouse to wait for their friends to be released on bail.  
The obstruction charges against the London Wafflers were later dropped, and Roper 
suggested “they weren’t interested in me, I wasn’t high-profile” like some of the other 
Wafflers arrested.50  Although the strike was not resolved until October, the Waffle’s 
participation in the Texpack demonstration drew attention to the company’s use of 
replacement workers and the Waffle’s criticisms of foreign ownership. 
The Saskatoon Waffle, like the groups in Winnipeg and London, drew much of its 
support from young people.  Saskatoon experienced significant population growth 
throughout the 1960s that led to the construction of a new freeway, bridge, and residential 
neighbourhoods, especially on the east side of the city.  The removal of the rail yards 
from downtown resulted in the construction of a shopping mall, YMCA building, and the 
Centennial Auditorium.51  The construction of office buildings and residential high-rises 
“was rapidly changing the look and feel of Saskatoon’s downtown.”52  Like Winnipeg 
and London, post-secondary education institutions responded to the influx of baby 
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boomers in Saskatoon.  The University of Saskatchewan expanded in numbers of 
students and buildings, and the Saskatchewan Technical Institute opened in 1959.53   
Members of the Saskatoon Waffle were drawn to the group through their 
backgrounds in student and anti-war activism.  John Conway, Don Mitchell and Don 
Kossick served as editors of the Carillon, the often controversial student newspaper of 
the Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan in the mid-1960s.  Conway 
described his experience as an undergraduate during the Sixties as an “awakening” and 
recalled being fired as editor for placing a picture of a frosh parade directly adjacent a 
photograph of Vietnamese people suffering and dying from American bombs.54  
Likewise, Don Kossick recalled students being radicalized over issues such as opposition 
to the Vietnam War, racism against native peoples, student power and university 
autonomy.  He explained “I tended to come to the Waffle more through the organizing 
work in the student’s movement and the farming union.”55  Don Mitchell pointed out that 
opposition to the Vietnam War was "really where I got that commitment because I came 
out of a conservative family, I was a student conservative in Saskatoon, I mean large-C, I 
was a member of the Young Progressive Conservatives,” and it was “only gradually, 
through these issues on campus, that I got drawn into broader politics.”56  Mitchell, like 
Kossick, organized for the National Farmers Union alongside numerous other Wafflers, 
including Conway, John Warnock, Lorne Brown, Gerry Sperling, Doug Daniels and Pat 
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Gallagher.57  Kossick explained that “we were looking for a politics that was beyond the 
formalized NDP.  And while we were looking at that we also recognized that we were 
also sitting in opposition, trying to get rid of the Thatcher government.”58   
John Richards, a twenty-six-year-old graduate student who had studied as an 
undergraduate at the University of Saskatchewan prior to moving to St. Louis, planned to 
return to the province and seek the nomination as an NDP candidate in Saskatoon for the 
1971 election.  Richards was preoccupied with the escalating anti-Vietnam War 
movement at Washington University for much of the spring of 1970.  Protests led by the 
Washington University Liberation Front (WULF) culminated in a mass demonstration 
outside the campus Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) building which ended after 
a protestor threw a cherry bomb firecracker that set the building on fire.  As one of the 
demonstration organizers, Richards was charged with unlawful assembly.59  Soon 
thereafter John Warnock gave Richards, who had previously researched the development 
of Saskatchewan’s potash industry and kept abreast of the province’s politics, some 
Waffle literature and encouraged him to seek the NDP nomination in Saskatoon-
University when he returned to Canada later in 1970.60  Warnock explained “we are 
going to stress the necessity of a young candidate, to win the university vote.  The new 
dormitories will place about 800 new voters in that riding.  We think we can get the 
wafflers out – the right has not been showing up for meetings in Saskatoon.”61  Richards 
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accepted the invitation, claiming his decision to trade extra-parliamentary protest for the 
nomination of a major political party could be explained in part by differences between 
American and Canadian politics: 
In America, there is no parliamentary politics worthy of the name.  The only kind 
of popular politics involves people in the streets, demonstrating, both violently 
and non-violently; against the war, against racism, and against a great number of 
other things which are wrong with America.  Thus, from afar I began to 
appreciate more, one of the few things which does separate Saskatchewan, and 
Canada in general, from the States; that there still remains, hopefully, enough of 
democratic socialist politics within the New Democratic Party that one can avoid 
the kind of politics that’s got to be fought in the States.  A politics which is much 
more violent, much more dangerous and altogether frightening… One shouldn’t 
forget, however, that one of the things which defines Waffle is that it is, in some 
sense, consciously distinguishing itself from ordinary New Left politics.  Whereas 
ordinary New Left politics has as its axiom that Parliamentary Politics ‘Stinks’; 
the Waffle has as its axiom that we must make a last desperate effort to win over 
the NDP.62 
 
The Saskatoon Waffle operated informally until 1972 when the provincial group 
adopted a constitution that provided for formally organized local chapters.  The 
Saskatoon Waffle adopted a “revised strategy” to redirect its efforts toward “building an 
active socialist political base within the community through direct action” and “moving 
away from an exclusive concern with radical organizing within the NDP.”63  They 
established committees on university reform, resources, co-ops, community clinics, 
communications, and a trailer park in the Sutherland neighbourhood.64  The university 
reform committee organized a seminar in February 1973 titled “The University: Who 
Benefits?” attended by sixty people which provided the impetus for Saskatoon Waffler 
Ed Mahood to draft a policy paper on education for the provincial group.  The 
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committees focused on community health clinics and the threatened Sutherland trailer 
park resolved to meet with activists and offer assistance.  Individual members contacted 
the Unemployed Citizens Welfare Improvement Council in Saskatoon and developed a 
welfare rights policy for the provincial Waffle.65  According to the chair, the Saskatoon 
group also “played a leading role in the Sask Oil Campaign” for the establishment of a 
publicly-owned oil company by preparing and distributing pamphlets, bumper stickers, 
buttons and posters, holding a one-day seminar on campus, and gathering signatures for a 
petition.66 
 The Saskatoon group also established a citizens’ committee which mobilized a 
“progressive coalition” including the Métis Society, legal aid clinics, native women, and 
the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) to support three left-wing 
candidates running independently of the NDP in the October 1973 municipal elections – 
the Wafflers Nora Thibodeau, Mary Arpin and Vicki Wilson.  The committee reported 
that the “coalition formed enthusiastically without any serious dissension over being in 
the field against a secret NDP-labour slate.”67  Fifty volunteers canvassed the city for the 
three Wafflers and prepared a four-page tabloid with help from The Sheaf, the student 
newspaper at the University of Saskatchewan.  The committee was pleased with its 
efforts, explaining “the vote ran between 3 and 12 percent and some promising contacts 
were made.”68 
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In the summer of 1972, before organizing as a formal chapter, the Waffle 
registered 124 supporters in Saskatoon.69  The following year Rob Dumont, the local 
chairperson, reported that the Saskatoon Waffle had seventy members and an additional 
125 people on its contact list.70  He praised Waffle MLA John Richards as a 
“pamphleteer, orator, mediator, researcher, organizer, agitator and always a socialist,” but 
the activities of the Saskatoon Waffle were sustained by a dedicated group of activists 
including Dumont, Duncan Bury, Gerry Kowalenko, June Santjes, John Piper, Jill 
Sargent and Don Kerr.71  Dumont acknowledged that “liaison and communication with 
the women’s movement has been very bad” and recommended that the next chair be an 
active feminist and a “rigid policy of parity on all committees be reaffirmed by the 
Saskatoon local.”  Furthermore, Dumont regretted that work amongst Saskatoon unions 
had been “minimal,” for which he blamed the “uncertainty” of the provincial Waffle’s 
position on the labour movement and the “underrepresentation of working people in the 
Saskatoon local.”72  Although no longer chairperson, Dumont remained actively involved 
in the group’s next major undertaking – John Richards’s re-election campaign – which 
preoccupied the Saskatoon Waffle for the ensuing year-and-a-half. 
The “Independent Socialist” campaign committee established by the Saskatoon 
Waffle decided early on that its primary aim was to “successfully raise socialist issues of 
substance,” and maintained that although “it would be nice to win – not least because 
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Richards needs a job” electoral success remained a “secondary goal.”73  Running in the 
newly-created riding of Saskatoon-Centre, Richards sought to increase his profile by 
canvassing, holding public meetings, and criticizing the NDP government from the left in 
the media.  Nearly fifty canvassers assisted the Richards campaign despite realizing that 
Paul Mostoway, the NDP candidate, was “folksy and poses a real threat.”74  Researching 
and writing policy for the Richards campaign was a group effort.  The campaign 
committee produced tabloid-style information pieces titled Citizens’ Advocate which 
addressed issues such as public ownership of provincial energy resources, housing in 
Saskatoon, and the “colonial state” of northern Saskatchewan, as well as pamphlets on 
senior citizens, women, health care and resources.  In keeping with the campaign’s goal 
of raising socialist issues, pamphlets such as the one titled “Bread and Butter Issues” 
sought to educate its recipients about the global politics of food production, trade 
agreements and overconsumption using poetic verse and featuring a suggested reading 
list including the books Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered by E.F. 
Schumacher and Diet for a Small Planet by Frances Lappe.75  
  At the campaign launch Richards argued that “residents of this constituency 
suffer more than their share of the injustices of our present society” and emphasized six 
policy areas.  He advocated for public ownership of urban land to prevent speculation, 
and promoted low-cost public housing and the preservation of heritage properties in older 
neighbourhoods.  He proposed community health centres as an alternative to private 
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medical practices, and a provincial prescription drug program.  Richards’s platform also 
included mandating that a majority of university faculty positions be held by Canadians, 
and measures to alleviate unemployment and poverty among Saskatchewan’s native 
peoples.76  Despite presenting a detailed slate of policies and recruiting a dedicated group 
of supporters, Richards’s educative approach to the campaign did not result in his re-
election.77 
The provincial Waffle’s decision not to support Richards’s 1975 re-election bid 
had devastating ramifications for its Saskatoon chapter.  After an extended debate during 
1974, which is discussed in Chapter Ten, over the purpose and value of participating in 
electoral politics left the issue unresolved, Richards opted to run as an independent 
candidate with the support of the Saskatoon Waffle.  The provincial Waffle ultimately 
declined to back a campaign for the re-election of a “social democrat,” albeit one to the 
left of the governing NDP.  Most Saskatoon Wafflers joined Richards’s “Independent 
Socialist” campaign committee leaving the local chapter of the Waffle in “shambles.”78   
John Warnock suggests that “resentment” over the Waffle’s treatment of Richards 
accounted for the group’s decline in that city, explaining 
From ’69 to the spring of ’74 I was in Saskatoon and during the period when they 
were in the NDP we had enormous... well probably enormous representation in 
our meetings and in our phoning lists and everything else.  I mean we had a very 
large group in Saskatoon… it’s really surprising to see that as big a group as we 
had in Saskatoon kind of just disappeared completely.79 
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After 1975, in the absence of a large contingent from Saskatoon, the provincial Waffle 
was increasingly dominated by a Regina-based group.  After ten members of the 
International Socialists (IS) resigned from the organization in August 1975 “there was 
practically no representation from Saskatoon.”80 
The political foci of the Waffle chapters in Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon 
varied, but each one attracted activists from the burgeoning women’s liberation 
movement.  The Waffle’s advocacy of government-funded wages for housework 
reflected the ongoing theoretical debates amongst early Canadian women’s 
liberationists.81  Authors Adamson, Briskin and McPhail explain that “the debate on 
wages for housework was an important theoretical and strategic turning point for many 
socialist women,” who realized that women’s liberation could be approached from a 
Marxist-influenced analysis.82  Women’s liberationists in the Waffle were among the 
organizers of the 1970 Abortion Caravan which travelled across the country to protest the 
continued criminalization of many abortions and the difficulty in accessing legal 
abortions in many parts of the country.  As was discussed in Chapter Four, Wafflers 
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welcomed the Caravan as it arrived in several cities along its route.83  The Abortion 
Caravan held a press conference at the University of Winnipeg where a member of the 
Vancouver Women’s Caucus promoted their abortion information service, explaining 
“within five years women will come to women’s liberation groups instead of 
psychiatrists… they will realize they’re not mentally ill in seeking an abortion.”84  
Winnipeg Wafflers and women’s liberationists were also active in the Abortion Action 
Committee of Winnipeg. They responded to Manitoba NDP cabinet minister Joe 
Borowski’s high-profile opposition to abortion by supporting the health clinics that 
referred women to resources for legal, out-of-province abortions.  The Wafflers 
demanded that Borowski and other anti-abortion MLAs be driven out of the NDP.85   
Students at the University of Manitoba founded Winnipeg Women’s Liberation in 
1969-70 as a “development of the consciousness-raising sessions begun in the living 
room of Millie Lamb, a feminist and high school teacher.”  Unlike the Manitoba Status of 
Women group, Winnipeg Women’s Liberation worked within a socialist framework and 
established a newsletter in 1973 as “a way for those of us involved on the left wing of the 
women’s movement to communicate with each other.”86  Ellen Kruger and Linda Taylor 
recalled that “there was very little written theory in the feminist world, and we worked 
out our policies and positions on issues through animated discussions and consensus 
decision-making. There were some women with years of political experience in the NDP, 
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particularly the Waffle.”87  Winnipeg Women’s Liberation established a Woman’s Place 
as a drop-in centre and meeting space in 1973 before separating in the late 1970s into 
sub-groups such as the Socialist Women’s Collective, the Winnipeg Lesbian Society, 
Women for Non-Sexist Education, and Mothers for Change.  Wafflers Margaret Simpson 
and Paddy Musson were active in London’s women’s movement throughout the 1970s 
and helped to establish the Women’s Resource Centre and the Women’s Credit Union in 
that city.88 
 Saskatoon Women’s Liberation has been described as the “first self-conscious 
socialist-feminist organization in Canada.”89  Members of the CSM, predecessor to the 
Waffle in Saskatchewan, formed Saskatoon Women’s Liberation in 1969 and decided 
men would be allowed to attend only public meetings of the new organization.  The 
following summer Saskatoon Women’s Liberation established a Birth Control 
Information phone-in centre and in the fall hosted the first national women’s liberation 
conference.  The group also organized a conference on campus which led to courses in 
Women’s Studies, and established a Women’s Centre which served as a base for further 
feminist organizing where Waffle policy statements could be found amongst the 
“mountains of lit.”90  Waffler Mollie McQuarrie was a feminist activist, and Lynda 
Holland, Rosemarie Rupps and Maylynn Woo, all members of the Saskatoon Waffle, 
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served on the editorial committee for the Saskatoon Women’s Liberation Newsletter.91  
An article in the newsletter reported that women activists in Saskatoon were supporting 
both John Richards’s “Independent Socialist” re-election bid and the campaign of Ann 
Boulton, “an avowed and unabashed feminist,” to become the NDP MLA for Saskatoon-
Sutherland.92 
 Furthermore, Wafflers such as Pat Gallagher and Sheila Kuziak, who both became 
active in trade unions, were crucial figures in Saskatchewan Working Women (SWW), a 
feminist group in the provincial labour movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  John 
Warnock suggested that SWW was “virtually a direct offspring of the Waffle” and 
Kuziak concurred that “women in the Waffle demanded a strategy… there was a strong 
sense that trade union women did not have a voice in their unions.  They weren’t really 
organized as women.”93  Lorraine Beardsworth explained that although SWW was 
organized by Wafflers, “we did not want to set it up as a front for the Waffle, supposedly, 
at the time we formed it we were talking about a mass women’s organization… asking 
the women who were associated with the Waffle, to help them organize something 
different where they could talk about women’s issues as well as union issues.”94  She 
elaborated that “SWW may not have ever turned into the mass movement that we wanted 
it to turn into but it was another training ground and it was the place that we Waffle 
women needed to go to as well, in order to learn the skills we needed that we weren’t 
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learning in the Waffle.”95 
Certainly women’s liberationists such as Jackie Larkin, Varda Burstyn, Krista 
Maeots, and Kelly Crichton took on high-profile roles in the Waffle.  Female Wafflers in 
Winnipeg recalled the effect of seeing other women assuming leadership roles in the 
group.  One anonymous Waffler commented that “the activity of other women in the 
Waffle… had an impact developing my confidence, overcoming feelings of shyness and 
intimidation.”96  Two Waffle-backed candidates in the 1971 Winnipeg municipal 
elections, Carol Fogel for council and Gloria Mendelson for school board trustee, were 
encouraged by their experience in the women’s liberation movement to become political 
candidates.  As one female Winnipeg Waffler explained, “the women’s liberation 
movement says go, do, fight, it gives an impetus and a motivation to activity.”97 
The relationship between women’s liberationists and the Waffle was nevertheless 
strained on occasion. One woman in the Winnipeg Waffle commented that,  
during Waffle educationals there was a kind of intellectual one-upmanship. I often 
had strong arguments with the men about this. The whole consciousness raising 
experience and democratic thing, the sense of the quality of experience and 
environment, isn’t part of male culture, and therefore you can’t bring that into 
political life.98 
 
Another Winnipeg Waffle woman suggested that the “women’s liberation movement has 
forced men in the Waffle to look at themselves to see if they are male chauvinists.”99  
Male Wafflers, when asked about the effect of the women’s liberation movement, 
described their appreciation of the necessity for changing both their personal 
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relationships and conduct and their political structures and priorities.100  Yet not all 
female Wafflers were convinced of the immediacy or extent of their male counterparts’ 
enlightenment.  Martha Tracey indicated that although most appeared genuinely 
committed to women’s liberation, “putting it into effect” could be difficult.101  Ken 
Collier suggested: 
The experience that women and Native people had in [the Waffle] was far 
different from what men had in it. Many of the women who were not on the 
executive but who came to the Waffle things mentioned that 'boy, it’s sure uphill 
for women to get right into that, to take part’… I guess one of the major criticisms 
that I heard from women was that a lot of things the Waffle did they thought were 
not very practical for them.102 
   
Similarly, the experience of women’s liberationists in the London Waffle led the 
women to deepen their commitment to feminist activism. Paddy Musson remembered 
being asked to leave the Delaware conference after confronting a male Waffle leader: 
He came in and made this broad statement in terms of this issue, and as an 
energized university student who was interested in social change, I thought his 
analysis had serious flaws in it. I dared to tell him and I was told to be quiet and I 
told him that I owned this meeting as much as he did and that the whole principle 
of the Waffle was to move away from the domination of the party centre control 
and… here he was practicing the same techniques that had been practiced by the 
party centrally and that was the point at which I left.103 
 
Neither Paddy Musson nor Margaret Simpson remembered the Waffle as a feminist 
movement.  Simpson recalled feeling like “an onlooker” at the Delaware conference, and 
neither she nor Musson detected signs of either feminist concerns or female leadership.  
Simpson remembered feeling like “I was just some young kid trailing along on the 
coattails of the professors who understood about socialism, the political movement and 
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the CCF.”104  Her main commitment, however, was to feminism.  In comparing the fun 
and excitement of her involvement with feminist groups and actions in the 1970s to the 
Waffle experience, Paddy Musson concluded “The Waffle was not fun. Those were not 
fun men… they were earnest, all of them.”105 Thus, the Waffle attracted women’s 
liberationists and the experience of women within the Waffle in Winnipeg, London and 
Saskatoon both strengthened their commitment to feminism and inspired them to greater 
political involvement. 
Most of the Waffle leadership’s energy was devoted to clashing with the NDP and 
determining the policies and tactics of the provincial Waffle groups.  This chapter’s study 
of local Waffle groups in Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon adds another dimension to 
the narrative of intra-party conflict that is highlighted throughout this dissertation.  
Young activists, influenced especially by the student and anti-Vietnam War movements, 
joined the Waffle in an attempt to extend the ethos of the New Left to Canada’s 
established social democratic party, the NDP.  The Waffle’s explicit declaration that the 
party should be the “parliamentary wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental social 
change” reflected the New Left’s faith in the power of social movements and frustration 
with traditional forms of electoral politics.  James Laxer explained that the authors of the 
Waffle Manifesto sought to “move this stream of very powerful youth politics into 
Canadian social democracy,” and the experience of Wafflers in Winnipeg, London and 
Saskatoon suggests this goal was at least partially realized.106  Moreover, many of the 
activists in these three local chapters were significantly impacted by their experiences in 
the Waffle.  Their hands-on activism such as supporting striking workers on a picket line, 
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distributing radical publications, or participating in the burgeoning feminist movement 
enhanced many Wafflers’ commitment to a lifelong struggle for social justice.  When 
Wafflers engaged in electoral politics in Winnipeg, London, and Saskatoon, they 
attempted an alternative vision of politics based on education and “the development of a 
socialist consciousness” instead of merely prioritizing the winning of votes.  The pursuit 
of a different kind of politics by local Waffle chapters was indicative of its place in the 
broader Canadian New Left and its unique position in the international phenomenon of 
youth activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
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Chapter Six 
“I’ll swallow them only if they are digestible:” Inside the NDP, 1971 
 
This chapter examines the Waffle’s participation in the federal NDP leadership 
race and the successful provincial election campaign in Saskatchewan during the first half 
of 1971.  During this period, the Waffle attempted to utilize the campaign to succeed 
Tommy Douglas as leader of the NDP to improve its profile and influence within the 
party.  James Laxer’s surprising second-place finish to David Lewis indicated that the 
Waffle commanded substantial, albeit minority, support within the party.  The federal 
contest and subsequent election victory in Saskatchewan suggested that despite its 
internal defeats the Waffle exerted a small influence over NDP policy and that conflict 
between the Waffle and party leadership, while serious, was not irreconcilable.  However, 
a growing backlash by NDP moderates and labour leaders against the Waffle’s radicalism 
only enhanced the existing polarization within the party. 
 After leading the federal NDP through four elections since its inception in 1961, 
Tommy Douglas, having lost his own seat in the 1968 federal election, indicated his plans 
to resign.  But when the death of NDP MP Colin Cameron only a month after the election 
opened up a relatively safe seat on Vancouver Island, the party executive persuaded 
Douglas to continue as leader.  Douglas agreed, and after winning the resulting by-
election in Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands in early 1969, he announced that he would 
remain at the helm until 1971.1  The NDP stalwart David Lewis was regarded as 
Douglas’s heir apparent, even after indicating he would not be seeking the leadership 
since he believed the next leader should be from the younger generation.2 
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 Ed Broadbent was the first to enter the leadership race to replace Douglas.  
Announcing his candidacy at an Ottawa press conference in June 1970, Broadbent was 
endorsed by four of his fellow MPs and promised a campaign that highlighted issues of 
full employment, the control of foreign investment, and industrial democracy.3  The press 
focused on the thirty-four-year-old Broadbent’s youthfulness and his obvious 
intellectualism, claiming he appeared “ideologically closer” to the Waffle than were any 
of the other likely leadership candidates.4  Broadbent did not approve of the affiliation.  
“I think I am of the left” within the NDP, he said, but he denied associating with the 
Waffle and criticized the reference in its Manifesto to American “imperialism abroad and 
racism at home.”5  Broadbent concentrated his campaign on discrediting Pierre Trudeau 
and the Liberal government, even releasing a book titled The Liberal Rip-Off in which he 
castigated the prime minister for failing to address poverty in Canada, and claimed 
“Trudeau has done less for the average or poor Canadian than any prime minister since 
the Second World War.”6 
 John Harney was next to enter the race, in late November 1970.  Although he 
neither held a seat in Parliament nor enjoyed the backing of any federal MPs, the Globe 
and Mail deemed the “bilingual, articulate and contemporary” thirty-nine-year-old 
Harney a potentially appealing candidate.7  A humanities professor at York University, 
Harney served as the Ontario NDP’s provincial secretary from 1967-69, and ran 
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unsuccessfully, in four federal elections under the NDP banner.8  He promised that as 
leader he would move the NDP further left, and prioritize adding urban and rural poor to  
the core of workers, intellectuals, and members of the progressive middle class who 
already supported the party.  Harney had voted against the Waffle Manifesto at the 
Winnipeg convention, but nevertheless supported both Quebec’s right to self-
determination and the Ontario NDP’s recently adopted policy of nationalizing resource 
industries.9 
 David Lewis joined the race one week after Harney.  Lewis was an architect of 
the NDP and long coveted the leadership.  Electorally he had struggled to win and retain 
a House of Commons seat until he recaptured York South in Ontario for the NDP in 1965  
and held onto it in the face of the Liberal surge of 1968.  Lewis achieved significant 
public prominence in 1970 as a leading opponent of the War Measures Act and its 
successor legislation, the Public Order Act.  His principled defense of Canadians’ rights 
and freedoms – expressed “eloquently, gracefully, and convincingly” according to one 
commentator – was lauded by many New Democrats.10  Backed by nine other MPs, 
Lewis announced his long-expected candidacy for the party leadership in early December 
in Ottawa, describing himself as “a very angry, very militant democratic socialist.”11  
That said, Lewis made clear that as leader he would pursue a moderate policy approach 
                                                        
8 The first three candidacies were in Wellington South in 1962, 1963 and 1965, and the most recent in 
Scarborough West in 1968. 
9 “Harney joins fight for NDP leadership in bid to move party to the left,” Globe and Mail, November 26, 
1970.  
10 John Burns, “The anti-terrorist bill: a dilemma for all MPs,” Globe and Mail, November 23, 1970.  
Opposing the government’s anti-terrorist measures required courage in the fall of 1970.  Poet Irving Layton 
dismissed Lewis as part of a “collection of boobs, windbags and second-raters… not fit to tie the laces” of 
Trudeau’s ski-boots in a letter to the editor, Globe and Mail, October 31, 1970. 
11 “Nine MPs support Lewis for leadership,” Globe and Mail, December 3, 1970.  The nine MPs included 
three from Manitoba – Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre), David Orlikow (Winnipeg North), and 
Douglas Rowland (Selkirk) – two from Saskatchewan – Alf Gleave (Saskatoon-Biggar) and Lorne Nystrom 
(Yorkton-Melville) – three from British Columbia – Thomas Barnett (Comox-Alberni), Randolph Harding 
(Kootenay West), Barry Mather (Surrey) – and only one from Ontario, Max Saltsman (Waterloo). 
  235 
for the NDP and not attempt to woo the Waffle with radical policy commitments.  He 
claimed “I’ll swallow them only if they are digestible.”12 
 The Waffle began preparing for the leadership race during its national conference 
in August 1970 by forming a ten-person campaign committee.  The committee planned to 
promote Waffle policies to NDP members and decide on a leadership candidate after 
holding a series of meetings with Wafflers across the country.13  By early November it 
was clear that ill health would prevent Mel Watkins, the Waffle’s most prominent 
spokesperson, from seeking the leadership.  After the Quebec-based television 
personality Laurier Lapierre also declined to run, the Waffle’s choices were whittled 
down to Cy Gonick and James Laxer.14  John Warnock, who was then teaching at York 
University, suggested to his Saskatchewan Waffle colleagues “I think Jim is the most 
articulate spokesman the Waffle has now,” but encouraged Gonick to enter the contest for 
“tactical reasons.”15  Warnock thought Gonick, an elected politician from Manitoba who 
was also older than Laxer, might be considered by some to be the more credible 
candidate among the two, and also able to draw support from western Canada.16  
However Gonick’s frustration with Manitoba’s NDP government and determination to 
build up the left in his home province dissuaded him from seeking the national party 
leadership.  Laxer thereby became the Waffle’s candidate of choice, declaring his 
candidacy in Toronto at the end of November before rushing back to Kingston to be 
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present for the birth of his and Krista Maeots’s first child, Michael.17  He promised to 
emphasize economic nationalism and the necessity of striking a new deal for Quebec 
within Confederation, while attacking Pierre Trudeau’s invocation of the War Measures 
Act as a ploy “to suppress his political opposition in Quebec.”18  The Waffle committed 
to a collectively-run campaign, and Laxer recalls “I was as much the representative of the 
Waffle movement’s ideas as an actual candidate for the leadership of the party,” 
suggesting that the Waffle aimed primarily to influence party policy.19 
 Frank Howard, the final candidate to enter the race in January 1971, was a veteran 
MP for Skeena, British Columbia, and something of a maverick in the federal NDP 
caucus for splitting with the majority in supporting Trudeau’s imposition of the War 
Measures Act.  In addition to advocating for prisoners and opposing Canada’s archaic 
divorce laws, he had achieved some notoriety in 1967 after a former friend’s attempt to 
blackmail him resulted in Howard’s admitting that as a young man he had spent time in 
jail for armed robbery.  In his leadership campaign, Howard contrasted his rough 
background as a miner, ironmolder, and logger to the university professors in the race, 
and criticized the Waffle’s “academic and professional theories” of nationalization of 
resource industries as “out of touch with the realities of politics and with common 
sense.”20  Going further still, Howard warned that widespread nationalization “would 
destroy Canada completely and thoroughly – just as any endorsement of these Waffle 
proposals will destroy the NDP.”21  By the time Lewis, Broadbent, Harney, Laxer and 
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and Mail, January 23, 1971. 
21 Ibid. Several potential candidates declined to enter the race, including Charles Taylor, a McGill political 
philosopher whose candidacy David Lewis was rumoured to have supported, Allan O’Brien, the popular 
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Howard began a tour of Canadian cities to hold a series of twenty public debates, clear 
policy divisions had emerged among the five leadership candidates.22 
The Waffle’s position on Quebec polarized the NDP leadership race more than 
any other issue.  In January 1971, Laxer publicized five resolutions on Quebec that the 
Waffle proposed for debate at the upcoming NDP convention, including commitments to 
support Quebec’s right to self-determination and building “a people’s alliance” between 
English Canadian and Quebec socialists.23  The Waffle’s position on Quebec received 
coverage in both the English and French-language press, and provoked David Lewis into 
accusing the group of factionalism and harming the NDP’s credibility by proposing an 
alliance with the separatist Parti Québécois (PQ).24  Moreover, he rejected the Waffle’s 
emphasis on nationalization as anachronistic socialist fundamentalism.25  Laxer shot 
back, rejecting Lewis’s charge of a Waffle-PQ alliance, disavowing the suggestion that 
the Waffle endorsed separatism, and complaining that “Frank Howard and David Lewis 
                                                                                                                                                                     
mayor of Halifax, and Douglas Fisher, the former MP,  journalist and Waffle critic.  Fisher failed to win the 
NDP’s nomination for the federal riding of Selkirk in his bid to re-enter the House of Commons as a 
prelude to a leadership run.  See “Six expected to contest NDP leadership by Blakeney,” Globe and Mail, 
July 18, 1970. 
22 Remarkably, concern over the Waffle’s capacity for attracting media coverage overrode the desire to 
attract attention to the leadership race among some members of the party leadership.  Gordon Brigden, 
provincial secretary of the Ontario NDP, responded to federal secretary Cliff Scotton that his suggestion of 
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File 2 Chronological File 1969, New Democratic Party of Ontario fonds, QUA. 
23 James Laxer, “Resolution on the Quebec question,” Le Devoir, January 19, 1971.  The resolution read “a 
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24 “Allow Quebec to secede, Waffle group proposes,” Globe and Mail, January 16, 1971. 
25 Lewis Seale, “Waffle is charged with factionalism, being out of date,” Globe and Mail, January 29, 1971. 
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have spent too much time criticizing the Waffle group and too little time putting forward 
their own positive proposals.”26 
NDP leaders were sensitive to suggestions that the party was sympathetic to 
Quebec separatism.  Pierre Trudeau had charged during the 1968 election that the NDP’s 
embrace of the deux nations concept and ‘special status’ for Quebec appealed to 
separatists, claiming that “René Lévesque’s movement is supporting [Quebec NDP 
leader] Robert Cliche because they feel Robert Cliche’s position is as far towards 
separatism as any federal party can go.”27  Furthermore, the federal NDP caucus’s 
opposition to the use of the War Measures Act did not endear the party to many English 
Canadians.28  As a result, although the Waffle did not openly advocate for Quebec 
independence, their endorsement of Quebec’s right to determine its own future went 
further than other English-Canadian politicians and appeared to some a quasi-separatist 
policy.  Wafflers, especially Laxer, were highly attuned to political developments in 
Quebec.  Both the Waffle and many nascent Quebec separatists were a product of New 
Left social movements which derived much of their inspiration and rhetoric from anti-
colonial independence movements in Asia and Africa.29  In late 1970 the Waffle did 
approach the PQ to “enter into discussions with socialists in Quebec.”30  Cy Gonick 
reported on his communications with André Laroque, a caucus assistant for the PQ, who 
                                                        
26 Lewis Seale, “Laxer criticizes his NDP rivals for distortion of Waffle policy,” Globe and Mail, February 
13, 1971. 
27 Trudeau quoted in Wright, Trudeaumania, 263. 
28 Thirty-six percent of respondents indicated that their opinion of Tommy Douglas went down as a result 
of what he did or said during the recent FLQ crises compared to only eight percent who said it went up. 
“Stanfield and Douglas Lost Most Favor in FLQ Crises,” The Gallup Report, December 19, 1970. 
29 Mills, The Empire Within. 
30 Minutes of Waffle National Housekeeping Committee, October 17, 1970, Box 2008-017/001, File 5, 
Kim Malcolmson and Paul Barber fonds, YUA. 
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suggested establishing regular meetings between the Waffle and the “left in the PQ.”31  
However, the group decided “to postpone any meetings with Quebecois” until after the 
Quebec NDP convention, and contact was not resumed in its aftermath.32 
Three weeks after the Laxer-Lewis dispute, some 200 delegates gathered in 
Montreal at the Quebec NDP convention, planned as an “open” meeting to attract 
progressive supporters into the hitherto moribund provincial party.  Delegates overrode 
objections by David Lewis and several English-speaking members and approved a 
resolution recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination.  They also passed resolutions 
highlighting the provincial party’s autonomy, including a decision not to run NDP 
candidates in future provincial elections, and a promise to collaborate with the federal 
NDP only when doing so “does not come into conflict with” the Quebec NDP’s 
principles.33  The convention replaced the party’s retired president Roland Morin with 
Raymond Laliberté, a Quebec nationalist and former president of the Corporation des 
enseignants du Québec (CEQ) who had been among that union’s leadership during its 
controversial 1969 strike.  Although Laliberté ruled out forming an alliance with the PQ, 
many long-time English-speaking party members remained suspicious.34 
                                                        
31 Cy Gonick to Kim Malcolmson, November 10, 1970, Box 2008-017/001, File 5, Kim Malcolmson and 
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he had “met with the FLQ.  They are willing to send a speaker to the National Waffle Conference in July.  I 
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34 “Quebec NDP to quit provincial politics” Globe and Mail, February 22, 1971; Desmond Morton 
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taken over the party” in concert with the Waffle.  The idea that the Waffle endorsed Quebec independence 
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 That same weekend in Kitchener, Stephen Lewis launched his first public attack 
on Waffle policies during a meeting of the Ontario NDP provincial council.  Lewis’s 
speech described the Ontario NDP as a “truly serious political party on the threshold of a 
dramatic advance,” and suggested many New Democrats had been “diverted from the 
essential chore of reasonable policies reasonably conveyed” by concentrating too heavily 
on basic organizational tasks, allowing party policy to be dominated by the radical left.  
Without mentioning the Waffle directly, Lewis took issue with two of its most prominent 
policies: support for Quebec’s right to self-determination, and large-scale 
nationalization.35  Lewis explained that part of the motivation behind his speech was to 
express concern that the NDP’s opponents were benefitting from the Waffle’s vocal 
promotion of policies unpopular with many English Canadians, concluding “it’s the kind 
of issue that Bob Nixon has already played by linking the party to Quebec separatism.”36  
Lewis himself endorsed a flexible federalism and insisted the right to self-determination 
already existed, but argued it was “perverse” and “presumptuous” to continually focus on 
Quebec’s right to self-determination as the Waffle was doing.  Lewis reminded the 
council of Desmond Morton’s contention that the NDP had “nothing to gain save our 
permanent and well-deserved oblivion” by adopting such a platform.37  Despite the 
prominence he gave in the speech to warnings about foreign ownership of the Canadian 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 161. 
35 Statement by Stephen Lewis to the NDP Provincial Council Meeting, Sunday, February 21, 1971, Box 
2009-047/001, File 7 Waffle - History, see "manifesto" for first drafts, 1969-1972 (2 of 2), Giles Endicott 
fonds, YUA.  Lewis also got in a few good shots at the new PC Premier, William Davis, commenting “we 
have entered an era of discursive circumlocution.  If the point can be obscured, it will be obscured.  If the 
core can be missed, it will be missed.  Bill Davis would never say fuddle-duddle in the Legislature.  It’s not 
that he’s too refined, it’s just that he’s too loquacious.” 
36 John Zaritsky, “Lewis takes aim at ‘false’ policies of Waffle Group,” Globe and Mail, February 20, 
1971. Robert Nixon was the leader of the Ontario Liberal Party from 1967 to 1976. 
37 Statement by Stephen Lewis to the NDP Provincial Council Meeting, Sunday, February 21, 1971, Box 
2009-047/001, File 7 Waffle - History, see "manifesto" for first drafts, 1969-1972 (2 of 2), Giles Endicott 
fonds, YUA.   
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economy, Lewis objected strenuously to “advocating a peculiarly sterile and sectarian 
view of nationalization as the answer” to foreign domination.38   
Waffler Gordon Cleveland responded to Lewis’s attacks by suggesting a 
confrontation between the Waffle and the Ontario NDP leadership was “inevitable.”39  
Laxer hinted that Stephen Lewis’s criticisms were on behalf of his father’s leadership bid, 
commenting “I think they should only attack one at a time so I can be there to defend 
myself,” and insisted Stephen Lewis had misrepresented the Waffle’s position on 
Quebec.40  Meanwhile, both Harney and Broadbent adopted positions on Quebec similar 
to the Waffle’s by recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination.  Broadbent promised 
a renewed federalism, and Harney decried the presence of separatists within the Waffle, 
but both were at odds with David Lewis who believed acknowledging Quebec’s right to 
self-determination only encouraged provincial separatists.41 
The Waffle’s strategy for the leadership campaign was to promote Laxer as a 
“socialist alternative” and emphasize the Waffle’s major policy divergences from Lewis 
and other NDP moderates, including their difference over Quebec’s autonomy.  In 
announcing Laxer’s acclamation as their candidate, the Waffle national steering 
committee solicited resolutions from its various provincial groups on an array of topics 
including labour, energy resources, economic development, the petrochemical industry, 
pollution, women’s liberation, foreign ownership, education, poverty and 
                                                        
38 Ibid. 
39 John Zaritsky “Showdown with Lewis ‘inevitable’ Waffler states,” Globe and Mail, February 22, 1971. 
40 John Zaritsky, “Laxer says Waffle stand misrepresented, charges Stephen Lewis with interference,” 
Globe and Mail, February 24, 1971. 
41 John Zaritsky, “Quebec stand similar to Waffle’s: Harney,” Globe and Mail, February 25, 1971; Donald 
Newman, “Attacks Waffle stand: Lewis defends right of Quebec to secede,” Globe and Mail, March 25, 
1971; Steed, Ed Broadbent, 162. 
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unemployment.42  The Saskatchewan Waffle, for example, developed the group’s 
agricultural policy including commitments to a land bank and the nationalization of the 
farm implement industry.43 
In preparation for the convention, the Waffle steering committee distributed to 
riding associations, affiliated union locals, and youth clubs a thirty-page booklet of 
resolutions that represented its “most expensive piece of campaign literature” to support 
Laxer’s leadership bid.44  Although Harold Steves (Vancouver), Ken Novakowski 
(Edmonton) and Bruce Archibald (Halifax) joined the ten members on the campaign 
committee elected at the Waffle’s national conference the previous summer, most of the 
organizational work was performed by a small coordinating committee based in Kingston 
and Toronto.45  Krista Maeots prepared a tabloid-style leaflet introducing Laxer and the 
Waffle to convention delegates which emphasized the importance of “public ownership 
of large corporations in key sectors of the economy,” and presented a strong feminist 
position in the section on “Women and Socialism.”46 
Laxer’s campaign was supported by youth sections of the NDP as well as 
provincial Waffle groups, the latter providing an existing organizational and fundraising 
network.47  Wafflers in Saskatchewan, Ontario, Manitoba and New Brunswick all 
reported success in recruiting and electing pro-Laxer delegates to attend the April 1971 
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43 Borch, “The Rise and Decline of the Saskatchewan Waffle, 1966-1973,” MA Thesis, 87.  
44 For an Independent Socialist Canada: Resolutions, April 1971, File 446-7, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC; 
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46 James Laxer for NDP National Leader pamphlet, April 1971, File 446-7, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC. 
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13-14, 1971, File 1-5 BC Young New Democrats Minutes, Provincial, New Democratic Party of British 
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convention in Ottawa.48  In addition, the Waffle nominated Saskatchewan activist Carol 
Gudmunson for party president in an effort to win support from uncommitted female and 
western Canadian delegates for the group and, in turn, Laxer.49  The Waffle’s success at 
organizing in riding associations, often where little NDP support previously existed, 
caused party moderates to worry that the group might appear larger and more influential 
than was the case.50  Harney supporter Desmond Morton later criticized what he viewed 
as a Waffle strategy of attempting to secure delegates and policy endorsements at thinly-
attended riding association meetings by staging long and tedious debates that exhausted 
and drove away less committed party members.  Morton recalled his own response to 
Waffle tactics was to co-found with Ontario NDP research director Marion Bryden the 
group NDP Now: 
It rapidly became the concern of a group of moderates, based on the party’s 
federal council, who decided that in the Ottawa convention the Waffle would not 
win by default… Launched a few months before the convention, the NDP Now 
group, like the Waffle in 1969, was no more than a cadre of like-minded people in 
search of wider support.51 
 
Much of NDP Now’s support came from the unusually large bloc of union delegates at 
the convention.52  The CLC had established a steering committee of key union leaders to 
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51 Morton, The NDP: The Dream of Power, 125. 
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coordinate labour’s role at the convention, and in particular to oppose Waffle policy 
positions.53  Lynn Williams, an USWA official, acted as liaison between the CLC 
steering committee and NDP Now.54  Unlike the 1970 Ontario NDP convention when 
Dennis McDermott and the UAW were prominent supporters of Stephen Lewis, in 1971 
Autoworker delegates were divided over whom among the leadership aspirants to 
endorse.  Therefore the Steelworkers took the lead in organizing opposition to the 
Waffle.55  Speaking at a USWA conference in Hamilton, Morton attacked the Waffle and 
alleged it contributed nothing to the NDP “that is not archaic, opportunistic or irrelevant” 
and added that “indulging youth, as the NDP regularly does, may be emotionally 
satisfying but it is politically stupid if it turns off hard-working, sensible people with 
mortgages.”56  For its part, the Waffle’s steering committee acknowledged NDP Now’s 
success in electing anti-Waffle delegates at riding association meetings across Toronto 
ahead of the convention.57 
Despite the efforts of NDP Now and the other four leadership campaigns, the 
Waffle steering committee operated on the premise that many delegates would arrive at 
the convention still undecided about their choice for leader.  The committee ensured that 
Wafflers were spread among the various Ottawa hotels hosting provincial delegations in 
order to canvass and record delegate information, including their first and second choices 
for leader, and their positions on issues such as Quebec’s self-determination and natural 
resource development.  With this detailed data in hand, Wafflers could more effectively 
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54 “NDP ‘unity’ group is out to crush party’s Wafflers,” Toronto Star, April 21, 1971. 
55 Wilfred List, “How labor outmaneuvered the Waffle” Globe and Mail, April 24, 1971. 
56 Desmond Morton, “The Waffle Within the ONDP,” Speech at USWA Political Conference, Hamilton, 
February 28, 1971. 446-16, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC. 
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File 5, Kim Malcolmson and Paul Barber fonds, YUA. 
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appeal to delegates in the later rounds of voting.58  The Waffle steering committee 
estimated at the beginning of the convention that 426 delegates, or twenty-three to 
twenty-five percent of the total, would support Laxer on the first ballot, putting him in 
second place behind David Lewis.59  It expected most of the youth and Quebec delegates 
and one-third of the Saskatchewan and British Columbia delegations were committed to 
Laxer.  Yet anticipated support from Ontario lagged.  Despite the emergence of Waffle 
groups in Windsor, London, Hamilton, St. Catharines and Welland that backed Laxer, 
and hopes for strong second-ballot support from northern Ontario, it was clear that NDP 
Now had limited the Waffle’s ability to attract Toronto-area delegates.60 
In addition to promoting anti-Waffle candidates at riding association delegate 
selection meetings, Morton produced a pamphlet criticizing the “Americanization of the 
Canadian left” and calling on delegates to reject Waffle positions.61  Ontario NDP 
president Gordon Brigden assisted Morton’s efforts by securing prominent endorsements 
for the pamphlet.  Brigden wrote to Manitoba cabinet minister Howard Pawley, for 
example, explaining that “a number of NDPers are concerned that we have positive 
policies for the forthcoming federal convention rather than go to the convention and swat 
down ideas we don’t like.”62  Marc Eliesen, the federal party’s research director and NDP 
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Now member, wrote to Lewis in an effort to ensure the convention schedule favoured 
their supporters: 
I suggest we attempt to seek Federal Council approval for the position that votes 
on resolution matters be taken at certain times during or at the end of the day.  
Because of the hardcore dedication of the Waffle group, it is imperative that the 
anti-Waffle forces be there at all times when votes are taken on important policy 
matters.  A large number of labour delegates do not participate in these policy 
matters and are therefore very difficult to round up for the final votes.63 
 
NDP Now successfully challenged the Waffle for positions on the party’s crucial 
Resolutions Committee, which selected, drafted, and prioritized from among the 
hundreds of submissions by riding associations, affiliated unions and youth groups the 
resolutions for debate at the convention.  With Wafflers making up only a quarter of the 
Resolutions Committee membership, Morton and his allies ensured resolutions that made 
it to the convention floor reflected moderate policies.64  As a result, during debates on the 
convention floor the Waffle was forced to refer resolutions back to the committee with 
specific instructions to re-draft the policy.65  This approach signaled to NDP Now and 
their union allies that all motions to refer must be defeated.66  Indeed, some delegates 
received written instructions from USWA official Bob Mackenzie to “push through – 
defeat those marked Waffle.”67  But not all union delegates opposed the Waffle.  Harry 
Greenwood, the secretary of USWA Local 1005, stated before the convention that some 
unionists  supported the Waffle, and warned that labour leaders should not automatically 
expect all union delegates to fall into line behind them.  On the other hand, Greenwood 
noted that not all Waffle unionists necessarily supported Laxer for leader; four of the 
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eleven delegates from Local 1005 for instance, backed Laxer, but Greenwood favoured 
Broadbent.68 
 Divergent and strongly-held opposing ideological visions for the NDP resulted in 
a highly polarized convention.  Liz Valleau, a Toronto NDP activist and former 
neighbour of Broadbent’s, recalled “I can’t describe how horrible that convention was… 
There was intense bitterness among the candidates, dirty dealings, backstabbing and a 
sort of psychological violence to it.”69  She added “the back-stabbing got to me.  I hated 
the way the Lewis faction treated the Waffle.  I felt the party wasn’t open to new ideas, 
and I’ve never felt the same about the NDP since.”70  Terry Grier, a former federal NDP 
secretary, faced the ire of Wafflers at the convention and remembered being 
hissed and booed by hordes of young people who hadn’t been anywhere in sight 
two years earlier and weren’t in sight two years later.  I wasn’t elderly then – I 
was only thirty-five – and I was really turned off by them.  I had joined the party 
at their age and I had stuck with it, working to build it.  I was getting ready to run 
in ’72 and was worried that relationships with my own constituents would be 
poisoned by their shenanigans.71 
 
An early indication of the convention’s polarization was the debate on gender 
parity for the party’s federal council.  On the first day of the convention, Krista Maeots 
presented a resolution requiring twelve of the twenty-four federal council positions 
elected at the convention be held by women.  Maeots argued “discrimination does exist in 
the politics of this country and in the politics of this party,” a view that would be 
reinforced for women’s liberationists over the coming days.72  The debate on Maeots’s 
resolution, chaired by former Ontario MLA and longtime USWA and NDP official 
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Eamon Park, was cut off before the time allotted had expired, bringing cries of “Seig 
heil” from frustrated feminists.  Although Harney spoke in favour of gender parity, the 
remaining four speakers opposed the resolution.  Mary Eady, the party treasurer, insisted 
the resolution represented “an unwise step backward by replacing discrimination with 
tokenism.”73  After the convention, Varda Burstyn described the result: “the parity 
resolution was not merely defeated or rejected – it was railroaded.”74  On the final day of 
the convention, the Resolutions Committee introduced its policy statement on women’s 
issues, which called for legislation to eliminate discrimination in employment 
opportunities, provide for equal pay and paid maternity leave, and eliminating abortion 
from the Criminal Code.75  The document’s conservatism appalled women’s liberationists 
who decried it as totally inadequate.  Waffler Kelly Crichton attacked it as an insult to 
women that would leave the NDP far behind the Liberals on support for women’s 
equality.76  An attempt to refer the document back to committee for revision including a 
commitment to hold a national conference of NDP women was defeated.77 
Policy defeats were not the only source of frustration for women’s liberationists at 
the convention.  Many delegates were visibly uninterested during the debate on women’s 
issues; union delegates and male Wafflers alike read newspapers and chatted amongst 
themselves throughout.78  Varda Burstyn recalled being heckled and insulted as she 
waited in line for a microphone, being told “go back to the kitchen where you belong,” 
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“you have to get married to join the union,” and “what you really need is a good fuck.”79  
The referral motion on the women’s resolution was defeated to the tune of “Solidarity 
Forever” sung by satisfied union delegates.  Despite the party prominently advertising its 
daycare provisions for the children of delegates, the facilities were only open from 2:00 
to 5:00 p.m..  Women’s liberationists were disgusted by an advertisement for a topless 
nightclub in the convention brochure.  Yvonne Trower summarized the feelings of many 
when she lamented, “this party is prepared to see women, not as policy makers, but as 
playmates.”80 
The Waffle fared little better in the debate over foreign policy held on the second 
day of the convention.  The catchall resolution produced by the Resolutions Committee 
called for revisions to Canada’s approach to foreign aid and trade, including increasing 
Canada’s foreign aid to one percent of the gross national product, less than the two 
percent called for at the 1969 Convention.81  Rejecting Wafflers’ criticisms that the 
resolution was too weak, Don Montgomery, Toronto-area director for the USWA, 
compared them to “a bunch of clerics debating how many angels could stand on the head 
of a pin.”82  Michael Cross, a commentator sympathetic to the Waffle, argued 
“imperialism was ignored, aid for national liberation movements in Africa was ducked, 
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Canadian defence polices and alliances were not discussed.”  Waffler Jackie Larkin 
dismissed it as “a liberal resolution.”83 
After two days of continuous policy defeats, the Waffle geared up for the critical 
third day of the convention in anticipation of the elections of party officers and the 
debates to determine the NDP’s stance on natural resources and Quebec.  But 
disappointment followed on all fronts.  Despite its related success at the Ontario NDP 
convention only a few months earlier, the Waffle was rebuffed in its attempt to refer the 
proposed policy on natural resources back to committee for consideration of its position 
on widespread nationalization.84  Instead, the convention passed a resolution calling for 
increased public control over Canada’s resource industries via several methods, including 
public ownership and joint participation with private corporations.85  Broadbent argued 
this was a retreat from existing party policy and attempted to introduce an amendment to 
the resolution calling for nationalization of all aspects of the oil and gas industries, but 
the vote was taken before he was recognized by the chair.86  Laxer, who had avoided 
involvement in the early policy debates, spoke in favour of the Waffle position, but his 
speech was criticized by Art Kube, a CLC director and former Steelworker, who “drew 
angry shouts and applause with an attack on the academics in the Waffle faction.”  
According to Wilfrid List, a reporter covering the convention for the Globe and Mail, 
Kube was furious, claiming “I’m sick and tired of those people in Kingston, led by Laxer.  
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It’s time we had people who did some work rather than professors who write 
resolutions… No one has refused to join the NDP because we’re not radical enough.”87   
The Waffle’s referral motion was defeated, and the resolution passed by a three-to-one 
margin. 
After an unsuccessful attempt at crafting a compromise policy on Quebec, the 
Resolutions Committee presented a resolution expressing a clear commitment to 
federalism, with the only concession to Quebec nationalism being acknowledgement that 
Canada should not be kept together by force.88  Both the Waffle and the Quebec delegates 
attempted to refer the resolution back to the committee with instruction to include the 
policy recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination adopted at the provincial NDP 
meeting in Montreal two months earlier.  Raymond Laliberté, Jim Laxer, Mel Watkins, 
Robert Cliche and Laurier LaPierre all spoke in favour of referral and 
“autodetermination,” while the other leadership hopefuls David Lewis, Harney, and 
Howard all spoke against.89  Desmond Morton argued that supporting self-determination 
would ruin the NDP’s electoral ambitions in English Canada.  Murray Cotterill, director 
of public relations for the USWA, denounced “bloody academic labels” and warned 
Quebec independence would divide bargaining teams, cripple workers’ negotiating 
power, and harm organized labour.90  Broadbent’s attempt at a compromise by 
strengthening the resolution’s wording in support of Quebec’s right to self-determination 
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while retaining the party’s commitment to federalism, was rejected by both sides.  The 
convention voted 953 to 423 to reject the referral motion and endorse the strictly 
federalist policy.  After the convention, David Lewis suggested that the resolution left the 
party’s policy on Quebec in the hands of the federal council, and emphasized his own 
support for a federalist solution.91 
The Globe and Mail neatly summarized the alignment of forces that had 
successfully opposed the Waffle at the convention: “labor supplied the muscle in these 
crucial votes but the ideas were developed by the NDP Now group.”92  Union delegates 
had indeed literally “supplied the muscle” on occasion.  After the Waffle motion to refer 
the resource resolution back to committee was defeated in a vote by show of hands, 
Waffler Gilles Teasdale lunged for a microphone to demand a recorded vote.  As the 
Globe and Mail reported the incident: 
He was thrown back from the podium by three trade union delegates acting as 
convention ushers.  When Mr. Teasdale again attempted to climb onto the 
podium, the ushers pushed him back and a fight almost resulted.93 
 
When Steve Penner, chair of the Ontario Waffle, tried to reach a microphone to suggest a 
standing vote, he too was rebuffed by union delegates when Terry Meagher, the 
secretary-treasurer of the OFL, noted Penner was not wearing a delegate badge.  Near 
bedlam ensued as Waffle and trade union delegates “cursed and pushed at each other,” 
Mel Watkins screaming that Meagher was “a fascist” and unionists retorting that Watkins 
was a “commie.”  Stephen Lewis intervened, telling the union delegates to “cool it,” 
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while Watkins urged the Wafflers to calm down and Penner to leave the podium.94  The 
Wafflers were justifiably upset over the actions of some union delegates to the 
convention.  According to Cy Gonick and Jack Warnock, “union muscle intimidation was 
let loose throughout the convention floor.”  They described the scene: 
A Manitoba cabinet minister who, in the final ballot, was refusing to wear a Lewis 
button was surrounded by representatives of the Manitoba steelworkers and told, 
“You vote for Laxer and we’ll fix you.”  He didn’t buckle, and that little exchange 
cost David a few more votes.  A union man who put on a Laxer button was 
grabbed by three others, pressed against a wall and threatened if he didn‘t remove 
the button.  One of us was grabbed and threatened by a union delegate for 
cheering one of the Waffle’s few procedural victories.95 
 
 The Waffle had also resolved to challenge the “administration slate” of candidates 
for party offices by nominating its own members for various positions.96  However, as 
with its policy setbacks, the group experienced several defeats with the result that fewer 
Waffle supporters were elected to important party posts in 1971 than had been two years 
earlier.  Former Ontario NDP leader Donald MacDonald defeated Waffler Carol 
Gudmundson for the party presidency by 885 votes to 565; Mary Eady was re-elected 
party treasurer over Waffler Sheila Kuziak by 897 votes to 497; and Roland Morin was 
re-elected associate president over Waffle-backed Marc Boulard by 807 votes to 680.97  
Carol Gudmundson was the only Waffler to be elected to one of the NDP’s seven vice-
president positions when Mel Watkins lost his bid for re-election.  Gonick and Watkins 
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were the only two Wafflers elected to the twenty member-at-large spots on the federal 
council.   In the convention’s highly polarized atmosphere, Sidney Green, a Manitoba 
cabinet minister, was left off the party establishment’s slate for re-election as a vice-
president.  Although Green was not a Waffle supporter per se, he attributed his rebuff by 
“the establishment group” to the fact they “were not satisfied with me, because I did not 
share their obsession” with the Waffle.98  Despite the electoral defeats, the Wafflers were 
buoyed by the results.  Many of their candidates had received over 400 votes, a promising 
harbinger it was believed for Laxer in the election for party leader to be held the next day. 
 Laxer’s speech to the convention emphasized how the Waffle’s vision for Canada 
and the NDP differed from his rivals.  Key defining tenets were “public ownership is 
central to any notion of building an independent Canada,” and the need to transform the 
NDP so its influence extended beyond Parliament Hill and periodic election campaigns.  
Laxer reminded delegates of the Waffle’s link to the broader New Left when he criticized 
“an educational system that is nothing more than a glorified babysitting service for 
society and nothing more than a training ground for the corporations in this country,” and 
held up the women’s liberation movement and the youth movement against 
authoritarianism as essential vehicles of social transformation. He reminded New 
Democrats that adopting radical policies without a basis in people’s movements was not 
sufficient to avoid “the trap of coming to office but the people not coming to power”.99   
While David Lewis was widely favoured to win the party leadership, an equally 
important question was how much support Laxer and the Waffle would draw.  An article 
in the left-wing publication The Last Post suggested some Lewis supporters planned to 
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back Harney on the first ballot in an effort to deny Laxer second place.  But as one party 
official explained, “it’s very tough to rig a ballot… you might subtract too many votes 
from Lewis or not give Harney enough.  So it’s going to be very very tough.”100  Publicly 
Lewis supporters predicted their man would have forty percent of the vote after the first 
ballot with Laxer in second place at twenty percent, but then Lewis would triumph on the 
second ballot by drawing the remaining anti-Waffle delegates into his camp.101   
Lewis did indeed lead from the first ballot, but he saw his support grow 
agonizingly slowly over the next two ballots.  Laxer finished second, ahead of Harney, 
and Broadbent came in fourth, although with less support than anticipated.  Howard 
received more votes than expected, but finished last on the ballot and was required to 
withdraw from the race.  When Broadbent again finished fourth on the second ballot and 
was eliminated, his supporters mostly split between Laxer and Harney on the third ballot, 
which Lewis continued to lead.  With Broadbent out of the running, Waffle supporters 
led by Watkins pushed into the Broadbent section of the convention hall offering 
delegates Laxer buttons.  As Wafflers Cy Gonick and John Warnock later recalled, “as 
soon as Broadbent dropped, they literally rushed to take up Laxer buttons, and for the 
first time in the past six months they felt politically comfortable.”102 
When Harney was removed from the third ballot, MPs and Lewis supporters Max 
Saltsman and Andrew Brewin pressured him to declare for their candidate.  Badgered by 
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CBC reporters eager for a story, Harney sat silently and refused to commit.103  Terry 
Grier, Desmond Morton, John Brewin and Donald MacDonald, all key Harney supporters 
and determined to defeat Laxer, donned Lewis buttons and encouraged others to do 
likewise.  Lewis finally prevailed over Laxer on the fourth ballot, by a vote of 1046 to 
612.104  While his supporters chanted “Power to the people,” Laxer moved the obligatory 
motion that Lewis’s election be declared unanimous and exhorted the party to “get 
together in the 1972 election.”105  Desmond Morton, writing of the event two years later, 
described the leadership vote as “a shabby triumph for a veteran who deserved better 
from his party.”106  Gerald Caplan described the Lewis victory celebration at the Château 
Laurier hotel as “one of the worst celebrations I’ve ever been at.  It was like a wake… 
I’ve never been to a place at which the winner felt so much like a victim.”107 
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Federal NDP Leadership Election – April 24, 1971 
First Ballot  Second Ballot  Third Ballot  Fourth Ballot 
Lewis  661 Lewis  715 Lewis  742 Lewis  1046 
Laxer  378 Laxer  407 Laxer  508 Laxer  612 
Harney 299 Harney 347 Harney 431 
Broadbent 236 Broadbent 223 
Howard 124 
Total  1,698 Total  1,692 Total  1,681 Total  1,658 
 
Leading Wafflers, despite the group’s various policy and leadership defeats, 
nevertheless expressed satisfaction over the convention’s outcome in general.  Laxer 
considered his second-place showing for the party leadership to be a great victory, 
making it “impossible for the left ever again to be ignored by the NDP.”108  Mel Watkins 
described the race for party leader as one of the greatest days of his life, and proclaimed 
the Waffle was ensconced within the NDP while continuing to function as a distinct 
movement.109  Laxer and Watkins both interpreted the increasingly polarized NDP on 
display at the Ottawa convention as evidence of growth in support for the Waffle since 
1969 when it was still a largely unknown entity to many in the party.  Lewis, in his 
leadership acceptance speech to the convention, commented “I look forward to working 
with Jim Laxer and his friends.  There is no difference of purpose in this party.”110  But 
during the press conference that followed he was unequivocal and uncompromising in his 
stance on the Waffle, describing it as an “organization of its own” and pledging he would 
focus on NDP policy, not the Waffle.  When asked for his reaction if the Waffle 
continued organizing the workers and the oppressed, Lewis replied “Well, if they do 
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organize the workers and the oppressed I would be a great deal happier.  So far they’ve 
organized the students and the oppressing.”111 
 At the same time as the Waffle was capturing national media attention for shaking 
up the federal NDP at its convention and beyond, Wafflers were playing critical roles 
during 1971 in the Saskatchewan and Ontario provincial elections and the New 
Brunswick NDP convention.  Saskatchewan Wafflers comprised the second largest group 
within the movement overall, and the election there represented an opportunity for 
incorporating Waffle ideas into an NDP campaign for winning back a province where the 
CCF/NDP had a strong presence historically, but currently had a Liberal government. 
 Saskatchewan Premier Ross Thatcher appeared confident when he announced a 
provincial election for late May 1971.112  Believing rebounding grain sales and the 
promise of a federal grain stabilization program subsidy for farmers would offset the 
unpopularity of the federal Liberals’ Operation LIFT (Lower Inventories For Tomorrow), 
Thatcher was also buoyed by apparent divisions amongst his political opponents.113  An 
attempted merger between the Social Credit and Progressive Conservative parties that 
ended in acrimony had undermined an effective challenge to the Liberals from the right, 
and news reports that the Waffle had split with the NDP in early 1971, although 
erroneous, initially reassured Thatcher that the left too was in disarray.114  Nevertheless, 
signs of voter disenchantment with Thatcher’s government existed.  In addition to 
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plunging grain sales troubling Saskatchewan farmers in 1969 and 1970, the Thatcher 
government had battled with students over university autonomy, introduced unpopular 
user fees for hospitals and medical care programs, and consolidated schools against local 
opposition.  Furthermore, the Liberal government was known to have blatantly 
gerrymandered electoral districts to its own advantage.115 
 The Liberal campaign, with its two-fold focus promising legislation prohibiting 
strikes and a commitment to economic development and diversification by opening more 
mines and mills backfired.  The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour responded to the 
anti-strike pledge by extensively supporting the NDP campaign.  And the announcement 
of more pulp mills, which many assumed would be American owned, angered opponents 
of foreign ownership and industrial pollution.116  In the span of four years the Thatcher 
government had antagonized students, farmers, teachers and the labour movement.  As 
Waffler Don Kossick recalled, “there was a really important coalition politics that was 
developing in the late 60s and helped the NDP get elected in ’71.”117   
 To counter the Liberals, the NDP platform a New Deal for People promised free 
collective bargaining, a Land Bank Commission and land-lease program to protect family 
farms, a commitment to challenge unhelpful federal government agricultural policies, and 
implementation of a fairer tax system.  The NDP also took aim at the Liberals’ record of 
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promoting economic development by subsidizing American investors.  It promised to 
cancel construction of the Meadow Lake pulp mill project Thatcher announced early in 
the campaign, and to “stop sellouts to foreign promoters… develop resources for the 
benefit of all and… protect our environment from pollution.”118 
 The Waffle’s influence was clearly evident in the Saskatchewan NDP’s electoral 
platform.  As an editorial in the Regina Leader-Post noted, the NDP platform “has a lot 
of Waffle in it.”119  In addition to criticizing the extent of foreign ownership of the major 
provincial resource industries and the unfavourable – to the public – terms on which new 
mines and mills relied, the platform promised an NDP government would “consider [the] 
feasibility of bringing the potash industry under public ownership,” which was a major 
Waffle demand.120  David McGrane, a political scientist, has pointed out that the platform 
contained ideas also found in the Saskatchewan Waffle Manifesto, including a 
commitment to eliminating “all sexual discrimination.”  A New Deal for People pledged 
to enact a new Human Rights Code that prohibited sexual discrimination in hiring and the 
workplace and ensured pregnancy leave entitlements.121   
Both the Saskatchewan Waffle Manifesto and the New Deal for People also 
promoted creation of a government-run land bank to lease land to farmers unable to buy 
their own.122  The NDP had adopted a modified version of the land bank at its 1970 
convention, and gone to great lengths to demonstrate its support for private property and 
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the family farm.  Regardless, its more conservatively-oriented critics such as David 
Steuart, the Liberal Minister of Finance, attacked the NDP program as communistic, and 
likened the Waffle to the humourless “Red Guard.”123  Perhaps fearing such criticisms, 
Allan Blakeney ensured his party’s provincial council included an option-to-purchase 
clause in the land bank plank of its election platform.124  A New Deal for People 
explained that the Land Bank Commission would “purchase land offered voluntarily on 
the market at competitive prices and lease this land, guaranteeing tenure, on the basis of 
need, with option to buy, with the objective of promoting the maximum number of family 
farms in Saskatchewan.”125  The Regina Leader-Post predicted “the farm vote is expected 
to tell the story” as both parties wooed Saskatchewan’s farmers.  Blakeney presented his 
NDP and its proposals for a land bank and curbs on foreign ownership as the “saviours of 
the family farm.”126  Ross Thatcher countered that “our program is just the opposite” of 
the land bank proposal.  “We have sold more than one million acres of Crown land back 
to the farmers and we will continue to do so.”127  Thatcher’s Liberals remained highly 
critical of Waffle influence over NDP policies throughout the campaign, contrasting the 
benefits of free enterprise with the dangers of socialism.128 
The Waffle made a conscious effort to minimize its conflicts with the party 
leadership in the weeks leading up to the provincial election.  Antagonisms between 
radicals and moderates in Moose Jaw, where MP John Skoberg openly sympathized with 
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the Waffle, threatened to spill over into the rest of the province.129  In the aftermath of the 
bitter nomination battle won by Gordon Snyder over Waffler John Conway to succeed 
William Davies in the riding of Moose Jaw South in April 1970, Conway and other 
Wafflers took over Moose Jaw’s leftist municipal group, the Civic Reform Association, 
prompting the city’s two-term mayor L.H. “Scoop” Lewry, a former CCF MP, along with 
four other moderate candidates to leave the group.130  Running as an independent in 
Moose Jaw’s December 1970 municipal election, Lewry was defeated by former 
Conservative MP J. Ernest Pascoe.131  Blakeney explained to Waffler John Richards that 
The situation in Moose Jaw is very, very prickly.  A couple of weeks ago I spent a 
long evening with Snyder, Davies and Skoberg trying to pour oil on troubled 
waters.  As a result a letter went out to the membership in Moose Jaw signed by 
all three which was (I hope) a delicate call for unity.  As you may know some of 
the Snyder group (if I may use that term) are feeling less than cordial to John 
Skoberg and less than cordial to Don Mitchell and John Conway.132 
 
Blakeney admitted he was “concerned about Waffle” and “hesitated to make any public 
statements on Waffle since that is clearly to rise to Thatcher’s bait.”  He did promise to 
be conciliatory in the press and emphasized the importance of party unity heading into 
the provincial election.133  For its part, as Richards explained to Blakeney, the Waffle 
“wisely decided to adopt a ‘low profile’ until the election is over.”134 
Privately, however, the NDP leadership was concerned that internal divisions 
might hinder the party’s electoral fortunes.  Clifford Scotton, the federal party’s 
secretary, predicted the NDP eking out a bare majority winning thirty-two of the 
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legislature’s sixty seats.135  Ontario NDP provincial secretary Gordon Brigden reiterated 
the party’s concerns about Liberal gerrymandering while also recognizing that “the party 
is split, thanks to the Waffle and Thatcher is exploiting this” alongside anti-union 
rhetoric.136  For some Ontario party leaders already concerned about the Waffle the 
Saskatchewan group appeared to loom larger than life.  USWA staffer, party organizer 
and Waffle opponent Bob Mackenzie wrote to Brigden to complain about being sent to 
the riding of Elrose for the election, which he claimed was the “centre of Saskatchewan 
Waffle” in addition to being large, rural and featuring a poorly organized campaign 
marred further by suspicions of the party’s Provincial Office.137  Mackenzie added that 
the Provincial Office was in complete chaos and suggested that they need to “get rid of 
some of the unreasonable and unsupported optimism.”  He concluded “I would not dare 
report all this to Sefton.”138  As it turned out, NDP candidate and Eston machinery dealer 
Hayden Owens, who demonstrated no discernible interest in the Waffle, defeated the 
Liberal incumbent in Elrose. 
The Saskatchewan Waffle was active in the election campaign, especially in 
supporting two candidates, Walter Smishek and John Richards.  Smishek, the NDP MLA 
for Regina North East, earned his reputation as a leftist in 1961 when, as the provincial 
government structured Saskatchewan’s medicare system, he strongly opposed the 
introduction of premiums and patient deterrent fees, and argued that doctors should be 
salaried rather than allowed to work on a fee-for-service basis.  Smishek had spoken 
                                                        
135 “Both New Democrats, Liberals shocked by NDP’s Saskatchewan sweep,” Globe and Mail, June 25, 
1971. 
136 Gordon Brigden to Don Stevenson, June 17, 1971, Series 20 File, File 118 Brigden, Gordon, 1970-73, 
New Democratic Party of Ontario fonds, QUA. 
137 Bob Mackenzie to Gordon Brigden, June 5, 1971, Series 20 File, File 567 Mackenzie, Bob, 1970-73, 
New Democratic Party of Ontario fonds, QUA. 
138 Ibid. Larry Sefton was the USWA Director in District 6 (Canada). 
  264 
favourably of the Waffle Manifesto during the party’s 1969 convention.  The Waffle also 
actively supported the campaign of Richards, a twenty-six-year-old professor of political 
economy at the University of Saskatchewan who was contesting the riding of Saskatoon-
University.  Active in the campus NDP as an undergraduate, Richards went on to do 
graduate work in economics at the University of Cambridge in England and Washington 
University in St. Louis, Missouri.  When planning his return to Saskatchewan, Richards 
decided to seek an NDP nomination and wrote to party activists in the province 
requesting their support.  At that point still unaware of the Waffle, Richards expressed his 
belief that Canadians “must try to diminish greatly our dependence – economic, political, 
and social – on America,” and he blamed American ownership, at least in part, “for the 
present chaotic conditions in potash communities.”139 
After he won the NDP nomination in September 1970 and publicly identified 
himself with the Waffle, Richards unwittingly became the focus of controversy and 
student protests on the University of Saskatchewan campus when his one-year teaching 
contract with the Department of Economics and Political Science was not renewed in 
1971.  Two weeks of student occupations of the university’s arts building turned 
Richards’s case into a cause célèbre, with the student union council, the Saskatchewan 
Waffle and the Saskatchewan NDP Youth all endorsing the protesters.140  Richards’s 
supporters suggested that his Waffle sympathies and NDP candidacy were behind the 
non-renewal decision, but Leo Kristjanson, who was the department head and also a New 
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Democrat, denied the claims.141  The real reason was opposition from economists in the 
department who disapproved of Richards’s political economy course.142 
It is possible the controversy contributed to Richards’s election victory, or 
perhaps he simply was propelled along as the NDP swept into power under Blakeney’s 
leadership, capturing forty-five of sixty seats, including thirty-two of the province’s 
forty-three rural ridings, and fifty-five per cent of the popular vote.  Despite his PC 
opponent Peter Russell’s criticisms of Richards’s inappropriate language and Waffle 
“extremism,” the NDP triumphed in the newly created Saskatoon-University riding by a 
margin of over 1000 votes.143  Commentators at the time attributed the massive and 
surprising swing to the NDP across Saskatchewan to the unpopularity of the federal 
Liberals’ agricultural policies, dissatisfaction over the Thatcher Liberals’ two tumultuous 
terms in government, distrust of foreign investment, concerns over industrial pollution, 
and the NDP’s modernized and active canvassing operation.144  Although historians of 
the NDP have largely ignored the appeal of the Saskatchewan NDP’s platform when 
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explaining the 1971 election victory, Thatcher’s biographer Dale Eisler described New 
Deal for People as a “masterstroke.”145 
 While Saskatchewan Wafflers granted that the unpopularity of both Thatcher’s 
government and the federal Liberals significantly influenced the election results, they 
also emphasized the contributions of extra-parliamentary “constituent groups.”  
According to Waffler John Gallagher, the NFU, the SFL, the Saskatchewan Teachers 
Federation (STF), and various environmental groups all vociferously opposed Thatcher’s 
Liberals thereby enabling the NDP to benefit “from a sentiment it did not generate.”146  
Don Mitchell, formerly a Waffle leadership candidate, agreed that the organized 
opposition of labour, farmers and teachers was significant to the NDP’s success, but also 
suggested “the left revival in the NDP made the party more credible.”147  Saskatchewan 
Wafflers were pleased that Walter Smishek was appointed minister of health in 
Blakeney’s cabinet and John Richards named his legislative secretary.  Still, the Waffle 
harboured uncertainties about the new government.  Specifically, John Gallagher noted 
“some serious ideological differences” remained between left and right wings of the 
caucus, and predicted only moderate reforms would be implemented under the Blakeney 
NDP.148 
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 Nearly two years after its formation the Waffle’s relationship with the NDP had 
been strained but not broken.  The federal NDP leadership race exposed significant policy 
divisions between the Waffle and moderate New Democrats over Quebec’s right to self-
determination, women’s liberation and gender parity on the party executive and council, 
and widespread nationalization of resource industries.  The creation of an organized 
opposition to the Waffle in the form of the NDP Now group, with its union allies, both 
curtailed the Waffle’s policy influence and further polarized the party between radicals 
and moderates.  Yet Laxer’s surprising second-place finish to David Lewis and the 
strength of his final ballot support indicated that the Waffle’s message appealed to a 
significant minority of party members.  Furthermore, the Waffle’s presence did not deter 
voters in Saskatchewan from electing the NDP in that province to a majority government 
in the 1971 election.  Despite struggles with party moderates over nominations and 
policy, the Waffle influenced the Saskatchewan NDP platform and had one of its 
members elected as a MLA.  Overall, circumstances appeared propitious in mid-1971 for 
the Waffle to continue exerting pressure from the NDP’s left wing. 
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Chapter Seven 
“I don’t like to see people get their fingers burned unnecessarily:” Polarization, 
1971-72 
 
The Wafflers’ optimism was soon challenged.  This chapter examines the 
Waffle’s escalating conflict with the NDP leadership throughout the latter half of 1971 
and into 1972, culminating in Stephen Lewis’s Oshawa speech denouncing the group as a 
“party within a party,” thereby setting the stage for its expulsion from the Ontario NDP.  
Canadian economic nationalism was high on the political agenda in 1971, and provincial 
Waffle groups sought to capitalize on the political climate by pushing the NDP to adopt 
policies reflecting the Waffle’s focus on independence and socialism.  The group’s 
distinctive strategy to conduct parallel electoral and extra-parliamentary activism was 
never clearer than during the late summer and fall of 1971.  Wafflers in Ontario 
supported the Texpack strikers while simultaneously fighting a landmark provincial 
election.  In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, they struggled to define their relationship with 
NDP governments, while federally the NDP agonized over its own relationship with the 
Waffle.  But conflicts with the party leadership – over the Trotskyist-dominated New 
Brunswick Waffle, the Waffle’s role in provincial elections in Saskatchewan and Ontario, 
and Waffle supporters within NDP-affiliated unions – intensified to the point where 
union leaders and party moderates were pushing by 1972 to marginalize the Wafflers. 
Canadians fearful of American domination of their nation’s economy were given 
further cause for concern during the summer and autumn of 1971.  President Richard 
Nixon announced his New Economic Policy (NEP) in a speech on August 15, 1971, 
marking a significant shift in American economic and trade policy.  Often referred to as 
the “Nixon Shock,” it has been described as an “epochal event in the history of Canada-
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United States relations” as the Americans made clear Canada would not be exempted 
from protectionist measures.1  Of particular concern to Canadians were the ten percent 
temporary import surcharge, the NEP’s ten percent tax credit for American-made 
machinery and equipment, and the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) that 
allowed American companies to defer paying taxes on at least half of their profits earned 
from exports.  Authored by John Connally, the Nixon administration’s combative 
Secretary of the Treasury, the combined impact of these measures was intended to bolster 
American manufacturing in the face of increasing competition from Western Europe and 
Japan.  But Canada too was in the crosshairs, thereby signaling to many the end to the 
‘special relationship’ Canadians had enjoyed with the U.S. to that point.2  Particularly 
worrisome were documents revealing American objections to the Auto Pact’s 
safeguarding of Canadian economic interests.3  The announcement of America’s 
unilateral termination of the Auto Pact had only been removed from Nixon’s speech at 
the last minute.4  The Nixon Shock led even the reliably pro-business Globe and Mail to 
editorialize “we have lately learned, and are still learning, that Canada’s economic and 
political dependence on the United States is not as easy, secure or undemanding as 
Canadian complacency has tended to assume in the past.”5  Although the United States 
ultimately backed down on changes to the Auto Pact and soon suspended the ten percent 
import surcharge against Canada, the aggressively protectionist stance adopted by Nixon 
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and Connally seriously shook many Canadians’ faith in American economic 
benevolence. 
A leaked federal cabinet report in late 1971 confirming large-scale foreign 
ownership of the Canadian economy further eroded that confidence.  At the request of 
Prime Minister Trudeau, Minister without Portfolio Herb Gray had created a working 
group to study levels of foreign direct investment in Canada.  The Gray Report, submitted 
to cabinet in May 1971 and not intended for public consumption, recommended a 
“screening agency” for direct foreign investment be implemented in particular areas of 
the economy.  After a version of the report was leaked by a government official and 
published in Canadian Forum in November 1971, the Trudeau government released the 
entire report and introduced legislation the following year to create the Foreign 
Investment Review Agency.6 
As fears of American economic domination percolated in the Canadian political 
psyche, conflict within the miniscule New Brunswick NDP boiled over in the fall of 
1971.  The New Brunswick Waffle, which was the dominant presence in two of the 
NDP’s largest riding associations in the province, was confident of attracting even more 
delegates into its camp when the provincial party met in convention in late September.  
But even they were shocked when the New Brunswick Waffle manifesto, which 
contained a stronger critique of capitalism and recommended more extensive socialist 
remedies than even the original Waffle Manifesto, passed at the convention by a vote of 
forty-one to forty.7  Nine labour delegates promptly exited the proceedings in disgust, 
                                                        
6 Azzi, Walter Gordon, 180.  See Herb Gray, prepared by the Editors of the Canadian Forum, A Citizen’s 
Guide to the Gray Report, (Toronto: New Press, 1971) for the leaked version of the Gray Report; Herb 
Gray, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972) 
7 Webber, “‘For a Socialist New Brunswick’,” Acadiensis, 91. 
  271 
joined shortly afterwards by more Waffle opponents, thereby thrusting the convention 
into chaos and a premature adjournment.  At a subsequent meeting of anti-Wafflers, Cliff 
Scotton, the NDP federal secretary, admonished the trade unionists for allowing the New 
Brunswick Waffle manifesto to pass.  By mid-October, Waffle opponents within the New 
Brunswick NDP had scheduled another convention, while the Wafflers reconvened the 
earlier meeting from September and elected one of their own, Pat Callahan, as party 
leader alongside a new executive.  The New Brunswick NDP thus found itself with two 
competing leaders and executives.8 
Meanwhile, the New Brunswick Waffle was itself splitting apart.  Members of the 
Fredericton Young Socialists (FYS), who had founded the province’s Waffle, had not 
attended the September New Brunswick NDP convention since the Toronto-based 
Central Executive Council of the YS had suspended their memberships for failing to heed 
the instructions of Ross Dowson, leader of the LSA, to adopt a more moderate approach 
within the NDP.  Fearful that a confrontation in New Brunswick could lead NDP leaders 
to purge the LSA and the Waffle from the party in the rest of the country, Dowson 
instructed the FYS to intervene in the New Brunswick Waffle in the hopes of avoiding a 
split with the provincial NDP.9  The twists and turns of Trotskyist tactics in New 
Brunswick could have proved a minor embarrassment for the Waffle had these 
maneuvers not been overshadowed by a dramatic series of events much closer to 
Canada’s media centre in Toronto. 
In the fall of 1971, the Ontario Waffle allied with workers represented by Local 
520 of the Canadian Textile and Chemical Union (CTCU) on strike at the Texpack textile 
                                                        
8 Ibid., 95. 
9 Webber, “‘For a Socialist New Brunswick’,” M.A. Thesis, 121-123. 
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plant in Brantford, as discussed in Chapter Five.  The CTCU represented the remnants of 
the Canadian Textile Council of the United Textile Workers of America (UTWA) that 
had split from the parent union when the UTWA expelled the popular organizers and 
leaders of the Council, Kent Rowley and Madeleine Parent, amidst accusations of 
communism.10  The pair continued organizing and representing textile workers in Ontario 
and Quebec through the Canadian Textile Council and Parent eventually joined Rowley 
in Brantford in 1967.11  The CLC continued to perceive them as communists.  Parent had 
assisted the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union in the battles against USWA for the 
Inco and Falconbridge locals in Sudbury in 1961, 1962 and 1965, resulting in 
Steelworker officials portraying her as a red witch atop a broomstick during the bitter 
campaigns.12 
Other unions had also seceded from their international parent unions in the 1960s, 
forming independent Canadian unions as a replacement.  Dissatisfaction with the 
International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, and the harassment 
of two radical unionists from British Columbia by American border guards, led to the 
formation of the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC) in 1963.  The 
Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers (CAIMAW) formed 
in 1964 at Griffin Steel in Winnipeg after seceding from the International Molders and 
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and trans. Andrée Levesque (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2005), 59-70.  Despite rumours that Parent was a 
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trans. Andrée Levesque (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2005), 72. 
  273 
Allied Workers Union.13  Barred from the CLC and recognizing an opportunity, Rowley 
and Parent organized an alternative national labour federation, establishing the Council of 
Canadian Unions (CCU) in July 1969.14  Along with the CTCU the CCU included the 
remnants of Mine-Mill Local 598, which continued to represent workers at Falconbridge 
in Sudbury, CAIMAW and the PPWC.15  The creation of a small, nationalist rival to the 
CLC did not endear Rowley and Parent to the leadership of the labour movement. 
Texpack was owned by the American Hospital Supply Corporation, which had 
begun phasing out manufacturing at Brantford and using the plant as a warehouse for re-
packaging surplus U.S. army bandages labelled “Made in Canada.”  The company paid 
low wages to a workforce eighty percent female.  The union local hoped an improved 
wage and benefit package would force the company to maintain manufacturing 
operations in Brantford.  Strike tensions were exacerbated by the company’s hiring of 
replacement workers and a court injunction restricting picket lines at the plant.  The 
strikers’ frustration occasionally boiled over into violent confrontations with police who 
were protecting buses of scab labour entering the plant.16 
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14 Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement, 102. 
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 The CTCU, which contested on principle the use of court injunctions limiting 
pickets as a means of easing the use of replacement workers, initially received little 
support for the Texpack strike.  The Brantford and District Labour Council waited two 
months before endorsing the strike in August, and did so then only grudgingly, refusing 
to provide financial support because the CTCU was not affiliated with the CLC.17  Worse 
still, the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) conducted a CLC-endorsed raid of 
the CTCU Local at Harding Carpets in Collingwood, claiming the Texpack strike was 
destined to fail.18  Adding insult to injury, the TWUA crossed CTCU picket lines at 
Texpack’s Rexdale plant to sign up replacement workers, and applied to the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board for bargaining rights before the predictable backlash forced them 
to drop the application.19  Texpack workers did receive support, however, from Wafflers 
and dissident unionists at USWA Local 1005 at Stelco in Hamilton and UAW Local 439 
at Brantford’s Massey-Ferguson plant.  By late August the Brantford and District Labour 
Council had eased its earlier reticence and helped to organize a demonstration in aid of 
the striking Texpack workers.  Seven hundred supporters from Brantford and Hamilton 
joined the CTCU in a massive demonstration on August 25 which descended into 
violence; demonstrators broke windows, threatened photographers and destroyed their 
cameras, attacked a police cruiser with rocks, and broke into the plant overturning a 
garbage disposal unit that caught fire.  A small police contingent stood by without 
intervening, less concerned apparently with protecting Texpack property than with 
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avoiding a violent confrontation.20  The next day 300 demonstrators again gathered 
outside Texpack, but this time were dispersed by police in riot gear, a first for 
Brantford.21  One week later, 600 demonstrators marched outside Texpack but police 
stayed away and the company closed the plant at the Mayor’s request.22  The following 
day, Brantford police withdrew ‘special protection’ for scabs at Texpack.23 
The Ontario Waffle joined the Texpack fray in early September by organizing a 
conference in Brantford to highlight the strike that drew trade unionists and pledges of 
support from the USWA, UAW, and CUPE.  Wafflers from Hamilton, London and 
Toronto joined the picket lines at Texpack resulting in several, including Mel Watkins, 
Steve Penner, Robert Laxer and Daniel Drache, being arrested following a confrontation 
with replacement workers and their police protectors.24  Finding it difficult to maintain its 
Brantford facility using only replacement workers, the company re-opened a plant in 
Rexdale.  There as well, Toronto Wafflers joined CTCU members picketing the plant and 
scuffled with police while attempting to prevent scabs from crossing their lines.25  The 
Waffle also organized a rally at Queen’s Park, and continued to defy the court injunction 
limiting picketing.  The company, under pressure from government mediators, and the 
union agreed to a settlement including a wage increase of seventeen cents an hour on 
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October 15 which the striking workers ratified three days later.26  Its encounter with 
Rowley and Parent’s CCU and the experience of the bitter Texpack strike hardened the 
Waffle’s stance on the role of international unions in the Canadian labour movement.  
John Lang, a researcher at York University and CCU member, recalled that the Texpack 
strike “challenged the Wafflers to include the domination of Canada’s labour movement 
as an important aspect of the US control of our economy.”27  In an analysis that appealed 
to the Waffle, Marc Zwelling concluded in Canadian Dimension: 
The Canadian Textile & Chemical Union has now given the lie to the myth that 
independent Canadian unions can never win against powerful multinational 
corporations… It is not the existence of international unions that gives labour its 
strength – but a dedicated union leadership, a militant membership and strong 
support from the rest of the labour movement.28 
 
At the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) convention in November 1971, Cecil 
Taylor and George Gilks, Wafflers in USWA Local 1005, submitted an emergency 
resolution calling on the OFL to condemn the TWUA for its “collusion with the 
company” in signing up scab workers but were ruled out of order.29  OFL president David 
Archer declared “we’ll not allow anyone to attack affiliates of this group.”30  Unlike the 
previous year’s Reform Caucus at the CLC convention, a newly-formed Waffle Labour 
Caucus appeared at the OFL convention, leading the Globe and Mail to report that the 
Waffle “is out to defeat the right-wing bureaucracy it says dominates major Canadian 
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unions.”31  The Waffle Labour Caucus also sponsored a hospitality suite, distributing a 
leaflet that called for “completely sovereign and independent Canadian unions.”  The 
program for achieving such independence outlined in the leaflet largely aped the CLC 
Reform Caucus’s program for autonomy, including ensuring Canadian union officers 
were elected by Canadians, union dues paid in Canada remained in Canada, and making 
specific acknowledgement of Canadian autonomy in the constitutions of international 
unions based in the United States.32 
 The Nixon Shock and Waffle involvement in the Texpack strike reverberated in 
the Ontario election of October 1971 and beyond.  Bill Davis, the new leader of the 
Ontario Progressive Conservatives, called the election on September 13, 1971, a few 
months after succeeding John Robarts as premier.  Davis had quickly disposed of two 
controversial issues handed him by Robarts when he cancelled construction of the 
proposed Spadina Expressway through downtown Toronto, and announced full provincial 
funding would not be extended to the province’s Catholic high schools.  In his brief time 
leading the government Davis had established the Ministry of the Environment, promised 
provincial money for public housing, initiated a lawsuit against Dow Chemical for 
mercury pollution, created Nordair, a provincially-owned airline to service northern 
Ontario, and enacted minor economic nationalist measures such as giving preferential 
treatment to Canadian-owned firms seeking government loans and grants.33  Emphasizing 
their activist record in government, Davis’s leadership, and a promised three percent cut 
in the provincial income tax, Ontario’s PCs combined stellar organization, effective 
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fundraising and prominent advertising to give birth to the ‘Big Blue Machine’ that would 
repeatedly propel the party into power over the next four elections.34 
Yet Stephen Lewis and the Ontario NDP leadership were optimistic as they 
embarked on the 1971 election campaign.  The senior campaign team, which included 
Lewis’s close friend and former Waffler Gerald Caplan, defeated leadership rival Walter 
Pitman, former leader Donald MacDonald, party pollster and professor of political 
science John Wilson, party secretary Gordon Brigden, and party treasurer John Brewin, 
identified sixty-five ridings as the focus of the NDP’s efforts.35 
All three parties responded to the Nixon Shock by featuring economic nationalist 
planks in their election platforms.  Davis’s accomplishments during his brief stint as 
premier included halting the sale of Crown lands as well as giving preference to 
Canadians when leasing these lands and to Canadian-owned firms seeking government 
loans.36  Ontario Liberal Party leader Robert Nixon promised that a Liberal government 
would create a Foreign Investment Review Board, possibly headed by the prominent 
economic nationalist Walter Gordon.37  And Stephen Lewis began the campaign with a 
promise the Ontario NDP would focus on regaining control of the provincial economy 
while creating jobs, reducing the cost of living, reforming the tax system, and instituting 
new environmental protections.38 
 Although the Waffle had enjoyed some success influencing Ontario NDP policies 
at the 1970 leadership convention, including commitments to nationalize the province’s 
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energy resource industries, an expansive housing strategy, and women’s liberation, 
Stephen Lewis tempered the more radical aspects of the party’s messaging in the 
following months.  The party sought to moderate Lewis’s image in the lead-up to the 
election campaign.  In addition to speaking to business clubs, Lewis cut his hair, replaced 
his corduroy suits, spoke more slowly and quietly, and sought camera angles that made 
him appear more polite.  It was all part of a concerted effort to portray the Ontario NDP 
as “a reasonable political force,” a moderate image somewhat at odds with how the 
Waffle was typically perceived.39 
Wafflers secured NDP nominations in six ridings going into the provincial 
election.  Bruce Kidd, a former Olympian and long-distance runner, defeated Marion 
Bryden, the Ontario NDP research director and NDP Now member, for the nomination in 
the east Toronto riding of Beaches-Woodbine.  John Brown, a social worker, had won the 
riding for the NDP in the 1967 election, but opted not to seek re-election after incurring 
public criticism over the controversial experimental treatment centre he ran for 
emotionally-disturbed children.  Among the twenty-one seats it held at the start of the 
campaign, the NDP considered Beaches-Woodbine one of the most vulnerable.40  Reid 
Scott, a Toronto alderman and longtime CCF/NDP stalwart, worked closely on Kidd’s 
campaign, while Kidd proceeded to garner headlines for his outspoken positions on 
Canadian sports.41  Within NDP riding associations Waffle support for women’s 
liberation at times faced opposition.  Varda Burstyn recalled the difficulty of watching 
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“the grand old lady of Beaches-Woodbine, a stalwart Scots left winger who had never 
allowed herself to be politically contained in the women’s auxiliary,” oppose the 
inclusion of abortion rights in Kidd’s campaign literature for fear of alienating voters.42 
Dan Heap, a self-described Anglican “worker-priest,” secured the NDP 
nomination in the downtown Toronto riding of St. Andrew-St. Patrick, where he faced off 
against Allan Grossman, a prominent cabinet minister in the Davis government.  Heap 
and his wife, Alice, who housed young anti-war, anti-poverty and Student Christian 
Movement activists in their Kensington Market home, had been among the activists 
opposing the proposed Spadina Expressway through downtown Toronto.43  A concerned 
Grossman reminded voters that the NDP, unlike his Progressive Conservative party, had 
not consistently opposed the expressway’s construction.44 
Other than Bruce Kidd, the Waffle’s best opportunity to elect an MPP appeared to 
be in the west Toronto riding of Dovercourt, where Steve Penner, chair of the Ontario 
Waffle, had defeated Bruce Knapp, a Pollution Probe activist, in a bitter and controversial 
nomination battle.  A dispute over registration procedures had caused the party to 
postpone the nomination meeting, and when it did occur the initial results were ruled 
invalid when more ballots were cast than there were delegates registered.45  In addition to 
his Waffle activities, Penner had led a protest in downtown Toronto in January 1971 as 
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part of the National Poor People’s Conference, and planned ongoing demonstrations at a 
welfare office to publicize the inadequacy of the program.46  Mel Watkins managed the 
twenty-seven-year-old Penner’s campaign during which he lauded the efforts of some 
two hundred youthful volunteer canvassers for revitalizing the NDP’s campaign on the 
ground, but complained that the party’s central campaign committee was withholding its 
support for Penner.47  Penner emphasized that working people were “extremely angry” 
with job losses resulting from foreign ownership and government inattention to the issue, 
and Waffler Dominic Pagnini, leader of a Toronto-area Italian labour organization, 
helped the NDP campaign canvass the riding’s large immigrant population.  Penner 
opposed the replacement of workers’ homes with high-rise apartment and condominium 
buildings that his Liberal and PC opponents endorsed wholeheartedly.48  Watkins 
explained that the Waffle sought to demonstrate “that you can put forward a candidate 
and a program which represent a genuine alternative, and that people will support 
programs more socialist than those presented in Ontario.”49   
None of the other three Wafflers were running in ridings where the NDP was 
given much chance of success.  Dave Neumann, a secondary school teacher, challenged 
Ontario Liberal leader Robert Nixon in Brant, Jean Usher took on the Minister of Health, 
Bert Lawrence, in Carleton East, and Garth Stevenson ran in Carleton, which had elected 
Tories without interruption for decades. 
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 Stephen Lewis was not especially effective selling his party to Ontario’s 
electorate during the 1971 campaign.  His responses to reporters’ questions were often 
long-winded and meandering.50  Although his sharp wit, remarkable memory, and 
articulate speeches frequently impressed members of the Queen’s Park press gallery, the 
same characteristics did not always resonate clearly with voters.51  Moreover, he found 
the Waffle to be a source of continuous frustration, recalling later that “we fought the 
election with and against the Waffle rather than with and against the Tories.”52  Lewis 
criticized the New Brunswick Waffle and in response to a reporter’s question exclaimed 
“thank God we don’t have an NDP member of the legislature in New Brunswick if that is 
what the Waffles are suggesting.”53  Desmond Morton also looked askance at Wafflers’ 
practice of questioning Lewis on the campaign trail on such controversial issues as 
nationalization and access to abortion.54  Lewis’s biographer Cameron Smith claims that 
“nine times out of ten he’d be asked [by reporters] to respond to something the Waffle 
had said that differed from the party position.”55  Bill Davis, not surprisingly, leapt at the 
opportunity to exploit the divisions among the NDP ranks, joking that the Waffle was 
causing Stephen Lewis “indigestion.”56  Bruce Kidd pointed out how Conservatives 
further sowed suspicion towards the Ontario NDP by distributing leaflets detailing the 
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New Brunswick NDP’s adoption of that province’s Waffle manifesto “which called for 
the nationalization – without compensation – of everything in sight.”57 
 Confident that the PC party’s well-funded advertising campaign would translate 
into more votes, Davis changed his itinerary during the final days of the campaign in 
order to visit NDP-held ridings in Oshawa, Peterborough and Brantford.  In response, 
Lewis held a rally with 3,200 supporters at Toronto’s O’Keefe Centre at which he echoed 
one of the Waffle’s core beliefs, namely that increasing foreign control of Ontario’s 
economy was “the single most important issue” in the election campaign, and vowed that 
an NDP government would reverse the trend and “we’ll head straight down the road to 
regaining social, economic and cultural independence.”58 
The results of the election, in which Davis and the Progressive Conservatives 
increased their majority to seventy-eight seats with 44.5 percent of the popular vote, were 
a disappointment for the NDP.    The party failed to supplant the Liberals as Official 
Opposition despite the Liberals’ own lackluster performance.  Although the NDP 
increased slightly its percentage of the popular vote, from 25.9 percent to 27.1 percent, it 
lost several close races and won only nineteen seats, two fewer than it held at 
dissolution.59  The three Toronto Wafflers were among the casualties, all losing to their 
Tory opponents.  Toronto alderman Tom Wardle surpassed Kidd by over 2500 votes, but 
Penner came tantalizingly close to winning in Dovercourt where he received just fifty-
five votes fewer than the victor George Nixon, which was an increase of some 1500 votes 
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over what the NDP candidate achieved in 1967.  Heap likewise increased the NDP’s 
share of the popular vote in St. Andrew-St. Patrick, rising from 24.9 percent to 41.8 
percent and receiving 3800 votes more than his predecessor had managed, but still lost to 
Grossman.60 
Wafflers Garth Stevenson and Dave Neumann nearly doubled the NDP’s vote in 
Carleton and Brant, and Waffler Jean Usher increased the NDP’s vote from 1075 to 6069 
in Carleton East, reflecting the “inexperienced but enthusiastic campaign workers” who 
revitalized the party’s door-to-door canvassing efforts in Ottawa.61  But the Ontario 
Waffle’s inability to elect one of its own would hinder the group’s capacity to influence 
the party’s direction or to defend itself against critics in the months ahead.  Steve Penner, 
the Dovercourt NDP riding association, and the six Wafflers on the ONDP Provincial 
Executive all urged the party to pursue legal action to overturn the Dovercourt results, 
pointing to a number of irregularities.  Although the party’s legal counsel suggested a 
challenge had a strong likelihood of success, the Administration Committee and a 
majority of the Executive were concerned with the potential cost and requested instead 
that the caucus ask the Chief Electoral Officer to void the election.  Penner and the 
Waffle continued to agitate for a legal challenge with the Executive finally agreeing to go 
along if the Dovercourt riding association could raise sufficient funds to pay the costs.62 
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In a closed and confidential meeting of the provincial council following the 
election, Lewis reviewed reasons for his party’s disappointing performance and “the large 
anti-socialist vote in Ontario.”  Among the multiple causes was a backlash against the 
NDP for its stance on issues such as abortion and automobile insurance; a “strong anti-
union, anti-labour vote;” the Conservatives’ expensive and effective advertising 
campaign; an over-abundance of party policy that occasionally contradicted itself; and 
distractions created by the Waffle.  Conceding that “there was a good showing by 
candidates who were identified as Waffle,” Lewis pointed out “there was also a good 
showing taken by more moderate candidates.”63  In the discussion that followed Lewis’s 
analysis, others voiced criticisms of the campaign and admitted feeling “disturbed” over 
the Waffle’s role in the election.64  Privately, Lewis and several others among the Ontario 
NDP leadership did not hesitate to lay blame on the Waffle.65  Morden Lazarus, for 
example, attributed Mac Makarchuk’s loss in Brantford to his association with the 
Waffle’s support for the controversial Texpack strike.66  Desmond Morton accused Steve 
Penner of mounting a “well-publicized attack on the party’s official programme,” and 
upbraided the Waffle for fighting a semi-autonomous campaign that relied in part on 
drawing sympathetic party members away from nearby campaigns to work for Waffle 
candidates.67  Morton sneered that “sectarian purity undoubtedly has its admirers but 
among Ontario voters they are not easy to find.  By making the NDP appear faction-
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ridden and far more extreme than its actual program, the Waffle hurt the party’s electoral 
prospects.”68  Waffler John Smart retorted that “if I had as much responsibility for the 
campaign as he and his friends in Toronto had, I would probably be looking for someone 
else to blame now too.”69  An editorial in the Globe and Mail suggested Lewis had been 
“hamstrung by the Waffle” and forced to spend much time and energy “to keep the split 
within his own party from destroying the foothold it had going into the election.”70 
The Waffle, by contrast, attributed the Ontario NDP’s disappointing performance 
to the campaign team’s decision to focus on leadership rather than the socialist policies 
adopted by the party convention the previous fall.71  The convention’s commitment to 
nationalizing the province’s vast energy resources, for example, had been reduced to a 
campaign promise to nationalize the natural gas distribution system only.  Mel Watkins 
argued the NDP had “effectively linked unemployment and foreign ownership” but failed 
to present a convincing solution.  Moreover, by highlighting too many different issues the 
NDP campaign lacked focus.  Most significantly, according to Watkins, the party failed 
to make the “Americanization of Ontario” its campaign focus, thereby allowing “Stephen 
Lewis… [to] be outflanked on the left by Robert Nixon on the issue of foreign 
ownership.”72  In Bruce Kidd’s estimation, it was essential the Ontario NDP undertake 
“much more educational work and extra-parliamentary organizing than ever before.”73 
Anger over the Waffle’s impact on the Ontario election was still rife when the 
NDP Federal Council met the following month.  The New Brunswick NDP’s split into 
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competing Waffle and anti-Waffle sections was the first item on the agenda.  Twenty-
eight members of the New Brunswick NDP opposed to the Waffle had petitioned the 
Federal Council to intervene to end the dispute, and Clifford Scotton, the party’s federal 
secretary, summarized recent developments in the province.  Both David and Stephen 
Lewis attacked the New Brunswick Waffle, criticizing its manifesto’s radical policies and 
lamenting the harmful impact negative press coverage had on the recent NDP campaign 
in Ontario.74  Despite protestations by Alistair Robertson, the newly elected New 
Brunswick NDP President and a Waffler, that the Federal Council lacked authority to rule 
on the internal affairs of a provincial party, the councillors nevertheless voted to suspend 
the New Brunswick NDP until federal party officers were satisfied it had held a 
legitimate convention and repudiated the Waffle’s radicalism.75  Waffler Pat Callahan 
reacted angrily to the decision, saying it was up to the people of New Brunswick “to 
decide whether to accept or reject our policies, not David Lewis or the union brass of 
Ontario.”76  The Federal Council’s decision evidently had a desultory effect on the New 
Brunswick Waffle, and at a poorly attended meeting the following week the Trotskyist 
FYS won support for a less divisive and confrontational approach within the New 
Brunswick NDP in an effort to avoid expulsion.  Unwilling to accept the federal NDP’s 
intervention in the provincial party, the non-Trotskyist members of the New Brunswick 
Waffle left the group as a result of the decision to acquiesce and at the rescheduled New 
Brunswick NDP convention in late November the FYS, now all that remained of the 
provincial Waffle, sought to avoid expulsion by recognizing the Federal Council’s 
                                                        
74 Patrick Webber, “‘For a Socialist New Brunswick’,” MA Thesis, 124. 
75 “Group expelled by federal party, New Brunswick NDP head says,” Globe and Mail, November 13, 
1971. 
76 “Federal council of NDP faces N.B. challenge,” Globe and Mail, November 15, 1971. 
  288 
authority and acclaiming previous leader J. Albert Richardson into the position again.77  
With the New Brunswick Waffle effectively neutered, federal NDP President Donald 
MacDonald, observing for the federal party, declared the convention legitimate. 
 Despite the rift within the New Brunswick NDP and the growing animosity 
between Wafflers and the NDP in Ontario stemming from the recent provincial election 
there, David Lewis presented the Federal Council with an optimistic picture of the party’s 
prospects, claiming there existed “a very deep feeling of intense unity in the Party right 
across the country.”78  Unity, however, was not a descriptor Wafflers and New 
Democrats in Manitoba and Saskatchewan were likely to use when reflecting upon the 
state of their party at that moment. 
 The Manitoba Waffle’s activities had peaked with its support of Laxer’s bid for 
the party leadership in early 1971, but then slipped into a semi-dormant state before 
restructuring itself in the summer of 1971.79  As mentioned in the more detailed local 
study in Chapter Five, the group, which was largely confined to Winnipeg, published a 
newsletter, supported striking construction workers, and organized for the city’s 
municipal elections before turning its attention in November to the Manitoba NDP 
convention where it hoped to wield greater influence than previously.  The Waffle did 
win the convention’s support for several of its policy resolutions, including a 
commitment to nationalize the Greater Winnipeg Gas Company, and to convene a 
conference to study the connection between unemployment and American economic 
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policies.80  Two issues threatened to divide the convention – the question of public 
financing of private and separate schools, and the liberalization of abortion laws.81  Joe 
Borowski, a popular former Minister of Transportation and Public Works who had 
recently been dropped from the cabinet for opposing liberalized abortion laws, was a 
prominent proponent of the former and opponent of the latter.82  The Waffle, who drew 
seventy-five delegates to their convention caucus meeting, opposed government support 
of private schools, endorsed “greater flexibility in education curricula,” and were vocal 
advocates of abortion on demand.83  Despite the internal party divide, Premier Ed 
Schreyer, who was popular with delegates, successfully urged the convention to pass a 
compromise resolution on public aid for private schools that allowed his cabinet 
flexibility to decide the issue.  Although members of a policy workshop passed a 
resolution over the objections of Joe Borowski and Health Minister René Toupin that 
called for abortion to be removed from the Criminal Code, the Waffle was disappointed 
when the convention as a whole defeated the resolution several days later.84  Cy Gonick 
estimated at least 125 of the 555 delegates attending the convention were sympathetic to 
the Waffle, and Waffler Una Decter lost in her race for the party presidency to incumbent 
Lawrence Bell in a 290 to 146 vote.85  Frustrated with the lack of substantial policy 
debates in the Manitoba NDP, Waffler Alvin Finkel complained “many left-wing 
delegates left the 1971 convention believing that the cabinet ministers had so much 
manipulated the convention delegates that the big issue was how to restore democracy to 
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the convention floor.”86  As its swan song the Manitoba Waffle hosted newly elected 
Saskatchewan MLA John Richards at a well-attended public meeting after the 
convention, but its activity subsided thereafter.87 
Although the Saskatchewan Waffle had reason to be encouraged after the 
successful summer election in which Richards was elected in the riding of Saskatoon 
Centre, the moderate and top-down approach of the Schreyer government in Manitoba 
gave them reason for pause.  A month after the provincial election, the group held a 
conference in Fort Qu’Appelle that, while closed to the media, attracted over two 
hundred people.88  The purpose of the conference was to determine the Waffle’s role in 
the new NDP government.  Many options were debated: should the Waffle be the 
conscience of the NDP; a “loyal internal opposition;” a traditional “left caucus;” the 
voice of extra-parliamentary social movements; an “intellectual wing;” advocates of 
“smallness” and local control; or left-nationalists.89  Failing to arrive at a consensus left 
Wafflers to pursue these disparate roles as they preferred, and they planned an ambitious 
strategy.  The meeting agreed they would carefully monitor the progress of major policies 
through the legislative process to ensure bureaucrats did not dilute the measures of their 
leftist heft.  The Wafflers also intended to promote socialism via the press, particularly 
such left-wing publications as Prairie Fire and Canadian Dimension while focusing 
specifically on policies for a land bank, alternative development strategies in northern 
Saskatchewan, the potash industry, health care, and the environment.  Finally, they 
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planned to create “study-action” groups throughout the province and to engage in 
unspecified local community organizing.90  At the end of the conference, the 
Saskatchewan Waffle welcomed the Blakeney government’s announced cancellation of 
an unfavourable contract with an American company to build a pulp mill at Meadow 
Lake, a decision Liberal leader Dave Steuart blamed on the “Waffle element” in the 
NDP.91  But the Wafflers were disappointed both by government’s unwillingness to 
nationalize the company’s other mill in Prince Albert and by its intention to compensate 
the company for expenses incurred at Meadow Lake and, claiming Saskatchewan voters 
would support a legal battle to deny compensation, argued that “people are fed up with 
government deals that offer crumbs to the people and huge benefits to entrepreneurs.”92  
Don Mitchell urged the government to hold public hearings prior to “any further 
development plans for the north, whether for pulp mills or other resources.”93  The 
recently-elected John Richards warned the NDP that Waffle support remained conditional 
on the party enacting its election platform recently endorsed by the province’s voters and 
encouraged “farmers, labourers, people in education and the party members to remain 
very active in assuring that the program is fulfilled.”94 
 In addition to formulating its ambitious agenda, the Saskatchewan Waffle 
questioned what precisely Richards’s role should be both within the group and the party.  
Some Wafflers expressed concern that Richards was being identified by the mainstream 
media as their group’s sole spokesperson, a problem Richards also acknowledged while 
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defending his right to provide a Waffle critique of the government.95  Richards sought 
advice from former leader Woodrow Lloyd who warned him to be prepared for 
disappointment when promoting leftist policies in government.  Yet Lloyd also 
encouraged Richards, explaining “there may be more support than expected in caucus.  
My own guess is that there is more in the country generally than is assumed by many.”  
Lloyd assured him “it seems to me that the Waffle group has a real opportunity and a 
very considerable responsibility.”96 
In the lead-up to the Saskatchewan NDP convention of December 1971, the 
Waffle agitated for the NDP to take radical actions.  The group placed advertisements in 
the party newspaper and held “teach-ins” at Regina to mobilize NDP members into 
pressuring the Blakeney government to support socialist measures such as eliminating the 
option-to-purchase clause from the land bank policy.97  In a press release issued just prior 
to the convention, the Waffle criticized the government for failing to fulfill its election 
platform, and argued in favour of public ownership of resource industries as an 
alternative to foreign ownership.98  Nevertheless, a majority of convention delegates 
defeated two key Waffle resolutions – the nationalization of the Prince Albert pulp mill, 
and elimination of the option-to-purchase clause from the proposed land bank legislation 
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– and no Wafflers were elected to the party’s Provincial Council.99  The Waffle did 
succeed, however, in convincing the convention to adopt both a resolution favouring 
creation of a publicly-owned oil company for the province and a constitutional change 
requiring constituency associations to elect at least one woman among their two delegates 
to the party’s provincial council.100  Wafflers were pleased with the party’s adoption of 
these policies but declared themselves “uneasy” about the election of party officials who 
“are in many cases opposed to the very policies adopted by the convention.”101  John 
Warnock estimated that about thirty-five per cent of the delegates supported Waffle 
initiatives, but concluded “the polarization is growing within the provincial NDP… It 
will be difficult for the Waffle movement to hold down those elements (mainly the older 
CCFers and the youth) who want to split and form a socialist party.”102 
 The Waffle’s disappointments over its proposals’ generally poor reception at the 
Saskatchewan NDP convention were augmented by Minister of Agriculture Jack 
Messer’s plans for a Land Bank Commission presented to the Saskatchewan cabinet later 
that month.  Although Messer and Deputy Minister Doug McArthur advocated keeping 
rents low in order to encourage leasing rather than the option-to-purchase, the Waffle 
opposed the weakened land bank proposal as inadequate.103  Don Mitchell argued that 
without first implementing other Waffle measures, such as regulating the farm machinery 
and food-processing industries, and limiting farm size, a diminished land bank would fail 
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to stem the tide of farm consolidations and rural depopulation.104  Linking the 
government’s proposal to the unpopular federal Minister of Agriculture Otto Lang, 
Mitchell suggested that a “land bank coupled with the assumptions of the federal task 
force will ‘Lang bank’ all the way!”105 
 Questions about their role and future strategy also dominated discussions among 
Wafflers in Ontario.  The Toronto Waffle, as the largest group in the province and home 
to most of the Ontario leadership including James Laxer, Krista Maeots, Mel Watkins, 
Kelly Crichton, Steve Penner and Jackie Larkin, met in December 1971 to debate 
strategy and determine if only NDP members should be allowed to participate in the 
Waffle.  A small number criticized the Waffle’s commitment to working within the NDP,  
arguing the Waffle leadership was too focused on electoral activity and therefore 
dismissive of extra-parliamentary activism.  Having “grasped the essence of social 
democracy… the fact that it is not a solution at all to class oppression, but an attempt – 
always unsuccessful – to divert the crisis inherent in capitalism,” they urged the rest of 
the Waffle “to become serious about starting to build an anti-imperialist movement, or, at 
least… start to discuss it seriously.”106  They also contended the Waffle should remain 
open to non-members of the NDP, making the confusing claim that the Waffle, having 
been open to non-members in the past, was more than a “left caucus” of the NDP and 
therefore accountable to its own membership.107  Not persuaded, the Toronto Waffle 
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instead adopted the position of other Waffle groups that only NDP members were 
allowed to vote or hold office in the Waffle.  Jackie Larkin and Steve Penner questioned 
how well the Waffle’s electoral activity fit with its overall political strategy.  They 
believed the group should remain active in the NDP in order to build a “strong mass base 
of support for socialist politics” in anticipation of its eventual split from the party’s right 
wing.  Ongoing coordinated Waffle activity in electoral politics as well as community 
and workplace organizing efforts was therefore essential.108 
 Waffle leaders acknowledged the veracity of some of these critiques.  Mel 
Watkins, Kelly Crichton and Gordon Laxer were among those who admitted “the Waffle 
has tended so far to be unduly preoccupied with moving from convention to convention 
and from election to election,” and believed further efforts at political organizing around 
community issues was in order.  They also advocated continued electoral activity, urging 
Wafflers to seek NDP nominations and “special efforts be made to encourage women, 
workers and new Canadians” especially.109  Krista Maeots noted that whereas the Waffle 
had participated in non-electoral activities its primary focus had been “mass educational 
work.”  As a result “our most important failing has been in the area of advancing beyond 
mass educational work to the building of a solid core of socialist activists in plants, 
offices, schools and rural communities.”  Encouraged by the formation of a Waffle 
Labour Caucus, Maeots warned that “the labour leadership no longer sees us as a force 
that will quickly die away; instead they see us beginning to carry anti-imperialist, 
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socialist politics and the demand for a Canadian trade union movement into their back 
yards.”110 
Indeed, union leaders did grow increasingly concerned as the Waffle built a 
support base within the labour movement.  As James Laxer explained, “the fact that 
dissident Steelworkers and Auto Workers were becoming involved with the Waffle was 
highly alarming to the regional and national leadership of the USWA and the UAW… 
they feared the Waffle might be gaining a foothold in their very organizations.”111  In 
order to do so the Waffle allied with existing factions in some of the largest and most 
powerful locals in the two biggest unions affiliated with the NDP – USWA locals 1005 
(Stelco in Hamilton) and 6500 (Inco in Sudbury) and the UAW Left Caucus, which 
included leaders of powerful Autoworker locals across southern Ontario – whose 
membership was becoming increasingly antagonistic towards its international 
leadership.112   
Lingering bitterness over the USWA’s successful 1962 raid on Mine-Mill, the 
Communist-linked union which had long represented Inco workers, and the USWA’s 
handling of the 1966 wildcat strike at Inco, helped the Waffle attract support at USWA 
Local 6500 in Sudbury.113  As well, as James Laxer recalled, “leading figures in Local 
1005 at Stelco in Hamilton… gravitated to the Waffle.”114  Political conflict within the 
massive USWA Local 1005 dated back to the union’s formation, but by the late 1960s a 
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growing influx of young workers further altered that local’s political dynamics.  After the 
1966 wildcat strike at Stelco two groups of union activists gained support in opposition to 
the ‘Right Wing Group’ which supported the international union and was closely aligned 
with USWA staff.  The longstanding ‘Left Wing Group” included older workers who had 
been active in the 1950s opposing USWA raids on Communist unions but gained new 
supporters in the late 1960s.  The ‘Autonomy Group” formed in 1965-66 criticized 
Steelworker staffers, such Stewart Cooke, the Hamilton Area Supervisor, and Larry 
Sefton, Director for District Six, and pushed for the Canadian sections of the USWA to 
break away from the international union.  Leaders of both the ‘Left Wing Group,’ such as 
Harry Greenwood, and the ‘Autonomy Group,’ such as Cec Taylor, supported the 
Waffle.115  Greenwood challenged Sefton’s handpicked successor and NDP stalwart, 
Lynn Williams, for election as District Director for District Six in February 1972, 
promising “Canadian control through a Canadian Constitution.”116  Although Williams 
won, Greenwood’s challenge was the first time the USWA District Six Director had not 
been acclaimed, an indication of increasing polarization within the Steelworkers during 
the early 1970s. 
The other major industrial union closely linked with the NDP, the UAW, had a 
Left Caucus in its Canadian section which included both Communists and left-wing 
CCFers since before the Second World War until the 1950s.117  In the 1960s the Canadian 
UAW became divided over the direction the continental auto industry was taking.  
Beginning in 1960, a minority in the Canadian UAW opposed the formalized integration 
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of the Canadian and American auto industries and advocated instead for automobiles 
designed and manufactured entirely in Canada.118  Charlie Brooks, president of Local 444 
(Chrysler in Windsor) from 1956 to 1977 and Abe Taylor, president of Local 222 (GM in 
Oshawa) from 1963 to 1978, were among the most vocal critics of the Auto Pact, which 
allowed for duty-free trade in vehicles and auto parts between Canada and the United 
States while establishing minimum Canadian content safeguards.119  However, UAW 
President Walter Reuther, the Canadian UAW Director George Burt, and the Canadian 
Council of the UAW all supported the Auto Pact, believing a fully integrated continental 
auto industry to be in their members’ best interests.120  James Laxer recalled that Waffle 
support in the UAW “included left wingers and nationalists who had been opposed to the 
Canada-United States Auto Pact during the 1960s.”121 
 Demographic changes among the UAW’s membership further enhanced the 
union’s rebelliousness and support for the Waffle.  The Ontario New Democratic Youth 
reported that their Oshawa club consisted mainly of young workers from UAW 222 who 
acted as a “left grouping with the NDP, and to some extent, within their unions.”122  As 
was happening in the steel industry, auto plants experienced during the mid to late 1960s 
an increase in young workers whose expectations differed from their older peers.  They 
insisted, for example, that working conditions as well as wage gains be up for 
negotiation.  When the UAW struck GM in the fall of 1970 at the outset of the ‘Big 
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Three’ bargaining round, members in the United States returned to work before their 
Canadian counterparts who remained out on strike until December in an attempt to win 
additional demands that included voluntary overtime and the primacy of the French 
language at GM’s plant in Ste-Thérèse, Quebec.  The international union leadership, 
including UAW President Leonard Woodcock, intervened to reach a settlement that 
included a generous wage increase but dropped the Canadian membership’s secondary 
demands, fueling opposition to the UAW leadership in Canada.123  Concessionary 
agreements at UAW locals representing workers at Acme Screw and Gear and Massey-
Ferguson in January and February 1971 further angered leftists in the Canadian UAW 
frustrated by their union’s timidity.  As a result, a group of UAW radicals met in June 
1971 to establish a new Left Caucus and elect a steering committee.124  With members 
drawn from the old Left Caucus such as Gordie Lambert and Bill Rutherford, aligning 
with younger activists such as Pat Clancy and Waffler Al Campbell, the new Left Caucus 
advocated a strategy including mass demonstrations and wildcat strikes to combat work 
speedups, imposed overtime, and threatened plant closures.  Also highlighted was 
increased activism within the NDP, and most importantly recognition of Canadian 
autonomy within the UAW.125  The UAW strike at Douglas Aircraft in Malton, Ontario, 
in the fall of 1971 gave the new Left Caucus further ammunition in demanding Canadian 
autonomy.  When the workers represented by UAW Local 1967 decided to remain on 
strike after their American counterparts settled for salary increases dictated by President 
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Nixon’s recently introduced wage controls, the international and Canadian UAW 
leadership intervened to end the strike and force the striking members back to work.126 
 In response to reports that Canadian safeguards in the Auto Pact were at risk from 
President Nixon’s New Economic Plan, the Left Caucus pushed for a one-day strategy 
conference at the Canadian District Council meeting in September 1971, but the majority 
of council delegates rejected the proposal.  In contrast to the militant strategy of a one-
day walkout and mass demonstration that the new Left Caucus advocated, Canadian 
UAW Director Dennis McDermott initiated a letter-writing campaign aimed at MPs to 
protest against revisions to the Auto Pact that might disadvantage Canadian workers.127  
When the Waffle organized and co-sponsored a conference on the Auto Pact with its 
UAW allies from the Windsor and District Labour Council in January 1972 – after the 
Left Caucus’s proposal for a similar conference had recently been defeated by the 
Canadian UAW – McDermott saw the move as an affront to internal union democracy 
and the all-important principle of solidarity.128 
The Waffle conference, which attracted 230 autoworkers, was addressed by 
Charlie Brooks, President of the UAW Canadian District Council, Ed Baillargeon, 
President of the Windsor and District Labour Council, and Ed Broadbent. Dennis 
McDermott did not attend.  Attracting front page coverage in the Windsor Star, the 
conference called for an independent Canadian auto industry and attacked the UAW 
leadership for failing to defend adequately Canadian production safeguards in the Auto 
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Pact.129  The conference also called for a one-day walkout and a demonstration by 
Autoworkers in Ottawa.130  Two days later the Windsor and District Labour Council 
likewise endorsed a resolution calling for a one-day strike in the auto industry to oppose 
the rumoured elimination of safeguards.131  As James Laxer later realized, the “highly 
successful event in the heart of UAW country… the Windsor conference was the last 
straw” for labour leaders.132 
Dennis McDermott, at a meeting of the UAW Canadian District Council the 
following weekend, assailed the Waffle at the same time he accused the new Left Caucus 
of disrupting internal union democracy.  He warned that the Waffle was behaving like an 
independent political party and seeking to infiltrate the labour movement.  “This union 
has dissociated itself from the activities of the Waffle,” McDermott claimed, “and in my 
view the NDP will have to do the same thing.”  He labelled James Laxer “an 
irresponsible academic, accountable to no one, a headline-hunter, and an ego-tripper par 
excellence.  His solution to every industrial problem is to first seize the plant and then 
nationalize the industry.”  Clearly on a roll, McDermott suggested that Waffle leaders  
start their revolution in the universities where “they draw their fat salaries for lecturing a 
couple of hours a week, and have all kinds of free time on their hands to meddle in other 
people’s business.  Meanwhile, why don’t they… for want of a better expression… get 
lost.”133  The new Left Caucus’s resolutions criticizing the UAW leadership for the 
timidity of the letter-writing campaign and its handling of the Douglas Aircraft strike 
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were defeated decisively by the Canadian District Council.134  Watkins and Laxer 
responded in a statement released the following day.  Calling McDermott’s attack 
“beneath contempt,” the Wafflers suggested that McDermott “is more concerned about 
the heads of his union in Detroit than he is about the sellout of the auto pact 
safeguards.”135  Nevertheless, they described their own relationship with the NDP as 
cordial.  Laxer commented that “I don’t expect any tension over the next few months.  
We are all working together for the next election.”136  He could not have been more 
mistaken. 
 The labour movement leadership monitored Waffler and leftist activity in the major 
union locals, sharing their findings with senior party officials.  Morden Lazarus, Public 
Relations Director of the OFL, wrote to NDP federal secretary Cliff Scotton about Laxer 
and Watkins and informed him that a pro-McDermott slate had ousted the “Abe Taylor 
group” in UAW Local 222 in the aftermath of the Auto Pact Conference and the UAW 
Canadian Council.137  The CLC maintained a confidential collection of documents and 
press clippings recording Wafflers’ statements about the Canadian labour movement.138 
Jean Beaudry, Executive Vice-President of the CLC, told a Saskatchewan Federation of 
Labour convention that the Waffle should not try to “capture unions for their own 
particular purposes or political motives.”  Beaudry defended international unions and 
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“served notice” that “the labour movement is well able to look after itself,” before hinting 
ominously that “I don’t like to see people get their fingers burned unnecessarily.”139 
 Union activists and NDP members in the Hamilton-Mountain riding association, 
angered by the Waffle’s role in the previous Ontario election and its unwelcome 
interventions in the labour movement, passed a resolution in late November 1971 for 
debate at the Ontario NDP Provincial Council in March 1972 calling for “those who 
adhere to any clearly identifiable ongoing political group” to be removed from the party’s 
membership rolls.140  Ian Deans, MPP for the Hamilton-area riding of Wentworth and 
House leader of the Ontario NDP caucus, supported the motion, arguing the Waffle was 
damaging the NDP’s ability to speak clearly for itself.  Deans alleged the Waffle had 
become “a political organization unto yourself,” and its presence meant “continuous 
harangues and battles that go on between the two factions.”141  The Waffle’s Auto Pact 
Conference in Windsor had only exacerbated frictions with its opponents.  An informal 
discussion in January 1972 between Stephen Lewis, Michele Landsberg, James Laxer 
and Krista Maeots failed to resolve the differences between the party leadership and the 
Waffle.142 
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 In February 1972 the Ontario Waffle held a conference at Hamilton’s McMaster 
University featuring sessions on Quebec, the labour movement, the women’s liberation 
movement, culture and media, and several other topics.143  The conference only fuelled 
the ire of the NDP leadership.  Stephen Lewis took a clear stand on the Waffle’s position 
within the NDP during his speech to the Ontario NDP’s Provincial Council the following 
month.  Declaring that “we, as a political party, can no longer proceed in our present 
state,” Lewis attacked the Waffle on four fronts – “human relationships, structure, labour 
and ideology.”  He criticized the Waffle for instilling “acrimony and bitterness” in the 
party, for its harsh attacks on union leadership, and for publicly promoting policies 
contrary to the NDP’s.  Referring specifically to the recent Hamilton conference, Lewis 
outlined the Waffle’s structure and fundraising efforts, arguing “it seems to me 
indisputable that the Waffle has already virtually become – certainly verges on – a party 
within a party.”144  Rather than following up Lewis’s speech with the scheduled debate 
on the Hamilton Mountain riding association’s resolution to expel the Waffle, Ontario 
NDP provincial secretary Gordon Brigden introduced a compromise resolution 
acknowledging “the grave anxiety among our membership at the emergence of a distinct 
group within the Party” and calling on the party executive to “prepare a statement 
outlining the responsibilities and obligations of members of the party.”145  The motion 
passed by a vote of 157 to 62.146  A committee was established comprised of Gordon 
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145 Minutes of Provincial Council, March 18-19, 1972, Series 13 Executive and Council Minutes, File 3 
Executive and Council Minutes 1968-70, New Democratic Party Ontario fonds, QUA. 
146 Ibid. 
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Vichert, the party’s president, John Brewin, its treasurer, and Gerald Caplan, tasked with 
drafting a statement to be discussed at the next provincial council.  The Waffle thereby 
retained its place in the Ontario NDP, at least momentarily. 
The Waffle’s unique strategy of conducting parallel electoral and extra-
parliamentary activism was most apparent in the summer and fall of 1971.  The American 
turn to protectionism represented by the “Nixon Shock” and the leak of the federal 
government’s Gray Report showing increasing American ownership of the Canadian 
economy caught the attention of many Canadians.  As a result, economic nationalism 
gained political prominence in late 1971 and the Waffle sought to take advantage of the 
situation.  The Ontario Waffle’s support of striking workers at Brantford’s Texpack 
factory served to demonstrate the dangers of foreign ownership and the limitations of 
conservative international unions whose leadership was closely connected to the NDP.  
Nevertheless, Wafflers continued to work within the party to organize for the adoption 
and implementation of more left-wing policies.  Six Wafflers won nominations and ran 
for the NDP during the October 1971 election in Ontario.  However, all were defeated 
despite Steve Penner coming agonizingly close to victory, hindering the Waffle’s 
influence within the Ontario NDP.  Wafflers in Manitoba and Saskatchewan alike were 
frustrated by their inability to substantially influence party conventions, let alone NDP 
governments, in those two provinces and began to question the group’s role in the party 
as a result.  Moreover, the Waffle’s struggle with the NDP leadership was exacerbated by 
conflict in New Brunswick between the Trotskyist-dominated Waffle and party 
moderates, perceptions that the Waffle’s presence during the Ontario election had harmed 
the party’s electoral prospects there, and the enhanced support for the Waffle amongst 
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dissident caucuses within the USWA and UAW.  Events in Ontario early in 1972 would 
thrust all of this internal strife into public view and signal the beginning of the end for the 
Waffle in the NDP.
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Chapter Eight 
“To fight for a free Canada, but without the Waffle forever an encumbrance around 
my neck:” Conflict, 1972 
 
 Stephen Lewis’s speech denouncing the Waffle at the Ontario NDP’s Provincial 
Council meeting at Oshawa in March 1972 reverberated throughout the NDP nation-
wide.  The Waffle would spend much of the ensuing two years in an existential crisis, 
debating its position vis-à-vis the NDP.  Until the spring of 1972, its raison d'être had 
been to challenge many of the NDP’s core attitudes and principles.  Central to James 
Laxer’s argument that the Canadian New Left should engage in electoral politics as well 
as extra-parliamentary struggles was the existence of a social democratic party with a 
union base and history of leftist politics.1  Although the Waffle had engaged with non-
electoral social movements, most notably within unions, its primary focus over the 
previous two-and-a-half years had been to change the NDP.  In the aftermath of Lewis’s 
Oshawa speech, the Ontario Waffle, which the media tended to cast as representative of 
the group nationally, devoted all of its energies to offsetting Lewis’s criticisms while 
struggling to maintain a foothold in the Ontario NDP.  In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, by 
contrast, the Waffle questioned its very existence in the party.  Frustrated by an inability 
to influence substantially the NDP governments in those provinces, leading Wafflers 
soon abandoned hope in the party’s openness to radical economic and societal changes.  
Socialism, at least as the Waffle understood it, simply was not in the cards in either 
Saskatchewan or Manitoba in 1972.  In Manitoba, where the Waffle was weakest, its 
members began drifting away from both the group and the NDP, while its sole MLA, Cy 
                                                        
1 Laxer had advanced this argument in “The Student Movement and Canadian Independence,” Canadian 
Dimension (August-September 1969), as discussed in Chapter Three.  John Richards made similar 
arguments to explain his interest in running for the NDP after his involvement in the American anti-war 
movement, as discussed in Chapter Five.   
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Gonick, grew increasingly disillusioned with electoral politics.  In Saskatchewan, where 
the existence of a stronger left tradition within the NDP might have been cause for 
greater optimism among Wafflers, they nevertheless spent much of the next eighteen 
months debating the appropriate time and tactics for departing the NDP.  After losing the 
fight to remain within the Ontario NDP, the Waffle there divided into those who chose to 
park their loyalties with the party and the rump who preferred to eventually establish a 
new political party to challenge the NDP electorally.  Meanwhile, in British Columbia, 
the election of an NDP government in August 1972 became final confirmation that the 
west coast Waffle had been fully absorbed into the party’s mainstream.  All told, by the 
fall of 1972, the Waffle remained active in just two provinces, Ontario and 
Saskatchewan. 
 In Ontario, the NDP executive established a committee consisting of Gordon 
Vichert, John Brewin and Gerald Caplan to fulfill the Provincial Council’s mandate of 
preparing “a statement outlining the responsibilities and obligations of members to the 
Party” with the expectation that the Waffle’s involvement in particular would be 
scrutinized.  The executive agreed to a motion by James Laxer that the committee hold 
consultation meetings with party members in Thunder Bay, Timmins, Sudbury, Ottawa, 
London, and Toronto.2  Vichert, in recalling these meetings, commented on the relentless 
hostility the committee encountered from Waffle supporters.  Comparing Wafflers to the 
Baptist fundamentalists of his youth, Vichert proclaimed “over and over again, wherever 
we went, we were subjected to that kind of blood test on the part of the Waffle who set up 
                                                        
2 Minutes of the Provincial Executive, April 8, 1972, Series 13 Executive and Council Minutes, File 4 
Executive and Council Minutes 1970-72, New Democratic Party of Ontario fonds, QUA; A Statement by 
the Ontario Waffle to the Ontario Executive of the New Democratic Party, personal files. Waffler and 
ONDP candidate Steve Penner continued to push the executive to support a recount in the close election in 
Dovercourt at the same executive meeting. 
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its own strict interpretation of what the policy of the party ought to be, and then called 
everyone a heathen who didn’t adhere to those policies.”3  He noted “we were not only 
dealing here with an ideological movement but with a movement for the leadership of 
Jim Laxer and Mel Watkins, for their own prestige and power within the party, and that 
seemed to us intolerable.”4 
 The Vichert Committee received over one hundred submissions reflecting widely 
divergent views of the Waffle’s role in the NDP.  The St. George riding association 
executive brief to the Vichert Committee acknowledged that the Wafflers “may have 
caused some confusion in the public mind,” but argued its actions did not warrant a purge 
and they would be ill-inclined to continue supporting a party that ousted the Waffle.5  The 
Welland riding association, by contrast, demanded “the dismantling of the structure and 
organizations of the Waffle” and advocated constitutional changes to “prevent the 
continuance or new formation of any such group.”6  A group of moderates, including 
John Harney, Walter Pitman, Karl Jaffary and Desmond Morton, claimed the party was 
“being presented with a terrible set of alternatives and we do not want to be forced to 
choose between them.”  They proposed instead a compromise that would allow an 
autonomous Waffle separate from the NDP, to associate with the party in a manner 
similar to union affiliation.7 
 The Ontario Waffle’s submission to the committee recognized the intra-party 
tensions, but accused Stephen Lewis of escalating them into a full-blown crisis with his 
                                                        
3 Vichert quotation in Morley, Secular Socialists, 214.  Desmond Morton describes “a neutral, even mildly 
sympathetic committee returned traumatised by the vitriolic mood it had encountered,” Morton, The New 
Democrats, 133. 
4 Vichert quotation in Morley, Secular Socialists, 214. 
5 “Submission from the executive of the St. George Riding Association,” New Democrat, May-June 1972. 
6 “Submission by the executive of the Welland NDP Riding Association,” New Democrat, May-June 1972. 
7 “Compromise,” New Democrat, May-June 1972. 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speech to the ONDP Provincial Council.  The Waffle contended instead that the greater 
crises with which the party needed to be concerned were “the increasing contradictions 
that manifest themselves in a dependent capitalist Canada,” namely the dangers to the 
country’s economy posed by foreign ownership and the growing appeal of a progressive 
Québécois nationalism.  The Waffle brief also claimed Lewis’s criticism of the Waffle 
for maintaining its own mailing list and conducting independent fundraising efforts was 
just a ploy for disguising his true ideological objections to the group.  The brief defended 
Waffle support of unions, and proposed several changes to the party’s governance 
including provision for allowing only ONDP members to sit as delegates at the party’s 
councils and conventions.8 
 Although the Ontario Waffle’s message to the Vichert Committee was combative 
in defending its right to exist within the NDP, the group was taking measures to limit its 
conflicts with the party and union leadership by disassociating from more radical left 
groups.  Laxer explained that “behind the scenes, a few efforts were made to find 
common ground between the Waffle and the party leadership.  At one point, Stephen 
Lewis asked me to have dinner with him, and the pleasant evening we spent discussing 
the future of the party gave me a false sense of hope that compromise could be 
possible.”9  Before Laxer defeated Marion Bryden for the federal NDP nomination in 
East York he denied suggestions that a victory represented a test of the Waffle’s strength 
in the party and instead indicated that “if Marion wins tonight, I’ll work for her, and I 
think that if I win, she’ll work for me.”  A reporter, obviously frustrated by the lack of a 
                                                        
8 A statement by the Ontario Waffle to the Ontario Executive of the New Democratic Party, personal files. 
This stipulation would preclude union members or staff who were not New Democrats from sitting as 
delegates at the ONDP’s councils and conventions. 
9 Laxer, In Search of a New Left, 161. 
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political “bloodbath” at the nomination meeting, complained about an atmosphere 
lacking energy, commenting “there were no demonstrations; there was no bar; there were 
none of the visceral pleasures associated with traditional political competitiveness… 
there were no fireworks.”10  Meanwhile the Ottawa Waffle, for example, had initially 
partnered with the Canadian Liberation Movement (CLM) on the Committee Against the 
Nixon Visit to protest the American President’s visit to Canada and speech to a joint 
session of Parliament in April.  But barely a week before Nixon’s arrival the Waffle 
withdrew from the committee and chose to hold an educational event rather than 
participate in the protest.  Its erstwhile partners alleged the Ottawa group had been 
threatened with expulsion from the NDP if it went ahead with the protest alongside the 
radical CLM and accused Wafflers Laxer and Watkins, who refused to speak publicly 
alongside Gary Perly, the CLM’s outspoken leader, of submitting to pressure from David 
and Stephen Lewis.11  The same month Watkins decried the radical New Brunswick 
Waffle manifesto as “a totally unacceptable thing” that “lay beyond the pale of social 
democracy.”12 
Internal strife within the Council of Canadian Unions (CCU) provided more fuel 
to the CLM charge that the Waffle leadership was yielding to party demands.  Jim Tester, 
a Waffle supporter and president of the only remaining Mine Mill local (Local 598) 
representing workers at Falconbridge in Sudbury, sought advice from Bill Walsh, a union 
arbitrator and consultant and long-time member of the Communist Party before joining 
                                                        
10 William Cameron, “NDP’s non-battle still produces a winner and a loser,” Toronto Star, March 16, 1972. 
11 The NDP, the Waffle and the US-Run Unions, n.d. [1972], Box 1A Leaflets A-H, File 139, Canadian 
Liberation Movements fonds, MUA; CLM Statement Regarding the Withdrawal of the Ottawa Waffle 
Group From the Committee Against the Nixon Visit, April 1972, Box 1A Leaflets A-H, File 139, Canadian 
Liberation Movements fonds, MUA. 
12 Watkins quotation in Webber, “For a Socialist New Brunswick,” 128. 
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the NDP in 1969 and becoming active in the Ontario Waffle.  At Robert Laxer’s request, 
Walsh had helped to establish the Waffle Labour Caucus.  Although Mine Mill had a 
long relationship of mutual support with Kent Rowley and Madeleine Parent, including 
hosting the CCU’s founding convention in Sudbury in July 1969, that relationship began 
to unravel.  Simultaneous strikes at Inco and Falconbridge in the fall of 1969 led to 
cooperation between the old rivals, USWA and Mine Mill, despite Parent’s advice to the 
contrary.  Furthermore, Mine Mill had downplayed its CCU connection during the strike 
in order to solicit support from international unions the CCU had loudly criticized 
previously.13  When Rowley requested Mine Mill Local 598’s assistance in the CCU’s 
attempted raids on Steel locals at Trail, Kitimat, Thompson, and Hamilton, Tester and 
Walsh declined.  Concerned that the CCU connection might invite another raid by the 
USWA, they pushed for disaffiliation from the CCU, a move the membership supported 
in April 1972.14  The CLM in turn interpreted the push for CCU disaffiliation as further 
evidence of the Waffle acquiescing to the NDP and labour leadership in order to avoid a 
purge.  According to the CLM, Walsh, Tester and the Ontario Waffle leadership were 
seeking “to prove to the NDP leaders and to the all-powerful Steelworkers, who would 
just love to have the Mine-Mill membership, just how good and trustworthy the Waffle 
leadership is.”15 
Unlike their Ontario counterparts, the Saskatchewan Waffle determined that it 
must break away from the NDP.  Disappointment over the NDP government’s newly-
created land bank spurred the decision.  When Jack Messer, Saskatchewan’s Minister of 
                                                        
13 Gonick, A Very Red Life, 245. 
14 Ibid., 246. 
15 The NDP, the Waffle and the US-Run Unions, n.d. [1972], Box 1A Leaflets A-H, File 139, Canadian 
Liberation Movements fonds, MUA. 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Agriculture, introduced legislation in early 1972 to create a Land Bank Commission it 
faced multiple criticisms.  The president of the Estevan Chamber of Commerce described 
the plan as “complete folly,” Liberal leader David Steuart attacked the bill as a “land 
grab” akin to farm policies behind the “Iron Curtain,” and the Saskatchewan Waffle 
complained the land bank’s option-to-purchase detracted from the broader goal of 
furthering public ownership.16  Doug McArthur, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and 
principal author of the legislation, sought to encourage leasing by keeping rents low.  
However, his explanation “that the option to purchase not undermine the main tenure 
option that the Land Bank was attempting to introduce” failed to convince the Waffle.17  
The Land Bank Act passed the Saskatchewan legislature in  May 1972 and the Land 
Bank Commission began operations later that year.18 
 Consequently many of the key figures in the Saskatchewan Waffle had given up 
hope by the spring of 1972 of sufficiently influencing the NDP.  At a conference in 
March that was closed to the press, Wafflers discussed the province’s resource policy and 
economic development, focusing on oil and potash.  Although they agreed to emphasize 
nationalization as the preferred path towards a comprehensive socialist economic 
development policy, some expressed fear that “the NDP government could conceivably 
give in to pressure and act in this area – as they are now doing in the land bank – without 
any socialist orientation, and indeed corrupting the idea.”19  There was general agreement 
that the Waffle’s continued presence in the NDP maintained the “left legitimacy of the 
                                                        
16 “Chamber president opposes legislation” Regina Leader-Post, May 3, 1972; “Steuart attacks land bank 
bill” Regina Leader-Post April 22, 1971. 
17 McArthur quotation in Gruending, Promises to Keep, 107. 
18 Canada. Saskatchewan. Land Bank Commission. First Annual Report for the Period Ending March 31st, 
1973. Regina, 1973. 
19 Waffle Conference in Regina, March 1972, File I.22 Saskatchewan Waffle-NDP 1972, John Warnock 
Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). 
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party,” and that a split was both an inevitable development and a positive step on the road 
to socialism in Saskatchewan.20  The one remaining question that was to dominate the 
Saskatchewan Waffle for the next year involved the “tactics and timing” for breaking 
with the NDP.  In the meantime the group resolved to remain politically active by starting 
a bimonthly news magazine to report “the news omitted by the capitalist press.”  The 
resulting publication, Next Year Country, would occupy the attention of several leading 
Wafflers for several years to come.21 
Given the Manitoba Waffle’s limited strength compared to its counterparts in 
Ontario and Saskatchewan, the decision by disgruntled NDP MLA Jean Allard to depart 
the caucus in April 1972 due to “the growing influence of doctrinaire socialists and social 
radicals” was met with incredulity by most observers.22  Caucus annoyance over Allard’s 
public musings that he might contest the federal Liberal nomination in Churchill seemed 
a likelier reason.   Certainly neither Cy Gonick nor the social conservative NDP MLA Joe 
Borowski were dismayed by Allard’s news.  Gonick suggested personal conflicts rather 
than ideological differences were responsible for Allard’s departure: “he was not a person 
that most members of the caucus liked to deal with.”23  Although Allard had agreed with 
Borowski’s opposition to the legalisation of abortion and his support for funding separate 
schools, Borowski, who was no stranger to intemperate outbursts himself, described 
Allard’s departure as “the best news I’ve heard” since being elected.24   
                                                        
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Egon French, “Allard leaves NDP,” Winnipeg Free Press, April 8, 1972; “‘Doctrinaire Socialists’ 
Accused,” Winnipeg Free Press, April 10, 1972; Egon French, “Politics chancy game,” Winnipeg Free 
Press, April 15, 1972. 
23 Egon French, “Allard leaves NDP,” Winnipeg Free Press, April 8, 1972. 
24 Ibid. 
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Gonick would undoubtedly have dismissed Allard’s claim that radical socialists 
were influencing Manitoba’s NDP government.  Although Gonick supported the 
government’s land bank strategy for tackling rural depopulation, he did not hesitate to 
hold the Schreyer administration to account.25  Gonick urged the government to adopt a 
strategy for industrial development and address the problem of multinational corporations 
shutting down plants in Manitoba by committing to nationalize any industry that 
terminated operations in the province.26  He also challenged the government’s 
conclusions on the potential impact of South Indian Lake flooding, leading a reporter to 
note that Gonick “has been known to ask embarrassing questions of his government 
colleagues.”27  Gonick was also a lonely voice for the women’s liberation movement, 
calling on the provincial Human Rights Commission to take action on the “sexist nature 
of readers in our elementary schools.”28  On one occasion, to highlight how women were 
treated as sex objects “to sell products” he jokingly exposed the Manitoba legislature to a 
fold-out photograph of a nude Burt Reynolds that appeared in Cosmopolitan magazine.29 
The struggling Manitoba Waffle, concerned over developments in Ontario and 
Saskatchewan and the fact that the national Steering Committee had been inactive for a 
year, initiated a call for a national meeting of representatives from all provincial Waffle 
groups to meet in Winnipeg at the end of April.  Ontario, Saskatchewan and Manitoba 
were all represented but the sole expected representative from British Columbia, Ken 
Novakowski, a Waffler and federal NDP candidate, was unable to attend.  Mel Watkins 
                                                        
25 Robert MacKenzie, “Government and Agriculture,” Winnipeg Free Press, March 20, 1972. 
26 “Gonick Would Nationalize Any Plants Due To Close,” Winnipeg Free Press, April 12, 1972. 
27 “Gonick Questions Flooding Studies,” Winnipeg Free Press, March 18, 1972. 
28 “Mackling Backs Increase,” Winnipeg Free Press, March 28, 1972. 
29 “Male ‘Playmate’ Raises Query,” Winnipeg Free Press, March 30, 1972.  PC Inez Trueman was the only 
woman among the fifty-seven MLAs. 
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reported on the Waffle’s situation in Ontario and outlined concessions it was willing to 
make to remain in the provincial NDP.  These included notifying the party in advance 
about the Waffle’s public activities, clarifying that any of its public statements were not 
necessarily reflective of official NDP policy, and ensuring that Waffle candidates in the 
upcoming federal election adhered to the party platform.  Watkins did not anticipate the 
ONDP Provincial Council taking action against the Waffle any time soon.30  As John 
Warnock, Carol Gudmundson, and Jill Sargent explained, the Ontario steering committee 
believed an attempted purge of the Waffle in that province would be hotly contested by 
those riding associations opposed to the idea, making it likely that “the Lewis forces do 
not want such a ‘victory’ and will therefore back down.”31  Watkins and Laxer did face 
some criticism at the national Waffle meeting over the Ontario group’s brief to the 
Vichert Committee and decision to pull out of the Nixon demonstration in Ottawa.32 
 Whereas the Ontario Waffle had outlined concessions it would make in order to 
remain in the NDP, leading Wafflers from Saskatchewan and Manitoba demonstrated 
they had abandoned all hope of transforming the NDP provincially.  Myron Kuziak 
reported that the Saskatchewan Waffle “has reached an impasse in the NDP” and now 
wondered if it should plan for a split or wait for one to be initiated by party right-wingers.  
Cy Gonick explained that the “personality cult” surrounding Premier Schreyer undercut 
any internal opposition in the Manitoba NDP, and lamented being the only left-wing 
                                                        
30 Al Finkel and John Warnock, “Notes on a clandestine and unofficial meeting of provincial Waffle 
representatives and interested observers,” 1972, File I.8 NDP-Waffle 1972, John Warnock Papers, SAB 
(Saskatoon). 
31 Jack Warnock, Carol Gudmundson, Jill Sargent to Saskatchewan Waffle Steering Committee, June 12, 
1972, File II.16 Correspondence, 1973-1981, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
32 Watkins and Laxer were criticized by other Ontario Wafflers for not involving the membership in 
responding to Stephen Lewis’s attack on the group and by Manitoba and Saskatchewan Wafflers for the 
concessions they were willing to make in order to remain in the NDP, especially since Waffle leaders in 
both prairie provinces had concluded there was not a viable future in the party.  The Ontario Waffle leaders 
also faced questions over their pressuring the Ottawa Waffle to “back off” from the anti-Nixon protest. 
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voice in the party’s caucus.33  The Winnipeg gathering debated the Ontario and 
Saskatchewan Waffles’ diverging strategies, with some advocating adoption of a national 
strategy.  Although a national coordinator position was created to improve 
communications, the provincial groups remained fully autonomous.  Responding to the 
earlier attacks against the Ontario Waffle, representatives at the national meeting 
confirmed that the Waffle must continue to identify and act independently, refuse to 
concede its right to exist as a separately structured entity within the NDP, and improve its 
links with union locals while attempting to re-establish a national focus.  Some 
disagreements were not settled at the Winnipeg gathering.  For instance, a debate that 
emerged among Esther Mathews, Kelly Crichton, Mel Watkins, Joe Flexer, and Jackie 
Larkin over the relative importance of cultural nationalism, foreshadowed future 
divisions over nationalism and class.34 
 Saskatchewan Wafflers expressed frustration after the meeting with what they 
perceived as the Ontario Waffle’s timidity.  John Warnock, Carol Gudmundson, and Jill 
Sargent complained to the Saskatchewan steering committee that the Ontario group was 
“on the defensive – or so it appears, and at a time when they by rights should be on the 
offensive because of the disastrous showing that the right-wing approach made in the past 
Ontario election.”35  John Conway also expressed displeasure with the Ontario Waffle 
leadership, explaining to Warnock he did not think it important to attend the Winnipeg 
meeting since “it was called only because Laxer does not like what we are discussing out 
                                                        
33 Al Finkel and John Warnock, “Notes on a clandestine and unofficial meeting of provincial Waffle 
representatives and interested observers,” 1972, File I.8 NDP-Waffle 1972, John Warnock Papers, SAB 
(Saskatoon). 
34 Ibid.; Summary – Winnipeg Waffle Meeting, April 30, 1972, File III.28 National Waffle, John Richards 
Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). 
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here.”36  Conway was also angry over Laxer’s appearance at a Waffle meeting in Regina, 
which he interpreted as an attempt to influence the Saskatchewan Waffle’s plans for 
splitting from the NDP.  Laxer, Conway snapped, “is beginning to behave like a David 
Lewis of the left.”37 
While the Saskatchewan Wafflers urged their Ontario confreres to take the 
offensive, the Vichert Committee contended the Waffle had become too offensive.  In its 
report the committee accused the Waffle of changing for the worse since its formation in 
1969.  The committee had been appalled at the Wafflers’ behaviour during its hearings at 
Toronto and Ottawa, when party members with whom they disagreed were subjected to 
booing, hissing, jeering, and “indifference or scorn.”  Furthermore, the committee 
concluded the Waffle’s continued existence as a permanent opposition “cannot fail to 
confuse the public.”  The report commented on the deep divisions separating the Waffle 
and NDP on basic party principles, which included divisions over electoral politics, 
policies, leadership, structure, and commitments to union affiliation.  While recognizing 
the right of members, riding associations, and affiliated organizations to express dissent 
over aspects of NDP policy and leadership, the Vichert Committee believed no 
compromises were possible as long as the Waffle insisted on existing as “an organized 
opposition in the party.”  The report deemed the Waffle “a group organized on a 
continuing basis for the expressed purpose of securing fundamental changes in the 
strategies, structure, leadership, policies and principles of the party,” and as such must 
either dissolve or face disciplinary action.38  James Laxer remembered the report being 
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“harshly critical of the Waffle, even going so far as to compare its political tone to the 
stridency of former Alabama Governor and segregationist George Wallace – a metaphor 
for new left Canadian nationalists that was so extreme as to ultimately undermine the 
credibility of the task force.”39 
Although Watkins had been sanguine about the unlikelihood of the Ontario NDP 
Provincial Council attempting a purge of the Waffle, the party’s Provincial Executive did 
adopt the Vichert Committee report when it met on May 6, 1972.  The only opposition to 
the move was expressed by the six Wafflers on the Executive.  The Waffle had not taken 
seriously John Harney’s proposal that it assume an affiliate status similar to a union local, 
and when Desmond Morton sought to amend the Executive Committee’s report to 
incorporate the possibility of affiliate status for the Waffle his motion was defeated.40  
 Five days after the ONDP Executive meeting Mel Watkins, Kelly Crichton, and 
James Laxer met with moderate party activists, primarily from the St. David riding 
association in Toronto, including former Waffler Giles Endicott and Toronto alderman 
Karl Jaffary.  MPPs Elie Martel (Sudbury East), Michael Cassidy (Ottawa), Janusz 
Dukszta (Parkdale) and Jim Foulds (Port Arthur) also attended the meeting at Watkins’s 
home.  Endicott chaired and explained how St. David activists had met with Stephen 
Lewis to tell him the Provincial Council in Oshawa “was a hell of a way to run the party” 
and that he should “cool it.”  Endicott urged the Wafflers to do the same, and clarified to 
Watkins, Crichton and Laxer that “this meeting may seem like an attacking session – it 
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is.”41  The moderates criticized the Waffle for making personal attacks on NDP and 
labour leaders, conducting independent fundraising efforts, and for operating separate 
from internal party structures.  They urged Wafflers to begin making positive statements 
about the NDP to demonstrate their loyalty.42  The Wafflers indicated a willingness to 
compromise on some of these issues. Laxer explained they were prepared to “cool it on 
personal attacks,” to work within the party structure, stop publicizing Waffle statements 
as ‘NDP-Waffle’ and curb their fundraising.  However Watkins, Crichton and Laxer 
rejected Dukszta’s suggestion “that the Waffle should disband formally and continue to 
do what it does.”  Watkins indicated that the Waffle was considering Morton’s idea of 
seeking affiliation status with the NDP, but it preferred the status quo and certainly had 
no intention of disbanding.43 
At the same time as the Waffle was facing pressure from party moderates to 
change its behaviour, party officials across the country, including federal NDP leader 
David Lewis, urged the Ontario section to compromise and avoid issuing the Waffle any 
ultimatums.  Saskatchewan MP John Skoberg opposed the “all or nothing” position taken 
by the Vichert Committee since the Ontario party’s decision was certain to reverberate in 
the party across the country.  Rather, the matter of the Waffle and “groups… using 
pressure politics to bring about democratic change within the Party” should be handled 
by a federal NDP convention.44  Grant Notley, Alberta’s NDP leader, signed a petition 
opposing any move by the Ontario party to oust the Waffle and as a result was 
admonished by Ontario NDP secretary Brigden for interfering in the affairs of another 
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provincial party.45  David Lewis wrote to Vichert recommending informal discussions 
between the federal and Ontario NDP leaderships to address how “federal aspects of the 
problem may be taken into consideration in discussions and preparations” for the ONDP 
Provincial Council scheduled for June in Orillia.  Although Lewis’s tone suggested 
concern that a showdown with the Waffle might harm the party’s chances in the 
upcoming federal election, he reassured Vichert “I do not have any hesitation about the 
fact that an appropriate and decisive step has to be taken with respect to the Waffle.”46  
Stephen Lewis later recalled: 
There were two meetings at the Ontario Federation of Labour building which I 
would sooner forget at which father and son were at bitter loggerheads… There 
was one meeting attended by David, by Mahoney, by Dowling, by Larry Sefton, 
by Lynn, by Don Taylor, by Montgomery, by Bud Clark, Sam Fox, David Archer, 
Dennis, Vichert, and myself at which David made a strong appeal that we 
shouldn’t do it, that we should lay off.  I was taking an absolutely intransigent 
line; so was Sefton; so was Williams.  McDermott was touch and go.  McDermott  
wasn’t sure – he wanted to move the Waffle out but he didn’t want to offend the 
old man – none of them did.47 
 
Kenneth Bagnell reported in the Globe and Mail that David Archer, Dennis 
McDermott and William Mahoney were approaching a compromise position, since they 
preferred to have the Waffle remain inside the NDP rather than witness the departure of 
hundreds of party activists, leaving a divided and demoralized party in their wake.48  
Media reports of this development led Ontario Wafflers to believe the party and union 
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leadership were debating withdrawing the Vichert Committee’s report.  Although willing 
to make some compromises, leading Wafflers resisted agreeing to any restrictions on 
their group’s activities beyond the concessions already granted.  Confident that it could 
count on support from party members in the various riding associations, the Waffle 
intended to force Stephen Lewis and the party leadership to drop all threats of expulsion 
and postpone any decisions on the Waffle’s right to exist until the ONDP convention met 
in the fall of 1972.49 
 In attempting to persuade party members of its right to remain within the NDP, 
the Ontario Waffle emphasized the democratic necessity of allowing members to initiate 
and organize internal reforms.  James Laxer recalled “the Waffle fought a provincewide 
campaign to salvage its legitimacy within the party.”50  Wafflers urged party members in 
their riding associations to oppose the Vichert Committee’s recommendations.  Several 
ridings, including Ottawa South and St. David, threatened a strike by party members “on 
all aspects of normal riding activities” should the Waffle be expelled from the ONDP.51  
Party activists from riding associations across the country urged the ONDP leadership to 
reconsider its expulsion plans.52  The riding association executive in Vancouver Point 
Grey lauded the Waffle’s “positive, vital, and constructive influence,” while in Moose 
Jaw North members implored the ONDP leadership and the Waffle to “resolve their 
differences in the interests of the NDP as a whole.”53 
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Concerned that attempts to implement the Vichert Committee’s harsh 
recommendations might be rejected by moderate party activists, Vichert and Gerald 
Caplan produced a compromise resolution via the Peterborough riding association similar 
to the one John Harney and Desmond Morton had previously floated unsuccessfully.  The 
motion proposed introducing a category of associate membership “open to organizations 
whose purpose is the dissemination of political ideas compatible with those of the party 
and which are not organized to seek public office, providing they undertake to accept and 
abide by the principles and constitution of the party.”  An added proviso would forbid 
associate members from using the party’s name or maintaining a separate organizational 
structure within the NDP.54  The Administrative Committee of the Provincial Executive 
rejected the Peterborough compromise in favour of the Vichert Committee’s original 
recommendations, a decision that Terry Morley, a member of the Administrative 
Committee, recalled was “strongly influenced by Lynn Williams.”55 
In their discussions with the Ontario NDP leadership about the Waffle and the 
Vichert Committee report, labour leaders were resolute.  The Waffle’s connection to left-
nationalist caucuses within the USWA and UAW in the unions’ heartland of southern 
Ontario threatened labour leaders who could not help being reminded of their struggles 
against Communist unionists in the recent past.  Although Stephen Lewis remembered 
being “persuaded that the Waffle was destroying the party,” he also recalled an “unstated 
ultimatum” from the trade union movement intimating labour would rescind its financial 
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support of the NDP unless the Waffle was removed.56  Lewis worried that the Vichert 
Committee report was “engendering so much antagonism” within the NDP it would 
produce an irrevocable rupture between party and union activists.  He therefore had no 
choice but to “persuade the trade unionists that alternative wording had to be found” in 
order to retain the support of moderate party members, even while he personally bore the 
brunt of labour’s displeasure.  As Lewis explained, “Lynn Williams, who was the 
bargainer for the trade union movement, was treating me like INCO and he just wasn’t 
moving an inch.”57  Larry Sefton, USWA District Six Director, who was then dying of 
cancer, expressed deep displeasure over Lewis’s request to compromise on the Waffle 
when Sefton himself had devoted his life to building up the CCF and NDP.58  Williams 
does not recall threatening to withdraw Steelworker support from the NDP, but 
explained: 
My sense of myself was built around indignation that the Waffle was going to 
destroy my party not that I was going to destroy my party.  And my whole focus 
was that we had to win this argument… I can’t imagine ever threatening that we 
were going to leave. Where would we go?59 
 
As Williams described in his memoirs, Sefton was “strong and unequivocal” on the 
existence of the Waffle.  At a meeting between Sefton, Williams and Lewis, Sefton 
“made it clear where the Steelworkers stood and that there would be no change in that 
position.”60  Williams maintained that the Waffle’s presence in the NDP “would 
jeopardize the union support the party enjoyed… And I’m certain that I would have 
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argued that the trade union membership represented much more of a cut of what Ontario 
citizens thought than did a meeting of the council of the party.”61  Moreover, as Bob 
Mackenzie, another Steelworker official deeply involved with the NDP explained in a 
letter to David Lewis, his support for the NDP was conditional on the Waffle’s departure.  
Mackenzie warned Lewis “it is not a time for Neville Chamberlain tactics,” and predicted 
“that the so-called middle of the Party would not last, or be effective, three months if the 
Waffle were in control and that the Unions certainly would not stay under this kind of 
situation.”  Mackenzie reminded Lewis that “you and the Party still need many of us who 
have become labelled the sell-outs and lunatic right wing fringe.  David, that support is 
no longer automatic.”  Mackenzie warned that a forced compromise with the Waffle 
would lead union leaders to conclude “some of us don’t belong and we have to find 
another political way.”62  Not long before, David Lewis had chided the Waffle over the 
inconsistency between its rhetoric and its actions represented by its failure to organize 
workers.  Ironically, the Waffle’s modicum of success in attracting support from workers 
in international unions had now generated a backlash that threatened to whip the group 
out of the NDP. 
 Moderates among the party leadership, including John Harney, Walter Pitman and 
Ed Broadbent, desperately sought a solution to the impasse.  Broadbent developed an 
alternative which they believed would accomplish the goal of ridding the Ontario NDP of 
the Waffle challenge while still affirming the right of dissenting caucuses to exist within 
the party.63  John Brewin explained that “a form of compromise was accepted which was 
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no compromise at all… There was a change in wording which meant that my father and a 
whole bunch of people who fell in the centre could say that they accepted it.  And yet the 
trade union caucus at the council could be persuaded that the compromise didn’t water 
down the fundamental recommendation at all.”64  The Riverdale riding association passed 
Broadbent’s resolution three days before the Provincial Council meeting: 
(1) The present structure and behavior of the Waffle cannot continue; (2) It is 
contrary to the spirit and meaning of the constitution of the ONDP for any group 
within the party to assume a public identity with a name distinct from that of the 
party.  The Waffle is such a group and has such a name; (3) Groups of members 
within the party are, of course, free as they have always been, to co-operate and 
caucus so long as their role remains non-public and consistent with the principles 
of the NDP.65 
 
Despite the forceful language of points one and two, Stephen Lewis had to work hard to 
persuade Lynn Williams and the USWA leaders that the Riverdale resolution could 
actually force the Waffle’s ouster from the Ontario NDP.  The Provincial Executive 
obliged by placing the Riverdale resolution first in the order of debate, ahead of 
compromise resolutions from the Peterborough, Beaches-Woodbine and Carleton-East 
riding associations.66  An increased number of Steelworker delegates was responsible for 
a union delegation larger than usually attended Provincial Council.67  Lewis described 
meeting with union delegates the night before the vote: 
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The night before the council meeting, at the beer-drinking hall where the dance 
was after the executive meeting, the trade union delegates were brought into the 
backroom in groups of between fifteen and twenty.  Pilkey was there, Lynn was 
there, Bob McKenzie was there.  They would talk to the delegates to explain the 
change in the report and why it was acceptable to them… I was at the hall from 
9:00 PM until 3:00 in the morning.68 
 
The Waffle and party moderates alike made desperate appeals to New Democrats 
ahead of the expected showdown in Orillia.  Walter Pitman and John Harney wrote an 
open letter to members on the eve of Provincial Council urging them to reach common 
ground and proposing a resolution which would allow the delegates to choose between 
two compromise proposals – one outlined rules of behaviour for internal party caucuses, 
and the other created an associate membership status – rather than removing the Waffle.69  
Mel Watkins also wrote to delegates prior to the meeting to explain the Waffle’s 
willingness to compromise by securing approval from party bodies such as riding 
associations or the OYND before undertaking any public activities and refraining from 
holding press conferences to promote policies that contradicted the NDP.  Watkins 
addressed tensions between union leaders and the Waffle, expressed regret at the 
Waffle’s contributions over the “present impasse,” and clarified that the group’s support 
for Canadian autonomy in the labour movement “did not intend to split or damage any 
existing labour organizations that have the support of their members.”70 
Five resolutions dealing with the Waffle were presented simultaneously at the 
Provincial Council, but the executive’s decision to hear first the Riverdale resolution 
ensured that it shaped the debate.  Confusion ensued when speakers supporting the 
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Riverdale resolution, including Gordon Vichert, MPP Michael Cassidy, and MP Andrew 
Brewin, described it as a compromise while Bob Mackenzie, a Steelworker official, 
explicitly attacking the Waffle as “a cancer,” interpreted the Riverdale resolution as the 
means to remove the group, and said “it will give us the tools to do the job.”71  Pauline 
Jewett, a former Liberal and star NDP candidate federally who opposed the resolution, 
argued that even compromise proposals endorsed by the Waffle were too conservative 
and would damage the party’s claim that it protected internal democracy.72  The 
implications of the Riverdale resolution soon became clear.  Watkins pleaded with the 
party to “draw back from the brink,” while Gerald Caplan mounted an “almost frenzied” 
attack on the Waffle.73  Stephen Lewis’s speech proved to be the final nail in the Waffle’s 
coffin.  Described by Waffle sympathizer Michael Cross as “a masterful performance, an 
affirmation of his socialist credentials, a persuasive argument, a threat of resignation, all 
wrapped up in a rhetorical tour du force,” Lewis attacked the Waffle for existing in clear 
violation of the party’s constitution.74  He declared “I, too am a socialist who wishes to 
fight for a free Canada, but without the Waffle forever an encumbrance around my 
neck.”75  The question was called and the Riverdale resolution passed by a vote of 217 to 
88.76  In his report the following day, Lewis described his personal feelings of “immense 
relief” at the weekend’s events, urged the Ontario NDP to focus on preparing for the 
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upcoming federal election, and expressed his hope that Waffle supporters whose primary 
allegiance was to the NDP would remain in the party.77 
The determination of David and Stephen Lewis’s opposition to the Waffle 
warrants added comment.  Their role in opposing the Waffle earned them a special 
enmity from some leftists, as Mel Watkins description of “how to identify a Waffler” in 
Maclean’s attests: “You walk right up to him and whisper, ‘Stephen Lewis.’ If his eyes 
go all slitty, he’s Waffle.”78  Two factors in particular likely account for the Lewises’s 
determination to oppose the Waffle.   
A history of conflict with Communists loomed large in the Lewis family, and in 
the polarized political atmosphere of the Cold War the Waffle likely appeared like a 
defeated enemy arisen from the ashes.  Cameron Smith emphasizes this aspect in his 
biography of the Lewis family.  One of the three quotations Smith uses to open his 
biography of the Lewis family is from Doris Andras, David’s sister: “we fought 
communists all the time.”  Smith emphasizes the importance of David’s father Maishe’s 
involvement in the Jewish Labour Bund in the early 20th century and he passionately 
described during his farewell speech to the 1975 NDP convention the experience of his 
father being arrested and threatened with execution by the Bolsheviks in 1919 during the 
Polish-Soviet War “for no other reason” than being a Menshevik.79  Furthermore, 
communists in unions were, in David Lewis’s view, one of the major obstacles to union 
affiliation with the CCF, and he worked tirelessly to rid the labour movement of their 
                                                        
77 Report of Provincial Leader, Minutes of the Provincial Council, June 24-25, 1972, Series 13 Executive 
and Council Minutes, File 4 Executive and Council Minutes 1970-72, New Democratic Party Ontario 
fonds, QUA. 
78 Maclean’s April 1971, 22. 
79 David Lewis, Speech to NDP Convention, 1975,  
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/david-lewis-says-farewell-at-the-1975-ndp-convention 
Smith explains that Lewis was “virulently opposed to the Moscow line of communism – after all, these 
were the people who almost killed his father, who instituted the Red Terror,” Unfinished Journey, 236. 
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communist rivals.80  Their defeat and ostracization was a key factor in the establishment 
of the CLC in 1956 and the NDP in 1961.  Clifford Scotton explained “I think David saw 
the Waffle as another manifestation of the Trots, the Commies, or whatever, so he would 
go back to the old battle.  David felt that you were either with us or against us.”81  The 
presence of “red diaper babies” such as James Laxer and Steve Penner alongside ex-
Communists such as Bill Walsh and Al Campbell and Trotskyists likely sounded alarm 
bells for David Lewis.  The Lewises’s biographer argues “what the Waffle did was touch 
a nerve still raw with memories of thirty years of bruising struggle.”82  David Lewis 
recalled that the Waffle reminded him of the struggle with the Socialist Fellowship in the 
BC CCF in 1950 and claimed “the consequences were not new or surprising, but they 
were none the less painful.”  He also suggested that Stephen, unaccustomed to “the 
poisonous antagonisms of internal strife on an organized scale,” was “outraged by the 
fratricidal animosities which deformed relationships and crippled the will to constructive 
thought and work during the Waffle period.”83   
 In addition to the Lewises’s concern that the Waffle was a recurrence of past 
internal struggles, it is clear that both David and Stephen Lewis also faced considerable 
pressure from labour leaders to rid the party of the Waffle.  David Lewis’s determination 
to secure union affiliations to the CCF and the joint CLC-CCF effort to create the NDP 
drew on his knowledge of the British Labour Party.  He viewed the labour connection as 
                                                        
80 David Lewis describes himself as “in the forefront against communist disruption,” in The Good Fight, 
298.  Smith writes “in all the battles against Communists David was centrally involved” and describes his 
pivotal role in the twenty-year-long struggle between the pro-CCF USWA and the communist Mine-Mill in 
Sudbury. Smith, Unfinished Journey, 306-26.  See also Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, 85-131. 
81 John Brewin concurred, saying “David and my father and others tended to see the Waffle as the old-style 
type of Communist assault on the party… it was yet another impulse of the left that needed to be put 
down.” Scotton and Brewin quotations from Smith, Unfinished Journey, 426. 
82 Smith, Unfinished Journey, 427. 
83 Lewis, The Good Fight, 387. 
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essential to the NDP’s future prospects.  Stephen realized the importance of union leaders 
and delegates to the party’s internal power structure prior to his successful leadership run 
in 1971 when labour support proved crucial to his victory.  It is unlikely that either could 
have imagined a NDP without its union allies. 
Despite initial press reports that it was acting in defiance of the Provincial 
Council, the Ontario Waffle planned a conference in Delaware, near London, in August 
of 1972 to determine its options.84  But first, at a two-day meeting during July in 
Gravenhurst a group of key Wafflers delivered papers and developed proposals for the 
formation of a Waffle movement separate from the NDP.  Among those in attendance 
were Watkins, Laxer, Maeots, and John and Pat Smart, all original authors of the Waffle 
Manifesto.  They were joined by long-time Waffle activists Ellie Prepas, Bruce Kidd, 
Paul Craven, Dave Neumann, Linda Hay, and Julia Bass.85  The outcome of the 
Gravenhurst gathering was a proposal to split the Waffle from the NDP and form a 
Movement for an Independent and Socialist Canada (MISC). 
Two of the Waffle’s constituent groups – the Red Circle and the League for 
Socialist Action (LSA) – promptly objected to the MISC proposal.  The Red Circle was 
the name given to a group of Wafflers that included Steve Penner and Jackie Larkin who 
were greatly influenced by developments in the international Trotskyist movement and 
had become increasingly critical of Laxer’s and Watkins’s leadership.  Penner, Larkin, 
Varda Burstyn and Joe Flexer insisted the Ontario Waffle remain within the NDP and 
abide by the party’s requirements that policy differences not be aired in public, while at 
                                                        
84 Claire Hoy, “Waffle decides to defy NDP order to disband,” Toronto Star, June 26, 1972. 
85 Towards a Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada: Two-Day Meeting, July 29-30, Gravenhurst, 
Ontario, 1972, Box 2, File 11, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA. 
  332 
the same time continuing its efforts to shift the party towards more socialist positions.86  
The LSA viewed MISC as potentially counterproductive since the existing polarization in 
the NDP over the Waffle “gives our movement greater possibilities to intervene than ever 
before.”87  LSA supporters predicted MISC would become a “dwindling pressure group 
composed of bickering academics and professionals, without real roots in either the 
economic or political movements of the workers.”  They encouraged the Waffle to 
imitate the LSA by becoming actively involved in the campaign for legalized, accessible 
abortion and the anti-war movement.88   
In the lead-up to the Delaware conference, Waffle members circulated a number 
of proposals, two of which represented irreconcilable positions that ultimately polarized 
the two-day conference.  Advocates of splitting from the NDP and creating a Movement 
for an Independent and Socialist Canada, dubbed ‘Option Three,’ included Laxer, 
Maeots, Watkins, Kelly Crichton, the Smarts, Dave Neumann, George Gilks, Esther 
Mathews, Corileen North and Ellie Prepas.  They deemed it no longer viable to remain 
part of the NDP since despite the Waffle’s best efforts the ONDP “decisively rejected the 
right of a left caucus to exist inside the party” as well as “the politics of independence 
and socialism.”  Continuing to organize within the NDP would only lead to mass 
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87 Gary Porter to LSA branch organizers, NDP coordinators and members at large, July 12, 1972, File 32-1 
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expulsions.89  Tellingly, the MISC paper identified “three streams of thought within the 
Waffle.”  The first stream, with which the authors identified, were those committed to 
independence and socialism who saw the NDP as a base for the struggle.  The second 
stream comprised committed New Democrats who understood the Waffle as a “ginger 
group” on the party’s left wing.  The third stream, which the authors considered a small 
minority, consisted of various “left tendencies,” such as Trotskyists, committed to 
exposing the “bankruptcy of social democracy” or believing themselves a “vanguard” 
within the Waffle.90  With the NDP no longer a viable base in the struggle for 
independence and socialism, the question looming over the paper was whether a majority 
of Wafflers would identify with the first “stream of thought” and choose to break from 
the party or if the group consisted primarily of left-wing but committed New Democrats 
and Trotskyists. 
Despite accusations to the contrary, the Waffle was not a Trotskyist group.  
Nevertheless its intention of shifting the NDP to the left was attractive to Trotskyists 
schooled in the tactic of entryism and the group certainly counted Trotskyists among its 
supporters from the early stages.  The tactic of entryism, embraced by the LSA/YS, 
entailed Trotskyist activists entering social democratic parties and social movements with 
the aim of winning new adherents to revolutionary socialism.91  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, Trotskyist activists made important contributions to New Left protest movements in 
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90 Ibid. 
91 Bryan Palmer explained the strategy: “In order to expand the possibilities of activism by like-minded 
revolutionaries, as well as win recruits from other organizations, Trotskyist groups could enter into bodies, 
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the 1960s, including the anti-Vietnam War movement.  The LSA’s efforts in the NDP 
had been less successful.  Thirty young Trotskyists were expelled from the NDP in 1963, 
virtually wiping out the YS contingent in the NDY and forcing members to avoid 
identifying with the LSA.92  A 1965 article in the New Democrat titled “Canada’s 
Screwball left” denounced the LSA/YS and Trotskyism as “parasites on the body of other 
political parties.”93  Another dozen YS members were expelled from the NDP in 1967 
and the persistent expulsions led LSA leader Ross Dowson to exercise and advise caution 
in LSA/YS interactions with the Waffle.94 
Trotskyists were active in the Waffle almost from its inception.  Regula Modlich, 
for instance, attended the group’s fourth meeting in Kingston on July 26, 1969 and the 
Workers Vanguard inadvertently published the Waffle Manifesto prior to its intended 
public release.  As discussed in previous chapters, the New Brunswick Waffle was almost 
entirely the construction of the Trotskyist Fredericton YS.  Furthermore, several Wafflers 
adopted a Trotskyist analysis as a result of their activism in the NDP.  John Warnock 
complained to John Richards: “It is too bad that Thompson, Brown, Kopperud and Kouri 
joined this LSA with all that fanfare… They have nothing to gain from LSA; they will be 
the best people in it.”95   
The LSA central office instructed members how to approach the Waffle’s internal 
debates.  Prior to the Ontario Waffle’s Delaware conference LSA secretary Gary Porter 
informed “branch organizers, NDP coordinators and members at large” that they should 
oppose the proposal to split and form the MISC.  Porter explained “the situation presents 
                                                        
92 Isittt, Militant Minority, 176. 
93 “Canada’s Screwball left: the Trotskyites,” New Democrat, August 1965. 
94 See, for example, Webber “‘For a Socialist New Brunswick,’” M.A. Thesis, 74-5, 121-2. 
95 Letter from John Warnock to John Richards, September 28, 1970, File II.3 Correspondence 1968-1971, 
John Richards Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). 
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us with a unique opportunity to move in, rally the force in the Waffle and the party as a 
whole that want to carry the fight and lay the ground work for another left formation or 
‘socialist caucus’ broader than the socialist caucus” that existed from 1965-67.96  
However, the LSA never achieved much influence within the Waffle.  In 1972 LSA 
political committee member Dick Fidler complained that “everywhere we are excluded 
from Waffle executives and campaign committees.”97  James Laxer remembers the 
Trotskyists as “quite a small minority” in the Waffle.  He explained “there might have 
been meetings where they were 20 or 25 percent.  But we always knew who they were 
and they never had their way in anything… one thing I would not agree with is ever using 
the Trots as a way to talk about what the Waffle really stood for.”98  In fact, the Waffle 
leadership’s hostility to the Trotskyists helps explain the Waffle’s reluctance to 
participate in coalitions with social movements in which the LSA played a leading role.99  
As Fidler explained, “the elements who constitute the Waffle leadership and determine its 
policies are hostile to the mass campaigns we project… they have explicitly rejected 
proposals to work in or support the anti-war coalitions and the organized movement for 
abortion law repeal.”100 
 However, the Trotskyist influence on the Waffle was not limited to the LSA.  The 
appeal of an ideology providing a revolutionary Marxist framework that nevertheless 
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engaged with mainstream social democratic political parties and unions and 
simultaneously connected New Left activists to an international socialist movement with 
a credible anti-Stalinist history proved strong.  Other Wafflers, such as Steve Penner and 
Jackie Larkin, adopted a Trotskyist analysis which led them to advocate a “stay and 
fight” position in the summer of 1972 and form the Revolutionary Marxist Group in 
1973.  And, as we shall see, a York-based study group that took over the remnants of the 
Ontario Waffle in December 1974 was strongly influenced by the Trotskyist analysis of 
the International Socialists. 
As the internal debate over the Waffle’s response to the NDP ultimatum 
crystallized around the MISC plan, the Red Circlers, including Penner and Larkin, 
championed a “stay and fight” proposal known as ‘Option Five.’  They criticized 
attempts by the Ontario Waffle to appeal to party centrists, such as during the debates 
preceding the ONDP Provincial Council in Orillia, a strategy that “retreated politically 
and diluted our position.”  They were convinced the Ontario Waffle continued to garner 
support from rank-and-file New Democrats and urged the group to persist until at least 
the next provincial convention.  Furthermore, they argued that MISC as envisioned would 
result in the group’s separation from workers in “politicized union locals” who remained 
affiliated with the NDP.101 
 At Delaware, after the morning was spent debating procedural questions the 
discussion revolved around Options Five and Three.102  Speaking on behalf of Option 
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Five, Varda Burstyn maintained that “our defeat at Orillia was only a tactical defeat… we 
reject the proposal to withdraw from the struggle.”103  Supporters of Option Three 
disagreed, insisting they were not withdrawing from the struggle but merely facing 
reality: the ONDP’s decision at Orillia essentially prevented the Waffle from organizing 
effectively within the NDP.  Laxer and Watkins, while personally committed to forming 
a new movement, emphasized that MISC supporters would not need to give up their NDP 
memberships and a future reconciliation might still be possible if the NDP turned 
leftward.  Furthermore, they explained MISC would not be a political party, although left 
open the possibility it might become one in the future.104  After an afternoon of 
acrimonious debate, the delegates voted 89 to 49 in favour of the Waffle leaving the NDP 
to form MISC.105   The minority committed to the “stay and fight” option issued a 
statement to the press indicating they would remain as a ‘Left Caucus’ within the NDP 
and strive to have this role validated at the NDP Convention in December.106  On the 
second day of the conference Option Three supporters reconstituted themselves as the 
Ontario Waffle Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada and passed a motion 
denying membership to delegates who had not voted with the majority and chose instead 
to remain as a ‘Left Caucus’ in the NDP.  Four Wafflers, all supporters of Option Three, 
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had previously been nominated as NDP candidates in the upcoming federal election.107  
All four, including Laxer and Watkins, resigned their candidacies after the conference.108  
Following a ten-minute adjournment, the conference reconvened as the Organizing 
Committee of MISC.  Much of the ensuing discussion revolved around criteria for 
membership in the new movement.  Wafflers, wary of a possible takeover by other left 
groups such as the Canadian Liberation Movement, the Communist Party, the Canadian 
Party of Labour, and the League for Socialist Action, passed a motion stating 
The Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada shall invite residents of 
Ontario who share its aims and purposes to join it.  Its membership shall not be 
open to members of other left groups who operate closed or unacknowledged 
caucuses in its midst.109 
 
MISC’s structure closely resembled that of the Waffle prior to the split.  Local groups 
were established with a minimum of six members, the largest being three Toronto groups 
and one in Ottawa.110  Prior to adjournment at Delaware, plans were made to hold a 
founding convention in Sudbury within three months, and an Ad Hoc Secretariat 
appointed until a regionally representative ProTem Committee could be established to 
organize the convention.111  The new movement was born. 
                                                        
107 The four Waffle-NDP candidates were Jim Laxer, Mel Watkins, George Gilks and Ellie Prepas. 
108 London Conference Minutes, August 19 and 20, 1972, Box 1, File 4, New Democratic Party Waffle 
collection, MUA.   
109 Minutes of the Organizing Committee of the Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada, August 
1972, Box 1, File 4, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA.  In the future, the Waffle would 
impose more stringent membership criteria, in which local groups were given the power to accept or deny 
prospective members.  John Bullen notes “the extreme irony” in the Waffle’s decision to ban internal 
caucuses in Bullen, “The Ontario Waffle,” M.A. Thesis, 152. 
110 The three Toronto groups were East Metro, North Metro and West Metro.  Laxer and Maeots were 
members of the East Metro group, Watkins and Crichton were members of the North Metro group, while 
the Smarts and the Mathews were members of the Ottawa group.  The executive and council were elected 
on the basis of regional representation proportionate to the number of members in each local group. 
111 The Ad Hoc Secretariat consisted of four Toronto Wafflers – Hilary Armstrong, Maggi Boyce, Richard 
Comber and Dan Heap. Minutes of the Organizing Committee of the Movement for an Independent 
Socialist Canada, August 1972, Box 1, File 4, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA; The 
ProTem Committee included Dave and Elfreda Neumann (Brantford), Paul Middleton (Hamilton), Jim 
Gaskell and Rosemary Warskett (Kingston), Mary Campbell and John Crook (London), John Smart and 
  339 
 Whereas in Ontario the NDP sought to rid itself of the Waffle and in 
Saskatchewan the Waffle sought to rid itself of the NDP, in British Columbia Wafflers 
had largely been absorbed into the party mainstream.  The west coast New Democrats 
were also regularly targeted with accusations of radical socialism by their well-
entrenched political opponents.  W.A.C. Bennett had been the Social Credit premier of 
British Columbia for nearly twenty years when, in August 1972, he continued his 
tradition of calling a summertime election every three years and sent British Columbians 
to the polls.  This time, however, the seventy-two-year-old Bennett faced a serious 
challenge from a trio of younger party leaders – forty-one-year-old New Democrat Dave 
Barrett, thirty-five-year-old Liberal David Anderson, and thirty-two-year-old Progressive 
Conservative Derril Warren.112  Warren in particular attracted a large measure of media 
attention which his party used to portray him as leader of the free enterprise party in 
British Columbia and natural successor to Bennett .113  Intra-party division and its 
lackluster campaign further hindered Social Credit’s hitherto tried-and-true two-part re-
election strategy of championing provincial economic growth while warning voters of the 
dangers of socialism. 
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 The labour strife that dominated British Columbia during the spring and summer 
of 1972 also complicated the political scene.114  Municipal workers across the Lower 
Mainland struck for seven weeks between April and June, while fallers in the logging 
industry continued striking over the summer even after the rest of the IWA’s 28,000 
woodworkers had ended their two-week walkout.115  Also that summer, building-trades 
unions defied back-to-work legislation during a three-month-long strike that resulted in 
the prosecution of union leaders and a strike by longshoremen in August that halted 
shipping across the province.116  Unions, enraged by some of the most restrictive labour 
legislation in the country, were committed to defeating Bennett’s government.  The BC 
Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) formed a Political Action Committee to coordinate 
teachers’ efforts to topple Social Credit after the government introduced legislation 
limiting salary and budget increases in the education sector.117  The British Columbia 
Government Employees Union (BCGEU), CUPE BC, and even the traditionally 
conservative Teamsters likewise campaigned to end Bennett’s long run in power.118 
 With the free enterprise parties divided and organized labour decidedly militant, 
the NDP campaign focused on the folksy, populist appeal of its leader Dave Barrett.119  
The NDP platform, “A New Deal for People,” recycled the title from the Saskatchewan 
NDP’s 1971 campaign, and included planks highlighted in successful elections there and 
in Manitoba, including public auto insurance, environmental protections, and higher 
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royalties for resource extraction industries.  A BC NDP advertisement linked its criticism 
of rising unemployment to foreign ownership, explaining “raw materials from primary 
resources leave our province creating thousands of jobs in foreign countries.  Many of 
those secondary industries could be developed right here in British Columbia.”120  The 
NDP campaign focused on opposing Social Credit and avoided emphasizing the 
possibility that social democrats might form the government.  Barrett’s personality helped 
to assuage concerns surrounding his party’s supposed inherent radicalism.  He recalled 
how during his first campaign, operating on a shoestring budget, “nobody saw me as a 
threat.  I was just a social worker, a little overweight, maybe, but quite jolly.   A funny 
little guy.”121  Certainly Barrett’s humour helped in deflecting Bennett’s attacks.  When 
the premier suggested that Marxists lurked in the NDP, Barrett joked “which one: 
Groucho, Harpo or Zeppo?” And when Bennett brought up Barrett’s support for the 
Waffle Manifesto, Barrett responded to a TV reporter:  
When he talks about waffles, I talk about pancakes.  When the premier said I was 
a waffle, I said he was a pancake.  He said I was a double waffle.  I said he was a 
stack of pancakes. Now he says there are waffles in our caucus.  I say there are 
pancakes in his group. It’s sheer nonsense.  The premier wants to avoid the issues. 
However, if he keeps this up, knowing how he feels about Quebec, I’m going to 
call him a crêpe Suzette.122 
 
Nearing the end of the campaign Bennett claimed “the socialist hordes are at the gates of 
British Columbia,” and warned voters of the dangers in electing the NDP.123  But the 
premier’s desperate fear-mongering was too little too late. On August 30, 1972, the 
“socialist hordes” rode to victory taking thirty-eight of the Legislature’s fifty-five seats 
with thirty-nine per cent of the popular vote. 
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 The British Columbia Waffle’s absorption into the NDP began when Barrett and 
his caucus and party supporters signed the Waffle Manifesto in the summer of 1969 in 
part to signify their opposition to Tom Berger’s leadership of the BC NDP.124  Barrett 
subsequently admitted to signing the Manifesto as a means of stimulating debate within 
the party, and Wafflers recalled his initial indecisiveness over the matter at the 1969 
federal NDP convention.125  MLA Eileen Dailly recalled that the Manifesto “seemed 
harmless to me” when she signed it in 1969.126  Left-wingers had maintained a substantial 
and influential minority position in the BC CCF/NDP, and several served lengthy terms 
in elected office.127  Even party moderates such as Grace MacInnis and Robert Strachan 
had called for the nationalization of the Canadian steel industry and the BC Telephone 
Company in the 1960s.128  Barrett’s triumph over Berger and his labour supporters at the 
1970 BC NDP convention had coincided with the election of a left-wing slate to every 
executive position, including Waffle supporters Paddy Neale, Dawn Carrell, and Harold 
Winrob.  Mike Lebowitz, an economist at Simon Fraser University and Waffle supporter, 
had assisted in developing policies for the party in 1969.129  And the BC NDP hired Hans 
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Brown, formerly Tommy Douglas’s executive assistant and a Waffle supporter, as the 
party’s provincial secretary and campaign manager for the 1972 election campaign.130 
The BC NDP therefore reacted less defensively to the Waffle challenge than did 
its Saskatchewan and Ontario counterparts, and Wafflers there demonstrated a 
willingness to work with moderates in the party.  A Waffle caucus decided on the eve of 
the BC NDP’s 1971 convention not to challenge Barrett for the party leadership despite 
their reservations about his coolness to both unions and extra-parliamentary action.  
Harold Steves, an active Waffler and NDP candidate, warned the caucus that allying with 
the BCFL to challenge Barrett would only allow a more moderate party leader to emerge, 
arguing “if you think Dave Barrett is right-wing just wait till you see who they put up.”131  
The caucus overwhelmingly defeated the proposal to run a Waffle candidate for leader by 
a show of hands, and rejected with a chorus of boos a second proposal to ally with the 
BCFL in a joint slate for executive positions, but still passed a motion censuring Barrett 
for his “right-wing, anti-labour” positions and his unwillingness to support the 
unemployed movement.132  Nevertheless, several Wafflers endorsed by Barrett were 
elected to positions on the party executive.  Wafflers were pleased with policy resolutions 
passed by the convention, including a recommendation that corporations developing 
natural resources in the province open their books to demonstrate they were operating in 
the public interest, as well as place workers’ representatives on decision-making bodies, 
with nationalization the consequence of non-compliance.133  The LSA complained that 
British Columbia was split into three groups but “insofar as the Waffle projects itself in 
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the NDP, it is identified with the present right wing leadership of the party led by 
Barrett.”134  Several signatories to the Waffle Manifesto, all Barrett allies, were appointed 
to cabinet positions, although none had maintained an active connection to the Waffle 
since 1969.135  Conversations with BC activists Nowakowski, Steves, and Dave York led 
Caroline Brown, from the Saskatchewan group, to report that Wafflers in BC were “more 
entrenched in the party” than in other provinces, but since the left had not consolidated 
“under one umbrella… the Waffle hasn’t been operating as the Waffle.”136 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1972 election some Wafflers were excited at the 
prospect of a new provincial government.  John Warnock claimed Barrett agreed with the 
Waffle that “Canada should cease being just a resource base for the American industrial 
empire,” and concluded the election results indicated “the people of Canada are ready for 
a political party clearly committed to Canadian independence.”137  Ken Novakowski 
reported to Caroline Brown that “4-5 of the elected MLAs in BC were Wafflers, and 5-6 
more were Waffle sympathizers,” and informed John Richards “there is no doubt that 
Barrett’s government is miles ahead of Blakeney or Schreyer.”138  According to 
Novakowski, the true test of the Barrett government’s radicalism would be its willingness 
to nationalize the province’s forestry industry.  Yet after just three months of the Barrett 
administration, BC Wafflers had grown concerned over the direction it was taking, and in 
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particular its unwillingness to replace civil servants associated with the previous Social 
Credit government.139  NDP MLA Harold Steves, for one, continued to associate publicly 
with the Waffle while at the same time cooperating with fellow backbenchers and non-
Wafflers Rosemary Brown and Colin Gabelmann in opposing several government 
decisions.  Novakowski claimed no Wafflers attended the 1972 BC NDP convention.140   
Despite the Waffle’s absence, convention delegates passed a resolution proposing 
a new ministry for women’s equality.  But Barrett dismissed the idea, and thereby 
launched an internal party struggle over his government’s commitment to women’s 
equality that led in February 1973 to the BC Status of Women Council giving the premier 
the Male Chauvinist Pig Award as “most sexist politician.”  Going forward, Wafflers 
such as Hilda Thomas and Sharon Yandle focused on the BC NDP’s Women’s Rights 
Committee (WRC), which published a newsletter, Priorities, and kept pressuring the 
government to adopt feminist policies.  The WRC successfully elected all nine of its 
candidates to the party’s provincial executive at the 1973 BC NDP convention, and 
discovered in Rosemary Brown (Vancouver-Burrard) a talented spokesperson on the 
government’s backbenches.141  The conflict over the BC NDP’s approach to women’s 
equality became the fight that was to consume the left and sideline the Waffle in coming 
years. 
The year 1972 proved to be a pivotal year for the Waffle in the NDP.  The 
Waffle’s ouster from the Ontario NDP proved the beginning of the end for the group.  
Despite the Ontario Waffle leadership’s willingness to compromise and the desire of 
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some party moderates to avoid a purge, or at least a public bloodletting, union leaders 
were intractable in their determination to rid the party of its radical and noisy left wing.  
The debate over how to respond to the Ontario NDP’s decision exposed pre-existing 
ideological divisions and split the Ontario Waffle at its August 1972 conference.  
Although a majority followed Waffle leaders Laxer and Watkins out of the NDP and into 
a new Movement for an Independent and Socialist Canada, a substantial minority 
determined to “stay and fight” in the party forming a Left Caucus to organize for 
upcoming party meetings.  Meanwhile, in British Columbia the Waffle had largely been 
absorbed into the party’s mainstream when the NDP won the August 1972 provincial 
election and formed a government for the first time in that province.  Despite the election 
of a pro-Waffle MLA and a strong left-wing tradition within the BC NDP, the Waffle did 
not maintain an active presence on the west coast and left-wing criticism of the Barrett 
government emerged from the women’s movement instead.  Wafflers in both Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan could have warned their radical counterparts in BC to be prepared for 
disappointment.  Frustration in both provinces over their NDP governments’ adoption of 
moderate reforms in place of comprehensive socialist programs caused the Waffle in 
Manitoba to dwindle and the group in Saskatchewan to debate whether it would be best 
to initiate its own departure from the party or wait to be purged.
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Chapter Nine 
“We are all tottering past the crucial age of thirty and into the senility of middle 
age:” Leaving the NDP, 1972-73 
 
After the Waffle’s ouster from the Ontario NDP in the summer of 1972 the group 
spent much of the ensuing year-and-a-half immersed in internal debate.  Without the 
group’s primary purpose of transforming the NDP, Ontario Wafflers focused much of 
their energy on researching and publicizing the deindustrialization of the province’s 
manufacturing heartland, a situation they attributed to the high levels of American 
ownership.  In Saskatchewan, despite publishing a highly critical analysis of the NDP’s 
first year in government, the Waffle remained divided over whether to leave the party and 
advocated nationalization of the province’s oil and gas industries.  The ineffectiveness of 
those Ontario Wafflers who chose to “stay and fight” within the NDP by forming a Left 
Caucus could only have served to dishearten the Saskatchewan Wafflers further.  They 
would eventually make the break in October 1973 amidst plans to form their own 
socialist party the following year.  By the end of 1973, in the two provinces in which the 
Waffle still existed – Ontario and Saskatchewan – Wafflers had broken all ties with the 
NDP. 
During the summer of 1972, following the controversial battle with the Waffle in 
Ontario but before the BC NDP’s surprise electoral victory, the national NDP’s prospects 
in the upcoming federal election appeared dim.  A party survey conducted earlier in the 
year revealed that under David Lewis’s leadership there appeared to be little potential for 
improvement over the NDP’s 1968 election results.1  In addition, the party was struggling 
to attract media attention apart from the Waffle, leading Lewis Seale to complain “you 
couldn’t turn on CBC radio without hearing about the Waffle, which had superb media 
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access.”2  Worse still, the Quebec NDP and its president Raymond Laliberté released a 
platform for the federal election entitled Il faut prendre le pouvoir partour that seemed to 
confirm his party’s separatist sympathies by stating Quebeckers alone had the right to 
determine their own future in Canada.  David Lewis formally repudiated the Quebec 
NDP platform and persuaded the provincial party to hold a special convention in 
September at which it accepted the federal party’s alterations and revised the offending 
passages of the platform.3 
 Despite these initial difficulties, Lewis hit on a winning theme early in the 
campaign attacking corporations that had taken advantage of government subsidies, 
grants, and tax loopholes despite making large profits.  With great relish he labeled them 
“corporate welfare bums.”4  The federal NDP research staff uncovered numerous 
examples of prominent companies enjoying “corporate rip-offs,” enabling Lewis to 
release new revelations to the press daily.5  The “corporate welfare bums” campaign drew 
significant media attention and re-energized party activists who had become disheartened 
by the internecine struggles of the previous three years.6 
 The NDP platform called for Canada to recover its economic independence and 
end American plundering of its natural resources.  The party opposed a continental 
energy deal, but endorsed full employment, public ownership of the oil and gas 
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industries, and the establishment of a prices-review board.  In addition, the NDP was for 
equal pay for equal work, paid maternity leave, expanded daycare, family planning and 
birth-control information, a ban on all nuclear testing, and Canada’s withdrawal from 
NATO and NORAD.7  During the final weeks of the campaign, with media interest in the 
“corporate welfare bums” exposés dwindling, Lewis turned to other issues, such as the 
NDP opposition to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline proposed for the Northwest Territories 
which he tied to the issue of foreign ownership.  Lewis told audiences “we in the NDP 
have been concerned about our political and economic independence for many years.”  
He emphasized the party’s commitment to ending direct grants to foreign corporations 
and tax concessions to resource industries and introducing a screening agency to review 
and possibly disallow foreign takeovers.  The NDP also promised to create a Canadian 
Development Corporation to provide “major investment in industries that will create jobs 
for Canadians,” and to “slow down resource development and export until the provinces 
and federal government have adopted a realistic energy and resources policy… requiring 
that the resources be fully processed in Canada.”8  
 The Waffle approached the 1972 federal election campaign with some 
ambivalence.  Cy Gonick dismissed Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau as a reactionary and 
acknowledged that “corporate welfare bums is a good slogan, but it’s a good liberal 
slogan.”  He claimed the NDP would expunge the Waffle to enable David Lewis to shift 
the party rightward into the centrist vacuum abandoned by the governing Liberals.9  Ken 
Novakowski, who ran as the NDP candidate in Burnaby-Richmond-Delta, a riding the 
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NDP held from 1962-1968, was the only self-identified Waffler to stand for election.  His 
campaign was co-chaired by Wafflers drawn from across the country, including Caroline 
Brown in Saskatchewan, Paul Barber in Manitoba, Tom Pocklington in Alberta, and the 
recently elected BC MLA Harold Steves.  Novakowski’s team solicited funds from 
Waffle supporters, explaining that because “Ken remains as the only ‘Waffle’ candidate 
in the country, we feel it is imperative that he be elected to represent a Waffle position in 
the House of Commons and in the federal caucus.”10  His campaign literature focused on 
protecting the Fraser River from pollution, building public transit, preventing foreign 
domination of the Canadian economy and halting the rise in food prices.11  Novakowski 
lost to PC candidate John Reynolds by 1440 votes despite increasing the NDP’s raw vote 
and finishing ahead of the Liberal incumbent Tom Goode. 
One month after meeting at Delaware, the Ontario Waffle Movement for an 
Independent and Socialist Canada made plans to stage a counter-campaign during the 
federal election.  Although the Ontario Waffle did not run candidates, it did draw 
considerable attention via public meetings, rallies in Ottawa and Toronto, and the door-
to-door distribution of its counter-campaign literature, to issues it claimed the other 
political parties were ignoring.  It highlighted foreign ownership and the “crucial trade 
talks” involving the Auto Pact renegotiations that followed the ‘Nixon Shock’; wage and 
price controls; the peacetime imposition of the War Measures Act during the 1970 
October Crisis; the government’s handling of the relationship between English Canada 
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and Quebec; and the status of women.12  Laxer, Watkins, and Ellie Prepas attended a 
press conference that turned hostile as reporters questioned the relevance of the Waffle’s 
“campaign… for no one.”13  According to a report from its Kingston group, the Waffle’s 
election strategy confused voters as well.14  The Windsor Waffle supported the NDP 
locally while simultaneously distributing counter-campaign literature.15  Both Laxer and 
Watkins, despite their criticisms of the party, announced they would vote NDP come 
election day.16  However, the Ontario Waffle made its hostility towards Stephen Lewis 
clear.  At a Waffle rally in Ottawa on the second anniversary of the institution of the War 
Measures Act, Robin Mathews criticized the lacklustre election campaign saying “Pierre 
takes his two children, Margaret and Justin, Stanfield takes whichever daughter is 
available and David Lewis pays Stephen to stay at home.”17  Several hundred people 
attended the rally which ended in a shouting match between Waffle supporters and 
members of the Canadian Liberation Movement.18 
The Saskatchewan Waffle planned its own counter-campaign, including holding 
local meetings, producing a four-page tabloid emphasizing the need for public ownership 
and resource development, and holding a press conference.19  The Saskatchewan 
Wafflers distributed the tabloid in Regina, Saskatoon, Moose Jaw, Prince Albert, North 
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19 Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, September 10, 1972, File II.31 Meetings, c. 1972-1983, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
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Battleford, Swift Current and Estevan, mailed it to rural supporters, and held public 
meetings in Saskatoon, Regina, Kenosee Lake, North Battleford, and Swift Current.  A 
rally in Moose Jaw days before the election featured speakers Carol Gudmundson and 
James Laxer.20  Yet despite the Saskatchewan Waffle’s criticisms of the NDP during the 
campaign, it continued to “offer voting support” to the party.21 
 Although David Lewis deplored the Waffle’s decision to run an anti-campaign 
instead of taking a “constructive, positive position,” the election result suggested the 
NDP was not significantly affected by the Ontario departure of its former left wing.  
Despite drawing only a small increase in its share of the popular vote, the NDP added 
nine seats to its 1968 total, electing thirty-one MPs and holding the balance of power in 
the House of Commons.22  Trudeau’s Liberals only barely surpassed Stanfield’s 
Progressive Conservatives, 109 to 107.23  The NDP added two seats in Toronto, two seats 
in northern Ontario, and retained the seven seats it had held in Ontario at dissolution.24  
The major gains came in British Columbia, where the NDP won thirty-five percent of the 
popular vote and eleven of the province’s twenty-three seats, a gain of six including 
Waffle Manifesto signatory Paddy Neale replacing left-winger Harold Winch in 
Vancouver East.25  The results in Saskatchewan were mixed.  Although the NDP retained 
                                                        
20 Waffle Newsletter, October 1972, File II.35 Newsletters, c. 1971-1979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB 
(Regina). 
21 Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, January 21, 1973, File II.31 Meetings, c. 1972-1983, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
22 The NDP won 17.8% of the popular vote in 1972 compared to 17.0% in 1968.  The Liberals won 38.4% 
of the popular vote and 109 seats, the PCs won 35% and 107 seats, and Social Credit won 7.6% of the 
popular vote and 15 seats. 
23 Duffy, Fights of Our Lives, 244-245. 
24 Terry Grier (Lakeshore), John Harney (Scarborough West), John Rodriguez (Nickel Belt) and Cyril 
Symes (Sault Ste. Marie) were the new additions from Ontario. 
25 Nels Nelson (Burnaby-Seymour), Stuart Leggatt (New Westminster), Mark Rose (Fraser Valley West), 
Harry Olaussen (Coast Chilcotin) and Tom Barnett (Comox-Alberni) were the new additions from British 
Columbia. 
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four seats and added Eli Nesdoly in Meadow Lake, three incumbents were defeated.26  
After the election Waffler Lloyd Robertson suggested that John Skoberg (Moose Jaw), a 
Waffle sympathizer, had suffered from the party’s polarization, alleging “The right-wing 
brass would not support him for his views.  The left wing would not support him for he 
had not joined the Waffle.  He lost.”27 
 In the aftermath of the election, Waffler Lorne Brown’s post-election analysis 
attributed the NDP’s floundering in Saskatchewan to its lack of a coherent agricultural 
policy and an unenthusiastic membership divided between Blakeney and the Waffle.28  
Other commentators concurred with Cy Gonick’s earlier assessment that the NDP had 
moved too far right in an effort to win votes from the middle class.29  Gonick also 
contended the NDP had been largely sidelined by the French Canada-versus-English 
Canada debate, which “overwhelms all other issues.”30 
The Waffle also criticized Saskatchewan’s NDP government for being 
insufficiently socialist.  Despite the government adopting another Waffle-backed policy – 
a publicly-owned provincial oil company – the group expressed disappointment over the 
limited progress made on this and other initiatives, further prompting its break with the 
party.  Approximately one hundred Saskatchewan Wafflers attended a weekend 
conference at Fort San in October 1972 at which they adopted a new constitution 
permitting non-New Democrats membership in the Saskatchewan Waffle for the first 
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27 Lloyd Robertson to Rob Dumont, October 12 ,1973, File III.24 Waffle – Correspondence, John Richards 
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28 Lorne Brown, “What Shape is Canada In: Thoughts on the Election Results,” Canadian Dimension, 
January 1973, 6. 
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time, and developed an organizational structure independent of the NDP.  The new 
format included a president and vice-president, which Don Mitchell and Sonja Gehl were 
elected to fill.31  John Richards, Joe Roberts and Rob Dumont comprised a task force on 
the nationalization of the oil industry, and a second task force was formed to envision 
agriculture as “part of an integrated over-all socialist development policy” which could 
not be “co-opted politically and rendered meaningless by social democrats in the manner 
in which the land bank concept was mutilated by the NDP government.”32 
The Saskatchewan Waffle’s primary focus during the fall and winter of 1972/73 
was preparing and distributing a critical evaluation of the Blakeney government’s first 
year in office, titled The Blakeney Government – One Year After.  The document 
described the Saskatchewan NDP’s 1971 election platform as the “most radical… the 
party had put forth since the 1930s,” but questioned whether the government had lived up 
to its promises.33  It criticized the government for ignoring northern development, for 
subsidizing private industry rather than pursuing public ownership, for continuing to seek 
foreign investment despite its campaign commitment to reduce foreign ownership of the 
province’s natural resources, and for relying exclusively on the civil service and a few 
senior cabinet ministers instead of left-wing party activists.  One Year After also 
dismissed the government Land Bank as flawed for including an option-to-purchase 
clause; far from being “a major experiment with a new land tenure system,” the Land 
Bank would not prevent rural depopulation and preserve family farms.  While the 
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document urged the Blakeney government to nationalize provincial energy resources 
through the Saskatchewan Power Corporation and also to nationalize the food processing 
industry, it concluded that “although the Waffle should continue to work within the NDP 
on issues of policy, it should spend less energy in direct confrontations with the party 
establishment for control of party institutions such as provincial council and executive.  
We cannot win the struggle for a socialist political party until more Saskatchewan people 
want socialism.”34  The Waffle neither challenged Blakeney’s leadership nor played an 
active role at the Saskatchewan NDP convention in November 1972.35 
There was by no means unanimity among the Saskatchewan Waffle over the 
desirability of splitting from the NDP.  Some rural and union Wafflers in particular were 
“less persuaded of the need or possibility of successfully leaving the NDP.”36  One 
expressed concern that “the Regina leadership are working toward a clandestine, elitist 
organization” that would leave the Waffle “a Trotskyist group without the NDP 
connection.”37  The Waffle Steering Committee therefore postponed plans for holding 
another conference until it had hired an organizer, and discouraged its members from 
participating at the NDP national convention scheduled for July 1973.  Don Mitchell 
pressed the Steering Committee for action on the grounds that “ambiguity among Waffle 
supporters about whether to leave the NDP” had to be resolved since the “present course 
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1972; “Waffle group critical of Blakeney’s policies,” Globe and Mail, November 18, 1972. 
36 Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, January 21, 1973, File II.31 Meetings, c. 1972-1983, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
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Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). 
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is producing isolation and impotence.”38  Mitchell’s message sparked a response.  The 
Saskatchewan Waffle planned a conference for October 1973 in Moose Jaw to decide the 
issue.  In the meantime, Mitchell was to meet privately with sympathetic individuals in 
the NDP to discuss a possible break from the party.39 
 The Saskatchewan Waffle continued advocating for a publicly-owned oil 
company.  Although the Blakeney government had already introduced legislation to that 
effect, the Waffle feared the likelier outcome would be joint-venture partnerships with 
private companies rather than a fully nationalized provincial oil industry.  The Steering 
Committee instructed MLA John Richards to hold a press conference during debate on 
the Speech from the Throne to launch the Waffle’s campaign.  To further promote its 
views the Waffle distributed “SaskOil – It Can Be Done!” buttons and bumper stickers, 
held a series of open meetings at Regina, Saskatoon and Swift Current, visited NDP 
constituency associations and met with the Regina Labour Council and Saskatoon 
Environmental Society.40  Although Liberal leader Dave Steuart attacked the crown 
corporation as a ploy by the Blakeney government to appease the Waffle, the 
Saskatchewan Oil and Gas Corporation established in May 1973 did not come close to 
fulfilling the Waffle’s demands.41  As John Richards later explained, its “actual mandate 
was to undertake a modest program of exploration.”42  As with the Land Bank, what the 
Waffle perceived as the government’s half-measures in energy nationalization policy 
further disillusioned its members. 
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 Over the winter of 1972/73, the Waffle’s remnant in Ontario pursued the different 
paths chosen at the Delaware conference.  Those who had supported “stay and fight” 
attended the Ontario NDP’s Provincial Council at Toronto in September 1972, but had 
little impact on the proceedings.43  Varda Burstyn was defeated in her bid for a seat on 
the NDP Federal Council, but was elected to the ONDP Provincial Executive.44  Three 
months later, just as the Ontario NDP convention was set to begin, Stephen Lewis 
declared the Waffle “episode is over and done with in the life of the party” and predicted 
a healthy debate on innovative policy proposals at the meeting.45  The Left Caucus 
nevertheless challenged the NDP leadership at the convention, leading a Globe and Mail 
reporter to describe “long delays due to procedural hassles, challenges to the chair and 
demands for counted votes.”46  A Left Caucus amendment to ban parent labour 
organizations from appointing delegates to NDP conventions or councils in the name of 
their affiliates caused some confusion, but passed.  Lewis moved the decision be 
reconsidered, telling delegates “I don’t think you realize what you’ve done.”  The 
following day Gordon Vichert as chair retroactively ruled the Left Caucus’s amendment 
out of order.47  The Left Caucus also had little success challenging the party 
establishment’s slate of candidates for the Provincial Executive.  Only Steve Penner was 
elected as member-at-large to the twenty-six-person Executive, a significant drop from 
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the five Wafflers chosen by the ONDP convention two years earlier.48  The Left Caucus 
suffered a further blow when the Provincial Council passed a recommendation 
immediately preceding the convention dissolving the Ontario Young New Democrats, 
which had always provided a solid base of Waffle support throughout its existence.  
ONDP Provincial secretary Gordon Brigden described the OYND as “an essentially 
insignificant force which from time to time had representation in the councils of the party 
which was far in excess of its numbers.”  He accused the OYND of working against the 
aims of some riding associations and questioned why the party should continue to 
provide financial support to an organization “which has been of no benefit to the party 
and which from time to time has proved to be largely a political embarrassment.”49 
After departing the NDP, the Ontario Waffle’s primary focus was 
deindustrialization.  During November 1972, in preparation for its first major strategy 
discussions since breaking with the NDP, members heard two alternative visions.  First, 
James Laxer argued the recent election of a Liberal minority government “is ideal from 
the point of view of the development of the Waffle movement… NDP members of 
parliament will refrain from voting no-confidence in the government and may back 
Liberal measures completely inadequate to deal with Canada’s problems.”50  Laxer 
identified critical issues confronting Canada – specifically, the renegotiation of the Auto 
Pact and a continental energy deal – and proposed the Waffle mount “massive campaigns 
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in opposition.”51  His plan centered on industry-by-industry research studies which would 
enable Wafflers to connect with workers, and on an energy policy conference scheduled 
for spring 1973 in Toronto.  Furthermore, “in the next year and a half we should seek to 
achieve sufficient size to allow us to choose whether to become a political party.”52  John 
Smart, a key figure in the Ottawa Waffle, shared Laxer’s optimism. While identifying 
different priorities more reflective of eastern Ontario’s circumstances, he likewise 
recommended a strategy dependent on research task forces and public meetings.  Smart 
cautioned “[it will be] easy for us to become another mini-left group devoted exclusively 
to internal discussion and to ever more refined histories and theories of socialism.”53  His 
warning took two years to come to fruition but was altogether prescient. 
The Waffle Council’s adoption of Laxer’s plan for a large-scale resources and 
deindustrialization campaign was not without controversy.  An alternative perspective 
was offered by activists in the West Metro group who urged taking a strong stance in 
favour of “workers’ control,” and de-emphasizing large-scale province-wide campaigns 
in favour of local, grassroots-based campaigns.  They maintained: 
The predominantly middle class, academic background of Wafflers makes them 
feel more confident about their ability to plan meetings, conferences and 
educationals, write speeches, newsletters, press releases, etc., but makes them less 
confident, even fearful about their ability to establish personal relationships with 
the working people of Canada.54 
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The Council meeting passed watered-down versions of the West Metro proposals 
which had also garnered the support of the Ottawa group.55  But in the coming months 
little further action was taken to incorporate themes of workers’ control and locally-based 
campaigns into the Waffle’s overall strategy.  Instead, divisions over developing a 
strategy for the resources and deindustrialization campaign continued into the new year.  
At a campaign committee meeting in February 1973, some members presented a plan 
“drawn up the night before by a core of leadership people in Toronto,” for a series of 
rallies and meetings to be held around the province.56  At a subsequent meeting called by 
the Ottawa Waffle the differences remained unresolved.  Finally, at a Waffle executive 
meeting in March, the decision was made to adopt the comprehensive approach 
advocated by Laxer, Watkins, and others among the Toronto-based leadership.57  
Although attention was paid to eastern Ontario and measures established for local 
elements within the campaign, the resources and deindustrialization campaign that 
eventually materialized in November bore a close resemblance to Laxer’s original 
proposal.   
After several months of internal debate but otherwise little activity since its 
formation, MISC initiated an ambitious twelve-part public lecture series in Toronto in 
early 1973.  Speakers including James Laxer, John Hutcheson, Tom Naylor, Mel 
Watkins, and Robin Mathews addressed such themes as “The Evolution of Canadian 
                                                        
55 “Minutes of the Provincial Council Meeting of the Ontario Waffle,”  November 25-26, 1972, Box 1, File 
4, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA.  It should be noted that a commitment to workers’ 
control had been an element of Waffle policy since the group’s formation. 
56 West Metro Waffle “A Letter of Resignation to all Ontario Wafflers,” Box 1, File 6, New Democratic 
Party Waffle collection, MUA. 
57 Ontario Waffle Executive Meeting Minutes, March 24, 1973, Box 1, File 5, New Democratic Party 
Waffle collection, MUA.  Handwritten notes on the back of this document further indicate the extent of the 
debate, saying “Ottawa is obstructionist and unprincipled… Laxer is only partly democratic… a sane policy 
is neither Ottawa or Laxer.” 
  361 
Capitalism,” “Class and Income Distribution in Canada,” and “Canadian Resources and 
Underdevelopment.”58  Some of the lectures were based on research projects the Ontario 
Waffle conducted into the extent of American ownership of Canadian manufacturing and 
resource industries and the loss of jobs in southwestern Ontario manufacturing centres.  
The well-attended lectures were later edited by Robert Laxer and published as (Canada), 
Ltd.: The Political Economy of Dependency.59  The collection focused on the Ontario 
Waffle’s thesis of deindustrialization, Canada’s history of economic dependence on 
foreign investment and resource extraction, and the Canadian manufacturing industry’s 
reliance on American branch plants.  The Ontario Waffle’s interpretation of this history 
as well as recent events held that deindustrialization in Canada would follow upon 
strengthened manufacturing in the United States, thereby further reducing Canada to a 
mere dependent of the United States valued only for its exploitable natural resources, oil 
in particular.  As a result, the Wafflers concluded the Canadian working class employed 
by American-owned manufacturers and resource extraction industries would be crucial to 
the development of Canadian independence and socialism – which in practice primarily 
meant workers represented by the USWA and UAW.60  Ottawa Wafflers explained “these 
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workers in the major industries are concretely experiencing the effects of American 
imperialism, through increasing plant shutdowns, lay-offs, and lack of new industrial 
development.”61  In November 1973 the Ontario Waffle embarked on its resources and 
deindustrialization campaign, holding public meetings in London, Kitchener-Waterloo, 
Brantford, St. Catherines, and Hamilton where the oil crisis, Canada’s status as a resource 
base for the United States, and the deindustrialization of southwestern Ontario were 
discussed.   The meetings, usually featuring Laxer and Watkins along with a local 
Waffler and trade unionist, typically were attended by 100 to 150 people.62 
By May 1973 when the first national Waffle meeting in over a year opened at 
Regina, the group was only active in Ontario and Saskatchewan.  In both provinces the 
members continued to wrestle with the question of whether or not to make a final 
decisive break from the NDP by challenging it electorally.  In Manitoba and British 
Columbia, the popularity of premiers Schreyer and Barrett stifled the Waffle’s ability to 
mount a challenge from the left.  Three Manitoba Wafflers, Paul Barber, Michael 
Mendelson and Harvey Goldberg, explained that the group in that province “has ceased 
to exist as an organized entity” although former Wafflers continued their activism “in a 
variety of special interest groups,” including producing a “socialist newspaper” titled 
Prairie Dog Press.63  The apparent popularity of the Manitoba NDP’s moderate course in 
government, and the Waffle’s inability to influence the party’s direction there led many 
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Wafflers to lose hope “of ever accomplishing anything in the NDP.”64  They revealed that 
Cy Gonick had decided against running for re-election, not least because he “personally 
can’t stand” participating in a government dominated by one man, Premier Ed Schreyer.65 
 Although no one from British Columbia attended the meeting, Caroline Brown 
reported on the situation in that province based on her discussions with BC Wafflers 
Harold Steves, Ken Novakowski and Dave Yorke.  She described Wafflers in BC as 
embedded in the NDP and explained “it is impossible to consolidate the left under one 
umbrella.”66  She also conveyed that Dave Barrett “is operating on his own without 
reference to the party,” and that he was a “clever operator who uses radical socialist 
rhetoric at constituency meetings but pursues a conservative course in Victoria.”67  As in 
Manitoba, BC Wafflers saw little possibility for an organized Waffle presence either 
inside or outside the NDP.  Two Alberta Wafflers reported that their provincial 
organization had disbanded in August 1972 as a result of the Ontario Waffle’s decision to 
leave the party, but remained as an informal left wing of the NDP. 
 The Ontario Waffle’s report, presented by Linda Hay, described its focus on 
deindustrialization and ongoing study of plant shutdowns in Ontario since 1966, as well 
as an examination of the proposed Mackenzie Valley Pipeline.68  Hay noted the political 
plans of Wafflers in the Steelworkers, including Cec Taylor’s intention to run for the 
presidency of USWA Local 1005 on a ‘United Steelworkers of Canada’ platform.  She 
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also reported that the Waffle women’s caucus met at every Waffle meeting, and had 
recently supported striking stewardesses at Wardair.69   
 Don Mitchell conveyed that the Saskatchewan Waffle was still debating over 
whether to continue working within or make a decisive break from the NDP.  He credited 
its SaskOil campaign with persuading the government to create a crown corporation, but 
lamented that instead of nationalizing the industry “so far all they have done is establish 
an exploration company.”  Mitchell acknowledged that a major debate over the Waffle’s 
future loomed, but felt “sentiment leans towards a split with the NDP and formation of a 
new party.”  He also argued that challenging the NDP electorally would be “the acid test” 
of any new socialist party.70 
Linda Hay reported that Ontario Wafflers remained active in the NDP, but 
admitted most in the group believed a new socialist party was necessary.  Consequently 
they were considering running candidates in the upcoming federal election.  Unlike the 
Ontario and Saskatchewan contingents, Manitoba Wafflers harboured reservations about 
challenging the NDP electorally.  The four provincial groups’ respective attitudes toward 
the upcoming federal NDP convention in Vancouver accurately reflected their opinion of 
the party generally – Ontario Wafflers did not plan on attending, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan Wafflers expressed indifference, and British Columbia’s Wafflers were 
very interested.  Although the attendees at the Regina gathering complained about poor 
communications among the provincial Waffle groups, little was done to rectify the 
problem.71 
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 Despite their deep disappointment over the directions Manitoba’s provincial NDP 
government had been taking, that province’s Wafflers predicted – accurately as it turned 
out – that the Schreyer team was poised for re-election in June 1973 after a controversial 
term in power.  The government had, for example, faced down intense opposition from 
the private insurance industry and implemented public auto insurance in 1970.  It had 
amalgamated Greater Winnipeg, created a community-based system of municipal 
governance, and expanded public housing.72  Furthermore, it had implemented 
agricultural reforms including a land-lease program targeted at younger farmers, 
nationalized the troubled Churchill Forest Industries, instituted labour reforms, 
established a Department of Northern Affairs, and continued its predecessor’s expansion 
of Manitoba’s infrastructure.73  Through it all, Schreyer had maintained his personal 
popularity as premier.  The NDP campaigned largely on its record, while promising a 
dental-care program for children, more money for public transit, and a publicly-
subsidized prescription drug plan.74 
Cy Gonick, as expected, declared he would not be seeking re-election in 
Crescentwood.  Gonick described his time as a MLA in the NDP government as 
“interesting but frustrating.”  He explained how he had been unable to advance his own 
priorities, including halting the takeover by multinational corporations of Manitoba’s 
economy, facilitating a major redistribution of income, creating better and cheaper 
housing and recreational facilities, improving health care and education for the poor and 
working class, opening community health clinics, implementing greater worker’s control 
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in industry, humanizing the school system, and ensuring public ownership of resource 
industries.  Gonick applauded the government’s creation of public auto insurance, its 
expansion of public housing and its agricultural reforms, but argued “most of the changes 
we have brought about have been too mild, partial and temporary in nature to make a 
dent in the gross inequalities which exist in our society.”75  Waffler Una Decter, 
chairperson of the Manitoba Welfare advisory board, sought the nomination to replace 
Gonick as the NDP candidate in Crescentwood, indicating she shared his objectives but 
intended to pursue them “with a little more optimism than Cy.”76  However, Harvey 
Patterson, president of the Winnipeg Labour Council, defeated Decter for the 
nomination.77  Patterson was narrowly elected in Crescentwood after two judicial 
recounts when the returning officer broke a tied vote in his favour, but the result was 
declared void after an investigation into the ballot-counting process and he lost the 
resulting 1975 by-election.78  Schreyer’s NDP retained office with an increased share of 
the popular vote and thirty-one of the province’s fifty-seven seats.79 
With the Waffle now extinct in Manitoba, its Ontario remnant struggled to remain 
relevant to avoid a similar fate.  Stephen Lewis described the Ontario NDP’s first 
Provincial Council meeting since the December 1972 convention as “a real turning point” 
and claimed “acrimony was jettisoned; the party was in good spirits; debate was 
argumentative in the best sense.”  Lewis proclaimed “it feels good now to be leader,” but 
ironically he resurrected a major theme of the early Waffle when he argued 
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The party must surely immerse itself in the enveloping spread of social activism 
throughout Ontario amongst groups who fight expressways, who oppose the 
deposit of garbage in our countryside, who resist indiscriminate high-rise 
development, who resist strike-breaking, who fight to preserve the Escarpment or 
Algonquin Park, who manage to change the boundaries of regional government.  
It is no longer credible to pay homage to direct action while watching it from 
afar.80 
 
Yet the Ontario Waffle remained separate from the party, and the Left Caucus 
while attracting support from outside Ontario had little impact on the NDP.  The federal 
NDP convention at Vancouver in July 1973 proved to be the last straw for the Left 
Caucus.  David Lewis drew loud applause from delegates on the first day of the 
convention with his response to Left Caucus member Barry Weisleder who had criticized 
the party’s support of Canadian participation in the International Commission of Control 
and Supervision in Vietnam.  Lewis reminded delegates the NDP caucus had opposed 
“the war in Vietnam before this young man knew Vietnam existed.”81  David Lewis and 
the federal caucus enjoyed widespread support throughout the convention as delegates 
endorsed major planks in their strategy for minority government: a resolution calling on 
Parliament to establish an effective prices review board, doubling old-age pensions to 
$200 a month, and providing six percent residential mortgages.82  The Left Caucus’s 
attempt to amend a comprehensive energy policy resolution by including nationalization 
of all resource industries was defeated by a wide margin.83  John Richards was not 
affiliated with the Ontario-based Left Caucus but he spoke in favour of its amendment, 
arguing the NDP should affirm the principle of “complete public ownership of all 
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resource industries.”84  Instead, delegates passed the original resolution calling for a 
government-owned Canadian petroleum corporation to operate in competition with 
private industry, federal aid for provincial oil and gas crown corporations, a national 
energy planning board, federal and provincial energy marketing boards, postponement of 
the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, public ownership of the oil sands in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, and the recognition of aboriginal land rights.85 
 Mississauga taxi driver Douglas Campbell, who had unsuccessfully sought to 
defeat Stephen Lewis for the leadership of the Ontario NDP in December 1972, now 
challenged David Lewis to head the national party but was defeated by 719 votes to 76.86  
The Left Caucus supported Varda Burstyn’s candidacy for party President, but incumbent 
Donald MacDonald easily won 648 to 164.87  The Left Caucus did not contest any of the 
vice-president seats, and none of its fourteen candidates were elected to the twenty open 
positions on the Federal Council.  Neither was the Left Caucus significant in the 
convention’s decision to organize a national conference on women’s rights despite the 
opposition of some of the party leadership.88  All told, the convention strongly endorsed  
David Lewis’s position as leader and the federal caucus’s role in the minority 
Parliament.89 
Disillusioned members of the Left Caucus, including Steve Penner, Joe Flexer, 
Bret Smiley and Barry Weisleder, joined a group of University of Toronto student 
activists named the Old Mole in the summer of 1973 in forming a new organization, the 
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Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG).  Interpreting the overriding theme of Canadian left 
politics over the preceding four years as “the historical isolation of North America from 
the main convulsions of the world revolutionary process” and concluding “the vanguard 
throughout this continent remains the prisoner of the parochialism and empiricism which 
are the main ideological pillars of the North American bourgeoisie,” the RMG’s founders 
looked internationally for inspiration and example.90  They found it in the Trotskyist 
Fourth International which they claimed had recently transformed “from a federation of 
propaganda circles to an international combat organization.”91  Thirty-one delegates 
attended the RMG’s founding convention in October 1973, joined by former members of 
the LSA.92  Delegates differed over whether the RMG should concentrate its activities on 
infiltrating union locals, or engage with “struggles of students and teachers around the 
institutional contradictions of capitalist education, mobilizations against political and 
legal repression, and movements in solidarity with struggles in Quebec and 
internationally (Cambodia, Chile, etc.).”  Although the convention adopted the latter 
position, delegates elected to the Central Committee were representative of both camps.  
The RMG proclaimed itself “proud of the seriousness and political level of the intense 
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debate which has just concluded” – so much so that it committed to the immediate 
publication of pamphlets outlining the convention’s dueling resolutions.93  
The RMG and Ontario Waffle were among the groups that actively supported 
striking workers in late 1973 at the Artistic Woodwork plant in north Toronto.  The 
Ontario Waffle had continued to support striking workers in its ongoing effort to engage 
with the working class, including taking part in the strike of primarily female employees 
at Dare, Inc. in Kitchener in early 1973.  The Artistic Woodwork strike attracted so many 
supporters from among the broader New Left in Toronto that the numbers picketing 
eventually dwarfed striking workers.94  When police determination to keep the plant open 
and protect private property clashed with picketers’ will to prevent the plant from 
operating, violent outbursts ensued, resulting in numerous picket line arrests, including 
that of Dan Heap.95  The strike attracted significant media attention and continued into 
November 1973 before pressure from media coverage, mass picketing, and provincial 
and municipal governments led to a negotiated collective agreement and an end to the 
strike.96  James Laxer joined the picketers in early September alongside Toronto city 
councillors John Sewell and Dorothy Thomas and spoke at a strike support rally in 
November.97  Historian Ian Milligan described the Artistic Woodwork strike as an 
opportunity for New Leftists who had turned “towards Marxism and the working class as 
                                                        
93 “Democratic Centralism and the Leninist Organization: Founding Convention of the RMG,” The Old 
Mole, November 1973, Box 7, File 8, Revolutionary Marxist Group fonds, MUA. 
94 Ian Milligan, “‘The Force of All Our Numbers’: New Leftists, Labour, and the 1973 Artistic Woodwork 
Strike,” Labour/Le Travail 66 (Fall 2010), 37-71.  Rowley and Parent had recruited several student activists 
to work for the CCU, including sometime Wafflers John Lang and Danny Drache, and the students drew on 
their extensive contacts in the Toronto New Left to popularize the striking workers’ cause.  Milligan, “The 
Force of All Our Numbers,” 49. 
95 Ibid., 54-59. 
96 Ibid., 65. 
97 “Politicians join picket line,” Globe and Mail, September 5, 1973; “Laxer says 6000 firms could have 
strike violence,” Toronto Star, November 22, 1973. 
  371 
a necessary component of social change” to put their politics into practice on the picket 
line.98  The strike became a personal touchstone for many New Leftists’ subsequent 
activism, especially among those who went on to careers in the labour movement.99 
The experience of supporting striking workers at Artistic Woodwork also proved 
pivotal in the political development of a group of York University undergraduates active 
in the Waffle.  Influenced by left-wing and Marxist professors including James Laxer, 
John Hutcheson, Virginia Hunter, and Robert Albritton, the students along with 
disgruntled members of the Waffle Labour Caucus created a study group, open by 
invitation only, committed to analyzing capitalism, socialism, the state, and the Waffle.  
Tired of the perceived “family compact” leadership of James and Robert Laxer, the study 
group declared the political atmosphere of the Ontario Waffle “tense and frustrating,” an 
opinion resulting in their decision to operate “underground.”100  Abbie Bakan, one of the 
group’s original members, provided an insider’s glimpse: 
In this little socialist study group, comprised at its peak of about thirteen people, 
there was a desperate thirst for political clarity… the study group members soon 
became influenced by Lenin and considered themselves to be working under the 
principles of ‘democratic centralism’… in practice, however, the main activities 
of the group were simply collective discussion.101   
 
The group’s members concluded that the Waffle was not an appropriate vehicle for 
advancing their theory of a socialist revolution, and instead began identifying with a 
British left tendency, the International Socialists, voraciously reading articles produced 
by its leading members such as Tony Cliff.  This imported analysis embraced the ideas of 
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the Bolshevik Party during the early years of the Russian Revolution and rejected 
Stalinism, describing the Soviet Union as “state capitalist.”102  The Artistic Woodwork 
strike, in addition to influencing the ideological development of the York-based study 
group, proved significant for the Ontario Wafflers whose presence on the picket line 
represented their final significant non-electoral attempt at activism in coalition with other 
like-minded groups. 
While the Ontario Waffle attempted to re-establish itself as an activist force 
outside of the NDP, the Saskatchewan Waffle determined by the fall of 1973, after 
eighteen months of debate, that its moment for leaving the party had arrived.103  The 
Saskatchewan Waffle issued a pamphlet in August by John Warnock entitled “A Socialist 
Alternative for Canada” criticizing the NDP for failing to take “action on the question of 
Canadian independence,” abandoning its roots as a “political movement” to become “just 
another political machine,” and warning that the party was “tightly controlled by a small 
self-perpetuating elite.”104  Warnock distinguished between the NDP’s social democracy 
and the Waffle’s socialism in calling for the creation of a new socialist party.  The 
Saskatchewan Waffle steering committee prepared for a conference at Moose Jaw in 
October when the membership would decide on the Waffle’s future.105  Prior to the 
conference, members of the Saskatchewan Waffle met with Allan Blakeney at the 
legislature, but the premier explained he had “nothing earthshaking to propose” and 
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indicated he was not prepared at that time to commit to any policies that might placate the 
group.  Blakeney told the Wafflers there was still a place for them in the NDP, which 
should act as the “great mother church” of the left.  Don Mitchell reiterated Waffle 
differences with the NDP, contending the government needed a working-class basis to its 
policies and should focus on wealth redistribution.  All agreed the split should focus on 
policy differences, not personalities.  John Richards asked about the possibility of a 
“principled reconciliation” if the Waffle left the party, but Blakeney expressed 
uncertainty and encouraged the group to “look over the NDP and see what you think” 
before splitting.106 
 Nearly three hundred people, including two hundred Waffle members, attended 
the Moose Jaw conference.  A resolution to withdraw from the NDP and “work to 
establish a new socialist party in Saskatchewan at a founding convention in the spring of 
1974” that was amended to remove the date and add the commitment that “a major 
external education and organizational program be aimed at developing a large socialist 
base within the province” was carried with only a handful of delegates opposed.107  
Members of other parties were to be barred from membership in the new socialist party.  
The conference elected Don Mitchell as president, Sonja Gehl as associate president, 
Cathie Cox as treasurer, and a ten-person steering committee.108 
 A panel discussion at the conference addressed the role MLA John Richards 
should perform in the legislature as the Waffle’s spokesperson outside of the NDP 
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caucus.  Fred Gudmundson summarized the discussion, explaining Richards “should 
emphasize ideological questions concerned with articulating a socialist alternative.”109  In 
early November 1973 Richards announced his departure from the NDP caucus.  His 
personal difficulty in deciding to leave the NDP stood in marked contrast to the 
enthusiasm most of the Saskatchewan Waffle leadership felt for a definitive break from 
the party and government.  Richards had long struggled with the dual challenge of being 
a Waffle spokesperson while remaining a member of the NDP government.  He had used 
his position to criticize the University of Saskatchewan’s administration, to attack high 
pharmaceutical drug prices and to call for a publicly-funded plan to cover their costs, and 
to express the Waffle’s demand for public ownership of the oil industry.  But in such 
cases he had faced questions of whether he spoke for the government or himself.110   
Richards had grown increasingly frustrated with the Blakeney government’s lack 
of progressive action.  In May 1972 he had voted against a bill allowing the government 
to extend forgivable loans to industries, a measure Richards decried as “welfare to 
industry.”111  Further difficulties arose when Department of Public Health officials took 
exception to an article Richards had published – albeit anonymously – in Next Year 
Country.112  As for the potash industry, the issue which had drawn Richards back into 
Saskatchewan politics in 1970, the government would take little action until after he had 
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left the NDP.113  Shortly after the Waffle released One Year After, its critical summary of 
the Blakeney government’s first year in office, Richards reported to his constituency 
association that the party had accomplished little and he described the “emptiness of the 
caucus debates.”  However, he did point to the establishment of a Department of the 
Environment, a survey of drug prices, support for community health clinics, and access to 
legal abortions as positive developments.114  When he announced in July 1973 his 
decision not to continue as legislative secretary to Health Minister Walter Smishek, 
Richards explained to his constituency association that he could no longer remain in the 
hypocritical position of criticizing the government while continuing to work within it.  
The government’s resource development policies were a major source of disagreement: 
“I think the government has failed to elaborate any substantial socialist strategies to deal 
with corporate exploitation of our natural resources and rural decline.”115  Specifically, 
Richards criticized the SaskOil program as a means for entering into joint ventures with 
private oil companies rather than fulfilling the party policy of nationalizing the oil 
industry,  and condemned the government for failing to live up to its election 
commitment to “challenge and end the control over the industry exercised by a cartel of 
multinational fertilizer companies.”116 
                                                        
113 The government introduced a new “reserve tax” on potash in October 1974 and created the Potash 
Corporation of Saskatchewan as a crown corporation in February 1975.  The government partially 
nationalized the potash industry in its next term after a major dispute with private industry and the federal 
government.  See Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, 259-275 and Allan Blakeney, An Honourable 
Calling: Political Memoirs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 141-150. 
114 Minutes of the Annual Convention of Saskatoon University NDP Constituency, October 14, 1972, File 
III.14 New Democratic Party – Saskatoon-University – Minutes, 1971-73, John Richards Papers, SAB 
(Saskatoon). 
115 “Richards abandons aide position,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, July 16, 1973. 
116 “Richards abandons aide position,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, July 16, 1973. 
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As the Waffle moved closer to breaking with the NDP, Richards wrote a friend in 
St. Louis and lamented “I have been depressed about politics for the last six months.”  
Although Richards recognized that the Waffle would soon leave the NDP, he explained 
I fear left schisms and it is with sadness that I see myself becoming estranged 
from many good people in the New Democratic Party.  However the NDP seems 
totally committed to administering the status quo, and totally unwilling to bend – 
even in a social democratic fashion – people on to new directions.  It is quite 
probable that, on its own, the Waffle will falter and die, but those of us involved 
feel that we must try – we all grow old, and we lack oriental patience.  We are all 
tottering past the crucial age of 30 and into the senility of middle age.117 
 
Richards’s announced departure from the NDP on the heels of the Saskatchewan 
Waffle’s decision thus came as little surprise.  Nevertheless he described the action as 
“painful,” indicating that he still respected Blakeney, the cabinet ministers, and party 
activists.  Ultimately, however, Richards concluded he could no longer remain in a party 
that had consistently rejected, both provincially and federally, the left-wing course 
advocated by the Waffle.118 
In the immediate aftermath of its decision to leave the NDP, the Saskatchewan 
Waffle focused on municipal elections taking place across the province.  The Moose Jaw 
Waffle had been active in municipal politics since its 1970 takeover of the Civic Reform 
Association from traditional New Democrats.   Allied with labour, the Civic Reform 
Association ran a slate of ten candidates for Moose Jaw city council in 1973 – all 
unsuccessfully – although hostility from New Democrats angry over the recent split 
lingered.  John Conway reported that the Civic Reform Association had a base of support 
                                                        
117 John Richards to Tsui Blanchard (“friend at Washington U, St. Louis”), August 15, 1973, File II.4 
Correspondence, 1972-76,  John Richards Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). 
118 “NDP ties severed by MLA Richards,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, November 9, 1973. 
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in the community numbering close to two thousand.119  In both Saskatoon and Regina, 
the Waffle campaigned for candidates against NDP-backed candidates.  In Saskatoon, in 
conjunction with activists from the Métis Society, native women, and legal aid clinics, 
the Waffle supported three candidates for council: Nora Thibodeau, Mary Arpin and 
Vicki Wilson.  Rose Bishop and George Smith ran in Regina, emphasizing public 
housing, free public transit and attacking slum landlords.120  Although none of the above 
named candidates in Saskatoon and Regina attracted more than twelve percent of the 
vote, the local Waffle groups were pleased with the result of their initial foray into 
electoral politics in direct competition with the NDP. 
 In December 1973 the Ontario Waffle met in convention to discuss becoming a 
political party and fielding candidates in the federal election expected the following year.  
As is discussed in the next chapter, this decision was crucial to the group’s future.  
Despite falling short of a membership of one thousand that some considered as the 
minimum necessary for holding a founding convention, the Ontario group pushed 
forward.121  One hundred and fifty delegates attended the Toronto convention, in addition 
to seventy observers and members of the press.  The convention’s focus was transforming  
the Ontario Waffle Movement for an Independent and Socialist Canada into a new “mass 
party for Canadian independence and socialism.”122  A resolution presented jointly by the 
                                                        
119 Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, October 23, 1973, File II.31 Meetings, c. 1972-1983, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
120 Ibid. 
121 The membership of 635 in December 1973 was the highest the Ontario Waffle would achieve. Nearly 
two-thirds of the membership lived in Toronto and Ottawa. 
122 East Metro Waffle, “Towards the Formation of a New Party For an Independent Socialist Canada,” 
Advance, November 13, 1973, Box 1, File 8, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA. 
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East Metro and Ottawa groups that stated “the objective conditions are right” became the 
basis for the group’s activities over the coming months.123 
The debate, for once, lacked ferocity.  Most Ontario Waffle groups favoured 
creating a political party and running candidates in the next federal election.  Only the 
Kitchener-Waterloo group was against the idea, deeming it premature, unwise, and likely 
to limit further the Waffle’s ability to establish alliances and win support amongst other 
activists.  Claiming as evidence the Waffle’s lack of cooperation with other labour groups 
in plans for a May Day celebration and a similar go-it-alone streak in demonstrations 
over the military coup in Chile, the Kitchener-Waterloo naysayers warned that creating a 
new party would do “serious harm” to the future of a broad movement for independence 
and socialism.  The majority, however, were not persuaded, and voted 115 to thirteen in 
favour of a new political party.124  The convention also agreed to replace the Waffle 
News, published by the Ottawa Waffle, with the journal Advance, which the York Waffle 
had been publishing since August, as the movement’s primary forum for internal 
discussion and debate.125 
 The Ontario Waffle’s decision to form a political party represented its final break 
with the NDP.  As Mel Watkins explained, the move was “a way of communicating to 
ourselves and to the public that the Waffle is unambiguously disconnected from the 
NDP.”126  The decision by the federal NDP to prop up the minority Liberal government 
led Watkins to conclude “the NDP is bankrupt… no more than the left wing of the 
Liberal party,” while James Laxer, appropriating Lewisian rhetoric, claimed “the NDP 
                                                        
123 Minutes of Waffle Convention, December 8-9, 1973, Box 1, File 6, New Democratic Party Waffle 
collection, MUA. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Nora McCabe, “Waffle votes to quit NDP and go it alone,” Toronto Star, December 10, 1973. 
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has become an encumbrance around the necks of the workers of Canada.”127  The Waffle 
criticized in particular NDP support of Liberal energy policies, insisting that the proposed 
national petroleum company would foot the bill for research and exploration while 
foreign oil companies reaped the rewards.  The convention voted unanimously in favour 
of nationalizing without compensation all Canadian energy companies, inspired in part by 
a May 1973 Gallup poll which indicated forty-eight percent of Canadians supported some 
degree of nationalization of Canada’s energy resources.128  Yet the federal election the 
following year would demonstrate just how misplaced was the Waffle’s optimistic view 
of its prospects outside the NDP. 
 Late in 1973 the Waffle in Ontario and Saskatchewan lost two key figures – Mel 
Watkins and John Warnock.  Following the Ontario Waffle’s December 1973 
convention, Watkins became adviser to the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest 
Territories to assist it in preparing a submission to the Berger inquiry into the Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline.129  The media attention and respect accorded Watkins, and the public 
recognition resulting from the 1968 Watkins Report, had made him one of the most 
prominent Waffle spokespersons.  He had been the first choice of many as the Waffle 
candidate for federal NDP leader in 1971.  Although he did not officially resign until 
August 1974, Watkins’s absence from the Ontario Waffle was keenly felt as it entered its 
next and ultimately final phase.  Coincidentally, in November 1973 Saskatchewan 
Waffler John Warnock announced his resignation from the editorial board of Next Year 
                                                        
127 Ibid. Laxer is making a thinly-veiled reference to a line from Stephen Lewis’s speech a year prior which 
demanded the Waffle disband or leave the ONDP. 
128 Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, “Most People Think We Should Nationalize Energy Resources,” 
May 16, 1973, Gallup Report (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 1973). Thirty-six percent of 
respondents preferred that private enterprise own and operate Canada’s energy resources, such as oil and 
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129 Bullen, “The Ontario Waffle,” M.A. Thesis, 158. 
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Country, a decision consistent with his determination to reduce his involvement in the 
Saskatchewan Waffle.  As he explained to the Next Year Country editorial board, in 
addition to needing to focus on his family and research, Warnock had begun “questioning 
my own political work.”130  Along with his objections to some of Next Year Country’s 
editorial decisions, Warnock was frustrated over the Saskatchewan Waffle’s 1973 Moose 
Jaw conference.  He explained, “I am growing tired of going to endless Waffle 
conferences, to discuss problems with the same hard core group.  There must be more to 
political activity than distributing campaign literature door to door.”131  Warnock 
maintained that the Waffle would not “amount to anything until it builds a base in the 
working class movement,” and indicated his plans to engage in activism with a group of 
ex-Wafflers in Saskatoon “who are actually working with trade union people.  For many 
reasons, the waffle has not been able to do that.”132 
 After the Waffle lost its bid to remain within the Ontario NDP in June 1972, its 
members spent much of the following year-and-a-half absorbed in discussions about their 
future purpose and direction.  Recognizing its failure to transform the NDP into a 
socialist party focused on preserving Canadian independence, the Waffle struggled to 
regroup.  The Waffle’s participation in the 1972 federal election is illustrative of the 
resulting confusion, for both the Ontario and Saskatchewan groups ran a counter-
campaign criticizing the NDP yet voted for the party anyway and individuals supported a 
Waffle-identified candidate running for the NDP in BC.  Provincial elections in British 
Columbia in 1972 and Manitoba in 1973 demonstrated that the Waffle no longer acted as 
                                                        
130 Warnock to Ailsa Rands, November 7, 1973, File I.3 Next Year Country, John Warnock Papers, SAB 
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an organized left wing of the NDP in either province.  Throughout 1972 and 1973 
Wafflers debated a variety of options – remain within the NDP despite overwhelming 
evidence that the party would reject Waffle policy prescriptions; break from the NDP and 
act as a social movement while reluctantly supporting the party electorally; or split 
definitively with the NDP and challenge it in elections.  The strategic and lengthy debates 
that occurred in Ontario and Saskatchewan especially over the Waffle’s future directions 
both exacerbated existing ideological divisions within the two groups and created new 
ones.  Furthermore, these internal debates occurred amidst a rapidly evolving New Left 
milieu.  Ideological and organizational divisions within both the women’s and labour 
movements, and an intellectual turn towards Marxism alongside a renewed emphasis on 
the working class, all significantly influenced the Waffle.  By the end of 1973, when the 
Ontario group decided to field candidates in the upcoming federal election, the Waffle 
existed only in Ontario and Saskatchewan, and in both provinces had broken definitively 
with the NDP. 
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Chapter Ten 
“Marx out of the closet:” Outside the NDP, 1973-75 
 
At the December 1973 Ontario Waffle conference, James Laxer reportedly 
declared that the time had come to “take Marx out of the closet.”1  After splitting from 
the NDP, the Waffle in Ontario and Saskatchewan adopted a Marxist analysis that 
prioritized the working class – which in practice meant the unionized working class – as 
the agent for socialist politics and radical change.  Although this shift attracted those 
academically-inclined activists interested in debating how best to apply a Marxist 
analysis to Canada in the 1970s, it simultaneously alienated others not drawn to such 
esoterica and thereby limited the Waffle’s ability and willingness to collaborate with 
various other left-wing social movements.  The Waffle’s embrace of Marxism would 
have ramifications for its relationships with the women’s, labour, and farmers’ 
movements, as well as affecting its approach to electoral politics.   As will be seen, the 
failure of the Ontario Waffle’s 1974 federal election campaign to garner significant 
support, and the consequent lost opportunity for communicating its ideas to a broader 
public, led the Waffle to re-evaluate its strategy.  The weakness of the campaign and 
resulting fears over its future became touchstones for opposition to the Ontario Waffle’s 
leadership.  Furthermore, the emphasis on Marxism resulted in many Wafflers re-
evaluating their group’s commitment to Canadian nationalism, and produced contentious 
ideological debates that split the Ontario and Saskatchewan Waffles into tiny sectarian 
fragments.  Radical student members of a study group based at York University grew 
particularly vocal in their denunciation of Waffle electoral strategy and its nationalism; 
their plan to take control of the Ontario Waffle came to fruition when its leadership 
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Abbie Bakan and Philip Murton attest that Laxer made this statement in their 2006 article “The Origins of 
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resigned en masse in October 1974.  Although the Saskatchewan Waffle continued to 
meet, publish, and debate for another ten years, by 1976 it had devolved into a small and 
primarily academic discussion group resembling the Committee for a Socialist Movement 
that had preceded the creation of the Waffle in that province.  Meanwhile, a sizeable left 
wing remained in the NDP despite the Waffle’s departure, and the party did not shift 
sharply rightward in the mid-1970s. 
 The Waffle’s ideological shift towards rigid Marxism occurred as a result of 
several factors.  First and most importantly, leading Wafflers became disillusioned with 
the NDP as a potential vehicle for the creation of an independent and socialist Canada.  
Their experience of three years of activism within and without the party, driven by the 
overriding aim of transforming the NDP into a party committed to independence and 
socialism and engaged with extra-parliamentary social movements, had sapped the 
enthusiasm inherent in the Waffle Manifesto.  Repeated defeats in policy votes and 
officer elections at party meetings, an inability to push provincial governments in 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia sufficiently leftward, and their expulsion 
in Ontario convinced the majority of Wafflers of social democracy’s limitations for 
confronting capitalism in Canada.  Secondly, Wafflers’ heightened emphasis on the 
working class drew on their perception of workers’ increased militancy during the early 
1970s, as demonstrated by the Quebec Common Front in March and April 1972 and the 
labour movement’s opposition to wage controls.  Thirdly, the shift was influenced by the 
Ontario Waffle’s conviction that the changing economic circumstances of the 1970s, 
particularly the protectionism of Nixon’s New Economic Plan and the 1973 oil crisis, 
would accelerate the deindustrialization of Canada’s manufacturing heartland and return 
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the country to its traditional dependence as a supplier of natural resources, oil especially, 
to the United States.  Finally, the Waffle’s embrace of Marxism was part of a broader 
trend among the international New Left.  The Canadian student movement had not been 
alone in facing criticism for its lack of a rigorous analysis of society’s ills and necessary 
remedies.2  The appeal of a systematic analysis purporting to demonstrate objectively 
capitalism’s inevitable collapse and the means of replacing it with socialism was strong.  
As a result, the 1970s witnessed a tremendous resurgence of Marxism in various guises 
throughout the international New Left. 
The Waffle’s focus on women’s issues underwent a transition after it departed the 
NDP.  In addition to their activism in local women’s liberation movements, Waffle 
women had worked with other feminists within the party to urge action on a variety of 
women’s issues.  After their split from the party, Waffle women in Ontario and 
Saskatchewan focused increasingly on the problems of working women; however, in 
doing so, they limited their opportunities for connecting with a broader feminist 
movement in building a socialist-feminist framework.  This was partly a response to 
changing circumstances within Canadian second-wave feminism.  A brief lull in 
organizing and activism had followed the 1970 Abortion Caravan, and when the 
women’s liberation movement re-emerged a few years later it represented a broader range 
of feminist issues and priorities.3  A “radical caucus” of women’s liberationists and 
female unionists, including Waffle sympathizers Grace Hartman and Madeleine Parent, 
had coalesced at a 1972 ‘Strategy for Change’ conference organized by the National 
                                                        
2 See, for example, James Harding, “An Ethical Movement in Search of an Analysis.” 
3 Nancy Adamson, “Feminists, Libbers, Lefties, and Radicals,” 264-5. 
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Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC).  But as historians and activists Nancy 
Adamson, Linda Briskin and Margaret McPhail explain:  
Gradually this unity of radical women was broken.  Those who would later form 
the radical-feminist current turned towards the creation of social and political 
alternatives to the existing society and concentrated particularly on the issue of 
violence against women.  Those who would form the socialist-feminist current 
turned to theoretical discussion and tended to concentrate on workplace issues.4 
 
Many women focused on organizing women’s centres and bookstores, rape-crisis centres 
and battered-women hostels as well as providing counselling services and birth control 
information.  At the same time other women’s liberationists emphasized the plight of 
working women; as the number of female unionists soared, feminists increasingly 
organized within the labour movement or in independent unions.5  As the Waffle turned 
toward Marxism, female Wafflers’ emphasis on working women represented the 
beginnings of a socialist-feminist analysis and practice that developed fully in the late 
1970s.  However, given the Waffle’s limited resources, both human and financial, and its 
focus on workers generally rather than women workers specifically, the women’s 
question was largely subordinated to issues of class and Canadian independence. 
                                                        
4 Nancy Adamson, Linda Briskin, Margaret McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change, 65; See also Meg 
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Waffle women worked with women’s liberation groups across Canada in the 
campaign to secure the right to safe, legal and free abortions, and were among the central 
figures in the Abortion Caravan.  Wafflers had also worked with other feminists within 
the Ontario NDP pressing the party, successfully as it turned out, to adopt policies 
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex, and introducing a 
government-funded houseworker’s allowance, improved childcare facilities, changes to 
divorce law, and abortion on demand.6  They failed, however, to make substantial 
changes to the NDP’s structure either federally or provincially, as the party consistently 
rejected proposals for mandating gender parity among party officers.  Gender parity, as 
well as the provision of childcare at its meetings, soon emerged as established norms in 
the Ontario Waffle after MISC was formed.  In Saskatchewan the Waffle accepted 
structural parity in principle, but it was not always practiced until enshrined in the 
group’s constitution in 1972.7 
The first hint of a new direction came almost immediately after the Ontario 
Waffle’s split from the NDP.  Krista Maeots, in her paper “Organizing Women” 
presented at the August 1972 Ontario Waffle conference at Delaware, declared abortion 
campaigns would not be “the main route to building a socialist consciousness among 
women,” and criticized the tendency of some “middle-class” groups to focus on personal 
issues.  Maeots called on the Waffle to lead the way towards a “mass-based socialist 
women’s liberation movement.”8  In Ontario, however, the forum for this approach 
                                                        
6 “Feminists in NDP want to see half of party’s responsible posts in hands of women” Globe and Mail, 
October 5, 1970. 
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Strategy for Waffle Women,” February 1974, File II.12 Conferences and Conventions 1974-83, 
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8 Krista Maeots “Organizing Women,” Box 1, File 4, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA.  
Maeots was undoubtedly responding to the ongoing debates within the women’s liberation movement.  A 
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remained the Toronto Waffle Women’s Group, as it had during the NDP years.  Meetings 
held at members’ homes during the fall of 1972 led to a “Conference on Women 
Working: At Home or At Jobs.”  The broad scope can be contrasted with the group’s later 
less encompassing efforts.  In addition to providing a history of women in the labour 
movement and a panel on organizing women, the conference featured speakers on 
women on welfare and the single parent family, women and the law, and the role of 
women in the media and the arts.9  For Waffle women the conference was noteworthy as 
“probably the first time in the history of women’s liberation meetings [that] serious 
discussion took place on the issue of women and the trade union movement.”10 
A further opportunity for developing this focus on working women occurred in 
December 1972 when Art Kube of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) suggested to 
the Waffle Women’s Group that it organize female white collar workers.11  The extensive 
discussions of the proposal that followed included concerns that the CLC might attempt 
to tone down the Wafflers’ socialist message to its members.  Ultimately, while some of 
its members appear to have participated as individuals in a CLC organizing drive at the 
North American Life Assurance Company, the Waffle Women’s Group did not engage in 
a full-scale program organizing white-collar female workers on behalf of the CLC.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1970 national conference of the women’s movement held in Saskatoon divided between activists, led by 
the LSA/YS, advocating a single-issue strategy focused on a national day of protest against abortion laws, 
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collection, MUA. 
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group did provide volunteer strike support for female flight attendants involved in a two-
month-long labour dispute at Wardair.12  In addition, it held evening educational 
workshops in Toronto.  But the Waffle did not highlight the Women’s Group throughout 
1973.  A group of West Metro Wafflers complained in a resignation letter that “the point 
is not that the women’s issue is a low priority in the Waffle; rather it is no priority at 
all.”13 
At the December 1973 Ontario Waffle convention, the women’s plenary session 
concluded “that working women are in the best position to bring about change for all 
women in society.”14  Waffler Virginia Hunter’s article “Women and Socialism” 
delineated the essential differences between radical and socialist feminists’ analyses of 
women’s oppression.  Unlike Wafflers and other socialist feminists, radical feminists 
held that sex, rather than class, was the primary contradiction in society.15  While other 
Waffle women agreed with her analysis, not all were convinced that the Waffle Women’s 
Group strategy should preclude working with radical or liberal feminists.  In fact, the 
Kingston Waffle argued that Waffle women did have a role to play in the abortion 
                                                        
12 Furthermore, the Waffle engaged in strike-support actions for female workers at Dare, Inc. in Kitchener 
throughout 1973.  However, support for the Dare workers, who originally struck over unequal pay 
increases for men and women at the cookie-making plant, was carried out by the Waffle as a whole, and 
was not a project of the Women’s Group. 
13 West Metro Waffle “A Letter of Resignation to all Ontario Wafflers,” Box 1, File 6, New Democratic 
Party Waffle collection, MUA.  Emphasis in the original. 
14 “Minutes of Waffle Convention,” December 8-9, 1973, Box 1, File 6, New Democratic Party Waffle 
collection, MUA.  The program included demands for 24-hour child-care, a shorter work day, equal pay for 
work of equal value, organizing women, and a $4.00 per hour minimum wage. 
15 Virginia Hunter, “Women and Socialism,” Advance, November 13, 1973, Box 1, File 8, New Democratic 
Party Waffle collection, MUA.  Activists and scholars identified three strains of feminism in the 1970s.  
The central tenet of “liberal feminism is equality of opportunity… the liberal-feminist vision includes a 
redistribution of opportunity in order to give women access to the power and opportunities of men.”  In 
contrast, “radical feminists identify women’s unique capacity to give birth to children as central to both 
women’s experiences and to the material basis of their oppression… radical feminists identify fundamental 
emotional, social, and political differences.”  The nascent concept of “socialist feminism,” with which the 
Wafflers identified, sought to intertwine the categories of gender and class in their analyses of women’s 
oppression.  Adamson, Briskin and McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change, 10-11.  
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struggle – a campaign which Wafflers had largely abandoned after concluding that 
abortion-on-demand was not an issue with the potential to transform women’s 
consciousness.16 
 In Saskatchewan the majority of Waffle women agreed that their focus should be 
on the working class and the struggles of working women.  The Saskatchewan Waffle 
held a women’s conference at Moose Jaw in February 1974. As Martha Tracey recalled, 
“by that point women who saw themselves as radical feminists weren’t there, so women 
in the Waffle had made a choice, and their choice was not to see men as the enemy but to 
look at more of a class analysis.”17  Conference presentations accepted the premise of 
emphasizing working women, and considered the desirability of establishing a separate 
women’s caucus within the larger group.  Six Moose Jaw Wafflers – Carol Bruce, Joy 
Elkin, Judy Hudson, Sally Mahood, Marilyn Patterson and Tracey – who self-identified 
as “scientific socialists” in their paper “Towards a Strategy for Waffle Women,” 
connected women’s liberation to the destruction of capitalism.  They claimed “it is clear 
that women have not been equal participants in the Waffle,” and argued for the creation 
of an ongoing women’s caucus to educate and advocate within the Waffle.   They urged 
the Waffle to undertake a public campaign on the “two related issues of female 
participation in the labour force and child care.”18  In contrast, Sylvia Pusch, Isabel 
Andrews and Elaine Nystrom argued against forming a separate women’s caucus.  They 
contended that although the Moose Jaw Wafflers had adopted a Marxist framework they 
                                                        
16 Kingston Waffle, “Marxism, Feminism and the Waffle,” Advance, July 17, 1974, Box 1, File 8, New 
Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA. 
17 Martha Tracey interview with John Warnock, September 24, 1989, Audio Tape, 1970-1989, R-11903B, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
18 Carol Bruce, Joy Elkin, Judy Hudson, Sally Mahood, Marilyn Patterson and Martha Tracey, “Towards a 
Strategy for Waffle Women,” February 1974, File II.12 Conferences and Conventions 1974-83, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
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erred by espousing the “feminist approach, that of viewing the formation of a socialist 
women’s movement in isolation from the working class as a whole.”  Pusch, Andrews 
and Nystrom asserted that “there cannot be a strategy for the emancipation of women 
apart from a strategy for the proletariat as a whole,” and a Waffle “strategy should center 
around the self-organization of women and women proletarians within the proletariat as a 
whole.” Although they pushed for the Waffle to campaign for child care and abortion, 
they maintained that single-issue campaigns drew the “attention of women inwards to 
themselves rather than outwards to an identification with their class as a whole.”19  Sheila 
Kuziak reported to the Saskatchewan Waffle Steering Committee that Waffle women had 
withdrawn from the abortion campaign coordinating committee established a few weeks 
before in Regina.20   
The focus on working women led key Wafflers, including Pat Gallagher, Sheila 
Kuziak, and Denise Kouri, to organize Saskatchewan Working Women as a coalition of 
union and community-based feminists in the late 1970s and 1980s, but this activism 
remained outside the parameters of the Waffle.21  Despite the Blakeney government’s 
relative inattention to women’s issues during its first term, the Saskatchewan Waffle 
rarely criticized the government for failing to address the major policy goals of the 
women’s movement.22  As will be seen, feminists and leftists in BC by contrast routinely 
criticized the NDP government there for its inaction on women’s issues, although not 
under the guise of the Waffle. 
                                                        
19 Sylvia Pusch, Isabel Andrews, Elaine Nystrom, “Between Marxism and Feminism There Is No Middle 
Ground,” n.d. [1974], File II.12 Conferences and Conventions c. 1974-83, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, 
SAB (Regina). 
20 Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1974, File II.31 Meetings c. 1972-1983, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
21 For a brief discussion of SWW see Chapter Five. 
22 For example, there is barely any mention of women’s issues in One Year After, the Saskatchewan 
Waffle’s extensive critique of the Blakeney government’s first year in power. 
  391 
 The Waffle’s ideological shift also affected its position vis-à-vis the labour 
movement.  During its NDP period the Ontario Waffle had antagonized leaders of 
Canadian branches of some major international unions, the USWA and UAW in 
particular, by criticizing the limited autonomy granted the Canadian sections, attacking 
the union leadership’s moderation, and working with left-wing caucuses of the 
international as well as independent Canadian unions, most notably affiliates of the 
Council of Canadian Unions (CCU).  The Ontario Waffle had lent its support to two 
prominent strikes by the CTCU, the CCU affiliate led by union organizers Kent Rowley 
and Madeleine Parent, at Texpack in 1971 and at Artistic Woodwork in 1973.  However 
Mine-Mill’s decision to withdraw from the CCU in April 1972, which two Wafflers 
prompted, harmed the relationship between the Ontario Waffle and the CCU.  The 
Ontario Waffle’s embrace of Marxism following the split from the NDP and commitment 
to the deindustrialization thesis further divided it from the independent Canadian labour 
movement.  In Saskatchewan, where there were no CCU locals or a manufacturing base 
employing large numbers of industrial workers, the deindustrialization thesis was not 
easily applicable and the ideological shift to Marxism resulted in the Waffle focusing its 
energies on organized workers unfettered by the practical complications experienced by 
their Ontario counterparts. 
In the immediate aftermath of its departure from the NDP, the Ontario Waffle’s 
uncertainty over whether it should organize within international unions or support a fully-
independent Canadian union movement contributed to a divide between the Toronto and 
Ottawa Waffle groups.  In a paper on “Trade Union Organizing” presented at the July 
1972 Gravenhurst meeting that preceded MISC’s formation, union activist Dan Sunstrom 
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recommended that the Waffle establish caucuses within international unions to advocate 
for Canadian independence and socialism.23  Conversely, Robin and Esther Mathews’s 
paper “On Labour and Practical Strategy,” circulated shortly after the Delaware 
conference, endorsed the Waffle working towards the establishment of independent 
unions.24  A letter to Canadian Dimension complained that “with the flip-flopping of the 
Waffle on the question both before and after Orillia, practically the only group in Canada 
to support the independent union movement has been the corporate-dominated 
Committee for an Independent Canada, a paradox which lends weight to the charges of 
company unionism.”25 
 A dispute in British Columbia throughout 1972 brought new urgency to the 
debate over international versus independent unions.  In Kitimat, a company town 
dominated by the aluminum giant Alcan, workers at the Alcan plant broke away from the 
USWA to form an independent union, the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied 
Workers (CASAW).    This ultimately successful severance from a major international 
union inspired others committed to the idea of an independent Canadian union 
movement.  Kent Rowley and the CCU had supported the Kitimat breakaway and the 
divide it engendered with USWA was among the reasons for Mine-Mill’s departure from 
the organization. The Ontario Waffle Labour Committee, however, adopted a more 
cautious approach.  The minutes of its May 12, 1973 meeting indicate only that an 
                                                        
23 Dan Sunstrom, “Trade Union Organizing,” 1972, Box 1, File 4, New Democratic Party Waffle 
collection, MUA. 
24 Robin Mathews, “On Labour,” 1972, Box 1, File 4, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA.  
Another paper presented in October 1972 argues that the Waffle should avoid both “left caucuses” within 
international unions and “narrow sectarian or ego-inflated moves leading to adventurism or arid rhetoric, 
eg. the generalized call for Canadian workers to leave US dominated unions en masse without providing a 
serious alternative; raiding of existing unions or shrill abstract calls for Canadian unionism.” Unidentified 
author, “Prospects and Strategy for Canadian Labour,” Box 1, File 4, New Democratic Party Waffle 
collection, MUA. 
25 Paul Knox, “Letter to the Editor,” Canadian Dimension, July 1973, 2. 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“informal exchange of views took place” over the issue of breakaways and the CLC 
response.26  Prior to this discussion Robert Laxer had expressed strong opposition to 
breakaways, and supported working within international unions.  In a February 1973 
paper he argued “the attempt to find the solution to new anti-imperialist struggles by way 
of short-cut organizational solutions is mechanical and uncreative.”27  Five months later 
the Ontario Waffle Labour Committee had largely adopted this position.  Its policy, 
passed at the July 1973 council and endorsed at the December 1973 convention, 
categorically stated:  
While the Waffle recognizes the frustrations that lead rank-and-file members to 
support local breakaways, it acknowledges that the preferable route for the 
Canadian members of so-called international unions is to remain united while 
they carry out the transformation of their unions into independent Canadian 
unions.28 
 
Although the complex internal politics of the Canadian labour movement clearly 
influenced the Ontario Waffle’s labour policy and strategy, the position adopted at the 
July council and December convention reflected the group’s emphasis on the Canadian 
working class in the “key manufacturing and resource based industries of Ontario” as 
critical components in the creation of an independent and socialist Canada.29  As a result 
of the Waffle’s internal confusion and eventual commitment to working within 
international unions, Rowley and Parent rejected the Waffle’s suggestion that it and the 
                                                        
26 “Ontario Waffle Labour Committee – Summary of Meeting May 12, 1973, Waterloo,” Box 1, File 4, 
New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA. 
27 Bob Laxer “Trade Unions as Working Class Organizations,” February 1973, Box 1, File 4, New 
Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA. 
28 “Labour Policy of the Ontario Waffle,” 1973, Box 1, File 5, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, 
MUA. 
29 Unidentified author, “Prospects and Strategy for Canadian Labour,” Box 1, File 4, New Democratic 
Party Waffle collection, MUA. 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CCU establish formal ties.30  The Waffle approached other potentially sympathetic 
unionists at CUPE and the Confederation of National Trade Unions in Quebec, but none 
were open to a formal affiliation.31  The Waffle’s concern over deindustrialization also 
precluded allying with environmentalists, according to Robert Laxer, who declared “our 
allies do not include people who advocate limits to growth – for under the guise of being 
concerned with the environment such a view is in fact support for de-industrialization of 
Canada.”32  In addition, the Waffle Labour Committee in 1974 began publishing North 
Country, a news magazine for Ontario workers.  Three issues were produced before the 
Waffle’s dissolution, with each edition featuring articles by Wafflers and union activists 
on strikes and workers’ struggles around the province. 
 Despite the absence of a large industrial working class in Saskatchewan when the 
Waffle there turned to Marxism between 1972 and 1974, it adopted an analysis that 
placed workers at the centre of its political strategy.  Pat Gallagher asserted at its August 
1974 conference that the group decided it would form “an open Marxist party with a 
working class base” and focus its organizing efforts on the trade union movement.33  
Indeed, individual Wafflers did just that in the coming years, including Shelia Kuziak 
with the Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA) from 
1974 to 1989, Don Kossick with the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union in 
1975, and Gallagher herself as an executive assistant with the Saskatchewan Federation 
                                                        
30 Ontario Waffle Executive Meeting Minutes, March 24, 1973, Box 1, File 5, New Democratic Party 
Waffle collection, MUA. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Bob Laxer, “National and Class Struggles in English Canada and Quebec: The Waffle and Alliances for 
Independence,” Advance, April 15, 1974, Box 1, File 8, New Democratic Party Waffle collection, MUA. 
33 Pat Gallagher, “Where do we go from here?” Waffle Newsletter, January 1975, File II.35 Newsletters c. 
1971-1979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
  395 
of Labour in 1976.34  Not surprisingly, the Waffle’s Marxist analysis prioritizing the 
working class hindered its existing relationship with the NFU.  The Waffle and the NFU 
had cooperated closely during Don Mitchell’s bid for the Saskatchewan NDP leadership 
in 1970,  and the Waffle had also attracted a number of NFU activists, including 
president Roy Atkinson, to its cause.35  Furthermore, the Waffle had supported NFU 
policies pushing NDP governments in Saskatchewan and Manitoba to adopt an 
agricultural strategy for combating corporate domination of farming and food 
production.36  However, as Don Kossick recalled, as the Waffle turned increasingly 
towards Marxism its prevalent view became “the farmers were reactionary, that they 
weren’t necessarily the group to work with in terms of progressive politics, and there was 
a lot of reading and analysis of Lenin and populism and so on.”37  At the national Waffle 
meeting in May 1973, Lorne Brown reported that the Saskatchewan group had grown 
disappointed with the NFU.  He explained how the Waffle initially perceived the NFU as 
a potential ally, but now realized it had “confused the NFU’s left populism with a 
socialist thrust.”38  The NFU had adopted a non-partisan approach to its advocacy, and 
Brown reported that “at the moment the NFU leadership views the Waffle with 
suspicion.”39  By December 1975, the Saskatchewan Waffle’s agricultural committee was 
                                                        
34 “Obituary,” Globe and Mail, November 5, 2016; Don Kossick interview with John Warnock, August 19, 
1989, Adio Tape 1970-1989, R-11906B, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
35 National Farmers Union list, n.d., File I.9 NFU-Waffle, John Warnock Papers, SAB (Saskatoon).  
Wafflers Lorne Brown, Don Mitchell, John Conway, Gerry Sperling, Doug Daniels, John Warnock and Pat 
Gallagher are all listed as providing resources to NFU local area co-ordinators on the document. 
36 Press Release, April 30, 1971, File III.1 Manitoba Waffle, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
37 Don Kossick interview with John Warnock, August 19, 1989, Audio Tape 1970-1989, R-11906B, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
38 Minutes of National Waffle Meeting held at Regina, Saskatchewan, May 5-6, 1973, File III.28 National 
Waffle, John Richards Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). 
39 Ibid. Shortly after John Gallagher, former editor of the NFU’s newspaper the Union Farmer, became 
full-time editor of Canadian Dimension, Joe Roberts complained to the Saskatchewan Waffle steering 
committee that the left-wing magazine had adopted a “consistent anti-Waffle line.” Publisher Cy Gonick’s 
own disillusionment with the Waffle undoubtedly contributed to Canadian Dimension’s increasingly 
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considering “how the Waffle relates to the question of agricultural production in a 
manner consistent with our developing Marxist and working class analysis.”  Their 
analysis divided farmers into three classes – capitalist agribusinessmen, petite bourgeois 
independent commodity producers, and wage earners – and encouraged Wafflers with 
farmer contacts to initiate a campaign explaining workers’ ongoing opposition to the 
imposition of wage controls.40  As Kossick observed, “the Waffle’s tension, or movement 
towards a centralized Marxist-Leninist model in a sense blinded it from recognizing other 
forms of organizational structures that could have mobilized workers or farmers in terms 
of coalitions.”41 
 Much as the Waffle’s evolving ideology influenced its approach to the women’s, 
labour, and farmers’ movements, so did its increasingly strict Marxist analysis shape 
fierce internal debates over participation in the 1974 federal and 1975 Saskatchewan 
elections.  The Waffle played an important role in the “new nationalist” movement, 
discussed in Chapter Three, that influenced the Trudeau Liberals’ adoption of several 
economic nationalist measures during the 1972-74 minority government.  Nevertheless, 
internal criticisms of the Ontario Waffle’s strategy following its disappointing 
performance in the 1974 election concentrated on the allegation that the campaign 
emphasized Canadian nationalism to the exclusion of the group’s socialist message.  By 
contrast, the debate within the Saskatchewan Waffle over the 1975 provincial election 
                                                                                                                                                                     
critical coverage of the Waffle.  Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, September 22, 1974, File 
II.31 Meetings c. 1972-1983, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
40 “Report of the Provincial Council Meeting, Regina, December 13th, 14th, 1975,” Waffle Newsletter V. 2, 
N. 1, File II.35 Newsletters c. 1971-1979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
41 Don Kossick interview with John Warnock, August 19, 1989, Adio Tape 1970-1989, R-11906B, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
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there focused on the question of whether there was any strategic value to be gained from 
participating in electoral politics. 
Although Trudeaumania and Pierre Trudeau’s ascension to power occurred during 
a period of “peak nationalism” in 1967-68, the new prime minister was in fact a 
committed anti-nationalist.42  Nevertheless, under pressure from the NDP and at the 
urging of the Liberal Party’s left-nationalist wing the Trudeau government embraced a 
series of economic nationalist polices.  Liberal left-nationalist politicians, professors and 
members of the media such as Walter Gordon, Beland Honderich, Abraham Rotstein, 
Eric Kierans and Peter Newman often shared platforms with leading Wafflers, accorded 
the socialists media coverage alongside mainstream nationalists, and warned their fellow 
Liberals that an overtly nationalist NDP, under the Waffle’s influence, would appeal to 
voters concerned about high levels of foreign ownership.  During his first term in office, 
Trudeau took little action on foreign ownership other than to appoint an “understaffed, 
low-priority task force” on foreign investment chaired by Windsor MP Herb Gray.43  As 
a result of the government’s inaction, Walter Gordon warned, “the NDP is likely to steal 
a good portion of the vote if the Liberals fail to bring in a strong policy to deal with 
economic independence.”44  Gordon, no longer a MP, nevertheless rejected the Waffle’s 
                                                        
42 Paul Litt explains that “Canadian nationalism was central to Trudeaumania” in his illuminating 
discussion of the Canadian Sixties, nationalism, the media and Trudeau. See Litt, Trudeaumania, 14-43.  
Although both Walter Gordon and his ally Beland Honderich, publisher of the Toronto Star, supported 
Trudeau’s leadership bid, Trudeau refused to endorse either the Watkins Report or Gordon’s economic 
nationalist proposals during the 1968 leadership campaign and subsequent federal election.  Azzi, Walter 
Gordon, 164; Clarkson and McCall, Trudeau and Our Times, 86-7; Anthony Westell, “New Nationalists 
May Push Trudeau to the Left,” Toronto Star, November 29, 1969. See also Wright, Trudeaumania, 182-3 
and Litt, Trudeaumania, 245. 
43 Clarkson and McCall, Trudeau and Our Times, 102. The authors describe Trudeau as “weary of all the 
attention American economic and cultural domination was drawing in the press.”   
44 Gordon quote in Godfrey and Watkins, ed., Gordon to Watkins to You, 23. 
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calls for public ownership, and urged the Liberal government to adopt instead his more 
moderate proposals for limiting foreign ownership.45 
According to Christina Newman, Gordon and the economist Abraham Rotstein 
were dismayed that the Waffle “was the only organized independentist movement in the 
country.”  Along with Peter Newman, editor-in-chief of the Toronto Star, they 
established the Committee for an Independent Canada (CIC) in September 1970 to 
“provide a focus for nationalists with ideas less radical – though no less passionately held 
– than those of the Wafflers.”46  They portrayed the CIC as a mainstream, non-socialist 
alternative to the Waffle’s emphasis on nationalization as the primary means for 
achieving Canadian economic independence from the United States.47  The CIC included 
as members such prominent public figures as the politicians Judy La Marsh and Pauline 
Jewett, writers Farley Mowat, Hugh MacLennan, Pierre Berton and Al Purdy, publishers 
Jack McClelland, Mel Hurtig, and Beland Honderich, journalists Claude Ryan and 
Adrienne Clarkson, and academics Robin Mathews, George Grant, Kenneth McNaught, 
Denis Smith, W.L. Morton and Lloyd Axworthy.48  Historian Stephen Azzi described the 
CIC’s statement of purpose, in contrast to the Waffle, as “intentionally vague, in an 
attempt to win as many members as possible.”49   Despite Newman’s and Gordon’s active 
speaking schedules promoting the organization in the fall of 1970 and spring of 1971, and 
                                                        
45 “Socialism Not Needed Gordon Declares,” Toronto Star, April 16, 1970.  Gordon and the CIC advocated 
for a Foreign Investment Review Agency and Canadian Development Corporation, limiting land 
acquisition by nonresidents, and regulations to promote Canadian content on radio and television. 
46 Christina Newman, “Growing Up Reluctantly; How a Political System Failed: The Birth and Brutal 
Death of the New Nationalism,” Maclean’s, August 1972, 57. 
47 Azzi, Walter Gordon, 177-8.  Azzi quotes Mel Hurtig describing the Waffle as “immediately antagonistic 
towards us” and Eddie Goodman arguing “it is my opinion that they [Waffle] cause irreparable harm to 
nationalist movement in Canada… I think they regard us as their enemies and so they should.”  
48 Ibid., 177. 
49 Ibid., 179. 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the CIC’s success gathering 170,000 signatures on a petition opposing foreign ownership, 
it quickly declined in prominence after its initial burst of activity.50 
Gordon’s close connections with the Toronto Star – he was a director and 
member of its board from 1970 to 1979 – furthered the newspaper’s support of Canadian 
left-nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s.  Certainly the Star’s coverage of the Waffle and 
the CIC enhanced the public prominence of both groups.51  In his study of the 
newspaper’s support for economic nationalism, Donald MacIntosh concluded that 
between Gordon and the Star “his cause was its cause.”52  The Toronto Star gave 
prominent coverage to opponents of foreign ownership such as Rotstein, Watkins and 
Laxer, and adopted a left-nationalist editorial position.  MacIntosh argues: 
The Star’s long preoccupation with foreign ownership is an excellent illustration 
of an attempt by a mass circulation newspaper not only to set one aspect of the 
political agenda but to change the public’s viewpoint.  There can be no doubt that 
the Star by the persistent prominence it gave the issue did, in effect, attempt to 
structure the way in which its readers perceived foreign ownership by the events it 
chose to report, its editorials and its interpretative articles... The Star, in its 
campaign to change its readers’ views on foreign ownership, came very close to 
suggesting that foreign ownership was responsible for most of Canada’s economic 
problems.53 
 
Peter Newman, in recalling his decision to accept the editor-in-chief position at the 
Toronto Star, explained “I was after a platform where I could preach my nationalistic 
convictions… what mattered to me was that the Star was the house organ of Canadian 
nationalism, and as its editor, I would be in a position to advance my crusade.”54 
                                                        
50 Ibid.; Clarkson and McCall, Trudeau and Our Times, 102.  Newman recalled “I spoke at what seemed 
like every Canadian church basement and Rotary Club luncheon, pushing the cause of economic 
nationalism,” in Peter C. Newman, Here Be Dragons: Telling Tales of People, Passions and Power 
(Toronto: M& S, 2004), 262. 
51 Azzi, Walter Gordon, 173-4. 
52 Donald Alexander MacIntosh, “The Toronto Star: A Study in the Advocacy of Economic Nationalism,” 
M.A. Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1978, 68, 98. 
53 Ibid., 28. 
54 Newman, Here Be Dragons, 262. 
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In addition to the Toronto Star, the Waffle received high-profile coverage in 
mainstream magazines such as Maclean’s, Chatelaine, and Saturday Night.55  When 
Newman left the Toronto Star to become editor of Maclean’s in 1971, he remained a 
committed nationalist and ensured that like-minded voices were prominent in the 
revitalized magazine.56  In explaining the nationalist inclinations of prominent Canadian 
journalists such as Newman and Pierre Berton, the historian Paul Litt asserted that 
“nationalism endowed their ‘beat,’ Canada, with meaning and purpose, and their voices 
were influential in the national conversation.”57 
Leading Wafflers’ familiarity with print, radio and television assisted their efforts 
to convey a message of independence and socialism.58  Wafflers such as Laxer, Krista 
Maeots, Don Mitchell, John Conway and Don Kossick had extensive experience with 
university student newspapers, and several others were employed by various media 
outlets in the early 1970s.59  Kelly Crichton, for example, was a reporter for both CBC 
and CTV before becoming a producer at CBC Television, and Gerry Sperling was a 
                                                        
55 See, for example, Christina Newman, “An Unemotional, Resolutely Unjingoistic Guide to the New 
Canadian Nationalism,” Chatelaine, October 1970, 22; Christina Newman, “The True Compromise: Good 
and Sane – How Mel Watkins Brought Socialism to the NDP,” Saturday Night, September 1970, 23-7; 
Walter Stewart “On the Left, Mel Watkins; in the Middle, Joe Greene: The Heavyweight Contest to Choose 
Captain Canada of 1971,” Maclean’s, November 1970; Christina Newman, “Growing Up Reluctantly; How 
a Political System Failed: The Birth and Brutal Death of the New Nationalism,” Maclean’s, August 1972.  
56 Newman, Here Be Dragons, 352. 
57 Litt, Trudeaumania, 87. 
58 The press, admittedly, found the Waffle’s internal debates rather less newsworthy than their showdowns 
with the NDP and labour leadership.  After the ONDP Council in Orillia, a reporter complained “for the 
press, Waffle caucuses are interminable.  Leader James Laxer had intimated no impulsive decisions were 
likely, and the journalists filtered away from the crowded hall.” Philip Sykes, “Officially dead, the Waffle 
girds for its biggest battle,” Toronto Star, June 26, 1972. 
59 Conway, Mitchell and Kossick all cut their activist teeth as editors of the Carillon. 
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freelance broadcaster with CBC-Regina.  Maeots began a successful career as a CBC 
Radio producer in 1971.60 
 In addition to the increased media attention devoted to the issue, public opinion 
polls between 1970 and 1974 suggest that new nationalists, with the Waffle prominent 
among them, had persuaded many Canadians that American domination of the economy 
endangered their economic sovereignty and way of life.  A November 1970 poll indicated 
sixty-two percent of Canadians believed there was already enough US capital in Canada 
(compared to twenty-five percent who said they would like more), a substantial increase 
from the forty-six percent that expressed concerns over American ownership in 1964.61  
A year-and-a-half later, sixty-seven percent said there was sufficient US capital in 
Canada compared to twenty-two percent who desired more.62  Responses to a poll asking 
if Canadian dependence on the US was a “good thing or not a good thing for Canada” 
showed a similar trend: thirty-four percent viewed dependence as a good thing down 
from forty-eight percent in 1963, while a majority (fifty-three percent) decried Canadian 
dependence on the United States, a rise of nine percent since 1963.63  By 1974, fifty-
seven percent of respondents believed the Canadian way of life was too heavily 
influenced by the US, a jump of thirty percent since 1956.64 
Liberal left-nationalists, apprehensive about the Waffle’s influence, NDP popular 
appeal, and shifting public opinion, conspired to drive the Trudeau government in the 
                                                        
60 Lydia A. Miljan and Barry Cooper, Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2003), 40; “Executive’s death puts CBC show off air for a day,” Globe and Mail, October 6, 
1978. 
61 “Enough U.S. capital in Canada, now, say 6 in 10,” The Gallup Report, November 28, 1970.  A month 
earlier, 46% of respondents approved of buying back majority control of US companies in Canada even if it 
meant reducing our standard of living compared to 32% who disapproved. “‘Buy Back Canada’ despite 
possible lower standards of living,” The Gallup Report, October 14, 1970 
62 “New high in belief enough US capital here,” The Gallup Report, February 12, 1972. 
63 “Majority now say dependence on US is bad for Canada,” The Gallup Report, August 26, 1972. 
64 “Growing Number Here Say too Much US Influence,” The Gallup Report, May 25, 1974. 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direction of economic nationalism despite the prime minister’s personal reluctance.  
McCall and Clarkson claim that in the aftermath of the Nixon Shock in 1971, a “crucial 
point in Canadian history, Pierre Trudeau’s stubborn anti-nationalism was a serious 
impediment to new planning,” but pressure from within the Liberal party as well as the 
NDP during the minority parliament of 1972-74 forced his government to act.65  It 
created the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) which required potential 
investors to demonstrate how a foreign corporate takeover would be of significant benefit 
to Canada, and the Canadian Development Corporation (CDC) to facilitate Canadian 
government investment in domestic businesses.  A massive increase in the price of oil 
compounded by the OPEC boycott following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 led 
the Trudeau government to accept NDP demands for a national energy policy, a state oil 
company, and a continued freeze in oil prices.66  However, when the government with 
Progressive Conservative support also passed corporate tax cuts and introduced a budget 
in early 1974 that reflected none of Lewis’s demands the NDP withdrew its support.67  
                                                        
65 Clarkson and McCall, Trudeau and Our Times, 97, 111.  Both Walter Gordon and Eric Kierans, the 
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States. Clarkson and McCall, Trudeau and Our Times, 107. 
66 English, Just Watch Me, 194-8, 218-9, 226; Aivalis, The Constant Liberal, 90-7; Morton, The New 
Democrats, 159. 
67 Lewis had insisted the budget include government subsidies to keep mortgage rates low and a large 
increase in corporate taxes.  Despite the NDP’s success in pushing the minority Liberal government to 
increase family allowances and old age pensions, create a Food and Prices Review Board, and introduce 
electoral and party finance reforms, the 1972-74 period had been challenging for the NDP ccuacus.  
Repeatedly divided over whether to support government polices or force an election the federal caucus also 
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John English described the Prime Minister as having “feigned fury” at the opposition for 
causing the election, but Trudeau later admitted that he, Turner and House Leader Allan 
MacEachen engineered the defeat to ensure a return to the polls on the Liberals’ terms.68 
 The NDP’s dilemma was how to claim responsibility for the minority 
government’s progressive policies while justifying its decision to force the election.  
With inflation growing at an exorbitant rate, much of the campaign focused on the PC’s 
endorsement of wage and price controls.69  The NDP slogan “who controls Canada?” 
initially targeted corporations as the primary cause of inflation, but when that strategy 
flopped the campaign shifted focus to attacking the PC’s proposed wage and price 
controls, which the Liberals also opposed.70  Otherwise, the NDP election platform 
highlighted the rapidly rising cost of living and the party’s promises to empower the Food 
and Prices Review Board to restrain price increases, create a two-price system for crucial 
commodities, and introduce a ceiling on mortgage rates.  On energy policy the NDP 
opposed a continental energy deal, promising instead to strive for Canadian self-
sufficiency in oil production by 1980, keep oil prices low, increase research into 
renewable energy sources, and delay the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline in order to 
assess its impact on Native peoples.71 
 During the 1974 federal election campaign the Waffle attempted to formulate an 
approach to electoral politics distinct from the NDP.  In Saskatchewan, it initially 
considered running a candidate against Liberal cabinet minister Otto Lang in Saskatoon-
                                                                                                                                                                     
disagreed with provincial NDP governments over energy policy and wage and price controls.  Morton, The 
New Democrats, 147, 160; Smith, Unfinished Journey, 474-6; Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 92. 
68 English, Just Watch Me, 233. 
69 Morton, The New Democrats, 166-7, Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 92. 
70 Smith, Unfinished Journey, 477; Whitehorn. Canadian Socialism, 92. 
71 Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 92. 
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Humbolt, but eventually decided not to given the “low level of interest” and the group’s 
predominantly provincial focus.  Instead the Saskatchewan Wafflers published a 
pamphlet explaining their stance on national policy issues and held rallies in Prince 
Albert on natural resources, in Saskatoon on abortion and the Wheat Board, and in 
Regina on inflation.72  The Ontario Waffle decision to run candidates left some of its 
erstwhile supporters torn.  Saskatoon Waffler Gerry Kowalenko, in Ottawa during the 
campaign, explained: 
I’ve decided to work for the NDP in the upcoming federal election.  I could not 
work for [Waffle candidate] Bela Egyed in Ottawa Centre – but I could not work 
against him – so I have decided to work in my own riding… which, while 
hopeless, will at least mean that I won’t have to work against the Waffle.73 
 
James Laxer’s second book Canada’s Energy Crisis received largely favourable 
reviews and generated much needed publicity for the Waffle in the lead-up to the 1974 
election campaign.74  At a press conference held prior to Turner’s federal budget 
unveiling in May, the Waffle announced plans to field four candidates, two of them 
women, who would campaign on four main issues: foreign ownership of the economy, 
and energy resources in particular; the oppression of women; the stagnation of Ontario 
manufacturing; and the need for an independent Canadian union movement.75  A Globe 
and Mail reporter sarcastically proclaimed that “the Waffle, the left wing that the New 
Democratic Party amputated in 1972, is flapping back into electoral politics.”76  One 
week later the Waffle identified its candidates, now reduced in number to three: James 
                                                        
72 Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1974, II.31 Meetings, c. 1972-1983, 
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
73 Gerry Kowalenko to John Richards, May 22, 1974, File II.4 Correspondence 1972-1976, John Richards 
Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). 
74 Geoffrey Stevens, “Finger-pointing the way to oil policy. Now for a party,” Globe and Mail, April 27, 
1974. 
75 John Slinger, “Left winging it,” Globe and Mail, May 7, 1974. 
76 Ibid. 
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Laxer in York West, Bela Egyed in Ottawa Centre, and Mary Campbell in Middlesex-
London-Lambton.  Despite running candidates against the NDP, the Waffle demonstrated 
some ambivalence in its stance toward its former party comrades. 
Middlesex-London-Lambton was selected because the Waffle anticipated the 
NDP would field strong or left-wing candidates in the neighbouring London ridings.77   
York West was thought promising because of its high concentration of working-class 
voters, and Ottawa Centre chosen because of the likelihood it would generate significant 
media attention.  The Ottawa Waffle believed it was accorded coverage worthy of a 
“fourth major party” - including an Ottawa Citizen profile of Bela Egyed published 
alongside that of the Liberal, Conservative and NDP candidates in Ottawa Centre – in 
comparison to other parties such as Social Credit or the Marxist-Leninists that also had 
candidates in the riding.78  Generally, however, Waffle candidates received little press 
coverage, and certainly less than they did during the 1972 counter-campaign. 
 The Waffle conducted its campaigns similar to the NDP, distributing leaflets in 
door-to-door canvasses and identifying supporters whom it subsequently encouraged to 
vote on election day.  With limited financial and human resources to draw upon, and 
believing its best electoral prospects were disillusioned and working-class voters, the 
Waffle focused on polls where the NDP had performed well in previous elections.79  Its 
platform highlighted the dangers deindustrialization posed to Ontario and advocated 
                                                        
77 “London Election Report,” Advance, September 23, 1973, Box 1, File 8, New Democratic Party Waffle 
collection, MUA. 
78 “Ottawa Election Report,” Advance, September 23, 1973, Box 1, File 8, New Democratic Party Waffle 
collection, MUA.  In fact Bela Egyed did receive significant media coverage from the Ottawa Citizen.  The 
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extending women’s rights in the workplace, nationalizing all resource industries owned 
by multinational corporations, and increasing the minimum wage and old age pensions.  
The NDP for its part largely ignored the Waffle throughout the campaign.  Neither its 
leader David Lewis nor the NDP candidates in York West, Ottawa Centre, and 
Middlesex-London-Lambton commented in the media about their rivals to the left.80 
 An improved Liberal campaign, the election’s twin foci on Trudeau’s leadership 
and wage and price controls, and the lack of a campaign message with the resonance of 
its previous “corporate welfare bums” tagline, proved the NDP’s undoing in 1974.81  
Reduced to 15.4 percent of the popular vote, the party’s caucus was nearly halved.  Three 
Toronto seats, including David Lewis’s riding of York South, fell to the Liberals, but the 
biggest losses occurred in British Columbia where the party’s popular vote dropped to 
twenty-three per cent from thirty-five per cent in 1972.82  Lewis had attempted during the 
campaign to distance the federal NDP from Dave Barrett’s provincial government, but 
still lost nine of the eleven seats it had won in BC in 1972.83  Lewis accepted 
                                                        
80 Geoffrey Stevens, “On the campaign trail, a last hurrah,” Globe and Mail, June 24, 1974; Jonathan 
Manthorpre, “The mood of the voters: Metro,” Globe and Mail, July 6, 1974; Don Butler, “Candidates 
touch familiar subjects,” Ottawa Citizen, June 21, 1974; “8 candidates woo York West voters,” Toronto 
Star, June 14, 1974. 
81 Dorothy Allen, a 22-year-old in Saskatoon explained that she and her husband planned to vote for the 
Liberals because “I don’t like Stanfield’s personality and I really don’t like that David Lewis.  If they got 
rid of him I might vote for them because I like the NDP Waffle.” Richard Cleroux, “3 Saskatchewan voters 
differ on the best man,” Globe and Mail, July 2, 1974. 
82 In addition to Lewis, Terry Grier (Lakeshore) and John Harney (Scarborough West) lost their seats in 
Toronto.  The party lost three seats in Saskatchewan – Bill Knight (Assiniboia), Alf Gleave (Saskatoon-
Biggar), and Meadow Lake (Eli Nesdoly) – and one in Manitoba – Doug Rowland (Selkirk). 
83 Dave Barrett and William Miller, Barrett: A Passionate Political Life (Vouncouver: Douglas & 
McIntyre, 1995), 92.  The defeated MPs were Paddy Neale (Vancouver East), Nels Nelson (Burnaby-
Seymour), Mark Rose (Fraser Valley West), Harry Olaussen (Coast Chilcotin), Randolph Harding 
(Kootenay West) and Frank Howard (Skeena).  Dennis Mulroney, Leonard Friesen and Don Barker failed 
in their bids to succeed Grace MacInnis (Vancouver Kingsway), Barry Mather (Surrey-White Rock), and 
Tom Barnett (Comox-Alberni), respectively. 
  407 
responsibility for the debacle and in the election aftermath announced his resignation as 
party leader and retirement from political life.84 
The election results were profoundly disappointing for the Ontario Waffle.  In all 
three ridings its candidates finished fourth behind the NDP, garnering a mere fraction of 
the NDP’s vote totals.85  In the electoral post-mortem, numerous Wafflers offered 
comments, criticisms, and suggestions for future activities.  Doris Jantzi, an executive 
member from Toronto, and Bela Egyed argued “we were wrong about the timing for the 
formation of a socialist party.”86  Ellie Prepas’s assessment was even harsher.  She 
informed John Richards: 
I think it’s fair to say that the Ontario Waffle will have great difficulty recovering 
from their federal election activities.  Their already diminishing credibility has all 
but been wiped out here in Southern Ontario.  I must say that the events of the last 
couple of years have been very discouraging from the perspective of social 
change in Canada, but more particularly for me, for social change in Ontario.87 
 
The disenchantment amongst Wafflers was widespread and captured in a paper “Lessons 
of the Toronto Waffle Election Campaign” written by the York Waffle’s study group.88  
The document, which was sent to all Wafflers following the election, was “strategically 
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86 Doris Jantzi, Linda Hay and Bela Egyed, “Paper on Strategy,” 1974, Box 1, File 7, New Democratic 
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signed by two members only… hoping this would minimize the defensive and repressive 
response of the leadership that arose with every hint of debate.”89  It did not, and the 
ensuing debate marked the beginning of the end for the Ontario Waffle. 
The internal debate over the Waffle’s election strategy focused on one 
fundamental issue – the York group’s belief that the Laxer campaign had emphasized 
Canadian independence at the expense of socialist principles.  A Laxer leaflet with the 
slogan “a vote for Jim Laxer is a vote for Canadian Independence” was presented as 
evidence.90  Although Laxer’s, Egyed’s and Campbell’s other campaign materials 
contained the slogan “for an independent and socialist Canada,” the critics were not 
placated.  Their perception of the purportedly undemocratic and ad hoc manner in which 
Laxer’s materials had been developed only enhanced their displeasure.91  Laxer’s 
supporters lashed back at the York critique.  Some thought it inappropriate that “Lessons 
of the Toronto Waffle Election Campaign” was distributed via an unauthorized mailing to 
all Wafflers.  Others focused on its negative tone, deeming it “long, heavy, and hard to 
read,” but most reacted against the charge that the Waffle leadership had “sold-out” 
socialism in favour of promoting Canadian independence.92 
 The debate over which goal should be foremost – Canadian independence or 
socialism – was hardly new to the Waffle.  Some leftists praised the Waffle’s efforts to 
develop a “reasoned critique of Canadian capitalism” after leaving the NDP.93  But John 
Smart explained “the articulation of a class analysis in the Ontario Waffle in the winter of 
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91 Ibid.  
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 409 
1973 (and after) interested a small number of young academic Marxists in the Waffle in a 
new way… seeing Marxism coming into its own in the Waffle some people have been 
misled into thinking that the Waffle was dropping independence/nationalism.”94  In 
February 1974, Robert Laxer presented a paper calling on the Waffle to develop alliances 
with non-socialist Canadian nationalist individuals and organizations, such as the 
economist and former Liberal cabinet minister Eric Kierans, or the Committee for an 
Independent Canada.95  A number of Wafflers, including those in the York study group, 
criticized and rejected this analysis.96  The debate became the last straw for James Laxer 
and others among the Waffle leadership. 
Members of the York study group intended to dominate and transform the Waffle 
by working within it.  Looking back from the vantage point of 2006, Bakan explained 
“the hope was to steer a course to the left, and reverse the pattern of declining morale and 
loss of members that had characterized the Waffle experience since its break from the 
NDP.”97  Her recollection conflicts with another document written at the time, “For 
Internal Discussion Only – from AB to the comrades in Study Group (I.S., Can., Ltd.).”  
The author, who almost certainly was Abbie Bakan, described the York group’s strategy: 
At first, before we knew how the Waffle struggle would develop, we wanted to be 
consolidated and at least 50 before we began to act and exist independently.  We 
saw the Waffle as an arena in which we could develop our politics and win 
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aimless revolutionaries to our ideas.  Then, having accomplished that, we would 
split and turn to the class.98 
 
This would be the strategy that guided the study group in the latter half of 1974 as it took 
the lead in criticizing the Waffle’s apparent electoral foible of emphasizing Canadian 
nationalism to the exclusion of socialist dogma.  By the fall of 1974 the study group, as 
‘AB’ wrote, “recognized ourselves as all that was left, saw our opposition as easily shed, 
and proceeded to go for broke.”99 
The nationalism debate lasted throughout the summer of 1974.  By September, 
James Laxer, now thoroughly exasperated, presented to the Ontario Waffle executive a 
statement designed to silence his critics and develop a program of activities for the group 
going forward.  Accusing them of “mini-left, anti-nationalist sectarianism,” Laxer labeled 
his opponents the “Americanized new left” more interested in sterile debates than “the 
compelling need to give socialist leadership to the nationalist movement.”100  Laxer’s 
defenders at times veered into an increasingly hostile anti-Americanism.  John Smart’s 
paper prepared for the October Council meeting made a point of distinguishing which 
critics (and members of the York study group) were American citizens, implying this 
characteristic alone was sufficient to discredit their complaints.101 
 The showdown occurred in October at the Waffle Council meeting in Ottawa.  
Laxer’s foes had previously circulated a position paper entitled “Towards an Alternative 
Strategy” in response to the Laxer statement recently adopted by the executive.  Virginia 
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Hunter, writing in Canadian Forum, suggested Laxer’s limited effort in organizing for 
the meeting might have indicated that he had already abandoned the movement, at least 
emotionally.102  Most local Waffle groups, including all three in Toronto, rejected the 
executive strategy in favour of the “Towards an Alternative Strategy” document.  As 
Hunter recounted, “many of us knew days, even weeks, earlier that Laxer wanted nothing 
less than complete submission on the part of his opponents or he would leave the 
movement.”103  Similarly, the Ottawa Waffle threatened to leave the movement if the 
executive report was not adopted.  And so it was.  The Waffle Council rejected the 
executive strategy, and Laxer and his supporters promptly departed the meeting and the 
movement.  A month later, they officially resigned from the Waffle executive.104  In a 
letter mailed to Wafflers the Laxer faction justified their decision: 
It was clear… that there were people in the Waffle with fundamental 
disagreements with the past policies and activities of the Waffle… in its present 
state the Waffle cannot make a useful contribution to the politics of our 
country…we do not intend to participate in a sterile debate within the Waffle.105 
 
The remaining Wafflers made plans for a December convention in Toronto, at which the 
York study group completed its takeover of the Waffle.  A few long-time Wafflers, 
including Virginia Hunter, walked out of the convention once they realized the new 
group’s commitment to socialism had little to do with the Waffle’s origins.106  The 
“Revolutionary Socialist Programme” produced by members of the York study group 
argued that “the struggle must be devoted to mobilizing the working class as part of an 
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anti-imperialist, socialist movement.”107  Only a tiny remnant, about twenty-five 
members, was left.108  Hunter’s comment that they were soon “swept away by the kind of 
love for the working class that only middle-class children can feel,” illustrated the deep 
divisions separating the York study group from the former Wafflers.109 
 The few remaining Wafflers quickly established contacts with the International 
Socialists in the United States, resolving in February 1975 that “we should put our Waffle 
past behind us and move on.”110  The Waffle, they concluded, had been too much like the 
NDP, too left nationalist and too focused on labour bureaucrats.  Initially adopting the 
name ‘Independent Socialists (Ontario)’ as “a concession to a lingering commitment to 
left nationalism,” the group soon broke even this final tie to its Waffle past by renaming 
itself the International Socialists and publishing a newspaper, Workers’ Action.111  The 
Ontario Waffle Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada was no more.  After 
Laxer visited John Richards following his resignation from the group he had helped 
found, Richards wrote “I am delighted that Laxer has finally seen the light about the 
increasingly sectarian nature of the Ontario Waffle… it was a pleasure to see him talking 
relatively rationally about the irrelevance of much of the sectarian Marxism being 
propounded by the Waffle, both in Ontario and in Saskatchewan.”112 
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 Meanwhile in Saskatchewan, John Richards’s desire to seek re-election in 
Saskatoon led to an intense debate within the provincial Waffle over the strategic and 
ideological purpose of electoral participation.  As the Saskatchewan Waffle, influenced 
by Joe Roberts, Lorne Brown and John Conway, adopted a rigid Marxist-Leninist 
analysis it questioned the strategic value of electoral participation and ultimately rejected 
Richards’s coalition-based approach to campaigning.  After splitting from the NDP and 
waging municipal campaigns in Regina, Saskatoon, and Moose Jaw in 1973, the 
Saskatchewan Waffle undertook an internal education program in early 1974 aimed at 
providing “the membership with the theoretical background necessary for a debate on 
party and electoral tactics prior to the founding convention of a new political 
formation.”113  The internal education program received a mixed response.  It was 
criticized as “too heavy,” and Caroline Brown claimed the program not only failed but 
also made some Wafflers feel like “they have no skills, a low level of consciousness” 
which led to feelings of alienation from the organization.114  Conversely, Pat Gallagher 
argued the internal education program successfully familiarized the membership with 
“basic socialist concepts necessary to adopting a Marxist analysis of class and political 
economy” preparatory to the group’s decision to form an explicitly Marxist party.115 
John Richards’s experience as an independent MLA illustrated the conflicting 
impulses of the Saskatchewan Waffle after its split from the NDP.  Uncertain about 
seeking re-election as an independent candidate in the next provincial election, he sought 
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clarification from the Saskatoon Waffle about its future directions.  The “lengthy and 
intense debate” within the group during early 1974 sent Richards contradictory messages.  
A straw poll revealed a majority in favour of his running again, a motion that the group 
reject electoral politics “at this stage in its development” passed, and another a motion 
refusing to support Richards’s candidacy was defeated.  The Saskatoon group then tabled 
a motion approving Richards’s re-election bid without using the Waffle label until the 
provincial leadership had decided whether or not he could run as a Waffler.116  Richards 
confided to a friend that although he did not expect to be re-elected he still believed 
“electoral politics can be a useful way of raising issues, and I am moderately pleased at 
what I’ve been able to do since 1971.”  Nevertheless, he also admitted “I get fits of 
depression where I think all this politics is going nowhere and I’m wasting my time.”117  
By departing the provincial NDP caucus Richards became isolated in the legislature.  He 
was unable in April 1974, for example, to find a seconder for four of his motions, 
including one calling on the provincial government to oppose the recently filed 
application for construction of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline.  Having previously 
encountered the same problem when he sought to introduce a motion on the potash 
industry, Richards’s frustration erupted into a heated exchange with Speaker Fred 
Dewhurst, who admonished the Waffle MLA for being “vulgar and rude.”118  Richards 
believed that NDP backbenchers who otherwise would have seconded his motions had 
been pressured by their caucus not to do so, a tactic he described as a “heavy-handed 
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attempt to squash the fly.”119  Ostracized by the NDP, Richards had little chance of 
finding support from the Liberal opposition which he had dismissed as “incompetent.”120  
Liberal MLAs complained about Richards’s attempt to question the government over its 
future development plans for Saskatchewan’s woodlands after an article in Next Year 
Country alleged overcutting of the province’s forests.121 
Cy Gonick, who knew firsthand the challenges of being isolated in the legislature, 
sympathized with Richards’s situation.  He wrote to Richards: 
I was sorry to see you in such rough shape.  I know what it’s like because I’ve 
been there myself.  I don’t like what I see about the Waffle.  They sound to me 
like a Marxist-Leninist sect – totally out of touch with the concerns of ‘the 
masses’ and increasingly incapable of communicating with them.  I detect a 
slavish and mechanistic application of Marxism which can only isolate them 
further – and a gross intolerance of other points of view.122 
   
Richards agreed with Gonick’s assessment of the Waffle’s increasingly “sectarian 
tendencies” in Ontario and Saskatchewan, but remained hopeful for “a return to more 
rational socialist politics.”123  He admitted to “operating increasingly independently of the 
Waffle because it is incapable of undertaking any active outgoing politics that involve 
people,” which he attributed to the Waffle’s recent ideological rigidity preventing it from 
forming coalitions with extra-parliamentary social movements.124  Richards explained: 
It is easy to dismiss the NDP’s issues as ‘social democratic reformism’, but they 
are no more reformist than most issues posed by trade union collective 
bargaining, poor people’s groups, native organizations, etc.  I would argue that it 
is only by posing ‘reforms’, working with groups to achieve them, that one can 
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credibly pose the socialist case regarding major contradictions in capitalist 
society.125 
 
Despite Richards’s qualms about the provincial Waffle’s strategy, members of the 
Saskatoon group encouraged his re-election.126  Richards, believing in the tactical value 
of election campaigns for highlighting important issues, building coalitions among 
progressives, and educating the public about socialist measures, agreed.127  At a meeting 
chaired by former CCF cabinet minister Joe Phelps and attended by more than 100 
people, Richards launched his campaign on March 29, 1974, more than a year before the 
provincial election was called.128  Launching the campaign before the Waffle  finalized 
its stance on electoral politics generally and participation in the next provincial election 
specifically sparked a reaction from the Steering Committee.  Although its members 
officially endorsed Richards’s candidacy, they sought a meeting with the Saskatoon local 
“to resolve the dilemma” and committed to measures “to ensure this type of situation 
does not arise again.”129  Even after President Don Mitchell and Associate President 
Sonja Gehl met with the Saskatoon group the question of the Waffle’s position on 
electoral politics remained undecided.  In an “open letter” to the Saskatchewan Wafflers, 
Ken Collier and Richards pleaded with them to resolve the issue immediately.  They 
urged their comrades to expand beyond purely abstract theoretical discussions and to 
debate and resolve such practical matters as the criteria to be used when choosing 
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constituencies, the degree of independence to be granted individual candidates, and 
whether they must run as exclusively Waffle candidates.  Collier and Richards warned, 
presciently as it turned out, that “without an electoral presence, we fear the socialist ideas 
of the Waffle will achieve few public outlets and the Waffle will condemn itself to being 
a study group wherein committed socialists come together to debate their respective 
positions.”130 
 At a strategy conference held at a camp on the shores of Lake Diefenbaker in 
August 1974, the Waffle attempted to formulate its plans for the next provincial election.  
A paper prepared by sixteen contributors questioned why the Waffle should participate in 
elections.  Pointing to the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende’s socialist government in 
Chile as evidence, it contended “socialism cannot be legislated in with the use of the 
ballot box.”  Even as a tactic for raising consciousness or promoting specific reforms the 
benefits of electoral participation were in doubt, as attested by the Saskatchewan 
Waffle’s failure to advance its policy agenda despite electing one of its own as an MLA 
in the governing party.  Declaring contesting elections to be nothing more than “right 
opportunism,” the sixteen insisted the Waffle could maintain a public presence without 
electing its members to public office.131  The Moose Jaw Waffle, which included John 
Conway and Don Mitchell, presented a contrasting view by arguing participation in 
elections “is consistent with but not central to the development of a broader socialist 
movement to ultimately gain state power.”   Claiming that “the debate has centered too 
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much on whether or not we run candidates and not enough on setting out a positive 
overall approach to the election,” it proposed the Saskatchewan Waffle plan a province-
wide campaign complete with public meetings, pamphleting, and a media strategy.  The 
Moose Jaw group encouraged their counterparts in Prince Albert, Regina and Saskatoon 
to join them in running candidates, subject to ratification by the Steering Committee.132  
Richards complained the debate over electoral participation indicated a “failure to 
tolerate disagreement and exaggeration of the significance of strategic decisions.”  It had 
resulted in members who were at least nominally Wafflers critically labelling one another 
as “social democrat,” “objectively reactionary,” “sectarian,” “opportunist,” and 
“vanguardist.”  Regardless, he defended his decision to seek re-election and explained the 
usefulness of electoral participation.  A precondition for conducting an election 
campaign, Richards contended,  is that it have sufficient backing from “those whose 
struggles we support” in order to be seen as a “valuable common activity” and thereby 
“rise above the level of sectarian irrelevance.”  He emphasized the need to form 
coalitions with other activists and social movements, and not to “elevate the refusal to 
compromise to a moral absolute.”  In Richards’s estimation the Waffle’s choice was 
clear: “either we opt for a miniscule Marxist vanguard organization or a more 
ideologically eclectic mass organization.”133  Unfortunately the conference failed to settle 
the debate and within a month Richards stopped attending Steering Committee meetings.  
By November 1974 John Conway had concluded that “clearly everyone rejects Richards’ 
idea of federation politics,” and one month later Richards told a friend that 
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the Waffle had by this time changed its nature and become far more dogmatic in 
its ideology and approach to politics.  It strove to define itself as a ‘revolutionary 
Marxist’ organization that spurned participation in bourgeois institutions such as 
parliamentary electioneering. From being an organization somewhat eclectically 
interested in a wide range of groups (labour, farm, women, native people) and 
issues, it decided to concentrate on the ‘working class’.  Processes of sectarianism 
have splintered the Waffle both in Ontario and Saskatchewan.134 
 
Most Saskatoon Wafflers ceased participating in the provincial group, devoting their 
energies instead to supporting Richards’s “Independent Socialist” reelection campaign.135 
 While the Waffle in Ontario and Saskatchewan wrestled with their position on 
feminism and socialism after splitting from the NDP, female party members continued to 
advocate key polices of the women’s liberation movement.  This internal pressure from 
the women’s movement along with leftists in the BC and Ontario parties indicated the 
departure of the Waffle and its offspring Left Caucus was not the death knell of left 
influence on the NDP in the mid-1970s.  The 1973 federal NDP convention had voted to 
hold a national women’s conference the following year, a Waffle proposal that delegates 
to the 1971 federal NDP convention had previously defeated.  The conference was held 
in Winnipeg in July 1974 following the federal election.  But first, a BC NDP Women’s 
Conference took place in May 1974, at which the BC NDP Women’s Rights Committee, 
energized by premier Dave Barrett’s refusal to establish a provincial ministry for 
women’s equality, passed a comprehensive analysis of socialism, women’s liberation and 
the NDP’s policy on women’s rights.136  The BC NDP Women’s Rights Committee in 
turn sent a large delegation to the national women’s conference in July, determined to 
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raise support for a female leadership candidate to succeed Davis Lewis as party leader.137  
Rosemary Brown, a keynote speaker at the Winnipeg conference, urged the NDP to 
embrace the cause of women’s liberation, stating bluntly that “true equality of women is 
the cornerstone of socialism” but male New Democrats still considered women’s 
liberationists the “nut fringe” of the party.  Brown warned that failing to support feminist 
goals would cost the NDP dearly, for “women have decided that they are no longer going 
to support any government that isn’t committed to women’s rights… But socialist women 
can’t swing their votes.  We must swing our party.”138  Prominent participants at the 
conference, which had the added legitimacy of federal NDP sponsorship, could hardly be 
associated with the party’s “fringe.”  Speakers included former MP Grace MacInnis and 
London Mayor Jane Bigelow.  Nancy Eng, a federal NDP vice-president and chair of the 
party’s Participation of Women Committee was also a leading supporter.139  One of the 
event’s organizers, the ex-Waffler Hilda Thomas, described it as a “feminist-socialist 
conference… although there are different views about feminism there is a general 
agreement that the NDP belongs in the women’s movement.”140 
While the conference attendees were by no means unanimous in their 
interpretations of feminism and socialism, they did endorse a series of radical and 
extensive recommendations.  These included affirmative action legislation guaranteeing 
women equal employment opportunites at any company or institution in receipt of public 
funds, maternity leave, a homemakers’ bill of rights modeled after the Veterans’ Bill of 
Rights, the extension of Canada Pension Plan benefits to women not employed outside 
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the home, free 24-hour government-subsidized child care, the extension of medicare to 
cover prescription drugs, more federal research into birth control and family planning 
education, and the elimination of sexism from television and radio advertising and 
programming as well as the school system.  Delegates also demanded the NDP publish a 
booklet on women’s health, and its federal caucus oppose the recent criminal conviction 
of Dr. Henry Morgentaler for performing abortions and push for the decriminalization of 
abortion.141   
In essence, the national conference endorsed the radical BC Women’s Manifesto, 
which political scientist Lisa Young described as “a blistering condemnation of the 
treatment of women in Canadian society and a thinly veiled attack on the NDP provincial 
government in British Columbia’s record on issues of importance to women.”142  David 
Lewis objected to the attacks on the BC government and the “unnecessarily strident 
language” of the BC Women’s Manifesto.143  However later that year the NDP Federal 
Council, despite approving a statement which dropped the critique of the BC government 
and replaced “oppression” of women with “discrimination” against women, committed 
the party to supporting the relatively radical policy recommendations of free child care, 
maternity leave, decriminalization of abortion, improved access to birth control, and 
changes in labour and pension laws.  Young contends that in so doing the federal NDP 
“endorsed the key elements of the feminist policy agenda.”144  The BC NDP Women’s 
Committee also convinced the conference to support a female leadership candidate for 
the federal NDP.  After both Grace MacInnis and Nancy Eng declined invitations to run, 
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the influential Victoria Socialist NDP Women’s Caucus encouraged Rosemary Brown to 
accept the challenge.145  Brown agreed, launching her campaign before any other 
candidates had declared.   
Although Barrett and his supporters had effectively absorbed the Waffle into the 
mainstream of the BC NDP by the 1972 provincial election, this did not preclude lefist 
elements within the party from criticizing his government.  Barrett’s refusal to create a 
ministry for women’s equality clearly rankled, and his tepid and brief endorsement of 
Brown’s candidacy for the federal NDP leadership exposed further the divide between 
the BC women’s movement’s most prominent spokesperson and the Premier.  Waffler 
Harold Steves and former BCFL political action director Colin Gabelmann also 
occasionally clashed with the government in the legislature, and leftist critics were vocal 
members of the BC NDP Vancouver Area Council, but none challenged Barrett’s 
leadership during his first two years in office.146   Left challengers did emerge at the BC 
NDP convention in Kamloops held over the Labour Day weekend in the aftermath of the 
disappointing federal election results.  Hans Brown, the 1972 provincial campaign 
manager and Waffle supporter, used the party’s newspaper The Democrat not only to 
announce his resignation as provincial secretary, but also to chastise the Barrett 
government for paying insufficient attention to the party and its activists leading up to the 
convention.147  When the BC NDP executive submitted a report to the convention 
condemning the government for failing to fulfill its commitments to party policy, the 
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media predicted a showdown.148  But successful organizing by Barrett supporters before 
the convention led to delegates rejecting the executive report by a vote of 368 to 202.149  
Allies of Barrett and the government repeatedly carried votes throughout the convention, 
and won every spot on the provincial executive.150  Nevertheless, delegates adopted, 
albeit over Barrett’s objections, the BC Women’s Manifesto drafted by the provincial 
NDP women’s conference in May and supported by the national NDP women’s 
conference in July.  The Women’s Rights Committee was pleasantly surprised by the 
outcome since, as ex-Waffler Sharon Yandle recalled, “we had come prepared to lose.”151  
The convention’s support led to a thaw in the icy relations between Barrett’s 
administration and the women’s movement, particularly after some activists were brought 
into the government.152  Still, as Rosemary Brown recalled, many women’s groups, 
believing the NDP viewed them with “hostility and distrust… decided to sit out the 
[1975] election and explore options other than electoral politics in the search for equality 
and justice for women” as an expression of their disenchantment with the Barrett 
government.153 
BC’s women’s groups were not alone on the left criticizing the NDP’s 
moderation.  Despite the Waffle’s ouster in 1972 and the departure of the Left Caucus the 
following year, tensions between leftists and the Ontario NDP leadership remained.  
Stephen Lewis was caught by surprise when twenty-eight delegates to the 1974 ONDP 
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convention in Sudbury, including two members of his caucus, signed a document urging 
the party to halt its “drift towards moderation” and instead move into the “vacuum on the 
left” of Canadian politics.  MP John Rodriguez and MPPs Jan Dukszta and Floyd 
Laughren made clear this call represented neither a challenge to the party leadership nor 
the Waffle reincarnated.  Laughren explained “in no way should this be construed as the 
son of Waffle,” while Dukszta declared “the Waffle is dead and buried.”154  Despite 
Dukszta’s assurance that the appeal was not “a divisive document” but “an analysis 
within the family,” Lewis responded unenthusiastically before eagerly describing a 
second statement by the two MPPs as “a complete retraction.”155  The party also passed a 
natural resources policy committed to public ownership that met with Lewis’s approval, 
and he urged riding associations to seek out female candidates to run in the upcoming 
provincial election.156  With the Waffle gone, Lewis revisited an issue from the previous 
election campaign by seeking to differentiate the Ontario NDP’s image from that of the 
labour movement by elaborating upon significant policy differences between the party 
and unions.157  Although Lewis’s effort to place some daylight between himself and 
union leaders undoubtedly appeared disingenuous to Wafflers, their absence from the 
Ontario NDP in 1974 clearly did not mean the party was free of leftist critics. 
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 In Saskatchewan, where the Waffle had rejected John Richards re-election bid and 
Wafflers in Saskatoon had decamped in order to support his independent campaign, 
ideological and strategic unity continued to elude the group.  Conflicts over the internal 
politics of the Métis Society of Saskatchewan, the contentious departure of two separate 
Trotskyist groups, the importance of nationalism, and control of the left newsmagazine 
Next Year Country absorbed much of the Saskatchewan Waffle’s attention and energy 
during 1974 and 1975.  Little interested in the provincial election campaign that resulted 
in the NDP government’s re-election, the Saskatchewan Waffle offered no support to 
John Richards, its erstwhile MLA, whose re-election bid as an independent socialist 
failed despite mustering a respectable fourth-place finish. 
 The Waffle in northern Saskatchewan included a number of community planners 
hired by the newly established Department of Northern Saskatchewan (DNS).158  Waffler 
Ken Collier recalled a ‘Wednesday night group’ that included Native and Métis Society 
activists who met regularly to discuss Waffle position papers and the failures of the DNS.  
The second issue of Next Year Country featured an article entitled “The True North: DNS 
– Re-Occupying the Colony,” which criticized the minister, Ted Bowerman, and his 
deputy, Wilf Churchman.159  Denunciations continued until another scathing critique in 
May 1974 led to the DNS firing planners sympathetic to the Waffle.160  According to Ken 
Collier, the “Wednesday night group ultimately became the organizing mechanism 
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around which the support for those people who were being dismissed got picked up.”161  
The Waffle also struggled to navigate the complicated politics of the Métis Society of 
Saskatchewan.  Métis Society leader Jim Sinclair was a persistent critic of the Blakeney 
government, and Waffle leaders attending Métis Society meetings were received with 
reactions ranging from “enthused to non-committed to perhaps some displeasure.”162  
Further confusing matters, Sinclair clashed with former Métis Society leader Howard 
Adams, an outspoken author and activist, over the latter’s claims that Sinclair was 
improperly spending Society funds.163  During the dispute, which ended with Adams’s 
ouster as a Métis Society director, he identified as a Waffler.  Don Mitchell and Sonja 
Gehl wrote to the Métis Society on behalf of the Waffle to repudiate Adams and reassure 
the Society that their group had “no role to play in the internal politics of the Métis 
Society.”164  Regardless, in September 1974 the Waffle Steering Committee reported on 
its “deteriorating relationship” with the Métis Society.165 
 Divisions within the Saskatchewan Waffle became increasingly pronounced as a 
handful of its members began identifying with the Trotskyist Revolutionary Marxist 
Group (RMG) that emerged from out of the ashes of the Left Caucus and the LSA.  They 
produced an 8,500-word manuscript embracing Trotskyism, decrying the Waffle’s 
nationalism, and declaring “the concept of socialism in one country (never mind one 
province!) is a reactionary utopian ideal which leads to the concrete abandonment of 
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proletarian internationalism.”166  Delegates at the Saskatchewan Waffle’s Annual General 
Meeting in November 1974 responded by passing a constitutional amendment specifying 
that members of the Waffle “shall belong to no other political party or sectarian group,” 
thereby making possible the expulsion of the RMG converts.167 
 The Saskatchewan Waffle continued to vacillate over its plans to hold a founding 
convention for a new Marxist political party in the spring of 1975.  On the one hand, Pat 
Gallagher, newly acclaimed as the Waffle’s co-president, argued that unresolved debates 
over the purpose and structure of the party and the role nationalism would play in it were 
detrimental to creating a new organization in such short order.168  On the other hand, John 
Conway, who advocated a Leninist ‘vanguard party’ structure without a nationalist 
emphasis, urged the Waffle to “get on with it” and hold a founding convention as soon as 
possible regardless of the lack of internal agreement.169  Ultimately the Steering 
Committee passed a motion presented by Ken Collier and Don Mitchell, the 
Saskatchewan Waffle’s other co-president, to hold a founding convention in April 1975 
ahead of achieving consensus on policy matters.170 
 In the lead-up to the convention, debate continued over the purpose and structure 
of the party.  Some leading Wafflers embraced the ideological certainty that can 
accompany Marxist sectarian politics.  Lorne Brown, during a debate with John Conway 
                                                        
166 Revolutionary Marxist Group, “The Waffle Dilemma: For Self-Sufficiency on One South Sea Island – 
or For a Red North America?” n.d., File II.12 Conferences and Conventions c. 1974-1983, SAB (Regina). 
167 Saskatchewan Waffle Annual General Meeting Minutes, November 8-10, 1974, and Waffle Steering 
Committee Meeting Minutes, November 24, 1974, File II.31 Meetings c. 1972-1983, Saskatchewan Waffle 
fonds, SAB (Regina). 
168 Pat Gallagher, “Where do we go from here?” Waffle Newsletter, January 1975, File II.35 Newsletters, c. 
1971-1979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
169 John Conway, “The Nature of the New Party,” Waffle Newsletter, January 1975, File II.35 Newsletters 
c. 1971-1979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
170 Waffle Provincial Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, January 5, 1975, File II.31 Meetings c. 1972-
1983, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina). 
  428 
over whether nationalism was a progressive or regressive position, declared “one of the 
important differences between Marxists and idealists is that the former base their political 
strategy on a concrete analysis of objective conditions rather than wishful thinking, guess 
work, dogmatic assumptions or moralism,”171  Larry Kowalchuk decried the “academic 
intimidation, personal attacks, externalized debates, lack of attendance at meetings and 
irresponsible levels of tardiness” typical of Wafflers, himself included.172  Conway 
complained that the Regina Waffle had “been locked in an increasingly incapacitating 
debate on the national question.”173 
 Debate at the April convention crystallized over two rival manifestos.  The Blue 
Manifesto, promoted by Conway, would have the Saskatchewan Waffle deemphasize 
Canadian nationalism and form a Leninist vanguard party to pursue its revolutionary 
goals.  The Yellow Manifesto, supported by Lorne Brown and Joe Roberts, emphasized 
Canadian nationalism as well as class conflict and rejected a Trotskyist strategy for the 
Waffle.174  The convention adopted the Yellow Manifesto, and Conway claimed its 
supporters had directed “vicious and slanderous charges” at the Blue caucus, 
demonstrating the increased polarization within the Waffle.  In the convention aftermath 
Brown and Roberts, while conceding the debate was “sometimes more heated than 
enlightened,” lauded the outcome as giving the Waffle a new statement of principles, a 
revised constitutional structure, and a clearer direction going forward.  Now the Waffle 
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could focus on three fronts: agitation in the labour movement, intensive investigations 
into agriculture and northern Saskatchewan, and exploring relations with socialist 
formations elsewhere in Canada, all pointing to the goal of forming a Marxist party 
nationally.175  Roberts, who replaced Conway as  editor and primary contributor to the 
Waffle Newsletter, steered the publication in a new direction.  Whereas previously the 
Newsletter had focused principally on internal Waffle debates over policy and tactics, 
under Roberts’s editorship the Newsletter added coverage of the international Marxist 
left.  In the first issue he edited, for example, Roberts and Camilo (a pseudonym) wrote 
critical reviews of articles by the Belgian Trotskyist Ernest Mandel and French 
existential-Marxist André Gorz on workers’ control.  It also included a reprinted article 
by the Canadian Communist Party that critiqued the Saskatchewan Waffle’s recent 
convention.176 
 Describing itself as a “pre-party formation,” the Saskatchewan Waffle effectively 
declined to participate in the provincial election of June 1975.177  Absent the Saskatoon 
Wafflers, most of whom supported John Richards’s re-election bid, the pre-party 
formation consisted of two small groups in Prince Albert and Moose Jaw and a larger 
group in Regina, all concerned principally with internal education and debate.  Numerous 
Wafflers expressed frustration at the group’s direction.  In January 1975, when the 
Regina Waffle did not protest the provincial government’s legislation ordering striking 
members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) back to work, 
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Conway complained “once again, events pass us by.”178  Ken Collier, in a letter 
describing his impression of the April 1975 convention, commented “there were times 
during the academic infighting that I turned my thoughts to earlier, real experiences in the 
peace movement, in unions, in the NDP, and in jobs.”179  Recalling the Wafflers’ inability 
to engage effectively in the wave of union resistance to wage controls imposed by the 
federal government and supported by the Blakeney government provincially, Don 
Kossick lamented “they got so caught up in the debates over the proper way of running a 
Leninist structure that they missed all those mobile things that were happening all around 
them.”180  In retrospect, Ron de la Hay admitted 
I think the study we did was good, for those of us who were interested in that, but 
to just let it dominate our activity and not achieve anything else was a mistake.  It 
didn’t really do much good to have all these ideologically correct people around if 
nothing comes of it.  There has to be the action as well as the theory.181 
 
 In the Waffle’s absence the Saskatchewan NDP’s re-election campaign was low-
key, emphasizing the accomplishments of the Blakeney government’s first term, the 
Premier’s competence as an administrator, and the province’s right to control its natural 
resources.  The government hoped to benefit from the recent boom in prices for wheat, 
oil and potash as well as anger over a recent court ruling favouring federal jurisdiction in 
the inter-provincial and international trade of potash.182  The party touted among its 
accomplishments the Land Bank, FarmStart loans, new community colleges, a rebate 
program on land taxes and home property improvements, dental insurance for children, 
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subsidized daycare, and the creation of a provincial Ombudsman and human rights 
commission.  During the campaign the NDP promised continued improvements to life in 
rural Saskatchewan and to diversify the provincial economy through further resource 
development.183  Its platform, New Deal ’75, promised “New Democrats will continue to 
act to see that Saskatchewan people get the greatest possible benefit from our resources… 
This may well involve new approaches to public ownership, to joint ventures between the 
government and private enterprise, and to resource royalties and taxation.”184  Liberal 
leader David Steuart took direct aim at the Land Bank, attacking it for artificially 
inflating land prices, and accused the NDP of seeking to create a system of state 
farming.185  Although Saskatchewan voters re-elected the NDP to a reduced majority 
with thirty-nine MLAs, its losses included fifteen per cent of the popular vote and eight 
rural seats since 1971.  Historian Dennis Gruending concluded the lesson for the NDP 
caucus “was that the Land Bank was unpopular.”186  The Liberals retained fifteen seats 
and suffered an eleven per cent decline in their popular vote to 31.7 per cent.  The PCs, 
under leader Richard Collver, gained seven MLAs and 27.6 per cent of the popular vote 
after being shut out of the legislature since 1967.187 
 Even without making the provincial election their priority, members of the 
Saskatchewan Waffle participated by distributing an election supplement to Next Year 
Country in Regina, Moose Jaw and Prince Albert.  Despite the Waffle rejecting his 
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approach to electoral politics, John Richards sought re-election as an “Independent 
Socialist” candidate in the new riding of Saskatoon Centre, which contained much of his 
former constituency.  His campaign committee consisted almost entirely of former 
Saskatoon Wafflers, including John Piper, Rob Dumont, Don Kerr, Jill Sargent and June 
Bantjes.188  Although former Ontario Waffle leader James Laxer spoke at a Richards 
fundraising event, no support was forthcoming from the Saskatchewan Waffle.  John 
Warnock recalled the Saskatoon group “felt really badly done by the Waffle because the 
Waffle wouldn’t support them because they considered Richards to be a social 
democrat.”189  Richards described the aims of his campaign as winning re-election and 
ensuring the “survival of the creative, dynamic left tradition in Saskatchewan politics” by 
raising public awareness of women’s rights, the plight of the poor, inadequate housing, 
high-rise developments in Saskatoon, and “colonialism in northern Saskatchewan.”190  
Richards’s election advertisements portrayed him as an independently-minded left 
opposition to the NDP.  One such advertisement explained “Like any large organization 
the NDP makes mistakes, hides things, accumulates power.  It needs all the PRODDING 
and UNSETTLING it can get.”191  Another urged “At least keep Socialism in the debate 
in Saskatchewan.”192  The NDP MLA Paul Mostoway, faced with the dissolution of his 
riding of Hanley, ran against Richards in Saskatoon Centre.  The Saskatoon Coalition for 
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Life endorsed Mostoway who supported the elimination of legal abortions in 
Saskatchewan.193  Richards, by contrast, made support for abortion and women’s rights a 
central theme in his campaign.  Mostoway narrowly won, just 359 votes ahead of the 
Liberal Doug Knott.  Richards finished fourth with over fifteen per cent of the vote, 
behind Progressive Conservative Morris Cherneskey.194   
Current and former Wafflers as well as the Métis Society supported two other 
independent candidates in the 1975 election, coordinating a fundraising event with 
Richards.195  Frank Tomkins ran in the northeastern riding of Cumberland, losing to the 
NDP’s Norman MacAuley and finishing fourth with just over ten per cent of the vote.  
Rod Bishop, who ran as a socialist candidate, lost to New Democrat Fred Thompson in 
the northwestern riding of Athabasca, finishing third with twenty-one per cent of the 
vote.196 
 The Saskatchewan Waffle assessed the election campaign and results at a 
Provincial Council meeting in June 1975.  Conceding that Richards’s campaign 
“presented a clear picture of why voting for an independent candidate may have some 
legitimacy in defending the interests of protest groups,” it attributed his lack of working-
class support to his failure to offer a class analysis or clear Marxist position.197  Lorne 
Brown maintained that the NDP lost seats because farmers, workers and Native peoples 
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were no longer united by a desire to defeat a right-wing Liberal government.  He claimed 
“there was no party presenting policies clearly in the interest of the working class” in 
1975, and criticized the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL) for its moderation.198 
Despite Joe Roberts’s enthusiasm for the labour movement’s militancy 
demonstrated by its resistance to wage controls and his encouraging of Wafflers to 
engage in the SFL campaign, internal divisions rather than organizing continued to 
preoccupy the Saskatchewan Waffle for eight months after the provincial election.199  
The Saskatoon Waffle had not existed since 1974 when most of its members supported 
Richards’s re-election campaign and shared his bitterness over being rejected by the 
Waffle leadership.  Ten members of the International Socialists (IS) briefly reconstituted 
the Saskatoon Waffle in 1975 before abandoning it later that year.  According to 
Roberts’s calculations, “now two manifestations of ideological and political error have 
purged themselves from the Waffle: the right opportunism of Richards’ electoralism and 
the left adventurism of the Saskatoon ten’s workerism.”200  Although Conway had been 
similarly critical of “Richards’ idea of federation politics,” he and the Blue caucus 
expressed dismay at the IS members’ departure.201  Conway argued that the 
Saskatchewan Waffle erred by ignoring developments in Ontario over the previous two 
years, specifically the creation of the RMG and IS, both Trotskyist organizations, and 
urged Roberts to stop “Trot-baiting.”202  A few months later, in February 1976, Conway 
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and eleven other members of the Blue caucus resigned from the Saskatchewan Waffle, 
criticizing its errant positions on nationalism and workers’ control, its “tailism,” and its 
new, more rigorous membership procedures.203   
The divisiveness that continued to beset the remnants of the Saskatchewan Waffle 
found further expression in its conflict with the editorial board of the leftist magazine, 
Next Year Country.  After the April 1975 convention, Lorne Brown and Joe Roberts had 
expressed hope that Next Year Country could be integrated “more effectively into the 
work and politics of the Waffle.”204  In late 1975, the Saskatchewan Waffle leadership in 
Regina sought to exert greater control over the newsmagazine, which had operated at 
arms-length from the Waffle since its inception three years earlier.  Although the 
magazine had been closely associated with the group, not all of its editors or editorial 
board were Waffle members.  John Deverell had served as co-editor since 1973, initially 
with Murray Dobbin and subsequently with Martha Tracey.  The editorial board along 
with Deverell and Tracey were sued in late 1975 by a developer over a story John Piper 
published in Next Year Country titled “Lots for Lots in Hub City” claiming to expose 
“private profiteering on land development with civic government assistance,” further 
undermining the editors.205  Four Wafflers, including Sheila Kuziak and Pat Gallagher, 
both of whom were members of Next Year Country’s editorial board, described “ill-
concealed antagonisms” and Waffle criticisms of the magazine’s ideologically “flaccid 
character.”  Kuziak and Gallagher were in the minority at an editorial board meeting 
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which rejected the Waffle’s recommendation that the board membership consist 
exclusively of Wafflers.206  Martha Tracey, Don Mitchell, and editorial board member 
Don Kossick described Next Year Country as a “popularly-oriented left news magazine,” 
and were adamant that non-Wafflers be allowed to sit on the editorial board.  As they 
explained, the editors were occasionally faced with the “dilemma of publishing a news 
story where no specific Waffle policy exists.”  They did “not see this as a problem.”207  
Joe Roberts countered that “the ability to struggle with the political question from a 
Marxist standpoint is the underlying reason for a desire to reform the Board.”208   
At the Saskatchewan Waffle’s Provincial Council in December 1975, the 
delegates passed a Steering Committee resolution demanding tighter control over Next 
Year Country by requiring the editorial board members be Wafflers, its editorial policy be 
consistent with the April 1975 Manifesto, and the newsmagazine led readers “to a greater 
understanding of class conflict and of imperialism in contemporary Saskatchewan and 
Canadian society.”209  The Waffle Provincial Council elected a new editorial board, and 
Pat Gallagher replaced Martha Tracey as editor.210  In an interview with Tracey, John 
Warnock noted that the magazine’s subscribers peaked at 2500 before falling to half that 
number after becoming an “arm of the Waffle.”211  Don Kossick recalled that “a group of 
us were accused of muckraking journalism… we got just flayed for that.”  Their 
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determination to include a “very strict Marxist analysis” resulted in feeling like “you had 
to finish every article with a last paragraph saying the proper Marxist response should be 
the following” which “drove immense amounts of creativity away.”212  Tracey 
remembered how publishing the magazine became “an end in itself,” and that “it was 
really hard to tolerate the debate, the political attack, on Next Year Country.”  She 
became “really bitter” over the Waffle’s decision to exercise greater control.213 
By 1976 the Saskatchewan Waffle had become a small, insular organization with 
a strict Marxist analysis, engaging primarily in struggles with other Marxist sectarian 
groups.  Joe Roberts complained that the Regina Waffle’s participation in the 1976 May 
Day protests had been “sabotaged effectively” by rivals such as the CP and CPC (M-L), 
and later instructed Wafflers preparing for the CLC’s National Day of Protest on October 
14, 1976 that they “will be expected to emphasize critiques of the state, the limits of trade 
unionism in facing the crises of capitalism, and the need for a revolutionary party.”214  
Assessing the group in December 1976, Roberts declared that after eight years “the 
Waffle is the oldest continuous radical political organization in Canada.”  He described it 
as being at the second stage of development, transforming from a radical populist 
reformism based primarily in the petit bourgeoisie, to a proletarian ideological line with a 
working-class base.  Roberts’s unfortunate choice of phrase (“let a hundred flowers 
bloom”) for an article reflected the popularity of Mao amongst the international sectarian 
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Marxist left.215  In response, Don Mitchell lamented that the Waffle had deteriorated 
“from a position of political relevance in the Province to one of inward study and 
isolation… the leading elements in the Waffle today are substantially the same as those of 
the late sixties who formed the Committee for a Socialist Movement.”216 
 Despite the Waffle’s departure from the NDP and its descent into conflict-ridden 
study groups in Ontario and Saskatchewan, a vocal and visible left-wing minority 
remained within the party in the mid-1970s.  Some of the Waffle’s New Left causes and 
policies, especially those advocated by the women’s movement, became largely accepted 
by the NDP mainstream in the aftermath of the Waffle challenge.  These developments 
influenced the leadership race precipitated by David Lewis’s resignation following the 
1974 federal election.  The federal caucus appointed Ed Broadbent as NDP interim leader 
after Tommy Douglas declined the position.  However, Broadbent, frustrated by the 
Federal Council’s rejection of his proposal to create a central treasury to fund an 
independent federal party organization, and annoyed by efforts to recruit higher-profile 
candidates such as premiers Schreyer, Blakeney and Barrett into the role, announced in 
January 1975 that he would not seek the leadership.217 
Rosemary Brown had already decided to vie for the job after the 1974 national 
NDP women’s conference committed to endorsing a female candidate.  The first Black 
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woman elected to a Canadian provincial legislature, Brown would also be the first Black 
woman candidate for the leadership of a major Canadian federal political party.  Ex-
Waffler Hilda Thomas was one of the leading members of Brown’s campaign committee, 
and headed the group of women who designed Brown’s policy platform.218  Using the 
slogan ‘Brown is Beautiful,’ Brown rallied women and leftists within the NDP to her 
cause with her advocacy of socialism and feminism.  Her candidacy’s momentum soon 
unnerved party and union leadership alike.  Brown was taken aback by the depth of 
antipathy her campaign generated among some NDPers until a subsequent conversation 
with David Lewis provided context:  “my leadership campaign attracted the support of 
party members who wanted to change the direction of the party in profound ways, party 
members who were the survivors of old internal struggles waged around the Waffle and 
other factions in the party, long before my arrival.”219 
Although two other candidates declared – John Harney and MP Lorne Nystrom – 
the popular response to Brown’s radical message drove party leaders, including Douglas, 
Lewis, Schreyer, Blakeney and Barrett, to persuade Broadbent to reconsider entering the 
race.220  Supported by ten of fifteen caucus colleagues, Broadbent was immediately the 
front-runner.  He focused on updating the NDP’s image for a new generation, explaining 
“the party’s base is no longer a person who fears the Depression and unemployment… In 
the advanced capitalist society, the NDP’s constituency is the man or woman who may be 
well off but who is still being screwed by the system – whether it be wages versus profits, 
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the high mortgage interest rates that keep him from getting a home or lack of job 
satisfaction.”221  A fifth candidate, Toronto taxi driver Douglas Campbell, was not 
considered a serious contender. 
Broadbent’s victory, although widely-expected, was not a sure thing given larger-
than-expected support for Brown at the convention and the unusually low number of 
union delegates in attendance.  Harney finished fourth with only 18.4 per cent of the vote 
on the first ballot and was dropped from the slate after the second ballot.  Broadbent and 
Brown each drew approximately one hundred of Harney’s supporters on the third ballot, 
with Nystrom picking up another seventy.  Nystrom failed to generate momentum as the 
anti-Broadbent candidate, and most of his supporters turned to Broadbent after he was 
dropped before the fourth and final ballot. 
Federal NDP Leadership Election – July 4-7, 1975 (Winnipeg) 
First Ballot   Second Ballot   Third Ballot 
Ed Broadbent  536 Ed Broadbent  586 Ed Broadbent  694 
Rosemary Brown 413 Rosemary Brown 397 Rosemary Brown 494 
Lorne Nystrom 345 Lorne Nystrom 342 Lorne Nystrom 413 
John Paul Harney 313 John Paul Harney 299 
Douglas Campbell 11 
Total   1,618 Total   1,624 Total   1,601 
 
Fourth Ballot 
Ed Broadbent  984 
Rosemary Brown 658 
Total   1,642 
 
Brown, excited by the relative success of her candidacy and the other candidates’ 
emphasis on socialist and feminist policies, did not hesitate to declare her second place 
finish “a real victory.  We’ve managed to shift the party to the left somewhat.”222   
                                                        
221 Hugh Winsor, “Making commitment produce votes first challenge facing new leader,” Globe and Mail, 
July 8, 1975. 
222 Wayne Cheveldayoff, “Broadbent elected federal NDP leader, but Mrs. Brown runs a strong second,” 
Globe and Mail, July 8, 1975. 
  441 
The left wing’s continued influence was not limited to the federal NDP.  Despite 
the earlier animosity between Stephen Lewis and the Waffle during 1971-72, Donald 
MacDonald claimed that “by the 1975 [Ontario] election, Jim Laxer was a member of an 
informal advisory group throughout Stephen’s campaign.”223  Although Desmond Morton 
asserted “every feature of the campaign, from Lewis’s issues of conserving farmland and 
improving industrial safety to the election colours – a warm shade of brown – had been 
chosen for their reassuring qualities,” moderation was hardly a factor in the Ontario 
NDP’s ascension to Official Opposition in 1975.224  Much as his father had done in the 
1972 federal election, Stephen Lewis discovered an issue that resonated – in this case, 
rent control – and flogged it relentlessly throughout the campaign.  In addition, the 
party’s efforts at organizing ethnic communities paid off with the election of four Italian 
NDP MPPs in 1975.  Also benefitting from a much improved caucus research staff, the 
Ontario NDP increased its popular vote slightly to 28.9 per cent, but doubled its 
representation in the legislature to thirty-eight members.225 
The provincial NDP in British Columbia had absorbed the challenge from the left 
wing of the party.  The Barrett NDP government introduced public auto insurance and 
rent controls, created an Agricultural Land Reserve to protect farmland from 
development, raised the minimum wage, banned the strap in schools, and banned mining 
and logging in an expanded provincial park system.  It also hiked royalties for resource 
extraction industries, introduced a Human Rights Commission, and prohibited 
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discrimination in housing and employment.226  But the party’s tenure in power was not 
without controversy and missteps, such as Barrett’s intervention in a scandalous dispute 
over egg production quotas infamously dubbed “the Chicken and Egg War.”  The 
premier’s relationship with union leaders, which had never been strong, was further 
strained when the BCFL opposed revisions to the government’s Labour Code in 1975.  
The ill will worsened when the government passed back-to-work legislation to end a 
nearly three-month strike by pulp-mill workers in October 1975.227  In the meantime, the 
Social Credit party under the new leadership of Bill Bennett positioned itself once again 
as the province’s sole defender of free enterprise against the NDP.228  The previously-
coddled mining industry was apoplectic the Barrett government imposed new royalties 
that threatened job losses as investment pulled out of the province.  An unintended 
consequence of the move endangered NDP fortunes in mining communities in the BC 
interior.229   When Barrett called a snap election in late 1975, he “requested a mandate for 
my leadership in a national fight against inflation,” and promised to extend the province’s 
freeze on prices of essential commodities unless the Trudeau government took action on 
prices as well as wages.230  The NDP campaign centered on Barrett’s populist defence of 
his government’s policies against criticisms from corporate executives and Bill 
Bennett.231  Although Social Credit was caught off guard for the election and suffered its 
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share of embarrassments during the campaign, it benefited from money, momentum, and 
the collapse of support for the Liberals and Conservatives.232  Despite drawing nearly the 
same popular vote as in 1972, the NDP lost twenty seats as Social Credit returned to 
power with a majority government.  Waffle MLA Harold Steves and Premier Dave 
Barrett each lost their seats. 
 After departing the NDP the Waffle in 1974 and 1975 shifted sharply, and 
acrimoniously, towards adopting a strict Marxist analysis that emphasized the importance 
of class divisions above all else.  The ideological shift was due to a number of factors, 
primarily Wafflers’ disillusionment with the NDP and social democracy as a means for 
bringing about radical change.  Wafflers were also influenced by changing circumstances 
and international developments in economics and politics, including renewed American 
protectionism, the energy crisis, Canadian worker militancy, and the popularity of 
varieties of Marxism (such as Maoism and Trotskyism) amongst the international New 
Left.  Certainly there was no agreement within the Waffle on which specific Marxist 
analysis to follow.  James Laxer and the Ontario Waffle leadership emphasized a 
deindustrialization thesis that linked class and nationalism.  In Saskatchewan, Joe 
Roberts, Lorne Brown and many other Wafflers embraced a Maoist-influenced Marxism.   
Numerous others in both Ontario and Saskatchewan, including the members of the RMG, 
the IS and John Conway, adopted a Trotskyist analysis.  The shift toward Marxism fatally 
hindered the Waffle’s capacity to attract non-academic, non-Marxist supporters.   
As the movement dwindled, bitter arguments over ideological divisions prevailed.  
By the end of 1975, the Waffle as a national movement was dead.  Three Waffle-NDP 
MLAs, Cy Gonick, John Richards, and Harold Steves, no longer held their seats or 
                                                        
232 Ibid., 309-314. 
  444 
identified publicly with the Waffle.  The Waffle’s offspring in the sectarian Marxist left, 
including the Saskatchewan Waffle, the RMG, and the IS, continued to debate and agitate 
for socialist politics for many years to come.  As for the NDP, by the end of 1975 it had 
largely recovered from the Waffle insurgency that challenged the party leadership from 
1969 to 1972.  Yet despite the Waffle’s absence the NDP did not turn sharply right either 
federally or provincially in the immediate aftermath.  Neither was the party’s left wing 
significantly weaker than during the Waffle period.  Indeed, leading Wafflers such as 
James Laxer once again assumed prominent roles within the party over the ensuing 
decade.  The Waffle, an often acrimonious expression of the New Left within Canada’s 
social democratic political party might be gone, but its continuing reverberations on the 
left in Canada for years to come was evidence it would not soon be forgotten. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The study of the Waffle reveals a dynamic movement marked by incongruity.  As 
a movement active almost exclusively in the early 1970s that expressed the New Left 
ideals of the “Sixties,” the history of the Waffle indicates a “Long Sixties” of political 
radicalism and activism that extended until 1975.  National in scope yet provincially 
distinct, an expression of the Canadian New Left yet challenging to New Left ideals and 
commitments, dedicated to transforming the NDP from within yet alienating party 
adherents, the Waffle not surprisingly leaves a deeply contested legacy. 
Noteworthy differences existed among the four largest provincial Waffle groups.  
Ontario, the only province where the party acted to rid itself of the Waffle, contained the 
largest provincial section of the NDP and was home to many of the Waffle’s founders 
and most prominent spokespeople.  As a result, the media tended to cast the Ontario 
Waffle as representative of the movement nationally when in fact there was generally 
little coordination among the provincial groups.  Southern Ontario’s role as the country’s 
industrial heartland meant the Waffle in that province focused their activism and analysis 
primarily on the organized working class in urban manufacturing centres.  The existence 
of pro-Waffle caucuses in two major NDP-affiliated unions – the USWA and UAW – 
along with the Ontario group’s flirtation with the CCU and criticism of international 
union leaders ultimately caused conflict between Wafflers and pro-NDP labour leaders.  
This conflict, plus the antipathy the loudly vocal and highly critical Waffle engendered 
amongst an Ontario NDP leadership frustrated over its third-party status and inability to 
overtake the Liberals in the 1971 election, ultimately led to the Waffle’s ouster from the 
party in that province.   
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The Ontario experience was not representative of the Waffle in other provinces.  
In Manitoba, the Waffle already had the support of a backbench MLA in the newly-
elected NDP government when it emerged on the political scene in late 1969.  However, 
the Manitoba NDP had won its first provincial election largely on the back of its leader 
Edward Schreyer, whose personal popularity and centrist approach to governing muted 
left opposition within the provincial party.  The Manitoba Waffle dwindled as its 
members, disillusioned with the NDP as a vehicle to achieve socialism, grew dubious 
about the possibility of establishing a new party to the left of the NDP. 
Although Wafflers were similarly disappointed with the NDP government in 
Saskatchewan they drew different conclusions than their counterparts in Manitoba.  The 
Waffle leadership in Saskatchewan was drawn primarily from an intellectual cadre of 
leftists strongly influenced by Marxism, including Joe Roberts, John Warnock, Lorne 
Brown and John Conway, who had constituted the Committee for a Socialist Movement 
that predated the Waffle.  Furthermore, the CCF/NDP’s history of electoral success in 
Saskatchewan and the Waffle’s albeit limited success in influencing the provincial NDP’s 
1971 election platform suggested the Waffle could encounter a base of support for 
socialist measures that did not exist in other provinces.  When the Saskatchewan Wafflers 
lost faith in the NDP government, they chose to establish a new party that better reflected 
their Marxist principles. 
Although British Columbia had the strongest tradition of leftism within the 
CCF/NDP, the Waffle in that province was largely absorbed into the party’s mainstream.  
Several factors account for this oddity.  No organized group of left intellectuals 
comparable to the CSM existed in BC prior to the Waffle’s formation.  Also, the BC 
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NDP reacted less defensively to the Waffle challenge than occurred elsewhere.  Dave 
Barrett’s supporters, in opposition to the labour leaders who previously dominated the 
party, allied with Wafflers to take control of the BC NDP and several Wafflers were 
incorporated into senior levels of the party leadership.  Barrett’s personal popularity 
among New Democrats, like Schreyer in Manitoba, also helped to limit the Waffle’s 
appeal in the province and assimilate the group.   
At first glace it might seem contradictory to characterize the Waffle as an 
expression of the Canadian New Left, especially since Wafflers at times intentionally 
distanced themselves from the New Left.1  Furthermore some New Left activists, such as 
James Harding, directly criticized the Waffle, and Myrna Kostach recalled that “the new 
left was decidedly unhappy” with the Waffle Manifesto’s “involvement in the polices and 
practices of a social democratic parliamentary party” and with its “appeal, in the name of 
anti-imperialism, to ‘national unity.’”2  However, by adopting a broader definition of the 
New Left which includes women’s liberationists, left-wing nationalists from Quebec and 
English-Canada, and young workers alongside the student and anti-war movements, the 
Waffle’s position is clarified.  Clearly, the Waffle brought many of the activists and ideas 
comprising a broadly-defined New Left into the NDP. 
 The Waffle struggled at times to live up to the New Left ideals contained in its 
Manifesto.  Writing in 1981, Dan Heap criticized the group’s elitism, arguing that “many 
Wafflers soon passed over grassroots organizing in ridings and locals as being too slow.  
                                                        
1 For example, Gerald Caplan’s invitation to the meeting that produced the Waffle Manifesto was 
addressed to those “who feel that we’re significantly left of the NDP but not happy to simply embrace all of 
the jargon and tactics of the New Left.” Gerald Caplan to Giles Endicott, February 6, 1969, Box 2009-
047/001, File 6 Waffle – History, 1969-1972 (1 of 2) Giles Endicott fonds, YUA. Near the end of the 
group’s existence James Laxer depicted his critics in the Ontario Waffle as the “Americanized New Left,” 
as described in Chapter Ten. 
2 Kostach, Long Way from Home, 205-6. 
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Little sustained effort was given to mobilizing the working class and its allies in action, to 
win short-term goals and prepare for larger battles.  Our main focus was on convention 
battles over policy statements and party office.”3  Neither did the Waffle’s practical 
commitment to feminism always align with its rhetoric.  Early in its existence gender 
parity in the Waffle was more honoured in the breach than in the observance.  Female 
Saskatchewan delegates to the Waffle’s national conference in August 1970 “strongly 
disapproved of the fact that two male ‘heavies’ were invited” to represent the province in 
a strategy meeting of the national steering committee without consulting the 
Saskatchewan delegation.4  Pat Smart described the conference while explaining the 
decision to establish a Waffle women’s caucus: 
My memory of it is that the men were “hogging the mics”… talking with great 
relish and at interminable length about all the issues and that the women – even 
the strongest and most articulate of us like Krista, Kelly Crichton, Jackie Larkin 
and Caroline Brown – couldn’t get a word in edgewise.  So we got together at the 
end of the morning and decided to form a caucus… insisting on gender parity in 
all Waffle bodies and a high profile for women’s issues in all Waffle events and 
publications.5 
 
But Smart also believed “there was a commitment by both men and women in the Waffle 
to putting the idea of gender equality into action in our own lives.”6 
 A sense of generational conflict also pervaded the Waffle’s struggles within the 
NDP.  The presence of young radicals with a commitment to the principles of the New 
Left but little background in the party contrasted sharply with those New Democrats and 
unionists who had devoted years of dedicated and often tedious service building the 
CCF/NDP into a viable political challenger for power in several provinces.  Consequently 
                                                        
3 Heap, “The Waffle – the recipe?” 43. 
4 Marilyn Hindmarch, Maija Crane, Lorne and Caroline Brown and Pat Gallagher, “Nat. Conference 
Analyses,” Waffle News, September 1970, File 446-18, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC. 
5 Pat Smart, “Growing into feminism in the Waffle,” Canadian Dimension, January 2010: 40‐3. 
6 Ibid. 
  449 
some New Democrats understandably questioned the New Leftists’ commitment to the 
party.  For many New Democrats, advancing the cause of the left and improving the 
party’s fortunes were virtually inseparable concepts.  This attitude, in conjunction with 
the experiencing decades of internecine struggle with Communists in the labour 
movement, produced a bunker mentality that often treated nonpartisan leftists as 
untrustworthy.  Wafflers, “mostly young, middle class and recent converts to radicalism,” 
according to Desmond Morton, “had no share in the painful struggles that kept the NDP 
and the old CCF alive and growing.”7  As Giles Endicott, an early Waffler who 
subsequently opposed the group explained, “I was a party hack.  My whole life was 
bound up in the structure of the party. I tried to persuade Laxer and Watkins that we must 
not be seen to be creating a party within a party.  They didn’t seem to realize the damage 
they could do to the organization.  But then, neither of them was a party person and they 
really didn’t care about the party.”8  Such concerns were exacerbated when generational 
differences devolved into personal attacks that supplanted ideological critiques.  Cy 
Gonick recalled that “Wafflers were also rowdy and headstrong.  They could also be 
arrogant towards others in the party, relentless and even abusive in their eagerness to nail 
down points of order and win debates.”9  Stephen Lewis accused the Waffle of having 
“nothing to do with democratic socialism and everything to do with acting out a 
pathological aggressiveness.”10   
                                                        
7 Morton, “Reconciling the extremes within the NDP,” Toronto Star, March 8, 1972. 
8 Steed, Ed Broadbent, 145-6. 
9 Gonick, A Very Red Life, 252. 
10 Lewis quotation in Steed, Ed Broadbent, 141-2.  Michele Landsberg went further, describing the 
Waffle’s motivation as “entirely Oedipal.  These were out-of-control bad boys who just wanted to screw 
Daddy and wreck the house.  However sophisticated their political analysis, this was their emotional force.” 
Quotation in Smith, Unfinished Journey, 425. 
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 The Waffle’s legacy in Canadian political history remains contested some fifty 
years after its founding in 1969.  Activists and NDP members alike continue to debate 
whether the Waffle, with its brand of left nationalism and embrace of New Left social 
movements, exerted a positive or negative influence on the NDP and the Canadian left in 
the years following its demise.  In a documentary aired on the Cable Public Affairs 
Channel (CPAC) in 2017, long-time left-wing and feminist activist Judy Rebick voiced 
the opinion of many ex-Wafflers when she argued “by driving them out they [the NDP] 
were cutting their heart out.  They cut out the vibrancy and the passion in the party by 
driving out the Waffle and I think it was a huge, huge error.”11  Stephen Lewis disagreed, 
and directly attributed the party’s subsequent political successes to its 1972 decision to 
disassociate from the Waffle: 
Judy Rebick is a friend… but palpably she’s wrong, as history has proved her 
wrong.  It was not long after we got rid of the Waffle that we formed the Official 
Opposition in Ontario for the first time in thirty or more years and I think set the 
groundwork for the eventual government in Ontario in 1990.  And all of the work 
that is done, you know, when you form a government in British Columbia and 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba and Nova Scotia, in Ontario, you’re building the 
party, and ultimately you get the right leader in the right place at the right time, 
like Jack Layton, and suddenly you catapult into the level of the Leader of the 
Opposition federally.  All of that, I think, would have been lost if we had not got 
rid of the Waffle.12 
 
This dissertation concludes by examining the contested legacy of the Waffle in six areas: 
its role in the new nationalism of the 1970s; its influence on developments in both the 
labour and women’s movements; its impact on the radical left and the New Canadian 
Political Economy tradition, and its descendants on the left of the NDP. 
                                                        
11 “The NDP: A Party at the Crossroads,” CPAC Documentary, 2017 
http://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/documentaries/episodes/90008058 
12 Ibid. 
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 The Waffle undoubtedly contributed to the surge in left-wing Canadian 
nationalism during the early 1970s.  Historian Sean Mills has observed that “today, 
debates rage about the role of the ‘nation’ in political struggles.  Many rightly point out 
the ways in which nationalism acts as a means of exclusion, both in Canada and 
elsewhere.  Yet, in the 1960s, nationalism was generally seen as a progressive force.”13  
The Waffle’s insistence that Canadian economic independence from the United States 
could not be achieved without socialism helped define Canadian nationalism as a left-
wing gospel for a generation.  As discussed in Chapter Ten, the attention the Waffle’s 
left-wing nationalism received directly influenced the formation of the moderate CIC by 
Liberal-leaning nationalists such as Walter Gordon, Peter Newman and Abraham 
Rotstein.  Furthermore, the CIC and left-nationalist pressure pushed a reluctant Pierre 
Trudeau to implement measures to protect Canada’s economic independence, including 
creating the CDC, FIRA, and Petro-Canada.  Several years later, James and Robert Laxer 
urged support for the Trudeau government’s National Energy Program.  The Laxers 
headed the Committee for the Canadianization of the Petroleum Industry (CCPI) in the 
early 1980s, which counted among its supporters one-time Waffle critic and CLC 
president Dennis McDermott alongside former nationalist rivals Mel Watkins, Charles 
Taylor, Walter Gordon, and Mel Hurtig.  One could argue that progressive nationalism 
was the dominant concept and overriding issue on the Canadian left at least until the 
decisive 1988 federal election, fought primarily over the issue of free trade with the 
United States. 
 Support for the CCPI’s economic nationalism from prominent union leaders 
reflected a significant development in the Canadian labour movement in the decades 
                                                        
13 Sean Mills, “Without surrender: an interview with Kari Levitt,” 50. 
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following the Waffle’s dissolution.  As other scholars have demonstrated, the Canadian 
labour movement underwent a “seismic shift from continentalism to nationalism” during 
the 1970s.14  Many of the measures Wafflers demanded to protect the autonomy of 
Canadian sections of international unions were eventually accepted as the labour 
movement underwent a gradual process of Canadianization and, even more significantly, 
union leaders adopted nationalist rhetoric in defense of Canadian workers. 
 Despite the Waffle’s decline, the 1974 CLC convention reflected the group’s 
continuing influence.  CUPE leaders, including Waffle supporters Grace Hartman, joined 
with those of the BCGEU, CUPW, PSAC and CBRT to prepare a reform slate of 
candidates for the CLC executive elections and produce a program emphasizing 
“Canadian autonomy, industrial democracy, social unionism, effective servicing, and the 
rationalization of jurisdictional structure.”15  Although the “reform movement that 
wasn’t” faltered, the convention still endorsed a watered-down proposal from the CLC 
executive for measures to ensure the autonomy of Canadian sections of international 
unions despite vocal opposition from the building-trades unions.16  As Gil Levine argued 
in retrospect, the “Canadianization issues raised by the Waffle and the Reform Caucus 
have had some effect” in the Canadian labour movement.17 
 Certainly the Canadian labour movement’s leadership embraced nationalism in 
the late 1970s and 1980s.  Miriam Smith contends that the federal government’s 
imposition of wage controls in 1975 in an effort to combat inflation “constituted state 
interference in ‘free’ collective bargaining” which led the CLC to a “fundamental 
                                                        
14 Aivalis, The Constant Liberal, 213; See also Miriam Smith, “The Canadian Labour Congress: From 
Continentalism to Economic Nationalism,” Studies in Political Economy 38 (1992), 35-60. 
15 Crean, Grace Hartman, 129. 
16 Robert M. Laxer, Canada’s Unions (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1976), 138-42. 
17 Levine, “The Waffle and the Labour Movement,” 189. 
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reappraisal of strategy and policy that resulted in the turn to a post-Keynesian economic 
program and, eventually, to economic nationalism itself.”18  Smith believes that the shift 
in strategy and program that began in 1976 culminated in the CLC’s 1982 economic 
program which “stressed economic nationalism, an understanding of the distorted 
character of the Canadian economy, and a preference for strong state policies.”19  Thus, 
the CLC’s opposition to the Mulroney government’s proposed Free Trade Agreement 
with the United States and its participation in the nationalist Pro-Canada Network was 
consistent with the Congress’s opposition to continental economic integration.20  The 
CLC’s embrace of nationalism thus represented a significant shift from its steadfast 
opposition to the Waffle. 
Stephen High maintains that Canadian unions achieved greater success in the 
1980s implementing worker-friendly responses to plant shutdowns, such as advance 
notice of closures and severance pay, than did their counterparts in the US, largely 
because they proclaimed a nationalist ideology and sought a political solution.21  As High 
explains, “despite tensions between the sometimes dogmatic left-nationalists in the NDP 
and internationalist-minded trade union leaders, both groups eventually came to draw on 
Robert Laxer’s concept of deindustrialization.”  He further demonstrates that union 
leaders “increasingly relied on nationalist oratory and the deindustrialization thesis to 
legitimate their demands for increased legislative protection for Canadian workers.”22   
Large Canadian sections of international unions in the years to follow also embraced 
                                                        
18 Smith, “The Canadian Labour Congress,” 37. 
19 Ibid., 50.  Smith connects “foreign investment and the distorted character of Canadian manufacturing.” 
20 Ibid., 54. 
21 Steven High, Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003), 167-191. 
22 Ibid., 178 and 169. 
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nationalist rhetoric to justify splitting from their American comrades.  In 1985, the 
Canadian section of the UAW broke away to form the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW).23  
Sam Gindin, a researcher for the CAW, in explaining the “pre-history” of the split wrote 
that the “Waffle… could be defeated, but it could not be ignored.”24  Significantly, 
former Wafflers who were subsequently active in unions and organized groups such as 
Saskatchewan Working Women pushed the labour movement to embrace Canadian 
nationalism, feminism and worker militancy. 
The Waffle served as a touchstone for the radical left in Canada in the 1970s.25  
Many former Wafflers, exasperated with the NDP’s moderation, became leading 
members of Marxist organizations that proliferated in the aftermath of the Waffle’s exit 
from the party.  Both the Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG) and the International 
Socialists (IS) stemmed directly from the Waffle, although debates within the 
international Trotskyist movement also influenced their ideological orientation.  The 
prominence of the Waffle meant that debates over its brand of left-nationalism and aim of 
transforming the NDP dominated the Canadian left in the early 1970s.  The long-standing 
Trotskyist party, the LSA, whose members had been active in the Waffle, split apart over 
those issues.  The Revolutionary Communist Tendency broke with the LSA in 1973 and 
                                                        
23 See Sam Gindin, The Canadian Auto Workers and Bob White, Hard Bargains: My Life on the Line 
(Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1987), 267-318.  Increased public sector unionization has been primarily 
responsible for the larger proportion of Canadian unions within the national labour movement.   
24 Sam Gindin, “Breaking Away: The Formation of the Canadian Auto Workers,” Studies in Political 
Economy 29 (Summer 1989), 69. 
25 In fact, the Waffle had an influence beyond the left or even the centre of Canadian politics.  The authors 
of Challenging Perspectives: Twenty-five Years of Influential Ideas claim that the neo-conservative Fraser 
Institute was formed, in part, to respond to the left-wing challenge represented by the Waffle.  Meggs and 
Mickleburgh describe MacMillan Bloedel vice-president Patrick Boyle working with J.V. Clyne to 
establish the right-wing think-tank to combat the Waffle’s perceived influence on the NDP.  Challenging 
Perceptions: Twenty-five Years of Influential Ideas: The Fraser Institute, 1974-1999, A Retrospective 
(Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1999); Meggs and Mickleburgh, The Art of the Impossible, 331-332 . 
  455 
joined with the Old Mole and Red Circle groups to form the RMG.26  After the LSA 
rejected the idea of working within the NDP and adopted a position opposing Canadian 
nationalism, Ross Dowson, who had served as the party’s executive secretary from its 
founding until 1972, left the organization in 1974 to form the Socialist League (known 
after 1978 as the Forward Group).27  The RMG published a periodical, the Old Mole, and 
ran three candidates in the 1975 provincial election in British Columbia.28  The RMG and 
its “sister organization” in Quebec, the Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire, united with the 
LSA in 1977 in establishing the Revolutionary Workers League/Ligue Ouvrière 
Révolutionnaire (RWL/LOR) and began publishing Socialist Voice and Lutte Ouvrière.  
Although some members of the RWL continued working with the NDP, the organization 
focused on activism within industrial unions.  The RWL ran a single candidate in the 
1977 Manitoba election, four candidates in the 1980 federal election, and five candidates 
in the 1984 federal election.  Otherwise it offered critical support for the NDP in English 
Canada and called for a new labour party in Quebec, where the RWL endorsed 
separatism.29 
 The International Socialists organization that emerged from the York-based study 
group within the Ontario Waffle MISC had, by early 1975, rejected any “lingering 
commitment to left nationalism,” explaining in Workers’ Action that “as the crisis of 
                                                        
26 Alexander, International Trotskyism, 154. 
27 Alexander, International Trotskyism, 151.  The Forward Group included Alice Klein, Michael Hollett 
and Wayne Roberts, who founded the alternative newspaper Now Magazine in Toronto in 1981. 
28 Sara Diamond received twenty-two votes in Burnaby North, where NDP MLA Eileen Dailly was 
reelected with 10,430 votes.  Gary Cristall and Steve Penner received thirty-one and forty-one votes, 
respectively in Vancouver East, where both NDP MLAs Alex MacDonald and Bob Williams held their 
seats with 15,918 and 15,396 votes, respectively.  The LSA candidate in West Vancouver-Howe Sound 
fared little better on election day, receiving thirty-four votes. Elections BC, An Electoral History of British 
Columbia 1871-1986, [Victoria, BC]: Elections BC, 1988. http://www.elections.bc.ca/docs/rpt/1871-
1986_ElectoralHistoryofBC.pdf 
29 Alexander, International Trotskyism, 155-6. 
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Canadian capitalism set in the bankruptcy of the Waffle’s nationalist position became 
clear.”30  In addition to emphasizing internationalist socialism, the IS rejected both the 
NDP and a “parliamentary road to socialism,” instead urging its members to “lead in the 
construction of a class struggle, rank and file opposition” within the union movement.  IS 
members were involved in the campaign to legalize abortions as part of the Ontario 
Coalition for Abortion Clinics in the 1980s, and Abbie Bakan and Dave McNally 
remained leading figures in the organization for many years thereafter.31 
 Although the clandestine nature of Trotskyist organizations makes determining 
their impact difficult, both the RWL and IS, although small in number, played a notable 
role on the Canadian left in the decades following the Waffle’s disintegration.  For 
example, Varda Burstyn, a former Waffler and member of the RMG, approached 
women’s organizations about planning the first march in English Canada celebrating 
International Women’s Day in 1978.32  Burstyn explained the event was successful 
because “a lot of the women who were part of that original organizing committee really 
wanted to have some way to act.  They didn’t want to just go to the NDP, which wasn’t 
feminist enough or socialist enough.  They wanted to have a way to show themselves and 
the world the power of socialist feminism.”33  Not all left activists remember the 
Trotskyists in a positive light.  Susan G. Cole recalls socialist feminists in the RMG and 
LSA “saw lesbianism as bad for feminist organizing” in the late 1970s.34  Nevertheless, 
Trotskyist activists were involved in the burgeoning gay rights movement of the 1970s.  
                                                        
30 Bakan and Murton, “The Origins of the International Socialists”; “What We Think,” Workers’ Action, 
April 15, 1975. Socialist History Project. http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/History/IS-Origins.htm. 
31 The IS positions on the NDP and where activists should focus their priorities have changed since the 
1970s.  As of 2018, the group continues to function, although neither McNally nor Bakan is affiliated with 
the IS. 
32 Rebick, Ten Thousand Roses, 117 
33 Ibid., 121. 
34 Ibid., 119. 
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Members of the LSA actively participated in Toronto Gay Action, the Gay Alliance 
Towards Equality (GATE) and the Coalition for Gay Rights in Ontario.  An RMG Gay 
Caucus joined the National Gay Rights Coalition, and RWL activists helped organize the 
Stop Anita Bryant Coalition in Toronto in 1978.35  Judy Rebick notes that “these far-left 
groups declined significantly as the decade progressed, with much of their female 
leadership going into the women’s movement and the union movement.”36  Historian 
Joan Sangster suggests that “quantifying the impact of new communism is difficult, since 
this remains a largely undocumented recent history… new communist organizing has 
been understudied, and I would argue underestimated, given the number of campaigns 
and issues – reproductive choice, non-traditional work, organizing in the public sector, 
and so on – in which these leftists were involved.”37  Future historians may well find this 
to be fruitful, if fractious, territory. 
Former Wafflers’ subsequent activism in the women’s movement was in keeping 
with the Waffle’s history.  Its advocacy within the NDP of major policies of the women’s 
liberation movement had been a source of significant division among the Waffle, the 
party, and labour leadership.  In addition to appealing to the NDP to support abortion on 
demand, improved access to child care, government-funded houseworkers’ allowances, 
prohibitions on gender discrimination in employment, and amendments to the nation’s 
divorce law, the Waffle also insisted, albeit unsuccessfully, that the party adopt gender 
                                                        
35 Brock, “‘Workers of the World Caress’: An Interview with Gary Kinsman on Gay and Lesbian 
Organizing in the 1970s Toronto Left.” See also Gary Kinsman and Patricia Gentile, The Canadian War on 
Queers: National Security as Sexual Regulation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 272-287, which focuses 
on RCMP surveillance of the radical left organizations. 
36 Rebick, Ten Thousand Roses, 18. 
37 Joan Sangster, “Radical Ruptures,” 11. 
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parity for its executive and council.  Varda Burstyn later criticized the NDP’s approach to 
feminists and the Waffle, arguing 
The NDP’s decision not to tolerate the Waffle in 1972 bears special mention for it 
was a fundamental and suicidal watershed for that party.  With the exclusion of its 
left-wing, the NDP leadership also excluded a whole layer of women’s 
liberationists who had laid the groundwork for the NDP program through a series 
of convention struggles in and around the Waffle.  The loss of this layer of 
women and the rejection of militant feminism that this implied (with the 
exception of BC) was a horrendous political error.  If the NDP leadership had had 
any political foresight – let alone integrity – it would have seen that feminism, 
broadly speaking, was the most important political movement of the period… as it 
was, the party missed the boat.38 
 
While acknowledging that Wafflers left the party, political scientist Jill Vickers maintains 
that many feminists who supported the Waffle’s positions on women remained in the 
NDP after 1972.39  In 1974, shortly after the Waffle departed the NDP, the party adopted 
a watered-down version of the radical BC Women’s Manifesto, thereby endorsing key 
components of the feminist policy agenda.40  Furthermore, Rosemary Brown’s 
surprisingly strong challenge for the federal party leadership in 1975 engaged feminists 
and leftists alike.  By the early 1980s, the NDP had accepted the concept of gender parity 
on the party executive and council.  In 1982, the ONDP adopted an affirmative-action 
resolution, brought forward by its Women’s Committee, mandating gender parity in the 
party’s governing bodies.41 In 1983, the federal NDP adopted a similar gender parity 
program.  Although feminists continued to struggle within the NDP, most notably in the 
1980s with several NDP provincial governments over support for abortion clinics, 
                                                        
38 Varda Burstyn, “The Age of Women’s Liberation,” Canadian Dimension (October-November 1984), 23. 
39 Vickers, “The Intellectual Origins of the Women’s Movement in Canada,” 59. 
40 Young, Feminists and Party Politics, 139. 
41 Sylvia Bashevkin, Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1985), 87. 
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feminist activists became instrumental in shaping party policies and structures and 
feminism emerged as a key component of the NDP’s agenda in the post-Waffle period. 
Beyond their influence on the NDP, the activism of feminist ex-Wafflers in 
unions contributed to the labour movement’s embrace of feminism and the development 
of a Canadian form of socialist-feminism.  In addition to organizing small independent 
feminist unions, female activists reshaped the labour movement in the 1970s and 1980s.42  
Meg Luxton has demonstrated how “union-based, working-class feminism” became a 
“key player” in the women’s and labour movements and the Canadian left at that time.43  
The Waffle’s advocacy of government-funded wages for housework reflected the 
ongoing theoretical debates amongst early Canadian women’s liberationists.44  Feminist 
scholars Adamson, Briskin and McPhail explain that “the debate on wages for housework 
was an important theoretical and strategic turning point for many socialist women” who 
realized women’s liberation could be approached from a Marxist perspective.45  In 
explaining “the emergence of different feminisms” in the 1970s, Adamson, Briskin and 
McPhail point to the development of socialist-feminist theory and practice in the early 
1970s.46  They describe Saskatoon Women’s Liberation as the “first self-conscious 
socialist-feminist organization in Canada.”47  Canadian socialist-feminism enjoyed its 
most successful period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when feminist authors made 
significant theoretical contributions and “the emerging socialist-feminist analysis 
                                                        
42 On independent feminist unions, see Julia Smith, “An ‘Entirely Different’ Kind of Union: The Service, 
Office and Retail Workers’ Union of Canada (SORWUC), 1972-1986,” Labour/Le Travail, 73 (Spring 
2014), 23-65.  Ailsa Rands, sister of Jean Rands, president of SORWUC, was an active Saskatchewan 
Waffler before leaving to organize farm workers in California. 
43 Meg Luxton, “Feminism as a Class Act,” 63-88. 
44 See page 224, footnote 81 for further discussion of the wages for housework debate. 
45 Adamson, Briskin and McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change, 69. 
46 Ibid., 67-9. 
47 Ibid., 70. 
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recognized the importance of making allies within the women’s movement and with other 
important social movements.”48  These developments led some to claim that the 
distinguishing characteristic between the women’s liberation movement in Canada and 
the United States “was and is socialism.”49  In addition to these contributions to socialist-
feminist theory, Wafflers organized Saskatchewan Working Women as a coalition 
between female unionists and community-based feminists in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The Waffle’s primary intellectual heritage was within the “New Canadian 
Political Economy” (NCPE) school of thought that thrived in the 1970s.50  Gregory Albo 
describes the NCPE as the Waffle’s “intellectual offspring.”51  Drawing on the work of 
Harold Innis, the NCPE characterized Canada as a “rich dependency” with an economy 
overly reliant on the export of “staple” natural resources to the United States and 
disadvantaged by its weak manufacturing base.  Chris Hurl and Benjamin Christensen, 
two scholars who examined the history of the NCPE school, noted “it was between the 
academy and a Left political milieu that the NCPE took shape.”52  They explained “the 
revival of political economy through this period is often associated with efforts to 
establish an ‘independent socialist’ Canada, manifested in the Waffle.”53  Specifically, 
                                                        
48 Ibid., 75.  Early Canadian socialist-feminist analyses include: Dorothy Smith, Feminism and Marxism, A 
Place to Begin, A Way to Go (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977); Charnie Guettel, Marxism and 
Feminism (Toronto: Canadian Women’s Educational Press, 1974); Roberta Hamilton, The Liberation of 
Women: A Study of Patriarchy and Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978). 
49 Roberta Hamilton and Michèle Barrett, eds., The Politics of Diversity: Feminism,  
Marxism and Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 1986).  This appears to be an overstatement.  See 
Deborah Gorham, "Feminism: Some Recent Canadian Contributions," Labour/Le Travail 22 (Fall 1988), 
267-72.  
50 Wallace Clement, “Introduction: Mel Watkins and the Foundations of the New Canadian Political 
Economy,” in Staples and Beyond: Selected Writings of Mel Watkins, ed. Hugh Grant and David Wolfe 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), xix.   
51 Albo, “Canada, Left-Nationalism and Younger Voices,” 164. 
52 Chris Hurl and Benjamin Christensen, “Building the New Canadian Political Economy,” Studies in 
Political Economy 96 (2015), 172. 
53 Ibid., 178. 
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they describe the NCPE as “linked largely to core members of the Ontario Waffle.”54  
The emergence of the NCPE in the early 1970s, shepherded by Waffle activists-turned-
academics, combined the politics of left nationalism with economic and historical 
analyses of Canada.  As Hurl and Christensen explain, “scholars drew influence from an 
earlier generation of political economy scholarship in Canada and combined it in creative 
ways with Third World theories of underdevelopment, elite theory, social history, and 
Marxist theories of the state.”55  Publishers such as New Hogtown Press, which was 
established to publish research reports by the CUS but turned to scholarly publishing in 
the mid-1970s, was joined by New Star (est. 1969), Black Rose (est. 1970), Between the 
Lines (est. 1977) and Fernwood Books (est. 1978) in spreading awareness of the NCPE.56 
Even as these energetic scholars established the NCPE as a legitimate academic area, 
many struggled to remain “politically engaged through the late 1970s with growing 
professional and family commitments.”57  In the late 1980s Mel Watkins had lamented 
the ongoing division between academics in the NCPE school and the NDP:  
                                                        
54 Ibid., 188. 
55 Ibid., 170. 
56 Ibid., 181. 
57 Ibid., 187.  Even divisions within the NCPE reflected divisions within the Waffle.  Speaking for younger 
scholars who had not been politically active in the early 1970s, Gregory Albo observed that “tensions at 
political meetings, political codes, and even individual rivalries, often date back to some Waffle episode in 
which we had no part.”  Moreover, “we have been enticed by the formative political and cultural 
experiences of the ‘Class of 68’ and the Waffle in particular, but also overwhelmingly excluded from its 
nostalgic codes, alliances and antagonisms.” Albo, “Canada, Left-Nationalism and Younger Voices,” 167.  
Emphasis in original.  In academia, former political allies sometimes became intellectual opponents.  After 
losing his re-election bid in 1975, John Richards returned to graduate school and began working with Larry 
Pratt, a professor at the University of Alberta, on a book about the economic development of Saskatchewan 
and Alberta.  Pratt explained, “we were struck by the similarities between the Blakeney NDP in 
Saskatchewan and the Lougheed Conservatives in Alberta. That was the first thing. The second was that we 
were both disenchanted nationalists.”  Pointing out that an Ontario-centric left nationalist analysis failed to 
account for developments in those two prairie provinces in the 1970s, Richards explained “with Prairie 
Capitalism, Larry and I were countering the excesses of Canadian nationalist discourse in the 1970s.”  Pratt 
described the reception of the book by former Waffle leaders: “we got called down to a meeting at York 
University. Mel Watkins was there and Jim Laxer was there and Danny Drache was there, Phil Resnick; all 
the big pooh-bahs of left nationalism. The book had just come out, about a month before, and they laid it on 
the line: it was a fundamentally flawed book, a dangerous book. We had transgressed the party line. I didn't 
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In 1976, people created their own political economy group within the Learned 
Societies.  There’s now a journal that’s been founded by this group, a very 
successful journal called Studies in Political Economy.  Almost everybody 
involved in it has been to the left of the NDP, has not been in the NDP, and has 
been more Marxist than the NDP.  So the NDP doesn’t even relate to it. But I see 
that partly as a phenomenon that is a result of the complete break between the 
intellectual community and the NDP.  And I think that is sad.”58 
 
Indeed, the dearth of left intellectuals within Canada’s social democratic party has been 
an important result of the Waffle episode. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Waffle’s tumultuous four years within the NDP, 
party loyalists were quick to equate criticism of either the NDP or the international union 
leadership with the departed Wafflers.  Terry Morley, a former ONDP executive member 
pursuing graduate studies in political science, in his review of Irving Abella’s 
Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour for the Canadian Journal of Political 
Science criticized the book as a “Waffle-inspired tract… currently fashionable academic 
nationalism which finds beauty and truth only in ultra-leftist movements.”59  Such 
antagonisms could diminish somewhat with the passage of time.  Political scientist Reg 
Whitaker explained how “David Lewis, no friend of the Waffle, years later remarked to 
me in exasperation at the party’s me-too performance over the constitutional debate in the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
know whether to laugh or cry.”  Richards did not continue to study Canadian political economy after 
Prairie Capitalism.  He explained, “I was not interested in fighting with C. B. Macpherson’s ghost.  I was 
not interested in fighting with the quasi-Marxist political economists, as represented by Mel Watkins or Jim 
Laxer. They are bright people, but I think they exaggerated the cultural differences between Canada and the 
United States.”  Quotations from Jeremy Mouat “Thinking about Prairie Capitalism: Interviews with Larry 
Pratt and John Richards,” Aurora Online, 2004, http://aurora.icaap.org/ 
58 Quotation in Smith, Unfinished Journey, 443. 
59 Terence Morley, review of Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist 
Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour 1935-1956, by Irving Abella, Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, 6, no. 4 (December 1973): 679-80.  Abella responded in a letter, claiming “I am not a member nor 
even a supporter of the Waffle, as should be readily apparent to any intelligent reader of the book. Indeed, 
if Morley had done any reading over the past year since the book appeared he would have noted that in 
their reviews and speeches, Waffle leaders were critical of the book's implications – and rightly so given 
their ideology.”  Irving Abella and Terence Morley, “Exchange,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 8, 
no. 1 (March 1975): 146-7. 
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early 1980s, ‘When the Waffle left the NDP, most of the brains left with them.’”60  
Desmond Morton, a leading opponent of the Waffle, admitted that “what the Waffle left 
behind in the NDP was a serious generation gap in the party’s intellectual wing and a 
nervous awareness of the dangers of policy discussion.”61  The idea that their departure 
cost the NDP dearly in intellectual and activist heft not surprisingly resonated with 
former Wafflers.  Mel Watkins, for one, believed the party’s efforts to dissolve the 
Waffle in Ontario “turned off a generation of activists.”62  Cy Gonick concurred, 
claiming “the NDP paid a high price when it expelled the Waffle.  It turned off a 
generation of activists and never did regain the intellectual vigour that made the NDP a 
lively venue for a time.”63  Nevertheless, many Wafflers, both prominent and grassroots, 
eventually drifted back to the NDP in subsequent years.  James Laxer joined an informal 
advisory group to the ONDP during the 1975 provincial election, and he was policy 
director for Michael Cassidy’s successful left-wing bid for the ONDP leadership in 
1978.64  Laxer also served briefly as the federal NDP research director, a stint which 
ended in controversy in 1983.65  Former Wafflers Dan Heap and Steven Langdon both 
served as NDP MPs under Ed Broadbent, and Jack Layton, who attended Waffle 
meetings while a graduate student at York University, became leader of the federal NDP 
in 2003.  Mel Watkins, who twice ran for the NDP in the 1990s, explained “I came to the 
view, particularly after [President Ronald] Reagan was elected, that it was a luxury to 
imagine that you could be to the left of the NDP.”66  John Smart, who ran for the federal 
                                                        
60 Reg Whitaker, “Introduction: The 20th Anniversary of the Waffle,” 167-171. 
61 Morton, NDP: Dream of Power, 155. 
62 Quotation in Smith, Unfinished Journey, 443. 
63 Gonick, A Very Red Life, 253. 
64 MacDonald, Happy Warrior, 159. 
65 “Last Chance for election call,” Globe and Mail, August 8, 1977; Steed, Ed Broadbent, 280-1. 
66 Quotation in Smith, Unfinished Journey, 444. 
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NDP in Ottawa Centre in 1979 and 1980 (where he was opposed by former Waffler 
Robin Mathews, leader of the short-lived National Party of Canada), explained that he 
continued working for the NDP despite the knowledge “that it is neither a socialist party 
nor a nationalist party and that it is not likely to change in either of those directions in the 
near future.”67 
 Observers doubtful of the NDP’s willingness to entertain serious internal policy 
discussions and debate often cite the Waffle era as evidence.  Wayne Roberts and George 
Ehring, two leaders of the party’s left wing in the 1980s, dubbed the NDP the “No 
Dissent Party,” maintaining “the Waffle incident was only the latest and most obvious 
proof that Democratic isn’t the NDP’s middle name.”68  The Waffle’s tumultuous period 
in the NDP has served as both inspiration and warning to left activists who have 
subsequently challenged the party leadership, including various iterations of the Left 
Caucus, the Coalition for an Activist Party in the ONDP in the 1980s, Svend Robinson’s 
leadership bid in 1995, the New Politics Initiative in 2001, and the Leap Manifesto in 
2016.69  Explaining his support for the Leap Manifesto at the 2016 NDP convention in 
                                                        
67 John Smart, “The Waffle’s Impact on the New Democratic Party,” 178. 
68 Ehring and Roberts, Giving Away a Miracle, 11. 
69 The Leap Manifesto was drafted in 2015 by a cross-section of social movement activists representing 
“Indigenous rights, social justice, food, environmental, faith-based and labour movements.”  The Leap 
Manifesto, released prior to the 2015 federal election, described Canada’s record on climate change as “a 
crime against humanity’s future” and proclaimed “there is no longer an excuse for building new 
infrastructure projects that lock us into increased extraction decades into the future,” arguing instead that “a 
rapid transition to renewable energy could be the occasion for an equally rapid redistribution of wealth and 
justice for Indigenous and other marginalized communities.”  According to prominent Leapers the 
document was not aimed specifically at the NDP and the party is not mentioned in the Manifesto.  Avi 
Lewis, in particular, has been anxious to discredit the notion that Leap represented “the NDP’s left flank 
attacking [then leader Tom] Mulcair,” claiming they “lost control of that narrative” in the media.  Indeed, 
once riding associations began advocating for the party to adopt Leap as policy, party organizers worked 
with both Mulcair’s office and the Alberta NDP, who hosted the 2016 federal NDP convention in 
Edmonton, to include a resolution which provided the party with an opportunity to debate the Leap 
Manifesto in riding associations while acknowledging it as a “high-level statement of principles that speaks 
to the aspirations, history and values of the party.”  However, the Alberta NDP, which had adopted a pro-
pipeline stance, fiercely opposed the Leap resolution, which passed amidst much confusion as to its actual 
meaning.  The peculiar emotional and ideological brew in Edmonton that weekend also resulted in 
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Edmonton, Stephen Lewis argued: 
The Leap Manifesto is a radical document; of that there’s no dispute… But that, I 
would argue, shouldn’t dispatch the Manifesto to obscurity.  I’m attracted to the 
idea that it could become a centerpiece of constituency debate over the next 
couple of years… the kind of proposition that re-energizes and re-animates, 
through the lens of a determinedly left-wing analysis, a social democratic party 
that’s searching for renewed vision… An intense exchange of views on all the 
issues raised in the Manifesto can only be healthy.  What kind of a party are we 
that would run from internal controversy when we seek a re-definition of who we 
are and where we’re headed?70 
 
Many former Wafflers could only have nodded in agreement.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Mulcair’s surprising defeat in a leadership review and subsequent energy focused on the leadership race 
instead of the promised internal debate over Leap.  Avi Lewis later explained “we never intended it to blow 
up the NDP convention.” See Jonathon Gatehouse, “Avi Lewis on the ‘ideological battle’ over the Leap 
Manifesto,” Maclean’s, April 12, 2016; Lawrence Martin, “NDP’s Leap is the Waffle reborn,” Globe and 
Mail, April 12, 2016; Jeffrey Simpson, “NDP faces another debilitating battle for its soul,” Globe and Mail, 
May 6, 2016.  See Roberta Lexier, “Challenge from Within: The NDP and Social Movements,” Party of 
Conscience: The CCF, the NDP and Social Democracy in Canada, eds. Roberta Lexier, Stephanie 
Bangarth and Jonathan Weier (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2018) for an analysis of subsequent left 
challenges within the NDP. 
70 “Stephen Lewis, for the record: ‘I am, truly, insufferably buoyant,’” Maclean’s, April 14, 2016 contains 
the full text of Lewis’s remarks made on April 9, 2016 at the NDP policy convention in Edmonton. 
71 It is worth noting that James Laxer criticized the Leap Manifesto, arguing that it failed to address 
adequately economic inequality and thus was not a “manifesto of the left.” James Laxer, “Why Leap isn’t a 
manifesto for the people,” Maclean’s, April 13, 2016. 
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Appendix A) A snapshot of the NDP in September 1969 
 
1968 federal election results by province;   most recent provincial election results; 
# of MPs and % of the popular vote # of MLAs (provincial party leader) and % 
of popular vote (election date) 
 
British Columbia: 8 MPs    12 MLAs (Thomas Berger) 
32.6%    33.9% (August 27, 1969) 
 
Alberta:   0 MPs    0 MLAs (Grant Notley) 
9.4%    15.9% (May 23, 1967) 
 
Saskatchewan:   6 MPs    24 MLAs (Woodrow Lloyd) 
      35.7%    44.35%  (October 11, 1967) 
 
Manitoba:  3 MPs    28 MLAs (Edward Schreyer) 
   25%    35.56% (June 25, 1969) 
 
Ontario:   6 MPs    20 MLAs (Donald MacDonald) 
   20.6%    25.9% (October 17, 1967) 
 
Quebec:   0 MPs    0 MLAs (Robert Cliche) 
   7.5%     - (June 5, 1966) 
 
New Brunswick:  0 MPs    0 MLAs (vacant) 
4.9%    0.1% (October 23, 1967) 
 
Nova Scotia:  0 MPs    0 MLAs (Jeremy Akerman) 
   6.7%    5.2% (May 30, 1967) 
 
Prince Edward Island: 0 MPs    - 
   3.2%    - 
 
Newfoundland:  0 MPs    0 MLAs (vacant) 
   4.4%    1.8 % (September 8, 1966) 
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Appendix B) The Waffle Manifesto (1969) 
 
 Our aim as democratic socialists is to build an independent socialist Canada.  Our 
aim as supporters of the New Democratic Party is to make it a truly socialist party. 
 The achievements of socialism awaits the building of a mass base of socialists in 
factories and offices, on farms and campuses.  The development of a socialist 
consciousness, on which can be built a socialist base, must be the first priority of the New 
Democratic Party. 
 The New Democratic Party must be seen as the parliamentary wing of a 
movement dedicated to fundamental social change.  It must be radicalized from within 
and it must be radicalized from without. 
 The most urgent issue for Canadians is the very survival of Canada.  Anxiety is 
pervasive and the goal of greater economic independence receives widespread support.  
But economic independence without socialism is a sham, and neither are meaningful 
without true participatory democracy. 
 The major threat to Canadian survival today is American control of the Canadian 
economy.  The major issue of our times is not national unity but national survival, and the 
fundamental threat is external, not internal. 
 American corporate capitalism is the dominant factor shaping Canadian society.  
In Canada American economic control operates through the formidable medium of the 
multinational corporation,  The Canadian corporate elite has opted for a junior 
partnership with these American enterprises.  Canada has been reduced to a resource base 
and consumer market within the American empire. 
 The American empire is the central reality for Canadians.  It is an empire 
characterized by militarism abroad and racism at home.  Canadian resources and 
diplomacy have been enlisted in the support of that empire.  In the barbarous war in 
Vietnam Canada has supported the United States through its membership on the 
International Control Commission and through sales of arms and strategic resources to 
the American military-industrial complex. 
 The American empire is held together through world-wide military alliances and 
by giant corporations.  Canada’s membership in the American alliance system and the 
ownership of the Canadian economy by American corporations precluded Canada’s 
playing an independent role in the world.  These bonds must be cut if corporate 
capitalism and the social priorities it creates is to be effectively challenged. 
 Canadian development is distorted by a corporate capitalist economy.  Corporate 
investment creates and fosters superfluous individual consumption at the expense of 
social needs.  Corporate decision-making concentrates investment in a few major urban 
areas which become increasingly uninhabitable while the rest of the country sinks into 
underdevelopment. 
 The criterion that the most profitable pursuits are the most important ones causes 
the neglect of activities whose value cannot be measured by the standard of profitability.  
It is not accidental that housing, education, medical care and public transportation are 
inadequately provided for by the social system. 
 The problem of regional disparities is rooted in the profit orientation of capitalism  
The social costs of stagnant areas are irrelevant to the corporations.  For Canada the 
problem is compounded by the reduction of Canada to the position of an economic 
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colony of the United States.  The foreign capitalist has even less concern for balanced 
development of the country than the Canadian capitalist with roots in a particular region. 
 An independence movement based on substituting Canadian capitalists for 
American capitalists, or on public policy to make foreign corporations behave as if they 
were Canadian corporations, cannot be our final objective.  There is not now an 
independent Canadian capitalism and any lingering pretension on the part of Canadian 
businessmen to independence lack credibility.  Without a strong national capitalist class 
behind them, Canadian governments, Liberal and Conservative, have functioned in the 
interests of international and particularly American capitalism, and have lacked the will 
to pursue even a modest strategy of economic independence. 
 Capitalism must be replaced by socialism, by national planning of investment and 
by the public ownership of the means of production in the interests of the Canadian 
people as a whole.  Canadian nationalism is a relevant force on which to build to the 
extent that it is anti-imperialist.  On the road to socialism, such aspirations for 
independence must be taken into account.  For to pursue independence seriously is to 
make visible the necessity of socialism in Canada. 
 Those who desire socialism and independence for Canada have often been baffled 
and mystified by the problem of internal divisions within Canada.  While the essential 
fact of Canadian history in the past century is the reduction of Canada to a colony of the 
United States, with a consequent increase in regional inequalities, there is no denying the 
existence of two nations within Canada, each with its own language, culture and 
aspiration.  This reality must be incorporated into the strategy of the New Democratic 
Party. 
 English Canada and Quebec can share common institutions to the extent that they 
share common purposes.  So long as Canada is governed by those who believe that 
national policy should be limited to the passive function of maintaining a peaceful an 
secure climate for foreign investors, there can be no meaningful unity between English 
and French Canadians.  So long as the federal government refuses to protect the country 
from American economic and cultural domination, English Canada is bound to appear to 
French Canadians simply as part of the United States.  An English Canada concerned 
with its own national survival would create common aspirations that would help tie the 
two nations together once more. 
 Nor can the present treatment of the constitutional issue in isolation from 
economic and social forces that transcend the two nations be anything but irrelevant.  Our 
present constitution was drafted a century ago by politicians committed to the values and 
structure of a capitalist society.  Constitutional change relevant to socialists must be 
based on the needs of the people rather than the corporation and must reflect the power of 
classes and groups excluded from effective decision-making by the present system. 
 A united Canada is of critical importance in pursuing a successful strategy against 
the reality of American imperialism  Quebec’s history and aspirations must be allowed 
full expression and implementation in the conviction that new ties will emerge from the 
common perception of “two nations, one struggle,”  Socialists in English Canada must 
ally themselves with socialists in Quebec in this common cause. 
 Central to the creation of an independent socialist Canada is the strength and 
tradition of the Canadian working class and the trade union movement.  The revitalization 
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and extension of the labour movement would involved a fundamental democratization of 
our society. 
 Corporate capitalism is characterized by the predominant power of the corporate 
elite aided and abetted by the political elite.  A central objective of Canadian socialists 
must be to further the democratization process in industry.  The Canadian trade union 
movement throughout its history was waged a democratic battle against the so-called 
rights or prerogatives of ownership and management.  It has achieved the important 
moral and legal victory of providing for working men an effective say in what their 
wages will be.  At present management’s “right” to control technological change is being 
challenged.  The New Democratic Party must provide leadership in the struggle to extend 
workingmen’s influence into every area of industrial decision-making.  Those who work 
must have effective control in the determination of working conditions, and substantial 
power in determining the nature of the product, prices, and so on.  Democracy and 
socialism require nothing less. 
 Trade unionists and New Democrats have led in extending the welfare state in 
Canada.  Much remains to be done: more and better housing, a really progressive tax 
structure, a guaranteed annual income.  But these are no longer enough.  A socialist 
society must be one in which there is democratic control of all institutions which have a 
major effect on men’s lives and where there is equal opportunity for creative non-
exploitative self-development.  It is now time to go beyond the welfare state. 
 New Democrats must begin now to insist on the redistribution of power, and not 
simply welfare, in a socialist direction.  The struggle for worker participation in industrial 
decision-making and against management “rights” is such a move toward economic and 
social democracy. 
 By strengthening the Canadian labour movement, New Democrats will further the 
pursuit of Canadian independence.  So long as Canadian economic activity is dominated 
by the corporate elite, and so long as workers’ rights are confined within their present 
limits, corporate requirements for profit will continue to take precedence over human 
needs. 
 By bringing men together primarily as buyers and sellers of each other, by 
enshrining profitability and material gain in place of humanity and spiritual growth, 
capitalism has always been inherently alienating.  Today, sheer size combined with 
modern technology further exaggerates man’s sense of insignificance and impotence.  A 
socialist transformation of society will return to man his sense of humanity, to replace his 
sense of being a commodity.  But a socialist democracy implies man’s control of his 
immediate environment as well, and in any strategy for building socialism, community 
democracy is as vital as the struggle for electoral success.  To that end, socialists must 
strive for democracy at those levels which most directly affect us all – in our 
neighbourhoods, our schools, our places of work.  Tenants’ unions, consumers’ and 
producers’ co-operatives are example of areas in which socialists must lead in efforts to 
involve people directly in the struggle to control their own destinies. 
 Socialism is a process and a programme.  The process is the raising of socialist 
consciousness, the building of a mass base of socialists, and a strategy to make visible the 
limits of liberal capitalism. 
 While the programme must evolve out of the process, its leading features seem 
clear.  Relevant instruments for bringing the Canadian economy under Canadian 
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ownership and control and for altering the priorities established by corporate capitalism 
are at hand.  They include extensive public control over investment and nationalization of 
the commanding heights of the economy, such as the key resources industries, finance 
and credit, and industries strategic to planning our economy.  Within that programme, 
workers’ participation in all institutions promises to release creative energies, promote 
decentralization, and restore human and social priorities. 
 The struggle to build a democratic socialist Canada must proceed at all levels of 
Canadian society.  The New Democratic Party is the organization suited to bringing these 
activities into a common focus.  The New Democratic Party has grown out of a 
movement for democratic socialism that has deep roots in Canadian history.  It is the core 
around which should be mobilized the social and political movement necessary for 
building an independent socialist Canada.  The New Democratic Party must rise to that 
challenge or become irrelevant.  Victory lies in joining the struggle. 
 
In Michael S. Cross, ed. The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea (Toronto: New Hogtown 
Press, 1974): 43-5. 
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Appendix C) The Marshmallow Manifesto (1969) 
 
For a United and Independent Canada 
 
New Democratic policy seeks to make and keep Canada free to realize the full 
potential and greatness of her people. 
 The live issue which concerns New Democrats, and Canadians generally, is to 
make us free to create the future of our economy and society; to redress the inequalities 
both within and between regions; to broaden and deepen the role of our people in the 
decisions which affect their lives; to redesign our cities; to improve the quality of life for 
all Canadians; to build a modern and efficient economy free of control of private 
corporate power, whether foreign or domestic; and to play a truly independent and 
meaningful role in the world. 
 The New Democratic Party is convinced that this cannot be achieved without the 
philosophy and policies of democratic socialism.  The struggle for Canada’s 
independence is one with the struggle for a better society.  It is a struggle for human 
equality and self-fulfillment.  To win this struggle, there must be Canadian control of the 
economy, public control of investment and other priorities, democratic social planning to 
use our resources for the enrichment of the human condition. 
 The urgent fact which concerns us is that our future as Canadians is now in peril.  
There are too many among us whose self-interest lies in the disintegration of our country.  
Our right of economic self-determination, the foundation of our future, is deeply 
undermined.  The control of our industry and our resources has passed to alarming degree 
into foreign hands. 
 The erosion of our national independence has reached alarming proportions.  
Effective measures to reverse the trend are necessary now before foreign control of our 
economic life reaches the point of no return. 
 The facts of foreign control in Canada are stark and threatening.  The rising rate 
of take-overs, the growth of foreign ownership in many of our major industries, the 
imposition of foreign laws on Canadian subsidiaries, and Canada’s increasing 
dependence on American markets and practices have placed unacceptable limits on our 
freedom to pursue independent policies for the welfare of the Canadian people. 
 In our present society, the future shape of our economy is determined mainly be 
the major investment decision taken by large corporations.  And for Canada this has 
meant, to an important and growing extent, decision by corporations owned and 
controlled by American interests.  The inevitable result has been a branch-plant 
manufacturing industry much less efficient that it should be, a natural resources industry 
largely serving the U.S. market, inadequate industrial research and development, 
restrictions on our foreign exchange policies, and investment decisions which take little 
account of the priorities and needs of Canadians. 
 All this has happened openly.  Those who hold power in Canada, the politicians 
and businessmen who have run this country, have presided publicly over the devastation 
of our environment, the dissolution of our national goals and the disappearance of our 
autonomy.  Their outworn economic philosophy led them to welcome Canadian 
dependence on American corporations and to offer increasing concessions in return for 
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continued good-will.  Canadian business and industrial circles found in profitable to 
follow this course. 
 While Continentalism has been the policy and practice of Liberal and 
Conservative governments, in marked contrast, Canadian independence and Canada’s 
survival as a free nation have been and are the determined goals of the New Democratic 
Party. 
 Old party spokesmen are fond of decrying concern for Canadian independence as 
anti-American.  Nothing shows more clearly how little they understand the feelings of 
Canadians.  Anti-Americanism is as barren and negative a concept as is anti-French or 
anti-English or anti any other country or people.  Canadians have always known this. 
 What New Democrats seek is to make and keep Canada free to realize her full 
potential and greatness.  We must regain control of our national future, not because of 
sentimental patriotism but because it is the only foundation on which we can build a 
better society. 
 To achieve this end, New Democrats will use all the means available in a modern 
economy: expansion of public investment and public ownership, government planning, 
investment controls, a just tax system, purposeful monetary policies freed from the 
restraints of a fixed exchange rate, and necessary laws to limit and regulate foreign 
investment and subsidiaries in Canada. 
 From its inception, the New Democratic Party has proposed a massive, publicly-
owned Development Corporation to give Canadians a strong new voice in the growth of 
their country and to provide government with an operating instrument having a large pool 
of capital for public investment in accordance with the essential social priorities.  We also 
propose a national commodity field throughout the world, so as to reduce Canada’s 
unhealthy dependence on one unregulated market.  Finally, we recognize that only our 
own efforts, through a serious commitment in carefully chosen areas of science and 
technology, will secure our industrial future. 
 Using not only one but all available means, the New Democratic Party calls on 
Canadians to free their country from foreign domination of its economy, of its cultural 
development and of its international policies.  However, we believe that the survival of 
Canada depends even more on national programmes for people – in housing, beauty and 
comfort in the cities, comfort and security on the farms, income maintenance, education, 
recreation and a host of other areas. 
 We have a noble myth in Canada of our capacity to accommodate cultural 
difference.  For too long, however, disparity of income and opportunity has been the 
price of diversity.  The result has been a persistent sectionalism, most conspicuously in 
French Canada, but apparent throughout Canada – in the Atlantic Region, in Northern 
Ontario and in the West.  The survival of Canada depends on removing regional and all 
other inequalities and building a true foundation for one united country in which the 
position and responsibilities of every region and, particularly, those of Quebec, are fully 
recognized within Confederation. 
 Millions of Canadians share our faith in Canada and our determination to 
strengthen and enrich Canada’s independence and place in the world.  We call on them to 
join with us in the great common enterprise of saving our country.  This is the challenge 
of the seventies and to this challenge the New Democratic Party rededicates itself. 
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Appendix D) The Ontario Waffle Manifesto (1970) 
 
For a Socialist Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada 
 
As democratic socialists, we seek to build a socialist Ontario in an independent socialist 
Canada.  As members of the New Democratic Party, we seek to make it the key 
instrument of that struggle. 
 
There is much to be done.  We live today in a corporate capitalist society.  Its failure are 
increasingly evident.  The combination of unemployment and inflation undermines the 
security of working people.  Labour is treated like a commodity, with giant corporations 
unilaterally closing plants and replacing workers in the name of “progress”, while the 
power of the state is used to repress unions.  Our resources are alienated into the hands of 
private capitalists, who are typically foreign, and the benefits that should accrue to local 
communities are drained abroad.  The land is despoiled, the air we breathe and the water 
we drink is polluted.  The educational system is designed to favour the privileged few 
while training the many to play social roles that have been prepared for them.  There is 
widespread discrimination against women.  The poor, the immigrant and native 
minorities are systematically excluded from our economic, political and cultural 
institutions and from affluence and power.  Toronto, as the dominant metropolis of the 
provincial economy, takes its tribute from its hinterland, and notably from resource-rich 
Northern Ontario.  The government is little more than a committee that administers on 
behalf of the corporations. 
 
Nor is that all, for Ontario is but a link in a long imperial chain.  The Ontario economy 
has been integrated into the American corporate system.  Corporate capitalism within the 
American empire funnels wealth to the large shareholders in the American metropolis.  
Toronto corporate middlemen run the branch office for New York in appropriating much 
of the profits of the Canadian economy for American owners.  The system of corporate 
empire results in investment being centred in a few favoured urban areas while the 
hinterland us exploited for resources and allowed to sink into economic stagnation and 
underdevelopment.  Economic imbalance results for much of the country including large 
parts of Ontario.  Between 1960 and 1967, Canadian subsidiaries and affiliates (about 
half of which are in Ontario) sent two billion dollars more to the United States in the 
form of profits, royalties, license and management fees, than they received from parent 
corporations in the form of capital imports.  Ontario is now the vehicle for the 
exploitation of much of the rest of Canada – we must end this domination of all 
Canadians by Ontario-based corporations. 
 
So it is that today the continuing Americanization of Ontario not only turns Ontario into a 
branch plant society; it poses the chief threat to the achievement of Canadian 
independence and Canadian socialism.  To build a vital socialist movement in Ontario 
would be to take a long step toward building an independent socialist Canada. 
 
The means to build a socialist Ontario are at hand.  The necessary powers to plan, to 
bring the economy under public ownership and control, and to develop our natural 
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resources for the public good already lie within the Province of Ontario.  The use of these 
instruments awaits the development of socialist consciousness in factories, offices, 
campuses, and neighbourhoods. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In fundamental opposition to our goals is the Ontario government’s present serving of 
corporate interests.  We must not let the continuing increase in government activity 
mislead us into thinking that we are moving, albeit gradually, toward a social order in 
which the people will get a larger say.  Rather, the needs of an advanced technological 
society are integrating the government more closely with the corporation.  What is now 
called “planning” by the government involves only the further buttressing of the system 
of private capitalism, and reinforces the holding of power by those who already wield it.  
They are satisfied to supply the support systems – hydro-electricity, highways, trained 
manpower – needed for the expansion of corporate activity. 
 
In the face of the increasing power of American multi-national corporations, the present 
Ontario government not only does nothing to resist, but instead actively promotes the 
foreign take-over.  Ontario businessmen and the old-line parties who represent their 
interests have given up any serious pretensions of an independent status for this country.  
Our human and natural resources are treated as enticements to investors, mostly 
American, to locate in Ontario.  In recent years, the Robarts Government has subsidized 
through grants and forgivable loans such giants corporations as Union Carbide, Allied 
Chemical, Kraft Foods and General Foods.  In this fashion, the taxes of ordinary people 
are used to subsidize the corporate elite and to reduce yet further domestic control of our 
economy.  Rising unemployment and a full sharing of American inflation are among the 
results of foreign ownership; (the present system is unable to cope with the most straight 
forward demand of working people). 
 
As democratic socialists, we must dedicate ourselves to fighting with all the means at our 
disposal this sell-out and give-away of Canada’s largest province.  To the present reality 
of Americanization and capitalism, we must pose the alternative of independence and 
socialism.  In order to rid ourselves of the control of our society by American 
corporations and their local allies, we must insist on nothing less than the diffusion of 
power to the vast majority of citizens not now included in decision-making.  The means 
for the repatriation of our economy and for the winning of power for the people are 
known.  They include extensive public control over investment and the nationalization of 
large corporations in the key sectors of the economy. 
 
To bring presently privately-owned corporations under public ownership would be to 
bring our economy directly under democratic control.  To create new Crown corporations 
is the most effective means to create both more jobs and more creative jobs.  All public 
enterprises must be run such a way as to give control in decision-making to workers and 
the community. 
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Socialist planning will make it possible for us both to half and reverse the 
Americanization of the economy and to combat underdevelopment in disadvantaged 
regions.  Crown corporations should be located in such areas so as to create a balanced 
variety of jobs, and to ensure that development serves the area and is not simply geared to 
quick profits for a distant head office.  Such Crown corporations must be administered by 
people in the locals areas rather than by an impersonal bureaucracy at Queen’s Park. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Our present society is characterized by gross inequality in the distribution of income and 
wealth and by a monopoly of power in the hands of the few.  Much remains to be done to 
redistribute income through an equitable system of taxation and a humane system of 
welfare.  But these are no longer enough.  Socialism means the gathering back of power 
into this country so that it can be put in the hands of ordinary men and women.  What is 
required is nothing less than the building of a truly democratic society. 
 
Across Canada we desire a new set of social and working relations in which the people 
themselves actually decide local issues in the factory, office neighbourhood and school.  
Socialist democracy means both the control of the immediate environment by those 
affected and the control of the larger provincial and national communities by the people 
as a whole.  Social movements such as those of workers, farmers, students, tenants, 
women, and minority groups are central to this social transformation.  Socialists must 
involve themselves in the organization of tenants’ unions, welfare recipients’ groups and 
producers’ and consumers’ co-operatives. 
 
The New Democratic Party must be the vitalizing centre that gives these social forces a 
common perspective, a sense of solidarity and an organization for united action.  Only in 
this way can power be taken away from the tiny elite which now monopolizes it.  Only in 
this way can capitalism be replaced by socialism. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The distorted priorities of the present system are nowhere more evident and more 
dangerous than in the destruction of the natural and human environment of this province.  
We can no longer afford to be sanguine about our “open” spaces and our “limitless” 
resources, or imagine that the world’s largest lakes and rivers can be killed by pollution, 
that immense timber stands can be mined out of existence, that rich resources can be 
turned into slag heaps and foul air.  We have seen unregulated urban sprawl eat away at 
the province’s best agricultural land.  The existence of tens of thousands of lakes has not 
guaranteed their recreational use for the public good.  The reckless exploitation of the 
natural environment of this province now imperils our future for all time to come. 
 
The impending energy resources deal between the Canadian government and the United 
States gives particular urgency to the case for new resource policies.  Such an agreement, 
negotiated by a Liberal government in Ottawa, aided and abetted by a Conservative 
government in Ontario, could result in the alienation in perpetuity of Ontarians from their 
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resources.  An immediate objective of New Democrats must be to stop any deal which 
treats Canadian resources simply as continental resources.  We must oppose such an 
extension of American imperialism by all the means at our disposal – through action at 
the provincial level as well as the federal, and by direct political action as well as in the 
legislature. 
 
In the cities, our human environment has suffered from the government’s primary 
concern with the promotion of profit and the pursuit of growth without respect to social 
costs.  Poor public transportation, inadequate housing, and the lack of parks and 
recreational facilities make it evident that human well-being is no the present aim of 
urban design.  The automobile industry in particular and its attendant jungle of 
expressways has already given us unplanned urban sprawl and now threatens the 
habitability of the inner city. 
 
Only by replacing a government controlled by profit-seekers with a government 
controlled by the people can we make the preservation of our natural environment and the 
re-fashioning of our urban environment for human habitation attainable goals. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In our present capitalist society, the people themselves are seen as a resource.  
Corporations use the state to provide them with trained manpower.  Immigrants are 
treated as a pool of cheap labour to be exploited.  Their entry into Canada is determined 
more by the state of the capitalist labour market and the manpower needs of the 
corporations than by human considerations.  Mindless talk of cultural diversity and the 
vertical mosaic obscures the reality of ghettoes and of pervasive barriers to the 
achievement of equality of condition. 
 
As the education system becomes increasingly integrated with corporate activity, people 
are taught to accept their lot as producers and consumers within the American empire.  
Our young people are taught to be competitive and individualist toward each other, and to 
be passive and obedient toward the school system, their employers and the state.  
Through their taxes, working people finance an educational system geared to maintain 
corporate interest and to educate privileged income groups. 
 
The industrial dependence on institutions of higher learning is causing both corporations 
and governments to use their influence and control to make universities and colleges 
better instruments for strengthening the capitalist system along continentalist lines.  We 
now have a branch plant system of higher education the better to service our branch plant 
economy. 
 
Canada is unique among the developed nations of the world in terms of the number of 
foreigners who teach in our universities.  Fewer than fifty per cent of professors teaching 
in the Arts and Science faculties of many Ontario universities are Canadian citizens.  The 
social sciences as developed in the United States have become instruments to extend 
American control by eroding our value systems and our national consciousness, and by 
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creating tastes and attitudes that make us passive consumers of North American 
civilization. 
 
Democratic socialists must seek a system of education in Ontario that is critical and 
Canadian and that is governed by students, teachers, and representative members of the 
community. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The overwhelming section of the population that works for a wage or salary must play 
the key role in transforming our society.  New Democrats who are trade unionists must 
continue the struggle to organize the majority of the working people who remain 
unorganized.  All New Democrats who are trade unionists must oppose the Robarts 
Government’s direct suppression of the labour movement.  While corporations combine 
to set prices and to exercise monopolistic control of markets, workers are prevented by 
state injunctions from using their organized power. 
 
Socialists must reject the concept that there are “management rights” in the industry 
which are non-negotiable.  They must be articulate and support new rights for working 
people: the right to a job, and with shorter hours and higher pay; the right to benefit from 
technological change without threat to income or security; and the right to control the 
product of their own labour through the popular democratic management of industry. 
 
The labour movement in Canada and in Ontario is presently fragmented among too many 
unions, in part because of the present nature of international unionism.  Canadian sections 
of international unions must have full autonomy, and mergers must be sought between 
unions in Canada. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Farmers like trade unionists have long struggled to control their own environment.  At 
present in Ontario farmers are losing that fight.  Farmers are not working for themselves 
so much as for the benefit of the great food monopolies, farm implement companies and 
other corporations which exploit both the farmer and the consumer.  Socialists must 
commit themselves to improving the standard of living and the quality of life of rural 
Ontario.  These objectives can be reached by ensuring that agriculture is carried on in the 
interests of the farmer and the community as a whole.  Industries related to farming such 
as food processing and farm implement manufacturing must be brought under public or 
co-operative ownership.  Agricultural marketing must be rationalized and prices 
maintained by means of produced controlled marketing boards. 
 
The movement to end the exploitation of women must be vigourously supported by 
socialists.  The oppression of women stems from the definition of a woman as wife and 
mother to the exclusion of all else.  Discrimination operates against women in the 
educational system and the work place.  Women are discouraged from seeking higher 
education and are channeled into the lowest paying and most meaningless jobs.  The 
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overwhelming majority of working women are unorganized and suffer discrimination not 
only from management but also from their fellow male workers. 
 
The New Democratic Party must provide its full support to the struggle for the liberation 
of women and must support independent women’s organizations which are fighting 
oppression. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In the face of accelerating continentalism, the growth of social movements and the 
increasing support for the goals of independence and socialism are reasons for hope.  The 
new awareness of the people regarding Americanization and the new consciousness of 
the social and human costs of capitalism must be given political expression at once if we 
are to halt the destruction of Canada 
 
We must not be deterred by those who will try to dismiss us by labeling us “anti-
American”, for those who do so profoundly misunderstand.  Our complaint is not against 
the American people and the progressive movements in that country, but against the 
American corporate, political and cultural domination of Canada.  Our colonial condition 
makes necessary an anti-imperialist struggle, if we are to achieve socialism and 
independence. 
 
Finally, in our efforts to oppose the present regime at Queen’s Park, we can afford to 
have the people misled by partial solutions that would result in neither independence nor 
socialism.  We must not settle for state capitalism or for welfare capitalism.  The New 
Democratic Party must dedicate itself to the building of a socialist Ontario in an 
independent socialist Canada. 
 
From For a Socialist Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada, personal files. 
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Appendix E) The Saskatchewan Waffle Manifesto (1970) 
 
For a Socialist Saskatchewan in an Independent Socialist Canada 
 
Introduction 
 Many of the richest pages of Canadian history have been written by the struggles 
of the people of Saskatchewan.  Whether one speaks of the struggle for political and 
economic self-determination led by Louis Riel or the continuous struggles of the farmers 
to obtain a secure life and a fair return on their crops, again and again the courage and 
progressiveness of the people of Saskatchewan is expressed in their fight in the interests 
of the majority of the people of the province – workers and farmers.  Again and again 
peoples’ movements in Saskatchewan have confronted the abuses, limitations and 
inadequacies of capitalism – an economic system based on the exploitation of the many 
by the few in the pursuit of profit and imperialism – the characteristic of capitalism in 
which the people and resources of one region or nation are exploited for the benefit of 
another region or nation. 
 In the depths of the Great Depression these same people founded the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF).  In 1933 the CCF’s first national convention adopted 
a far-reaching socialist manifesto calling for the eradication of capitalism.  Thus from 
diverse expressions of the struggle of people against capitalism emerged a united socialist 
movement. 
 Over the next decade the movement struggled in the interests of the working 
people of the province – farmers and workers.  In 1944 through political action at every 
level of the community, the CCF movement swept to an overwhelming electoral victory.  
The movement had become a profound part of the social fabric of the Saskatchewan 
community. 
 But over the years the sense of being a movement was lost.  The ‘prosperity’ and 
political conservatism of the fifties forced the CCF to retreat from an aggressive and 
courageous espousal of socialism to a more conservative reformist posture.  This process 
culminated in the formation of the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961 which 
decisively set the movement on the traditional course of a parliamentary party. 
 Times have changed.  The political mood of the people has changed.  The 
‘prosperity’ of the fifties and early sixties has been exposed for the hoax it was.  Poverty, 
unemployment and depression once more confront us.  New threats face our people – 
pollution, the distant but immediate threat of nuclear annihilation, permanent and hidden 
poverty, urban sprawl, repression, etc.  Today people are moving forward toward more 
active and intense politics = the politics of survival. 
 Today we face new problems for which we must find new socialist solutions.  The 
chief source of the problems remains the same capitalism.  In the thirties capitalism as a 
system collapsed.  Only a global war could restore it and only a continuing Cold War 
could prop it up.  Today we face monopoly and corporate capitalism in which the old 
failings are magnified and intensified.  Rampant individualism and private profiteering, 
price fixing, the intervention of the state on behalf of the corporations and the elimination 
of competitors are common features in our irrational economy.  The goals of the system 
remain the same – pursuit of profit for the few at the expense of the many.  And today, in 
Canada and in Saskatchewan, we face American imperialism in which the resources and 
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skills of our people are not only exploited for the profit of the Canadian corporate elite 
but also for their American senior partners.  Thus the priorities of our economy are 
doubly distorted. 
 In Canada this will come to mean that we will be more and more a colony of the 
American economy serving the needs of that economy as a resource base and consumer 
market. 
 In Saskatchewan, as the economic depression depends, this will come to mean 
that our province will be further depopulated, the rural economy further eroded, and our 
land taken over by American or Canadian corporate capitalist farms, further extending 
the monopoly control of the food chains.  Many of us will be reduced to the status of 
seasonal employees on the land we once owned and cultivated.  The cash income of the 
farmers, on which so much of our city and town population depends, will leave the 
province as corporate profits, throwing our cities and towns into deeper depression.  
Many more of us will be driven to the urban centres to make do as best we can. 
 It is a question of the survival of Canada as a nation.  It is a question of the 
survival of Saskatchewan as a decent human community. 
 Mere reforms of capitalism are not enough.  We must build a socialist 
Saskatchewan in an independent socialist Canada.  Nothing less will do. 
 We of the New Democratic Party must accept this challenge and must rekindle 
and cherish the socialist heritage of the CCF and strive to apply it to the conditions we 
face today.  The NDP must become a socialist movement.  It must again realize that the 
building of such a movement is built primarily among the people – on farms, in factories, 
offices, trade unions, universities and in the streets.  We must come to realize that within 
a hostile capitalist society only supreme effort and diligent work will allow the socialist 
heritage we have had passed on to us, to be nurtured, and to become victorious. 
 Supporters of the Waffle Caucus seek the preservation and successful extension 
of this socialist heritage in Saskatchewan and Canada.  Aware that adequate socialist 
solutions will not be found in one province but nationally, we commit ourselves to the 
support of the national movement for and independent socialist Canada. 
 All supporters of this document are members of the NDP.  We are committed to 
the NDP; to work within it and so to convince it to select the road of a grassroots socialist 
movement over the futile course of a traditional parliamentary party.  We will publicly, 
openly, and democratically organize and debate our positions among our party’s 
members and supporters.  We are convinced that this free and open debate will be a 
turning point for the movement. 
 
Toward a program of socialist planning 
 
A socialist NDP will introduce comprehensive social and economic planning.  A 
planning agency will be created with authority to develop, with the cooperation of 
constituency-level, popularly selected groups, development plans for the several regions 
of Saskatchewan.  Comprehensive planning must provide for all sources of government 
revenue including receipts from crown corporations and other income earning public 
functions, license and other fees, income from investments and various taxes and 
royalties.  It will be a primary objective of a socialist NDP to reduce reliance for revenues 
on income and property tax and to maximize reliance on proceeds from publicly 
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controlled enterprise.  As more experience is gained the party must be prepared to extend 
its direction over added sources of investment now considered private. 
 Planning for development will cover all present public services such as education, 
health, welfare, power, roads, and communication.  But it will also be extended to include 
a broad definition of development, including but not restricted to urban development, 
jobs, ecological conservation and housing. 
 Within this broad context, we would make the following more specific proposals 
regarding the Saskatchewan economy and the development of social services and more 
tangible democracy. 
 
A) The Regional Economy 
 
 “Regional disparity” is not an historical accident.  The underdevelopment of the 
prairie economy is a consequence of capitalist planning.  The purpose of the national 
policy from 1850 to 1930 was to establish a population base in the West and to build a 
network of commercial trading centers, railways and ports necessary for: (1) extraction of 
primary resources and food staples; and (2) the protected marketing of British 
manufactured goods.  Eastern Canada acts as a funnel for wealth from the prairies which 
now ends up the hands of American capitalists. 
 Regional development must be part of a new national policy based on socialist 
planning. 
 Saskatchewan is a rich producer of food, and has abundant reserves in petroleum, 
potash and other mineral resources.  Our total economy depends on our ability to 
generate and retain wealth in these key areas. 
 We propose an integrated program of development in the seventies which seeks to 
retain in Saskatchewan the productive wealth of our key industries thereby expanding 
supporting services and secondary industry.  Expansion in health care, education, 
recreation, electrical and telephone services only become possible when agriculture can 
be made profitable for the producers and when profits from primary sources are 
distributed within the region. 
 Capitalist planning produces the opposite results.  Foreign based monopolies take 
the profits from agriculture, oil, and potash but contribute little to services and secondary 
industry.  Even public capital goes to support private industries (such as the Prince Albert 
Pulp Mill) while hospitals and schools are closed down and workers in the public sector 
take relative wage cuts.  Fewer teachers teach larger classes at lower real wages; 
qualitative improvement in education becomes impossible.  Small businessmen and 
professionals within the province are forced out of business while international chain 
stores expand their profit margins.  As production in all sectors reaches an all time high, 
urban unemployment increases, the rural area is depopulated, people of every age and 
description are forced to leave the province. 
 A socialist NDP would adopt the following general approach to regional 
development: 
1) All sectors of the economy will be integrated into a planned program. 
2) Productive wealth will be retained within the region necessitating ownership 
in key areas of food production and resource industries 
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3) Industrial planning and production must be democratically controlled by those 
working within and or affected by the industry with ultimate authority in the 
broader community. 
4) Community control will be build into all services and social institutions such 
as education, health care facilities, recreation, crown corporations etc. 
 
More concretely still, we propose the following program for a socialist NDP in the 
seventies. 
 
I) Agriculture 
 Our central objectives in agricultural planning are: (1) to preserve and expand the 
rural community; (2) to maintain the farm family as the basic social unity in a larger 
community structure; and, (3) to establish democratic control by the farmers and workers 
in the agricultural community over all facets of food production. 
 In order to meet these objectives, a socialist NDP will propose the following 
program for agriculture for Saskatchewan and Canada: 
i) Guaranteed farm income – Farm income will be separated from produce 
and livestock prices.  Farmers will bargain collectively for income with 
government on an industry-wide basis.  Income levels will be based on 
need and the productive potential of land.  Farm commodities will become 
a public responsibility from the time they are produced with market and 
pricing policies designed to cover costs of farm income payments, costs of 
services to the community, and the purchasing of farm land by the crown. 
ii) Halt corporate farming – Legislate against corporate invasion into farming 
and expropriate land which is foreign or corporate owned. 
iii) Support for co-operatives and young farmers – Enact legislation on land 
tenure which places maximum limits on single holdings.  Begin a program 
of crown land assembly by: (1) providing the crown with the initial option 
to purchase retiring land at assessed value; and, (2) purchasing land from 
farmers who wish to release their capital fixed in land.  Such land will be 
put to preferential use by licensing to young farmers or farmers desiring 
co-operative or collective operations.  Such land would remain under title 
of the crown and would be rent free.  Such a policy will sustain the rural 
population at present levels and encourage repopulation by eliminating the 
huge capital outlay in land required presently. 
iv) Rationalize the food industry – A socialist NDP is committed to public 
ownership because capitalism has been exploiting producers and 
consumers alike.  In no area is this systematic exploitation more 
pronounced than in the corporate food industry.  The food industry 
therefore will be taken into public ownership and rationalized so that food 
processing and marketing (where possible) takes place in the region of 
production.  Phony advertising and phony competition in retail operations 
will be eliminated, and the artificial profits between producer and 
consumer destroyed. 
 
II) Resource Development Policy 
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 A program for resource development must reverse the trend of exploitation for 
private profit and redirect proceeds to social needs and the furthering of human and 
ecological values.  Within provincial authority the possibility for achieving this objective 
is severely limited.  Any program of extractive industries must be based upon and judged 
against its social and ecological consequences.  Considerations of economic benefit or 
loss, threats to long-term conservation, pollution, degree of community control, and the 
interests of the local people must be weighed.  No provincial government has yet 
assessed these factors in determining its policies.  A socialist NDP will make this 
assessment of the potash, oil and pulp and paper industries and in assessing future 
development proposals.  A socialist NDP will ensure that our vast northern riches are 
developed for the benefit of the people and not for foreign or domestic private profit.  As 
a general principle, we must seek to develop resources through public ownership so that 
we have a just return of wealth, real control over industry policies, and can encourage and 
develop industrial democracy. 
 
B) Building Peoples’ Power 
 
 In order to build socialism, we must erect practical economic and social structures 
that put power in the hands of the people in an ongoing fashion.  If we do not do this, we 
will merely substitute the authoritarian top-down state bureaucracy for the authoritarian 
top-down corporation.  In order to achieve a socialist democracy, a socialist NDP will 
adopt the following perspectives and policies. 
 
I) Labour policy 
 Throughout its history, the labouring classes of this region have suffered 
exploitation in the extreme at the hands of foreign based capital.  Wage slavery and poor 
working conditions in the mines, mills and railways of Western Canada caused labour to 
organize and take militant action.  Today in the midst of yet another depression, poor 
conditions and punishing attitudes prevail.  Anti-labour legislation has been enacted 
which denies working people their basic rights – the right to organize without fear, the 
right to bargain, and the right to strike in support of their demands.  A socialist NDP 
government will be a partisan government in support of the worker and farmer majority 
in their efforts to achieve basic rights. 
 A socialist NDP committed to true industrial democracy will not only recognize 
these rights, but will acknowledge and support new rights for the working man: (1) the 
right to benefit from technological change in industry without threat to income or 
security; (2) the right to control the product of his own labour through the democratic 
management of industry; and (3) the right to employment with shorter hours and higher 
pay as surpluses in productive labour emerge. 
 A socialist NDP will protect and support the working man.  Immediately this 
means: 
i) The repeal of restrictive amendments to the Trade Union Act and new 
legislation guaranteeing freedom to organize without employer 
interference; 
ii) The repeal of Bill 2; an extension of the right to strike during the life of 
the contract when new circumstances arise which are not settled by 
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negotiation; and legislation enabling workers to bargain over traditional 
“management rights;” 
iii) Legislation requiring notice by employers of changes in plant operations 
which threaten jobs.  The implementation and effects of all such changes 
should be subject to negotiation including the right to re-training and/or 
transfer or severance pay; 
iv) An increase of the minimum wage to $2 per hour regardless of age, sex, or 
geographical location of work place. 
 
II) The liberation of women 
 The oppression of women is essential to the continued smooth functioning of 
capitalism.  This oppression focuses on the definition of a woman as wife and mother to 
the exclusion of all else. 
  The most graphic demonstration of oppression is the denial to women of control 
of their own bodies through knowledge of, and access to, birth control techniques and 
free abortions. 
 Work performed in the home by a woman is not regarded as socially useful labour 
by society and, consequently, is viewed as secondary and supportive to work performed 
in the market place where one works for wages. 
 The education system actively contributes to discrimination against women.  
Working class women are discouraged from seeking higher education, and women who 
enter university are channeled into traditional women’s occupations. 
 Working women find themselves performing two jobs – as housewives and as 
cogs in the labour force.  As workers women are discriminated against by management 
and fellow workers.  They are paid the lowest wages for the dirtiest, most degrading jobs.  
In vast majority non-unionized, they exist as a pool of unskilled labour to be brought into 
the work force, or rejected, at the whim of the employers.  At the same time, they remain 
an alternative source of labour to the male labour force, keeping all wages down. 
 The NDP shares with the union movement a complicity in active discrimination 
against women in their own ranks.  This must cease.  If we are to work together as equals 
– men and women – and socialists we must reform the party structures to eliminate 
discrimination.  Yet, the struggle against the oppression of women must be carried by the 
women themselves organizing around their problems and demands. 
 A socialist NDP committed seriously to the liberation of women will: build 
structural equality within the party itself; support independent women’s organizations to 
fight their oppression; enact laws to provide free birth control and abortion; provide free 
government supported child care; eliminate sexual discrimination in hiring, job 
classifications and job training; guarantee equal pay for equal work; eliminate sexual 
stereotyping in the educational system; and recognize the productive labour done in the 
home with a living wage paid from the public purse. 
 
III) Social services 
 Welfare in the capitalist society is nothing more than a program of expediency 
designed to ease the pain of the suffering of people and the conscience of the exploiters.  
It degrades human beings, and, therefore can have no place in a socialist society.  Social 
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services must become instruments of liberation increasing the freedom, independence, 
and integrity of the people concerned. 
 First, good health in a socialist society is a basic right of all.  In no way can it be 
treated as service administered on the ability to pay.  A socialist NDP will expand the 
medicare system to include all forms of related health services.  It will implement a social 
medicare program for preventive medicine and the development of community clinics. 
 Second, a socialist NDP believes that all members of society have a right to 
adequate, decent housing.  Furthermore, they have a right to live in a community which 
has been planned and organized to serve their needs rather than the profits of land 
speculators, builders, and real estate parasites. 
 Third, a socialist NDP will ensure that basic income payments to the poor, the 
unemployed, the aged and the physically handicapped will be integrated into community 
development and action programs controlled and administered by the people themselves.  
Social services must not mean bureaucratic invasion and control. 
 
IV) The Indian and the Métis 
 Racism in Canada has created a colony within a colony.  The native people of this 
continent have had to face two levels of exploitation.  One, at the hands of a distant 
imperial power; and one, at the hands of an immediate white society which seized the 
wealth of their lands and threatened the defeated victims with cultural annihilation.  
Capitalism and racism combined have ensure that these people are the first victims to 
suffer chronic unemployment, underemployment, and inhuman living conditions. 
 A socialist NDP government in Saskatchewan must help the native people of this 
land achieve self-determination and self-preservation.  The policy of assimilation as 
advanced from Ottawa threatens to complete the process of cultural and economic 
genocide.  To meet this threat, Indian and Métis people must be granted the right to a 
viable economic existence which will provide the real opportunity to preserve their 
independent culture and history. 
 A socialist NDP government will bargain without prior conditions with the native 
community to reach a just settlement.  The rights and privileges extended in treaties made 
with Indian nations will be unconditionally guaranteed at modern economic standards.  
The dismantling of the expensive and rigid Indian Affairs Department is a necessary step 
towards autonomy for Canada’s Indians.  Real changes for Indians will only come 
through their control over their own lives and resources.  This is the essence of a 
democratic socialist society – the development of individual and group identities within 
the framework of broad regional and national purposes.  The survival of the native 
peoples of Canada demands a socialist society, and a socialist movement in 
Saskatchewan requires the involvement and leadership of the native people. 
 
V) Education policy 
 Education in a capitalist society, by using public resources to provide advantaged 
education for children of middle and upper-income families, perpetuates the existing 
class system.  By stifling the development of social criticism it both destroys the 
creativity of students and assures passive obedience to capitalist rule.  Its values are the 
values of capitalism: competition, obedience, passivity and individualism. 
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 Educated workers are essential to modern capitalism, yet education produces no 
direct profits to corporations.  Hence, educational spending remains a reluctant priority 
and in times of economic crisis suffers particularly.  At such times, quality education, 
even in traditional terms, is curtailed. 
 The Saskatchewan educational system is stifled by central control  Bureaucratic 
regimentation is the most formidable barrier to creative learning.  Students, teachers and 
the community at large must directly become involved in educational decision making.  
Schools must become resource centers for the entire community.  Province-wide 
curriculum planning must be balanced with more local control over teaching methods, 
curriculum, and school administration. 
 Far from conducting dispassionate research in the interests of “pure science,” our 
universities serve as handmaidens to monopoly corporations.  Their research serves the 
corporate interests, and thousands of their graduates are forced to leave the province in 
search of employment.  Yet working people, not corporations, finance in greater 
proportion the cost of higher education.  The university must serve the interests of the 
working people. 
 Specifically, a socialist NDP will seek to organize and implement the following 
program: 
i) Reduction of size of the central authority of the Department of Education 
providing more power and finances to local community controlled bodies. 
ii) Elimination of tuition fees and provision of stipends for all students 
beyond the age of family dependence; such provisions to be automatically 
implemented for all post secondary students. 
iii) Enabling democratic control at all levels of education by: (1) eliminating 
the business controlled Board of Governors of the university and replacing 
it with a body representative of working people to work in consultation 
with students and faculty in all areas of decision-making; (2) granting 
autonomy to the university at Regina and any future campuses or junior 
colleges; (3) establishing a student-centered teaching approach in primary 
school to facilitate the development of democratic, humanistic, and 
autonomous personalities; (4) entrench the right of students and faculty to 
organize and to be politically active without fear of reprisal. 
iv) Compensating working people, Indian and Métis, the poor, and women for 
the failure of the university in the past to respond to their interests by: (1) 
providing privileged admissions’ policies for children of poor and 
particularly Indian and Métis families; (2) providing stipends and free day 
care for student mothers; (3) providing complete public access to all 
university records pertinent to the university’s research activities and to all 
negotiations between the government and the university; and within the 
university, as related to fiscal matters; (4) providing research facilities and 
personnel on a priority basis to working people and their organizations, 
and all oppressed minorities. 
 
Conclusion 
 The issues our people and our party face are issues of survival.  They call for a 
fundamental socialist transformation of our society.  They, therefore, call for a 
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fundamental re-orientation of the NDP.  We must again make our party a socialist 
movement – a peoples’ instrument in their struggle against capitalism, racism, 
chauvinism and imperialism. 
 We are aware that the layers of crises which we must confront cannot fully be 
dealt with by the socialist movement of one province.  But we do believe that we can 
again light the spark and lead the way in Saskatchewan.  By building our movement here, 
we build the national movement.  By succeeding here, we give hope and inspiration to 
our brothers and sisters across the country. 
 The seventies is a decade of decision for Saskatchewan and Canada.  We can 
choose socialism and self-determination; or we can choose the fate of a colony of the 
American Empire.  We must choose socialism. 
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